

MAN OR
LEVIATHAN
?

by the same author

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MAN OR LEVIATHAN ?

*A Twentieth Century
Enquiry into War
and Peace*

by
EDWARD MOUSLEY

Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben
(Only law can give us freedom)

GOETHE



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To
FRANK MOUSLEY
*scientist, poet and
reformer*

PREFACE

WHILE the problem of war remains unsolved, and indeed largely misunderstood, future human progress can never be more than problematical or man's existing achievement out of jeopardy.

The problem will not solve itself. The eyes that see in rhythmic tracings of event upon history evidence of a vast plan, immanent on earth, of immutable, unfolding purpose that in time will reveal all necessary solutions in fulfilment, are never those of the successful administrator of human affairs. There are, however, available certain phenomena that can be observed by the attentive eye in a careful survey of political experience, and it will be found that they point the way to an underlying issue.

The advance towards peace begins, firstly, with the recognition that war, which is power in contest with power, is inescapably the alternative of law; and, secondly, with the discovery that the reign of law is indispensably single. The essential process of peace is therefore the bringing of diverse political units within the reign of law. In this enquiry it is found that, conceived in reference to its true end, statehood can be manifested in any number of co-existing political units—varying in the degree of their limitation by the limitation of each one's particular sphere—provided all are within one and the same hierarchy of authoritative power. In short, with this view of sovereignty—what may be called the theory of the relativity of sovereignty—established, it follows that the reign of war can shrink and finally come to an end only as the evolution of the political society proceeds to its consummation through the subordination, not disappearance, of the present political unit.

What to-day is preventing the next stage of that evolution by holding up the process of peace at the frontier of the present political unit is nothing else but the supreme power of the state—among Leviathans called Leviathan. The

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contest, immediate and inevitable, is thus between man and Leviathan, the issue superficially one of Government but fundamentally spiritual. When that issue is apparent the advance to peace will be seen to involve planned control of mankind's career on earth, and therefore planned leadership of a new order.

This book, the work of some years, carries forward the results of labours in an enquiry, interrupted by the War, and which, in all its incompleteness, was accepted by Cambridge University as an original contribution to knowledge. While, in writing it, I have kept faith with men like Westlake, Kenny, and John Salmond—friends long passed on who urged me forward—I have attempted something more than a jurisprudential excursion across detached, familiar fields. The survey, consistently taken from the standpoint of the view established at the outset that war is inevitably the alternative of law, has been allowed to shed increasing light upon the spiritual issue which receives due attention in the constructive section with which the study concludes.

Their object being illustrative and not informative, the facts, selected from cross-sections of international affairs, are in no sense encyclopaedic. Thus I have not thought it necessary to re-illustrate the characteristics of Leviathan by cataloguing his latest exploits, still less to hazard a guess about others impending. Before our eyes world events now unrolling with quickening speed will, I believe, increasingly illuminate the truths I have tried to reveal.

THE AUTHOR

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BOOK I

THE CONTEST

INTRODUCTORY

IN darkening and expanding chaos persisting human forces have once more undermined and erupted what were intended to become permanent, worldwide foundations for lasting international trust and peace. These were foundations resolutely laid by men purified in motive after a gigantic conflict which, at its end, the war generation of victor and vanquished alike had come to see as the supreme folly of history. Less than two decades have passed, yet already the dark sadness of its aftermath is deepened by the sinister shadows of oncoming events that threaten to engulf civilization in total eclipse. It is as though descending night has not only darkened the judgment of the rebuilders but blinded them to certain pitfalls and obstacles that have all along been known to beset the path of those that plan peace. Men of war, successful after stupendous sacrifice commended by them in order to end war, failed tragically as men of peace because, in the haste to re-erect the fallen structures, they overlooked certain cardinal facts that have throughout proved themselves to be eternal and decisive in the human story.

Of determining factors indisputably operative in man's history, one, human nature, has always been paramount and, being likely to endure for an immeasurable time, it will also have to be reckoned with in the future. Now it is just this same fundamental nature of man, one of the most unchanging things on earth, that not only sentimental and idealistic experimentalists but even practical and responsible statesmen have ignored in their zeal to run up some sort of shelter for peace.

That human nature has a fair, as well as a seamy side, few will deny, or that it has been shaped by circumstance and tempered by the force of competition. Moreover, that it will bow only to force may be rejected by some as a mere theory,

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while illustrated by others as a fact. But at least it is plain truth that, from its earliest tribal beginnings, human order—that is to say, human society—regardless of race, place, or time, has been found possible only if there is a supreme power over men which they are compelled to obey. Observe that, for the moment, we leave aside all question as to what particular direction that supreme power may follow or ought to follow, the first truth being that, except by such supreme power, there can be no directing whatever of a political society because, without supreme power, no political society at all will be possible. Self-subjugation of the individual by his unaided and private effort, a sort of personal voluntary disarmament, in other words his uncoerced compliance with the general will of the community ascertained or ascertainable, has never yet proved a feasible substitute for the empowered authority of organized society. And, this being so in the province of the national state, there is no reason to suppose it would prove otherwise in the international sphere.

This is but to restate the truth enclosed by one of the hardest facts in history which was stated three centuries ago by the great Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, in his book *Leviathan*, as that there can be no peace without subjection. The accuracy of that particular view of Hobbes—and we are not here concerned with any other view of that writer—has been amply confirmed by the course of history and, indeed, of civilization ever since he lived.

Human nature did not end in 1914. Will it continue to operate in the future? Can it suddenly come to an end? As a life student of the subject, I am convinced that this interpretation of Hobbes' view applies so truly to the overwhelming majority of mankind as to justify being accepted as a scientific law of universal and permanent validity. Look where one will into any cross-section of international affairs and there will be confirmed, plainly engraved by events, the truth that the science of government begins with the knowledge that, whether governed rightly or wrongly, mankind can be governed at all in a political society only by supreme power.

In other words, the Hobbesian axiom is that supreme

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power is essential to the reign of order through law. Now if this is incontrovertible, then the endeavours of many earnest seekers of peace in England, and elsewhere, are misdirected, bound to fail sooner or later, and therefore perilously delaying. This is what has happened. In the reactionary post-War period, we have been actually involved by theories running counter to this scientific truth at the risk of catastrophic loss of all we have and all we hold in trust. It may be contended that, even although human nature does not change, it can nevertheless pass under the control of a growing and directing human character superior in its standards and, possibly, one day international in its outlook. Even so it would be wise to reflect that the formative process could hardly promise instantaneous metamorphosis throughout the world. It would, in any event, be a process of progressive evolution and, of course, a process developing more slowly in one part of the earth than in another.

Again, if it is true that nowhere on earth to the same extent as in the British Commonwealth of Nations is there freedom for the expansion and development of the human spirit, then this, of itself, should have been sufficient factor to make the British people pause before, in any large-scale decision like disarmament, we committed ourselves to the views of experimentalists, as, for instance, that human nature underwent some radical alteration as the result of the Great War's lesson in suffering; or again, that human nature is neither the main cause of war nor an important factor of war. War can be evaded, asserts one experimentalist, by limitation of armament, another by disarmament, another by piecemeal economic or geographic concessions, another by a timely social credit scheme, another by pacifism, or non-violence, another by the theological conversion of humanity, another by an infra-national police force, another by a policy of isolation, another by echoing catchwords like "Collective Security," or, in latest vogue, "appeasement."

Now the policy of ending strife by "removing the cause of strife" has never been found a reliable way of escape from anarchy to peace because rarely, if ever, will two people wholeheartedly agree about the diagnosis of human trouble

or about the nature of the remedy, still less about the provision for supplying the remedy; not infrequently the grievance is invented, exaggerated and exploited; and, not least, despite the pacifists, the world has discovered that it now takes only one to make war. On the contrary, the province of the reign of law—which alone can end the reign of war—is not to remove any cause of strife whatever as defined by the stronger party to the dispute, or as defined by either party, but to decide by the authority of the supreme power of the state whose decision may offend both parties.

Now, as we shall find, the problem of war arises, to a considerable degree, from an abuse and misapplication of this supreme power, here named Leviathan. This power behind the law, however, is none the less indispensable to control human nature which, not only in its worst moments demanding riot and war, but even in its better moments demanding justice and freedom, must be directed as well as disciplined from the moment man enters human society.

Our proper preoccupation in this enquiry is not only with the question of the diagnosis of the disease war, but also with that of its sustained suppression and the possibility of its ultimate cure. Numerous writers appear satisfied merely to assert what they believe is the cause of some wars—or some likely war—and they usually select one cause apiece. The real problem of war, which lies much further ahead, is how to remove the cause not of any particular war but of war itself. In short, they fail to distinguish between a war and war by which is meant the reign of war. Now the cause of war we shall find in the course of our enquiry to be the absence of the basis of the reign of law which is the alternative to the reign of war, whether the subjects of the reign of law are men or peoples—in either case, that is to say, calculating without human nature. Some people, no doubt, would point to life in Soviet Russia as demonstrating that, as a factor, human nature, at any rate sometimes, can be successfully ignored or overridden, just as the individual can be ignored or overridden if need be. On the contrary, it is precisely in that form of state absolutism illustrated in Russia, Germany, and Italy

to-day, that human nature, so far from being ignored, is most exploited.

At the outset, therefore, we may assume that human nature which governs the monopoly of method—for there is but one—of suppressing anarchy (or war), is a continuing factor. As there can be no peace without subjection, so there can be no subjection except by supreme power. What, for these purposes, is power we shall consider in the chapter on armament.

It follows that just as individual man cannot remain wholly free if he is to belong to any human society of men organized for peaceful order but must give up liberty beyond the point where the supreme power of that society decides that his liberty conflicts with the liberty of others, so must each nation limit its liberty—for instance, in political experimenting, in its ideology, and, indeed, even in its form of government—to what the supreme, communal, supra-national power finds tolerable; that is, to what that Power decides, as one day it will have to decide, is not incompatible with equivalent liberty for other nations.

On a little thought, what is involved here will be found to be nothing less than the purpose of the human political society (or the state)—a matter of first importance for, in its turn, the purpose of the state intrinsically and inevitably involves the purpose and supreme end of the life itself of man on earth. But the most urgent aspect of man's choice of an ideology for his political society is his need to foresee that his difficulty eventually must turn upon Leviathan—the empowered authority of the state as it exists at present—and that this latter problem comes first for, without a Leviathan, reformed or unreformed, there can be no political society at all. *Prima facie*, then, man's problem appears to be how to control, while submitting to, Leviathan who, throughout this enquiry, will be taken to mean the supreme power of the contemporary, national state when abusing its trust of power for law to the end, war—Leviathan with whom man is already engaged in a contest for mastery.

Now this contest is quite other than the primitive struggle between man and man before, and out of which, the supreme

power and, with it, the political society emerged. It is a contest that happens long afterwards—the prospect, in fact, which to-day faces even the most civilized communities. This appears beyond doubt when it is asked how it has come about that, although man has accepted subjection, still he has not found peace. As we have seen, peace instead of anarchy was the purpose for which man submitted, yet he finds himself in the midst of an anarchy made infinitely more dreadful than ever by the scientific products of civilization. So long as that state of things remains, the supreme power of government cannot be said to have fulfilled the purpose for which it was erected. This is partly because no Government as yet has any very clear idea for what purpose that supreme power was given and what its true purpose involves. While traditional political practices and the precedents of centuries may, in part, explain the situation, the principal reason is the wilful betrayal of man by the supreme power, Leviathan who, having no power himself but, whether an individual or a group, being only the repository of power, usurps it and becomes power incarnate and traitorously purposeful.

What is at issue in the contest, then, is the purpose for which the supreme power is given. More than any other, the totalitarian state exhibits Leviathan defiantly usurping his trust and, through “power-policy,” misapplying for the purpose of war that supreme power of a community which was left in trust only for the purpose of law. And that purpose, as we have already seen, is to suppress anarchy.

It is therefore erroneous to suppose that a period of international anarchy is approaching—it has been here all along. The process of history has never ceased to rotate round the axiom that the alternative to perpetual warring involves, firstly, some curtailment of the individual’s unbridled liberty, and, secondly, his pooling of power. That partial surrender of the individual, for the sake of the peace of the many, having taken place within the tribe, the further surrender must take place between the warring units, whether tribal, provincial, or continental. Internationally, therefore, as well as nationally, the supreme power must continue to be

ascertained. That the process has not been allowed to proceed further than the boundary of the national state is chiefly due to Leviathan purposeful for war. But the *impasse* is only in less degree due to the short-sightedness of the world's leaders, even in the democracies, in not conceding what sooner or later must inevitably pass.

It is obvious that if, supposing with right good will, the Governments, say, in Europe were each to decide how far its national ideology in regard to international justice could be pushed without disrupting the harmony of the family of nations, the resulting conclusions, except by a miracle, would never be so homogeneous as to be generally acceptable. Common leading principles, therefore, would have to be settled and likewise imposed by supreme power, just as happens among individuals in any national state. Thus even if, under the most favourable auspices, say, of some cultured democracy, human nature could be largely discounted, the limitation of man's knowledge, as of his opportunity, would render a lawgiver indispensable. So technical, so scientific, so interwoven with other matters that on first sight appear quite alien, so world-wide, and yet so germane and urgent are the issues that call for a decision from moment to moment in the life of any modern, national Government, no reasonable individual in that regard could require to be consulted on them all. Indeed, it is only on the plainest issue like that in connection with the abdication of King Edward VIII that the ordinary citizen can ever have any clear idea of what the issue is.

Thus, in one sense, even if he were free to do so, man is farther from being able to govern himself than ever. But, on the other hand, he can elect to be governed under the reign of law, and even, at least in democracies, have a voice in electing what sort of law it shall be. By this choice he has lost nothing but gained much. If man's brain-power could be increased a hundredfold there would, to-day, still arise urgent questions beyond his knowledge or capacity of knowing, but affecting his welfare—questions to any one of which, however, the next man might know the answer. Even if it could be given to man to see incomparably deeper into life than he does, let

alone, as some critics a little greedily stipulate, to "see it whole," it is probable that while there would be some things that many men would mind less and other things that they would mind more than they do now, no two men would be brought to see more alike than they do now. And in this respect, nations are not more than men but considerably less. But if both disputants cannot resolve their discord, still less can one. Where, on any question or dispute, the point of compromise is to be fairly set, similarly two or more nations cannot decide. But unless that point is set somewhere else-how, war will continue to be the only decider. The point of decision, there, can be set only by the authority of the reign of law enforced through power supreme above nations as, elsewhere, similar power is authoritative over men.

* * * *

The feature of Hobbes' view most commonly selected for emphasis by jurists as well as by laymen has nearly always been his alleged predilection for the element of force. As I have already said, it would be more correct to interpret Hobbes' vital contribution, explicit and implicit, as chiefly this, that the individual in society cannot voluntarily restrain himself within a self-measured and self-imposed limit to his liberty with satisfaction to the community. There are, however, more reasons for this than one. Besides the fact that each one would have a different limit owing to the waywardness of human nature, men do not see alike or equally far. The task, therefore, must be performed by supreme authority.

Again, Hobbes emphasized the "nasty and brutish" element in human nature but also—and not without significance usually overlooked—that man's life is short, implying that he who consents to-day is gone to-morrow. It is true not only that a "social contract," whether Hobbes', Rousseau's, or any other, cannot be entered into, even in history, afresh every day, but that inescapably the consequences of the individual's act affect others including his successors. The formation of opinion into formulated doctrine, with its trial and subsequent rejection or modification, is part of a continuing process of change and flow that can never be clearly

reflected in any government from moment to moment. One has only to inspect the shelves of the chambers of any legislative draftsman to appreciate how often urgent measures of great importance become unavoidably the playthings of chance matters like publicity or electoral considerations, and frequently depend, for their passing into law, on good luck in the agenda.

There is, it cannot be denied, a margin of imperfection in the law which but reflects the imperfectibility of human life itself. Carried forward to the next day's account it is only by a fiction that it can be said to represent the will and decree of the supreme power that must daily move onward in a relative world—a fact that reminds us that even justice is only relatively just. Similarly, when at last the reign of supra-national law arrives, as one day it surely will, it, too, will contain imperfections which hypocritical human nature in one quarter or another from time to time can safely be expected to demonstrate. But these imperfections and shortcomings will have to be remedied, when they sufficiently accumulate, by process of legislation and not by the single act of this or that faction. No section of a community, any more than any individual, can indefinitely remain a law unto itself, not even if that section is a nation. Without any formal contract, social or otherwise, nevertheless, established by the existing pattern of events, a society of nations exists as a fact already—although it cannot yet be called a fully emerged political society. It is this hard fact which the dictators ignore, the sequel of which can only be that the community will conquer in the end. And here, once for all, the truth must be read as applying to the nation as to the individual.

The true alternatives, then, are not peace or war, but law or war. That and nothing less is the abiding issue. Pacifism does not equate law, still less does it offer the least prospect of ever supplanting war. On the contrary, submission to his unchastened will could hardly fail to augment the power of eccentric Leviathan.

Unconsciously and instinctively, man, for a long time, has learned to submit to Leviathan for a certain purpose which we have recognized as order through law. He must now

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remind Leviathan of this purpose, he must capture control over Leviathan, but first of all he must learn that, for the reign of world peace, there can be only one Leviathan and that the more Leviathans the more war. In short, the original purpose of Leviathan can be completely fulfilled only in the ultimate fusion of innumerable manifestations of Leviathanic power into a single supreme power.

Sooner or later the recognition of this cardinal truth will be insisted on by humanity as the *sine qua non* condition upon which any Government holds office. That is a truth likely to be brought home to certain peoples in sudden revelation, just as the penalty for its denial is likely to be exacted by them no less speedily from their Governments, if Europe should ever find itself being swiftly reduced to ruins.

* * * * *

So when, as at the present moment, the domain of law urgently requires further extension—this time beyond the national frontiers as formerly beyond the boundary of the tribe—those obstructing Leviathans who insist that their installation is permanent and their power indivisible and irrevocable, must be brought down. This, sooner or later, must come to pass. Abusing the trust of humanity and existing each unto itself, the usurping Leviathans one by one will eventually succumb to the survivor among them. Those Powers constitutionally governed, on the other hand, will combine and, while possibly shedding something of their identity, may preserve much of their individuality in the new corporate entity, the supra-national society. They will be under a broadened reign of law. To the extent that it is broadened, they, instead of risking annihilation, will endure.

Here let it be said that the inevitable and necessary failure of the League of Nations is nowhere more salutary than where it redeems man's hope of ultimate peace by showing him, firstly, that the way is that of law: and, secondly, that while it is true that this in turn involves the emergence of a supreme power, nevertheless, as the next advance to the reign of law can proceed only by conscious co-operation directed to that

end, it must be preceded by an intellectual leadership resulting in the intelligent advance of mankind.

It must surely be that in all nations there exist men who, as they approach death, find courage to face the demonstrable truth that knows no frontiers. The League has failed only in that it has been made to array the weight of violence of certain unsorted Leviathans against that of other unsorted Leviathans. The advance to the reign of law may well have to be covered by the sword, but it can hardly fail to be held up if it proceeds by way of a frontal attack upon a position well prepared by rebel Leviathans fundamentally and mutually antagonistic although superficially united in a Satanic alliance.

Thus the intellectual advance which must precede, as it may condition, the actual advance under arms towards the reign of law, may be said to involve a gradual sorting out of the Leviathans—the union of some, the overthrow of others. This involves a re-examination of the purposes and limitations of statehood and of its attendant sovereignty. And this, in turn, requires the consideration of what are the important ends of life itself.

The way to peace among nations and peoples is a long and hard pilgrimage and, therefore, the question what shall the vanguard and its supports comprise is most important. There must, I have said, be a sorting out of Leviathans. But man can decide about Leviathan only after he had decided about himself. Originally he was master and Leviathan was his servant, for the very *raison d'être* of Leviathan is the reign of law. Now, in the case of some nations, the original roles are contrivedly reversed by Leviathan and, in the case of other nations, deliberately obscured. In those instances the very form of the state usually reveals the fingerprints of usurping Leviathan and no longer preserves the mould of humanity.

It is noteworthy that it is in the totalitarian state, whatever its particular brand of servitude may be, that the one universal aspect of Hobbes' law is most visibly working. There force and fear constrain men at every turn not merely to obey the supreme power but permanently to surrender their manhood to that power. There, as nowhere else, Leviathan,

the servant of man, usurping the power lent in trust, turns it against man and claims mastery. Even the workmen and peasants of the Russian Revolution, it is interesting to observe, cannot be relied upon to obey the supreme power voluntarily, but are required to accept a subjection deepening as the plan for their freedom enlarges. In Germany, the sister totalitarian state, the present drive is towards an iron standardization of the individual along lines likely to prove most serviceable in Leviathanic wars of conquest. However crazy as a design, the Russian plan is intended to be one for mankind and, as such, therefore, it transcends the German Nazi plan which is a war plan for the benefit of Nazis alone. There the supreme power, man's instrument of law, transformed into Leviathan, confronts the German individual as a usurper and betrayer, seizes man and turns him into a blind, lifeless machine of war. The point here, however, is that, no less than in Russia, the power-policy of Germany, which, in that country, has always been the vogue whether in national or international affairs, not only illuminates grimly the universality of Hobbes' law but illustrates its most fearful exploitation. In Fascist Italy, too, as in Russia, men obey because they must. In all three totalitarian states an unchecked, single-brained, and therefore conceivably megalomaniac dictatorship in international affairs, at first imposed from above by sheer violence, conceals, behind an advertised aggrandizement of the nation, not only the political subjection but also the spiritual subjugation of the individual.

But even apart from the dictatorships, everywhere the tendency at the present moment is in the direction of the governmental tightening up rather than of slackening the law of Hobbes. The contention that, at least in the United States, that isolated citadel of democracy, Hobbes' law does not hold good, and that what the American state provides is not a Leviathan at all but only a safeguarded opportunity for making money, is seen to be invalid when one remembers that the terrorism of the desperadoes is barely kept in sufficient check.

To come back to England where, among the law-abiding Britons, the main purpose of the state hardly ever occurs to

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most people, and where the prevailing notion of the Britannic state is that its purpose is to hold against non-Britishers the place we have come to occupy in the world, here, too, order through the reign of law is conditioned by supreme power. "It is not ultimately by violence that man is ruled," declares Bertrand Russell.¹ Nevertheless, the reign of war, which is violence, is not yet at an end and the only alternative to it is the administration of law based on the supremacy of widely assembled power. There is a difference between power acknowledged and, indeed, organized by man as a means to a beneficial end, and violence, naked, untamed, and undirected to any such end. The one belongs to the reign of law, the other to the reign of war. Nor, because the reign of law is broadly based on authoritative power, is there the slightest justification for considering as necessarily restricted by that fact the end to which that particular reign of law may be directed. It might, it is true, be directed to upholding a culture wholly immoral by present standards; or, again, it might enshrine the Christian covenant and induce obedience to it, if that were desired, to a degree that has never yet occurred. In short, when based on supreme power, the law can be the ark of any covenant.

At the moment it will suffice to point out that the reign of law, in the full meaning of the phrase, can only be singular: from which it follows that the true conception of the state is singular likewise—an aspect of the main problem to which we shall return in a later chapter.

Having discovered Leviathan we must now proceed to understand the several aspects of the issue with which Leviathan confronts mankind, for only thereafter can we consider how that issue can be satisfactorily resolved.

¹ *Power*, p. 284.

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IT is apparent that even at this early point in our enquiry certain scientific principles have begun to appear. Indeed, our progress is such that already, although the average reader may not be aware of the fact, we have drawn near to and are overlooking at this very moment the field of jurisprudence which means no more than the science of the law of the human political society. A more simplified definition would be the science of supervising and directing human action. A bird's-eye view over that territory will enable us to recognize features we have already noticed but which will now be found to have a new interest vital to our study.

Thus, whatever the form of government, it is scientific truth that the supreme purpose of the political society remains throughout what it has always been and always will be, namely the *administration* of justice by the supreme power in the state. Indeed, unless there were some need for the administration of justice, there would be no need for the existence of the state. In order to achieve this main purpose, the state, it is usually alleged, is invested with two chief functions: (a) the preservation, by means of law, of order within the state through the supreme power in the state; and (b) the maintenance of the *status quo* by war.

The supposition, in this view, that war is an accompanying feature of law, has not only supplied Leviathan with a false vocation, but has stultified the expansion of the reign of law itself—a view, that is to say, tending to defeat the purpose for which men combine. It overlooks that if the preservation of order can proceed only from a supreme power, then the wider the zone of that power the wider the order and the wider the peace. In the words of Hobbes:

“The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others), in the introduction

of that restraint upon themselves (in which wee see them live in Commonwealths) is the foresight of their own preservation and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre which is naturally consequent to the naturall Passions of men when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe. . . . Fore the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy and (in summe) 'doing to others as wee would be done to') of themselves without the terrour of some Power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our Naturall Passions that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge and the like. And Covenants without the Sword are but Words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore . . . if there be no power erected . . . every man will . . . rely on his own strength. . . . And in all places where men have lived by small Familyes, to robbe and spoyle one another has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained the greater was their honour. . . . And as small Familyes did then so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Familyes . . .

"Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men that gives them this security. . . . And be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements and particular appetites they can expect thereby no defence nor protection neither against a common enemy nor against the injuries of one another. . . . For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice . . . without a common Power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any Civill Government or Commonwealth at all; because there would be Peace without Subjection."¹

As a sharp reminder that the state is no chance by-product of human endeavour but exists because it must and because it alone can provide the supreme power which men obey, that statement of universal truth has never yet been bettered. Centuries later, in our own day, the same truth is echoed in the clear words of the realistic jurist, John Salmond:—

"However orderly a society may be and to whatever extent men may appear to obey the law of reason rather than that of force and to be bound together by the bonds of sympathy rather than of those of physical restraint, the

¹ Thomas Hobbes: *Leviathan*, ch. xvii.

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element of force is none the less present and operative. It has become partly latent, but it still exists. A society in which the power of the state is never called into actual exercise marks not the disappearance of Government control but the final triumph and supremacy of it.”¹

Moreover, for this element of power within the law effectively applicable as it must be against the violators, no substitute has been proved capable of taking its place. Of public opinion, often mistakenly so regarded, Salmond rightly says:—

“The constraint of public opinion is a valuable and indeed indispensable supplement to that of law but an entirely insufficient substitute for it. . . . A coercive system based on public opinion alone, no less than one based on force alone, contains within itself elements of weakness that would be speedily fatal to efficiency and permanence. The influence of the public censure is least felt by those who need it most. The law of force is appointed, as all law should be, not for the just but for the unjust; while the law of opinion is set rather for the former than for the latter and may be defied with a large amount of impunity by determined evildoers. The rewards of successful iniquity are upon occasion very great. . . . It is also to be observed that the influence of the national conscience, unsupported by that of the national force (or ‘supreme power’) would be counteracted in any but the smallest and most homogeneous societies by the internal growth of smaller societies or associations possessing separate interests and separate antagonistic consciences of their own . . . the social sanction therefore is an efficient instrument only so far as it is associated with and supplemented by the concentrated and irresistible force of the incorporate community. Men being what they are—society can exist only under the shelter of the state, and the law and justice of the state is a permanent and necessary condition of peace, order and civilization.”²

It should hardly be necessary to point out that this not only applies to ordinary state law operating within the national state, but must apply equally to all law wheresoever contemplated as the desirable and only alternative to anarchy. There is no need whatever to set any limit to Hobbes’ or to Salmond’s state. What both really had in mind

¹ John Salmond: *Jurisprudence*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

was the human political society. There is but one kind of law operative in such a society and both writers are here speaking not of a law but of *law*. The truth that human subservience to order (or human compliance with law) depends on superior power is universal and absolute. Being based on human nature it applies equally to the conduct of men whether regarded as members of a nation, i.e. considered nationally, or regarded as composite units of one of the members of the family of nations, i.e. considered internationally.

This rule, general like the principle of gravity, governs the political relationship of all men belonging to any human political society however small or great. This means that this rule, which I will call the law of Hobbes, applies to men as individuals and to nations which, after all, comprise men, whatever the nation's political form. Where once stood the tribes, now stand the nations; the law of Hobbes spans both tribes and nations. Just as order and justice among men and tribes hitherto have always been found dependent on the supreme power of the state, so will order and justice between the nations prove unattainable until there arrives comprehensive supra-national statehood to furnish once more the indispensable superior power. And, as we shall find later, statehood is no more than a hierarchy of power for certain ends. To endeavour to substitute for that supreme power some such alternative as consent, or customary law, or public opinion, or national conscience, or morality, is to waste the lessons of human experience.

Expedients based on such substitutes, the tragic limitations of which have been proved only too often, have in recent years again and again been held out to us not merely as make-shift measures but as capable of providing a solid foundation for a final and lasting peace on which, it has been asserted, the English-speaking peoples need not hesitate to take a stand with all we have and all we guard—and, moreover, where logic would so indicate, to take that stand, if necessary, alone.

If the present retrograde process of the de-civilization of humanity now being pursued by Leviathan is to be arrested, new and determined steps towards the reign of law

must be taken by some nations in the not distant future. Ahead there lie the further stretches of the ancient road—imagined by some to be the only road—which presents, as it has always presented, the old inescapable alternative of slay lest ye be slain.

It is, however, not the only road. Man's great need at this moment is to be shown that there are two paths to ultimate peace, firstly the old red road—the slow way whereby the stature of Leviathan is increased by conquest and death: and secondly, a new road, steep, difficult, but nearer—the way of life via union. Here what really is increased is the *range of purpose* for which the supreme power of the state stands. And this is so whether the expansion takes the form of territorial condominium, of political merger, of economic co-operation, or of all three.

Man must be shown that the supreme test of civilization, perilous, perhaps irrevocable, lies in his choice between these two roads, both of which, be it noted, ultimately lead to peace. But it is a peace in each case of a different kind—the first, the peace of the jungle when the last rival has gone: the second, the peace of civilization.

There are some who would foist upon us the delusion that there exists a third road, an easy and short cut, by which man can attain peace and yet avoid payment of its price. And so, deliberating yet confused, restless yet hesitating, here, as elsewhere, man stands halted before an obstacle of his own creation—Leviathan, a machine, insensate and soulless as are all machines. And here, where that machine is the instrument of power by which humanity itself is governed, the remedy lies with man himself in asserting proper control over his creation. To do this he must think. The first question that requires an answer is, what is the true purpose of that power? The second question is whether that purpose is to-day being rightly pursued. The answer to this further question we shall find to be confirmed in the course of our examinations of a cross section of world affairs seen from different angles. The plain answer is that the true purpose of supreme power—which is law—is defeated through the radius of that purpose being cut off short at the boundary of each national state

which the Leviathans, each equipped with two irreconcilable functions, war and law, conceive as eternal and therefore to be rendered inviolate by violence.

Who will help man to see the truth? Is this to be expected of Leviathan? Hardly. For Leviathan's is the very power that moves the machine of government, a power that is conservative but, still more, self-preservative and usurping. And yet inevitably, and sooner rather than later, the truth one day will be recognized. Enlightenment from the leaders failing, it will be forthcoming somewhere from amongst the rank and file of the people. That is the only true revolution and for it all must work. Humanity must save itself. This it will do the better after being convinced that, whichever of the two roads towards peace is taken, one hard necessity, the submission to some supreme power, must govern the march, for supremacy of power is indispensable to union. In short, union is the condition of order, law and justice, and, therefore, of peace.

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Let us now consider the inescapable alternative, the choice between these two roads. From the preceding argument it may be surmised that throughout the ages and with the widening of civilization the process at work in the human political society since its earliest forms has been one of expansion—a fitful progress, no doubt, proceeding sometimes even by way of disruption but, nevertheless, in the end always towards eventual expansion.

This expansion is more than geographical or racial. It is perhaps not too much to say that the advance of civilization towards peace (likewise its retreat from barbarism) can be measured by the degree of expansion of the average human society the radius of which was once that of the family, later that of the tribe, and so on, the unit ever increasing. With disruptive and disintegrative forces frequently intervening, nevertheless there has everywhere, always in the long run, been union, visible and invisible, in ever larger circles.

This, of course, must inevitably be so. In order to escape conflict men and factions have been driven to seek shelter

under a perpetually expanding roof broad enough to house whatever minimum of supreme power is found adequate to dispense a peace widened with man's needs and activities. And so it must be with the nations. They must unite and coalesce and expand until where once ten stood there will be seven, five, three, then two and finally only one.

It is important to observe here that this expansion of the human political society by means of the coalescence of smaller units is, in its early stages, seldom a visible and orderly process, and that in the future this may prove to be the case even more so than it has been in the past. It follows that such expansion will not at first have legalistic form nor would any legalistic formulation of its process be likely to outstrip convictions. Facts precede law.

Now, for this expansion to take place, there is needed, as the supporting foundation, nothing more solid nor less solid than the plain concord of men, whatever their community, determinedly resolved upon one single issue. And it is this issue alone that provides the plane for the concord of man broadened into what, for convenience, may be termed super-statehood. This resolve upon which they irrevocably unite is that henceforth war *between them*—not merely in phrases but in fact—*shall not be permitted*: that their common, supra-national will shall so decree; and that this decree shall be enforced by the supreme power of the union called into being for the purpose.

First and last this paramount intention and desire of a widened section of humanity to displace war by law must constitute the mandate of the supreme power and govern its exercise. Leviathan could observe this mandate by aiding, not blocking, the arrival of a widened reign of law and an expanded supreme power, by stepping aside, if only for limited purposes, to make way for the emergence of that expanded power. In short the vital process of union wider and wider for law must not be halted by Leviathan at the boundary of the national state behind which Leviathan lies in wait to maraud, that being a commonly supposed function of so-called sovereign power.

It is not to be supposed for a moment that the transition

from many competing reigns of law to a single reign of world law will, or could, take place at once. Praiseworthy as was the hope behind the League of Nations, even that programme was too ambitious. The prime duty of the supreme power of law in every political society is to facilitate and speed up the broadening, expanding process; that is to help on the growth of real, broadened power in the world which will arise supreme in the midst of rival powers. This, as we shall find later, does not mean the annihilation of all power except the one and only ultimate widened power; for the pre-existing powers can continue to exist subordinately. Rightly interpreted, the vital process is therefore the relegation of national supreme power to its proper place in a hierarchy of power, its topmost expression on earth the single reign of law.

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How can this essential and desired expansion be brought about? In earliest times the common will was invariably the surviving will ascertained in a series of trials of strength resulting in triumph or subjugation. The broadening process became automatic and inevitable. Men instinctively combined in order to repulse attack or to secure supremacy. In the event of defeat they were absorbed by the victor, preferring this to death.

But the farther the human society progressed the more the process became one of deliberate calculation and assessment of chances rather than one of actual contest. To-day, however, as never before, if he is to save himself from unspeakable pain and torture, a higher demand is made of man. His next far-reaching act of union must be by conscious process, for reliance on instinct will not serve the farther turn. In the alternative he will experience the extremity of suffering and sacrifice and have to unite after all.

Here, then, again appear the two ways—either union secured by the triumph of man's own reasoning powers and act of will, or else union compelled by dire circumstances super-imposed by victory upon defeat, the sharp alternative being subjugation or death. This statement of the final choice is not one-sided. No one can win all the time. The results of

victory of any one power, dynasty, or faction, have never remained permanently unchanged. Throughout the human story it is only man's lot that has remained unchanged. He has been the sufferer from war, from victory as well as from defeat, every time.

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The recurring mistake of mankind during the last century and made again and again since the Great War, is in imagining that civilization is faced with innumerable issues of almost equal and competitive importance. There is but one supreme issue and on it all others depend, for upon it turns that of the life or the death, perhaps the living death, of humanity—the issue law or war. This is the paramount issue confronting man at this moment as a member of the human political society just as it has always been the supreme issue confronting him in that capacity in the past. At rhythmic periods the re-emergence of that issue seems to have rounded off a chapter of history. This time man's eyes have begun to open to the issue. They must be opened wider and wider in order for him to recognize that it is an issue on which humanity must soon consciously and fatefully divide.

There are truly only two ideologies, that of those who desire to perpetuate war and that of those who desire to end war. Not less but more than the one strains to weight the scale for war, must the other effect actual union for peace. Between these two mentalities there must inevitably proceed a strife that can admit of no compromise, the one striving for war, the other striving for law through which alone peace comes.

As the rival Leviathans cannot all remain in the ring for ever, it cannot be doubted by any thinking man that where the tribal chiefs once submitted to a stronger power, sooner or later the Leviathans, too, will have to submit. If, in the dire alternative, the Leviathans insist on fighting it out, it would be a gross error for anyone to imagine that they could ever be fighting about anything other than that plain, that paramount issue, *law or war*. Only when this is realized will the indispensability of "supreme power" be put first and peace become an actuality. True, even then, it will be no

more than relative peace for, no doubt, disturbances will continue to occur and the reign of law continue to be challenged just as is the case with any law in any country in the world to-day. But whenever that happens the supreme power will step in, adjudicate and administer justice. And if this supreme power should on occasion seem to be overthrown, what in fact will have happened will be that the centre of political gravity has shifted—that is all.

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Of the two roads, then, that lead ultimately to relative peace, both follow the Hobbesian view which implies an ever-broadening base of supreme power, but one road follows the method of expansion by conquest and absorption, while the other follows that of union adopted by the way of unviolent evolution—by alliance, by merger, or by coalescence. The latter method can be said to be voluntary, at least in the sense that its prospect is thought to be preferable to the consequences of the only foreseeable alternative.

Who can doubt that Europe under a single government would, in important respects, be a better place *whatever* conceivable government that was? The abolition of international war, the end of armament racing, the abolition of all armed forces (save what would be needed for police), the monopoly of all methods of restraint and therefore their subjugation and control! And so an end not only to bombing, poison gassing, or submarine warfare, but, likewise, an end to discriminating international tariffs, to exchange restrictions, to the scramble for raw materials and to the blast and counterblast of lying propaganda that seeks to divide men who agree. With a single government in Europe how long would Asia and Africa remain outside? Let each person thoughtfully picture for himself peace expanded round the world.

The present attitude of mind of the commonplace individual unit of massed mentality would no doubt provide the answer that of course Europe would be a better place if the particular Government to which that individual belonged

were the only one in power. This assuredly would likewise be the answer of any Leviathan, whether French, German, Italian, Russian or British.

But remove the Leviathans. Conceive a single supreme power thrown up by mankind the majority of whom have decided rightly that single plain alternative, law or war—a strange new Leviathan become the reforged instrument of law that would teach oncoming generations and backward peoples to understand that just as several races in one country can persuade themselves to live together under one government, even so could the nations in one continent or one world.

It may be said that this is looking a long way ahead, but that is where ultimate peace lies, at the end of long arduous roads which at first diverge but finally converge and meet. In the choice of those roads, a choice often recurring, man's will must arbitrate in a conflict between the old human nature and the new growing character within him.

At the present moment it appears that the odds are heavily in favour of a large section of mankind allowing human nature still to prefer the road of conquest and subjugation to that of voluntary merger and of union based on the supreme issue. If so, then there must yet be further revealed in bloody history the full, sinister meaning of the words—"They that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Satisfactory, indeed, would it be if, before the storm broke, the English peoples and all who will stand with them were already well along the way of voluntary fusion—that way of *unviolent* though *safeguarded* evolution; for the peaceful evolution, no less than the bloody revolution, will need to be safeguarded by arms. The alternative course of laying down arms and accepting subjugation in the hope that the emerging ideology hammered out by the victorious Leviathans may be no worse, we shall consider later in the chapter on pacifism.

The arch-Leviathans, we can be assured, cannot fail to throw up succeeding and novel ideologies each of which, in turn, will exalt a paramount authority increasingly Leviathanic and leave the world still more bloody, more

violent, and so more retrograde than it is even to-day. Law and war are eternally opposed and those who uphold war by so doing turn their backs on law.

And those who uphold war by opposing law are none other than those who set a limit to the union of humanity—a limit they call nationality. Thus it comes about that the supreme power entrusted to Leviathan for the purpose of enforcing law and order is applied merely to restrain men from killing one another within the nation but only in order to prepare them for killing men of other nations, *the pretext being that the reign of law stops at nationality*. Most marked of all political developments in modern times is the usurpation of governmental power for that false purpose. By setting the limit of man's union at nationality Leviathan thus stands between man and law and therefore between man and that very peace which, nevertheless, Leviathan exists to promote. As peace, which is man's chief need, depends on law, so, whatever stands in the way of law must be overthrown even if that obstacle be the ancient rampart of nationalism, watch-towers and all.

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So gigantic a change in human affairs as that from war to law cannot take place at once, for law is a growth. The first movements towards that vital change—the supra-national expansion of the political society—although perhaps not very apparent, have already begun. If the unviolent method of union and fusion of interests were adopted by several law-minded nations, the change, so far from being a sweeping one, need root up hardly any characteristics of the national life except undesirable ones. It is true some consequences that would be introduced might at first be thought to be unpleasant but, compared with the horrors and stupidity of war, the sacrifice would soon be seen to be worth while. Further, this unviolent method is positive, not negative; and, for instance, would involve a new standpoint being taken of such practical issues as that of neutrality, viewing it as a dynamic principle of broadening scope, and passing, say, from unplanned non-intervention to planned inter-

vention. Such constructive statesmanship would contemplate a fusion of common interests in order to provide a real foundation for widened power concerned for law—something more, that is, than a mere political alliance based on power-politics.

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At the outset the choice appears to be that between an enlightened, controlled, but free democracy, and the enslaved, purposefully misinstructed and machine-blind totalitaria of the totalitarian state—not, be it observed, necessarily of the dictatorship. So long as a state recognizes that the important ends of life include the spiritual growth and the self-liberation of man, so long must that form of state be tolerated, whatever it is, so far as possible. And this is so notwithstanding that the price of that toleration may seem to cost this nation some of the lustre of its own prestige, or cost that nation the admission of forces undermining its own sovereignty.

As we shall see in a later chapter, national sovereignty is not a condition precedent of the arrival of the supreme power, but follows it. Moreover, unless, like statehood, it is understood relatively, national sovereignty is meaningless. Understood rightly, it offers no obstacle to union but seeks it. It is not, of course, to be supposed that, while free men would not lightly yield to a nation of enslaved mentality, they would relish coalescence or merger with them. But if the whole purpose of the supreme and imperative change on earth is to displace war by law and with it the lie of war's inevitability, and if, further, this can result only from the working of truth and reason, then the duty of the ideologist of peace and law may be to work for understanding even in the ranks ranged behind Leviathan.

Understanding comes first, and indeed almost last as well. The day when character will have become so strengthened in man throughout the world that human nature may be ignored and all notion of armed and supreme power put away everywhere for ever, is probably immensely far distant. Moreover, humanity is made up of individuals at different stages of enlightenment and self-liberation. As I have said,

human nature is always with us and is likely to remain with us. To fully enlightened persons war, as a policy, must always have appeared as insanity, but nevertheless many who took this view have long accepted war slavishly from habit. That is no longer the case. The catastrophe of modern war has quickened the reason of mankind and no one who has sampled modern war can be in much danger of forming this habit. On the other hand, the fighting instinct remains and, with other kindred instincts, is exploited by Leviathan, the Spirit of war, who, having discovered that modern government is a machine of power for law, now exploits that power by using that machine primarily for war. Thus man's understanding of the vast problem of war depends on his insight into Leviathan and, no less, on his insight into his own nature.

It is because it is only through the mind of man that his control of instinct by superior reason can take place, and because it is on the general outlook of man's mind that the revelation of what war is really depends, that the mind of the individual has become the subject of usurping Leviathan's special care. To deaden that individual mind, to deafen it except to one voice, to blindfold its eyes except to one sight, to stamp it into a pattern and then, ignoring its separate existence, thenceforth to deal only with the patterned mass mind, is the totalitarian's Satanic method of wedding the nation to war and of breeding only warriors. Swallowed up, man, the master, becomes the spawn of his servant Leviathan!

Thus, so far from being subdued, human nature is exploited in the people to afford the greater scope for the play of the human nature of totalitarian Leviathan. Psychology the new science, propaganda the new art, have facilitated Leviathan's betrayal of the people who are first doped, then duped, and then misled.

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Except for a new factor, tremendous in importance and which has now changed the whole outlook, it might well have taken several more centuries for the thickening mists to lift

sufficiently for the two roads to appear as clearly to observant and thoughtful men as they have now begun to appear to even a large section of unthinking humanity. That factor is aircraft, the outstanding importance of which it is useless to ignore and which, even so far as it is developed, as we shall see in a later chapter, has already overthrown all previous notions of strategy and tactics and left perturbed even the most powerful of Leviathans. Indeed this factor has transformed almost every aspect of international affairs as, for instance, the magnitude and importance of any Power, the old-time conception of neutrality and of neutralization, and the very meaning of war itself.

In short, it begins to be evident that, with the advent of aircraft, the moment at last has come when man must decide. So much so that it is probable, in the not remote future, that aircraft will be regarded as having been the first decisive factor of peace.

From now on the steps that man takes may prove not easily retraceable. Nor is one step at a time enough. The choice, as has been said, is one between two roads, two directions. It is the distant scene upon which he must fix his gaze. Somewhere beyond the formidable heights that seem to bar man's further progress towards freedom lie the war-free centuries of the future. Is the choice of route to be determined merely by the thrust of the crowd's impetus or is it to be decided upon after thought?

We know that for thousands of years the striking of the direction has been at least as much fortuitous as instinctive and, we know too, that instinct will no longer serve. At the moment the supreme duty of humanity is to pause and consider the direction of future advance. The untried, steeper way which will prove less arduous in the end, must be taken, if it is taken at all, with the knowledge that it entails union at the price of sacrifice, but a sacrifice, however, in obedience to the inexorable demands of the supreme end of life. Instead of "divide and rule" the policy must be "unite and rule." To this the only alternative is the old road of the same ancient struggle, the blind way of war by night, the longer road via the battlefield. Or, as that picturesque phrase will

no longer pass, let us say that longer road, the way of blood. No, not necessarily the way of blood either. The way of blindness, then, of suffocation, and of broken minds. And, the final outcome, spiritual death, for the sole survival value of humanity at the end will be only efficiency to destroy.

Now, just two decades after the Armistice, when, re-emerged in Europe and Asia as the inspired machine of soulless power incarnate, Leviathan once again, lifts his head, raves, and casts about, once again the experimentalists have come forward to urge on democracy conflicting advice. It is all to the good that at last, instead of rushing forward upon this or that particular counsel, darkening and bewildering, plain men everywhere, most of all in England, have stood steady and fallen to thinking. In short, once more proof comes from the people that, even without being able to explain how or why, they know that the old leadership has failed and cautiously await a new.

This is almost the sole heartening feature in a gloomy outlook. It is not in the final decision for or against any particular war that the leadership has failed, but in not having sufficiently planned *for* the reign of law and planned *against* the reign of war. Even at this moment, in an unplanned world, it is only war that is planned. Schemes for peace and formulas for peace have been exchanged for prayers for peace—and these have been unanswered. The dictatorships are not alone in following a false path. No less, but with less reason, the democracies, too, have erred. They, too, have their Leviathans who put personal vanity and place before the common weal. At what points have all governments erred? We must find the answer before we can find the way.

Our first wrestle will be with words, catchwords, slogans, and with tabloid doctrines and formulas. Instead of accepting such at their currency value, let us ask ourselves what is meant by certain terms important to our enquiry, and let us begin with war and peace.

WAR IN PEACE

WAR and peace are invariably and mistakenly spoken of as mutually exclusive periods of time and as far apart in conception as is heaven from hell, a truce being located somewhere in the purgatorial gap between. It would be more accurate to say that peace and war flow or merge into each other.

A little thought will show that true peace among the nations there has never been and can never be until there shall have taken place the major evolution of war into law enforced by a supreme power emanating from a supra-national authority or sovereign power. At most there has been a lull, long or short, at the termination of each period of open hostilities, the relaxed tension between the rival powers thereafter changing as the strength of the defeated returns or as new designs and combinations take shape. Indeed, so long as war—that is to say the method of deciding by ruthlessness—is retained by the Great Powers, who expressly reserve the right to fall back on this method for the settlement of important differences (as will appear when we reach the chapters dealing with international law and the existing machinery for settling disputes), the actual outbreak of hostilities may be said to be merely a registration of previously existing and gathering tension. Just as a general in the field will often seek to avoid his enemy and refuse combat until reconnaissance permits of comparison of strength, so, in periods of so-called peace, diplomatic victories are often gained by a superiority in armed strength, real or bluffed, set off by superior opportunity.

When, either from temporary embarrassment or from partial unpreparedness, a Power offers to give way rather than choose violent battle and defeat, what happens is only a change in the tension. Similarly, when the strain is held,

as in a tug-of-war, the stillness is that of contest, not that of peace.

In this regard history reveals a changelessness, the effort in calculation now being greater, that is all. Thus to-day, as heretofore, while on the one hand the young desire to experience what their elders advise them to avoid, on the other hand the memory of the horrors and vast futility of the World-War still remains burnt into the minds of many yet living—and the result is said to be peace resulting from a calculation of chances. But the affairs of mankind, increasingly interwoven afresh each day with new intricacy, leave the outcome of war less predictable than ever. The consequences, whether of victory or of defeat, are now so incalculable that no nation, unless ruled by propagandizing gamblers, would enter a war without great trepidation. The recent discovery that a people prepared in mind lightly to risk war, or whose dictator can commit them to war or bluff others into thinking he can so commit them, can bully a far more powerful nation into yielding the diplomatic victory, is not altogether surprising. Arms speak in peace as well as in war, and often more effectively. Knowledge of this fact is the secret of the success of the present warlike dictatorships. The peacelike dictator—a being as incomparably greater than the warlike dictator as his task is greater—has yet to be born.

The premium on armed diplomatic bullying has increased with the advent of aircraft which, among unknown factors, at this moment comes first. Of this factor, which will be considered in a later chapter, it is necessary to say here only that it has altered the international outlook of almost every nation in the world, that it has razed ramparts thought to be impregnable, and deprived ancient watch-towers of all but historical significance. Indeed, until supremacy has been ascertained in the air just as, time and again, it has been ascertained and reascertained on the sea and on land, the old seniorities among the Powers must be considered in abeyance and the new ones not yet proved.

It follows that the old notions of balancing this nation with that nation no longer apply. Equilibrium cannot be ascer-

tained until the new factor has been weighed. For instance, it is highly probable that, any superior might of Germany in the field notwithstanding, the inevitable revolution-breeding demolition of her cities and dense industrial areas would eclipse any retort in kind she could make to Russia in a present contest between these Powers—an ominous factor hourly influencing policy throughout Europe.

How revolutionizing the unmeasured factor of aircraft may prove, appears, for instance, if one considers the former "rules" of blockade. All in a flash has changed, for henceforth blockade must be "effective" in the air as well as on sea and land—a vast and new difficulty that no international jurist will lightly assess. It is as though in a moment we are thrown back at the beginning again and a fresh start must be made with most of the old problems of which this is but one. The present moment seems the more perilous because so many positions like that of blockade, in its full range of military and naval possibilities, are now suddenly thrown completely open to new elements introducing strange forces of unknown consequences.

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Actually what has happened is that the makeshift arrangements of men have been overthrown by this new factor in world affairs and that the sham of so-called international law has been disclosed not only to "publicists" but to the multitude. Also it has clearly revealed the indispensable need not only for judicial authority but for legislative authority over the nations in order to fit principles to new situations. Chiefly, however, it has revealed the need for an enforcing authority possessing supreme power.

At the instance of the dictators the arms' race has recommenced and, in alarm, the democracies have joined in. Now would be the moment for the super-dictator, for the commonplace mind of a rare leader new to history, who would dictate to the people this truth that the gap in the Covenant of the League is negligible compared with the perilous void that surrounds each nation; that this void can be filled only by law and not by arms; and that in the arms' race there can

be no final victory, mediate or immediate, even to those Powers economically the stronger. Finally that, above all, in reality the race is the old, regular one between the Leviathans. There is no such regular race between individuals or between peoples.

As, from day to day, the preparedness for war of rival Powers changes—for instance, by increased resources, whether economic or industrial, or of man-power—so from day to day armaments speak with changing voices. Even in peace-time, therefore, war in its arrangements of preparation and for replacement can rightly be said to be proceeding, and the prospective enemy then more or less in view. At this moment there lie in the mounting munition dumps among the nations many a shell and bomb whose destination, provisionally certain, is conditioned only by the success or failure of this or that diplomatic move. When, and in what territory in Europe or elsewhere it is most likely to explode, is best known to the dictator whose innermost resolution, the strength of whose obsession and the reality of whose bluff, remain unrevealed. Those who live under a dictatorship may be said to live in the most fatalistic world.

To-day, therefore, war proceeds in Europe as elsewhere, and, whatever the front, only on the surface is there quiet. The more one considers the truth of this the farther does the discovery reach. What is the difference between blockading a country—whether by “distant blockade” or “effective blockade” during actual war—and severing trade with that nation by first impounding all available supplies of gold and then, while declining to buy from that country, offering to sell only if payment is made in gold? Any difference can only be one of degree, for spilt blood may scarcely appear on the future battlefield. Gas, bacteria, thirst, famine will vary the traditional appearances of fields of glory and vindicated honour.

Again, it is more than an academic conclusion that discriminatory tariffs, hostile exchange restrictions, invidious state subsidies by which a nation's resources are stretched to oust the ships of commerce of a rival Power—are measures of war not less for being applied in “peace.” And if, contrary

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to common sense, and in spite of the clear evidence recently heard by the Royal Commission on the subject, it becomes the fashion among the nations for the state alone to manufacture armament and to traffic in arms with other nations as an everyday "peace-time" occupation, would not this, comparatively, be a very advanced measure of war, particularly if the material supplied were calculated to turn the scale from diplomatic defeat to diplomatic victory?

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We are here considering not the *causes* but the *nature* of war, for, if we are to avoid war, we must first be clear in regard to what war is. So long as war continues on into "peace" it cannot be considered surprising that so-called international law is only a treacherous chaos, a fair-named No Man's Land between Leviathans armed and waiting; or that the machinery for settling disputes is allowed by the Leviathans to creak for a moment before its customary crash. It is the knowledge that this is so that encourages any realistic despot like Mussolini to unmask his guns even in the very halls erected in the name of justice and peace.

Nevertheless, by so doing, Mussolini at least has shattered illusion. He has reintroduced humanity at large to the bitter Hobbesian truth that you cannot have justice or peace without law, or law without a supreme power. But better the bitter truth than a savoury untruth, and the sinister influence of Mussolini on history has thus not been wholly unsalutary. Armaments, those final arbiters of that special category of reserved questions called "vital interests," armaments not only of Mussolini but at large, overshadow every international tribunal—the courts of arbitration, the fact-finding commissions, even the Permanent Court of International Justice itself. And now guns talk and aircraft talk loudly and from farther off than ever before in the world's history although national frontiers are still "open" and we go about our daily concerns up and down a Europe which people are told is at peace. "Peace! they cry," exclaimed Jeremiah "when there is no peace."

There can be no peace, even relative peace, unless its price

first is paid. Whether regarded immediately or ultimately this price involves the submission by nations of their sovereignties to a central supreme power. So far that price has been refused because the imagined gain or advantage has not been considered worth the sacrifice involved. This is so because hitherto mankind in the mass has not sufficiently objected to war. When, however, after the long drift downstream from crisis to crisis, the waterfall comes into clear view and shows the dreadful spectacle of those first to reach it, no doubt then, if not earlier, the delayed, far-reaching decision of the survivors will be taken. And that decision, in all probability, would be taken not because civilization was believed to be approaching final catastrophe, but because *national* extinction was alleged to be threatened. Ironically enough, however, it would be just this aspect of nationality and national sovereignty that it would then prove to be too late to preserve.

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Passing from the consideration of the nature of *war* to that regarding the object of *a war*, this is often confused with the cause of a war but is not the same thing. Our first discovery is that only rarely is the object of a war permanently secured, and even then it could be far better attained by other means.

Speaking generally, the causes of war, as we have seen, proceed from one cause only—the absence of a single supreme power the existence of which, however, would be incompatible with any such array of independent, fully self-willed and assertive sovereignties as disfigure the international scene to-day.

On examination the objects of wars are seen to fall into certain categories:

- (1) To vindicate a state's honour, to uphold its prestige, to re-establish its self-respect after a diplomatic defeat or a set-back among the nations. All these go under PRIDE.
- (2) To preserve some cherished right, possession or other advantage coveted by another Power; e.g. to anticipate a war which would otherwise eventuate in less favourable circumstances later on, whether a so-called defensive war or a preventive war exploited by others as well as by the

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dictator who, lest he should be hurled from power, engages his country in foreign adventure which furnishes not only excuse but scope for summary dictation, the removal of all rivals, the occupation of the inevitable malcontents, and the stifling of the restless social urge. These go under FEAR.

- (3) To obtain some fresh possession or right or advantage belonging to another nation, sometimes a great and affluent Power but as often a minor and poverty-stricken state—and which could not be obtained so quickly, even temporarily, in any other way. This heading is AMBITION.
- (4) To maintain a claim to some right disputed, impaired or threatened, or in respect of a wrong suffered, war being resorted to either because it is considered a "vital interest" and therefore not "justiciable," or because it is thought that the verdict is uncertain or might be unsatisfactory owing to political or other bias. These go under JUSTICE.

Although not exhaustive these categories will be found to cover the main field of international disputes. Whichever heading is considered it will be recognized that in each case some material advantage appears among the issues and it is this material advantage which supplies the real incentive to war. Decreasingly nations fight for honour alone. If an insult is taken up by a government, then, as usually proves to be the case with prestige, the incident is exploited as furnishing an opportunity to the Government to conceal the real and more materialistic object, as, for instance, the Italian complaint that in Abyssinia her flag had been repeatedly insulted and due respect not shown to her consuls. (It is not, of course, suggested that this completed the Italian case.)

Categories (2) and (3) similarly disclose some material advantage and the same may be said of "justice," for it is hard to conceive any mere abstract right of justice that, as such, would be considered of sufficient "vital interest" for any government to fight in order to compel its recognition.

But although some such material advantage may thus be said invariably to be involved in the object of any war, this common element cannot rightly be regarded as always economic. In view of the recent revelation that no longer can war-tributes, expenses, or even reparation accounts be collected, the object of a war can hardly be considered economic.

What is usually implied by the argument is that the nation's economic position has got into such a desperate condition that its Government, in order to extricate itself from the mess, tries to escape by war without considering what it is escaping into, the hope being that, out of the new confusion, new opportunity for self-extrication may arise even if at the expense of others.

It will be found upon a little thought and research that these four categories include primarily the *objects*, as they do the *interests*, of nationalistic governments bent or pretending to be bent on war, and only secondarily concern the objects or interests of the people. As was recently well remarked by Lord Essendon—whose mental anchorage is in world trade and not in politics—"Nations are always more foolish than the individuals who compose them." That is why men in the mass accept a dictator's leadership which, as individuals, they would scorn. The organ stops of these four sounds—pride, fear, ambition, justice—are in fact pulled out from time to time by the governing power of each of the great national sovereignties and which Hobbes preferred to call Leviathans whom he wrongly conceived as above the law, thus relating Leviathan to war rather than to law.

And now, having traversed the consideration of those objects of war under the categories of pride, fear, and ambition—in all of which emotion and human nature are so obviously operative—we approach the remaining objective, "justice." In doing so we draw near to the cause of the fearful dilemma presented to man by Leviathan, for it was to exchange anarchy for justice that man submitted to supreme power. Leviathan is he who, created to secure order through power within his province, steps beyond that province and, usurping that power, exploits it for purposes of aggrandizement among the nations obtained through an asserted, and, if necessary, a proved superiority of strength. Born of power, conceded power—but only as a means is conceded in order to gain an end—Leviathan makes this power an end in itself. Indeed, the state has come to be considered almost exclusively from the outside—that is to say internationally, not nationally. So regarded, it is naturally

called a *Power*, as, for instance, a Great Power, a smaller Power, an isolated Power, and so forth.

Now this conception is fundamentally false, for, as we shall discover later on in our enquiry, the true characteristic and purpose of statehood is the *administration* of justice; and statehood, therefore, is best revealed from within and not from without. Its true conception is neither national nor international, but domestic and legal. To recognize this truth is not only to make an advance of first importance in jurisprudence but, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, to clear the road for the advance to the reign of law and, not least, to facilitate that advance by lightening it of burdensome impedimenta such as sovereignty falsely ornamented and statehood deceitfully adorned.

Identifiable with the will of a single individual only in the case of a totalitarian dictatorship, the Leviathanic Spirit at times touches the politicians in turn, even in a democracy. He who holds on to office but who *leads* even peremptorily towards the true end of statehood is thereby no more Leviathanic than is the most just judge of the supreme court in the most perfect democracy, Leviathan being he who usurps the power of the law and applies it to the objective, war.

While it is safe to say that, in the past, Leviathanism has been relative, and all nations more or less at different times have been Leviathanic, this Power preferring the policy of expansion by power-polity, that Power, which already possesses all it desires, affording to pursue the more respectable-sounding policy of defending "vital interests"—soon, as he approaches the cross-roads, man, unblinker, will see that it can remain so no longer, and that he must decide.

That Leviathanism exists is proved by the fact that even where men do not desire war the Leviathanic Spirits ensnare them into it. And it is because man, the individual, can escape the snare only by recognizing it, that to advance to the reign of law away from the reign of war is conditioned by right and efficient leadership. Not less but more than elsewhere must there be leadership in a democracy, for here, too, are found ignorance and human nature among men.

Danger lies in the "unmassed" minds of democrats not less but conceivably more than in the "massed mind" of the dictatorship—so long as democracy is taken to mean freedom without leadership or freedom for all and sundry to fall back.

What true democracy implies will appear only towards the end of this enquiry. The equality democracy involves relates to the individual right of all men to grow as free human spirits—the right not to be dragged at the heels of Leviathan and de-created as slaves. The test of Leviathanism is thus a question of objective—is the end law or war? This question, as we shall discover, can be answered not much longer by phrases and definitions but only by wills and acts. Those who declare for law and against war must follow up their words by whatever acts the advance towards law entails. Moreover, as the advance towards law inevitably involves, sooner or later, a clash with Leviathan, it is necessary at the outset, in order to reckon with the enemy, to consider what is the strength and what the weakness of Leviathanism.

Pride, Fear, and Ambition are the three outstanding attributes of any Leviathan when confronting similar, co-existing creatures of power, created by power out of power, whose creation is indeed the inevitable outcome of power in the early stages of law. Leviathan's preoccupation has always been with power and those three offshoots of power—*pride* for the power it has, *fear* that it may lose its power, *ambition* for more power. These three provide the fullness of the tragedy in which man has become involved through his desperate need of a human society in which to dwell with its protection against the worst element in human nature that gives the same three birth. Leviathan emerges as the spirit of the war-method—that barbaric method of war by violence instead of the civilized method of law by power.

In the case of *justice*, no less than in the case of the remaining categories, human nature, as well as other human limitations, once more weights the scales. If vagueness and false contradictory meanings of the term be all shorn away the irresistible conclusion follows that the only conceivable justice for the purpose of ending war is that which is forthcoming through law, i.e. legal justice.

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In the first place it is important to observe that, whatever the real reason, it is on the ground of *justice* if not in the name of justice, and not sometimes but always, that people are exhorted and excited to fight. Indeed, the more unprovoked, premeditated, avoidable or inexcusable the war, the greater will be the effort of those responsible for it to convince public opinion that, unless they fight, the outrage of justice put upon them will not be rectified. This is because the *feeling* that certain things are just and certain things are unjust lies mysteriously among those emotions which stir the deepest instincts of man. And, as we have seen, it is that side of human nature making for war—the instinct to fight—which is most easily exploitable. Justice believed to be outraged awakens in man a religious fervour which can easily be turned into a blind and unrestrained fanaticism that can stampede mankind headlong until their own impetus carries them over the precipice of catastrophe. In short, the conviction that they are being denied justice can still induce most people to accept whatever violence, cruelties, insanities or sufferings the following of that course of unreason may involve.

And, looking ahead, men recognize that they will be able to console themselves or to quieten their doubts by the thought that all this was inevitably in the interest of so-called justice which, however, on consideration, may prove to be mere sentimentality or egotism. Nevertheless, it is this muddled and, indeed, erratic sense of justice in man that is most appealed to by the propagandists. Thus, in the case of Italy's ferocious and calculated rape of Abyssinia, it is wrong for outsiders to imagine that most Italians were not perfectly sincere in their belief that, after all, it was only justice itself that had triumphed. In their view justice approved that they should have Abyssinia and they were surprised and angry when certain other countries, including an old friend, England, disapproved. If war had broken out between Italy and England it is safe to say that, for the Italian people, doped as they were by propaganda, the issue would have been primarily one of justice. So, too, on the outbreak of the Great War itself, the mouthpiece of each nation anticipated

and articulated the general desire of the public to get "on side" with God, and, on this tremendous occasion, likewise, it was everywhere on grounds of justice that the fatal step was announced to the thrilled multitudes of Europe. Out of war-fever the Leviathans created the resolve which was then given a military direction by the generals and a religious direction by the priests.

But not only does the denial of justice arouse one of the very deepest emotions felt by man. It promotes the belief, even in calmer moments, that often the only way to secure justice is by way not of reason but of unreason, that is to say by violence. Thus, as nothing else can, it provides at one and the same time a reason for war and an object of war. And in the event of a military setback or reverse the recollection of rankling injustice can be made to supply a useful, sustaining power or, at least, to provide a comforting solace.

Now when, at the outset of the Great War, the politicians sought to justify committing a nation to war, they did so on the ground that the proposed course was "right" and "just" internationally. That is to say, it was international or universal justice that they felt or pretended to feel was being denied to them and in the name of which they worked up themselves and others. We pass on to consider what meaning can be attached to international justice.

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As we have seen, absolute justice does not exist on earth. Nor, while men's minds and men's hearts and, above all, men's capacities differ, could they ever be expected to arrive by themselves at a common standard of justice. *Tout savoir c'est tout pardonner*. But the facts are not known to everyone, and to many never can be known at all.

The truth is that not many words are so lame or asked to do so much as is this word justice, and few are so much exploited by human nature. As a result it is not surprising that scarcely two men can be found who will agree what amounts to justice in particular cases. And, if this is so as between one man and his next-door neighbour, how can it fail to be still more so between the nations? Indeed, so soon as,

into the consideration of the problem of justice, that factor, the state, is introduced—a factor by no means constant but varying from state to state—the very notion of justice begins to recede. When, however, justice is considered not merely as administered by the state to the individual but as concerning each state many times over from the standpoint of every other state—the standpoint and therefore the view of justice differing as we pass from state to state—then justice among the nations seems to lose all meaning. How can it be otherwise until statehood is reduced to common terms and is not differently regarded by the Powers?

Even to the question what comprises justice for the individual, the answer invariably seems to involve some code of ethics or even of religion. Can a slow-witted, stupid man be said to receive just treatment equal to that of a smart, quick-witted fellow when each is given an equal portion which the latter can make go so much farther? Is it justice to give them equal portions if the former sincerely believes he must prefer death to dishonesty, while the latter no less sincerely believes that, if in no other way he could save his children for the state, then he must violate even the state's decree and steal?

In which national ideology is justice to be found, in socialism where a monopoly of property and the means of production are in the hands of the state that partitions the total yield in uneven portions among the populace according to their deserts, as, for instance, according to individual output—or in collectivism where the state similarly is the sole overlord of production but distribution is governed by the needs of each man? Is the notion of justice derived from the traditional Christian belief that the apparent injustice on earth is the result of man's original sin and is therefore not injustice but justice after all, the appearance of injustice being necessary to the formation of character and justifiable by the standard of a higher value? Is justice incompatible with totalitarianism which, holding that the rightful ends of life are bound up with the state, considers it just that the worship and consideration of the state should override every other consideration? And does not this come down to a mere

matter of idols, here the state being the super-God of one political religion, there the race, and there again the classless proletarian society? And is justice, then, rather an ethical than a political question or is it both? Like visibility, is justice capable of infinite gradation?

The problem cannot be solved by trying to separate what is just from what is unjust for there is no dividing line. In an imperfect world it is rather a question of adjudicating between the less unjust and the more unjust. But, from this very difficulty of setting a dividing line, it follows that justice must be of some *administrable* variety and, moreover, it must be *administered* to count at all in human society.

More and more, any other meaning of the term continues to fade. Thus communism and Fascism are rival systems upheld by millions of human beings who maintain, respectively, that their system alone is just, the rival system its deadly enemy, although, on a little reflection, Fascism is seen to be less opposed to communism than is communism to socialism or to capitalism and, instead, to be distinguished chiefly in the particular variation of its preferred method—war. Further, in the form the present-day experiment of communism or Fascism has taken, it may be said of both that whatever degree of just equalization in the distribution of the benefits of wealth to the individual either system may have brought about—that is to say, economic justice—this has been achieved only at the expense of a shrinkage in the degree of personal liberty hitherto existing. Thus while they exalt the method, war, even the new totalitarian ideologies fully reflect the ancient process by which man accepted certain advantages in exchange for loss of liberty to make private war—advantages regularized by *law*.

Here, then, in two large-scale schemes boosted as promising to man increased freedom from bondage, the supreme power has been found not less but more indispensable than usual in order to constrain men to conform. In Russia the silencing of the voice of reason and the usurpation of the individual's will have required a double dose of despotism because, by strong feelings of injustice, man has been driven to protest against oppression at the hands of Leviathan's lackeys.

The principal objects of repeated purges of extermination instituted by the Russian Leviathan—theirself formerly trustees of the power of the Russian Commonwealth—have for the most part been condemned as treacherous scoundrels. Limbs of Leviathan, they had abused their trust and turned their usurped power against their fellows. So spake and speaks Leviathan. So the Leviathanic trick has continued, and the condemnation of members of the preceding administration by each succeeding administration has become more and more the vogue in Russian politics. There again events have demonstrated to the plainest man that Leviathan, the spirit of violence, and often, as in this instance, the offspring of revolutionary excess, so far from possessing qualities like compassion or moderation or justice, has succeeded through not being hampered by them. His method, immersion, not conversion, is selected for its display of power.

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To restrain Leviathan it is necessary to know—that is, to understand—him. To understand Leviathan it is necessary, firstly, to recognize that he must agitate to stir up trouble so as to make leadership necessary—in short, to justify his leadership; secondly, to recognize that the violence by which he rises to power and maintains power is often, only power stretched to its farthest serviceability by cruelty and ruthlessness in order to represent increased power—that is to assert a larger margin of supremacy than if it were not so applied. The difference between power and violence, accordingly, is often supposed to be only one of method and degree of application—but this will not bear examination. Leviathan, no doubt, does not go out of his way to be cruel for the sake of cruelty, but is so designedly and purposefully. Given sufficient power to ensure the death of millions instantly, the totalitarian dictator would probably blot out a rival totalitarianism painlessly thus and forgo proving his superiority in power through being more ready for fiendish cruelty than was his rival.

Truly the success of contemporary dictatorship is not because it possesses any greater power than that available

to the democracies but because, in order to multiply his power by terrorism, the dictator is the more resolved in his mind—and, through their prepared psychology, so are his followers equally resolved—on methods of utter ruthlessness, frightfulness and inhumanity. Prepared to stoop lower than the beasts and to vie with the monsters of ancient mythology, Leviathan is bound to win against an opponent equipped with the same amount of force but applied less totalitarially. And now that Leviathan is no longer merely amphibian but has sprouted wings this is more so than ever.

The golden age of Leviathan, however, has already passed if it be remembered that, to be effective on the side of law, power has only to be great enough to overwhelm the violence on the side of war. It is generally overlooked that power, the basis of law when law arrives, is also the forerunner of law that takes the prior step to law. Until sufficient power is available to constrain human nature to obey, the position is not prepared for the arrival of the reign of law. Thus power, the forerunner of law preparing the way for law, is no less directed towards this important end than is the power which serves that end by standing behind the law when the reign of law has arrived. The end of law being the administration of justice—and, as we shall see later, the only means of safeguarding liberty for spiritual growth—power used to overthrow violence is therefore directed to a just and spiritual end.

Here, in considering the meaning of war and of its alternative, law, we are led to the discovery that much of the bickering argument proceeding from pacifist-minded politicians, and others, is due to a fundamental confusion of thought that fails to distinguish *war* from *a war*. Law, or the law, means the reign of law in which a law operates. War means the reign of war in which a war proceeds. It is the reign of war, that is to say war, which is wrong. While *the reign of war* continues, *a war* is frequently inevitable seeing that it does not take two to make a war, but only one. It is, of course, true that warfare now proceeds simultaneously on many fronts including the economic. But even in the narrower sense of a contest by armed might, this might equally well take

the form of a contest between violence for war on the one hand and power for law on the other.

Failure to recognize the distinction between *war* and *a war* has blurred much of the significance for Christianity of the resolution of the Lambeth Conference of 1930 which Bishop Crotty declares:

"was, therefore, realistically Christian in its unanimous declaration that war, as a method of settling international disputes, is incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . ."¹

The Lambeth Report proceeds:

"It is the duty of the Christian Church to create a worldwide public opinion which will condemn a nation which resorts to war from a motive of self-interest or a mistaken conception of honour as guilty of a crime against humanity."

Bishop Crotty's comment on the above extract is as follows:

"A Christian [*sic*] preacher once proclaimed rhetorically that he stood for peace at any price—even at the price of war. It was a stupid saying. For the only final stuff of peace is in the things that make for peace. And war is not among them."

Now if the preacher had said, "at the price of *a war*," then his statement would be far more Christian than is Bishop Crotty's, and, indeed, far less inaccurate. For if the "final stuff of peace is in the things that make for peace," the chief of these things is power which supports the law by which peace alone is possible.

Similarly in so far as the Lambeth Report condemns the reign of war it is wholly in the right and is bound, therefore, to uphold power repulsing violence launched under the reign of war, provided that this step is followed by the remaining steps necessary in order to end that reign of war. But by its condemnation of a country that "resorts to war" the Conference clearly had in mind a country that resorts to *a war*, and here the Report is not only wrong but even un-

¹ Bishop Crotty: *The Church Victorious*: Introduction by the Bishop of London (Dr. A. F. Winnington-Ingram).

christian. It is the duty of Christendom to safeguard the liberty of individual spiritual growth. If this is in peril, for instance, at the hands of Leviathan equipped with violence, then the Christian Church not only may but must stand up for the reign of law which alone can furnish that safeguard. The Church should therefore stimulate spiritual courage throughout the world upon an issue which is spiritual, and even enlighten public opinion to the view that the Leviathanic violence of the reign of war can be repulsed and overwhelmed only by the power of the reign of law.

The truth is that this phrase "resorts to war" is a mere slogan and harmful because thoughtless. For example, the earnestness of Bishop Crotty's little Christian message is robbed of the value it deserved not only by this confusion but by hesitation in regard to whether the Church should take any side at all about war—an attitude which must be determined one way or the other. It is difficult to see how the forces of Christianity can remain aloof and even shelter behind some Christian principle left confused and contradictory in its interpretation with the result that Christians are at sixes and sevens upon the supreme problem of our day.

It is not without interest that so good a Christian as the present Bishop of London in a little book entitled *God and You* gives sections entitled "God and the Housewife," "God and the Sportsman," "God and the Businessman," "God and the Doctor," but omits the all-important section on "God and the Soldier"—which, of course, now ought to read "God and the Soldier-Civilian." Even the thought on this problem of so earnest a seeker as Canon Raven is unprogressive because blinkered and similarly confused. Nor can this confusion be excused on the plea that pacifism is against all war whether it be the reign of war or a war. Properly understood, pacifism is itself the campaign of a war, its real main-spring being not peace but justice for which man can have a feeling without knowing it and even before he knows what justice implies.

This feeling, which is instinctive, insists that justice at least must provide that all shall be treated impartially. Now, whatever his talents or virtue, the dictator proceeds by reason of

his own caprice, and his decisions are inevitably only arbitrary commands devoid of principle. But commands, as such, can never be synonymous with the administration of justice which requires that some common measure be applied to all men alike. This inexorable application of unswerving justice to all, regardless of place or position, is the first, and, perhaps, the only, universal aspect of justice. It is the one insistent demand made of authority, even the authority of kings, throughout the ages. The fool that saith in his heart "there is no God" is most often only the man whose reading of life tells him God is not impartial.

In short, to man justice at least implies a standard applicable to all, and this alone involves the reign of law. In the absence of any such standard among the nations and of a body to interpret that standard and apply it to particular cases, no war or any other international event can be considered either just or unjust.

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While to wage a war as a regular political method may be condemned as immoral, that is to say, less justified, than a war in self-defence, it is questionable whether all the events of any war could be considered morally "just" or "right"—whether even ethical justice could ever be secured by a method where the final arbitrament is by force.

Almost every one of us who crossed to France in August 1914 no doubt thought the British entry into the Great War was justified. Now, however, who can look back across that terrible scene of human sacrifice without at least some doubt on what ground it was *justified*? Does justification mean no more than worth while? If it was a war to end war, then, judged on this ground alone, it was not justified but tragically misconceived, for, until some far more dreadful lesson overtakes mankind than has yet been administered, each generation will insist on gathering its own experience in the matter. If, again, our entry into the Great War was justified in order to make the world safe for democracy, justice likewise miscarried, for, instead, it has thrown up a crop of dictatorships. If we fought in justice for our position on the seas, that posi-

tion we have lost. If we justified our action on the ground that it would maintain the inviolability of Belgium, there, too, justice was overwhelmed, for Belgium was despoiled. If justice to ourselves demanded the overthrow of German military arrogance, we but helped to take it from Germany to give it to France from whom Germany has since snatched it back. If our justification was to maintain the superior mentality of the Allies, then alas! we have to remember the Soviet "circus," the Stalin "purges," the Fascist "opportunism," the Hitlerian method of "Anschlag," of succeeding years—none of which can be said to be a better method, but only possibly more scientific than the 1914 Prussian frightfulness which, since then, has been perfected into the technique of the "Berchtesgaden touch."

We may have been "justified" in entering the Great War for reasons of self-preservation or for other similar and possibly good reasons, but the contention that it was a war demanded by justice or that it was a righteous war raises the difficulty that, for the majority of our enemy individuals likewise, it was "required by justice"—although a justice depending on a fortuitous issue!

An important result follows. If it is an error to speak of a just war then it is absurd to speak of the ensuing peace as a just peace for, however much the victorious nation may have thought it was in the right throughout, as we have seen, the proof on which side justice has lain is only proof by supremacy of force. The point, be it observed, which we here approach, is not that a war on this account is to be evaded—a consideration which will be reserved for the chapter on pacifism—but that, at the present moment, to talk of "justice" among the nations—whether the justice of war or the justice of force—is nonsensical. The Treaty of Versailles was certainly not unjust. The German Leviathan, it is true, has naturally tried to wriggle out of the War's verdict just as he tried to forestall defeat. Both are veritable war manoeuvres and, as we shall see, war continues on in peace.

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The variations in meaning attached to "justice" are not

always appreciated. Thus Bertrand Russell declares that peace is not possible without "social justice" between nations and between individuals, and that only through an equitable organization of the world's economic life can peace and justice and freedom be secured. Here clearly social justice means something peculiar to Bertrand Russell, his peculiarity differing from Stalin's as from Mr. Coles'—in short, it is a purely arbitrary view. Economic justice, of course, is not necessarily incompatible with legal justice which might conceivably administer Bertrand Russell's ideas of economic justice, or Rousseau's or Stalin's or, say, those of *The Economist*—ideas by no means harmonious. In any event it would not be justice if it were not impartially administered, and it could not be impartially administered without legislative and judicial machinery. Bertrand Russell, it is true, might seek to justify his economic views as alone "just" from the standpoint of certain principles of ethics sometimes referred to as absolute justice or again as the moral law. How economic justice differs from social justice he omits to inform us, but, presumably, impartiality can be predicted of both.

We arrive back at the truth, then, that the only justice that can be administered in the political society of this earth is legal justice the proverbial imperfections of which relate to the imperfectibility of man even when the man is a judge. That being so, impartiality, it may be objected, is only relative too.

So long, however, as the essential factor is present—a supreme power to enforce compliance and not a mere willingness to comply resting on volunteered consent that can be withdrawn any moment—this legal justice may be said to include economic justice or financial justice, or social justice, or working-class justice, or religious justice, or industrial justice, or farmers' justice, or capital levy justice or even authors' justice. Until they are applied and *administered*, any ideas of what is just are not forms of justice at all but only views. Here again we see why the emphasis must be on the *administration* of justice, for administration is an indispensable part of justice. Failure to recognize this is responsible for a

large part of the confused thinking and wishing upon the subject of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as for the confusion at present surrounding and concealing the problem of how to end war. As we saw in the preceding chapter, this *administration* of justice, that is to say, of legal justice, is without doubt the chief and direct purpose of the state. Indirectly that purpose is order and peace.

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To sum up, justice between men or between nations is indispensably dependent on the *administration* of law. There is war in peace because Leviathan, supreme in power and endowed therewith as a means to justice, pursues this objective in the domestic or national sphere which, however, is too narrow to contain the full reign of law. Beyond the national sphere, that is to say in the zone external to the frontiers of a state, the power of Leviathan, so far from serving justice, furthers war which is the eternal enemy of law whose realm, anarchy, it is the privilege of law to reclaim. Regarded in this aspect Leviathan is seen to be the personification of crude power, untamed, non-legal and usurping—in short, to be the spirit of war, the negation of law and the betrayer of man.

In the arena of the nations, there is, for the individuals of any particular state, no law beyond its boundaries because there is no supreme power above the Leviathans who wander there at large in the full arrogance of a strange conceit called illimitable sovereignty. For this condition of anarchy there are many reasons, but the chief is the obstructive and traditional nature of Leviathanic power itself, which, only with the arrival of totalitarian statehood has assumed its full menace. A new and terrible scourge has arrived on earth, a force of inconsummate evil, personified in Leviathan. Not merely passively obstructive of law, but, aware of his opportunity and of man's jeopardy, active for evil, Leviathan deliberately reconstructs his trust of power for law into one of making war both within and without the state; that is to say, Leviathan decides that the purpose of the state is war and not law and justice. That his decision alone becomes that

of a whole people is the scourge and evil of the Leviathanic Spirit incarnate in the totalitarian dictatorship.

How can Leviathan be restrained? A totalitarian dictatorship for total peace is conceivable, but the only totalitarianism so far is bellicose. There is, it is true, something called international law which we shall examine in the following chapter. Some theorists argue that international law is law so long as you remember that it is law not *over* states but *between* states. That, however, is but to indicate voluntary commitment that commits only until it is voluntarily violated; and that, as we have seen, is not law effective to deal with human nature, least of all human nature in Leviathan rampant.

No one, however, will be found rash enough to dispute that there is as yet no supreme power external to and overshadowing the national so-called sovereign state. And this is so for the very good reason that a sovereign state is considered one that acknowledges no state or authority above it—that is, a state claiming to be sole judge of its own cause and which could never for a moment acknowledge any such possibility as the administration of justice among the nations.

It is therefore no exaggeration to say that, according to the common conception, a sovereign state is conditioned by anarchy and defined in terms thereof. Thus there is no such thing as international justice or international law. Instead there is international war.

It becomes clear, therefore, that until the Leviathans of national governments combine and acknowledge a super-power for wider law, one or two things must occur: The Leviathans will continue to compete by bluff and battle until at last one is left supreme. Or, as catastrophe proves unendurable, probably in Europe to begin with, the people of the suffering nations will overwhelm their Leviathans and refashion them into a single Leviathan.

In either event, sooner or later, an end will be put to *fear* of any rival, there will be no need for *pride* because there will be no equal to be awed, and there will be no place or occasion for *ambition*—that third object of war—because at last supreme power will be unrivalled and, therefore, in its

appropriate sphere, supreme. That sphere is the human political society the purpose of which is to replace the reign of war by the reign of law. The reign of law is therefore effected by power as it is made effective by power.

Law, the governing purpose, requires that the human political society shall conform to the order of evolution by which alone that purpose can be fulfilled—the order of an ascending hierarchy of which only the widest and highest, the supra-national, can ensure peace. And that is the situation in fact.

What, then, emerges is firstly that no limitation—whether in scope or in form—is set to the development or extension of the human and political society; and secondly that statehood is merely the quality of that society in its varying forms. In a world which was fully peopled and sufficiently civilized at the outset of its creation, law might have had its beginning at the top of the pyramid and worked downward instead of at the bottom working upward. Then there might have been peace between the nations before there was peace between men. As things are there is no reason, whether of statehood, of nationality, or of sovereignty, why the reverse process should not similarly be completed. There is nothing sacrosanct or absolute about sovereignty to delay the arrival of supra-national justice, nor any desirable feature of statehood whatever that would suffer thereby.

The subject of statehood will be more fully considered in a later chapter—here it will be sufficient to emphasize the important truth that statehood, commonly supposed to be primarily a geographical entity, exists and operates beyond territorial frontiers, on the high seas, in the hearts of men. If adequate proof were needed of the inadequacy of the slipshod contrivances of Geneva claimed to represent and possess the effective instrumentality of law among the Leviathans, proof would be afforded by the fact that the Powers differ about nothing more than they do about the state itself, its significance, its purpose, its province, its illimitability. Such divergence representing, as it does, only one aspect of the vast international confusion, alone suffices to explain why a supreme power above the nations (not

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"between" them!) is as indispensable in the international scene as elsewhere. The shattering of common illusions obscuring these twin subjects, the state and sovereignty—which are nursed by none more than by politicians—is no less urgent in the cause of peace than is the shattering of illusions about justice.

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We have now considered all four categories of objectives of wars—pride, fear, ambition and justice. It is to be observed that the first three are among the chief propensities belonging to human nature, that they are located deep down among the instincts and that they derive not from man's reason but from the heart of his emotions. Yet what, besides reason, can check and control emotions?

It is also obvious that the *pride* may be made to appear worthy, the *fear* well-grounded and formidable, the *ambition* a matter of serious wrong demanding material, or usually economic, remedy. The fourth category, *justice*, is also an object emotionally coloured by feeling, but justice stirs the reason as well as the emotions and it is here that an important advance can be made. Having considered the meaning of justice one can reject as superficial and unintelligent any such statement as that wars will remain until social justice is conceded or economic redistribution made. Order and law have been maintained in countries where the economic situation is good and where it is bad. At the most, economic grounds are only a contributory issue of war, whereas the absence of the administration of justice—which alone could ensure the application of whatever scheme for economic equality was thought most desirable—is, as we have seen, the all-embracing cause of war and which the reign of law alone can replace.

Sometimes it is said that the cause of war is always psychological—which may mean that a man finds himself in a war because his temperament is warped, or that reason was nowhere consulted, or because, if consulted, that consultation decided on the war. Again, it may amount to no more than that man is only at his present stage in evolution

and not farther on, for, in its field, psychology includes both reason and the emotions. In the case of the Spanish grocers that lie dead facing the bodies of their shoe-maker compatriots, how much is the jargon of collectivism, syndicalism, democracy, fascism, communism, state socialism, or Bolshevism, responsible—and how much did the psychological element contribute to their fate? Is not human nature psychological? The conclusion is that any war is psychological because life is psychological, no more, no less.

Finally, it may be added that it is by their objects that wars are to be condemned just as it is by their causes that they are excused. So powerfully can emotions discolour facts and dominate reason and judgment that any cause—even the need for German and Italian military intervention in Spain—can easily be made by the propagandist to appear just.

So we come back everlastingly to the conclusion that justice, among the nations, is possible only in the same way that it has been found possible among men—by the reign of law presided over by supreme power. Accurately stated, then, the issue is not merely war or peace, nor yet is it war or justice. It is war or law.

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Before proceeding to consider the subject of international law it might be added that, besides the “causes” of wars referred to in the foregoing categories which, as I stated, are not exhaustive, there are other contributory causes of war such as the call to adventure or the release from boredom according to sanguineness of temperament.

False, indeed, is the glamour with which war has been traditionally invested. Throughout the history of western civilization right up to the Great War—and, in some countries, for instance Germany, more than ever since the War—the plastic mind of man has been moulded to regard war as a tremendous opportunity, as a worthy test, almost the supreme test, of manhood. To face as well as give “cold steel,” to survive or at least encounter the worst that can befall, this, it is declared, is to qualify for manhood and humanity! Some persons, particularly those who have never

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known war (and a few who have, when it is all over), confess experiencing a kind of ecstatic joy as war draws near, and declare it has a thrill that nothing else can give.

It must be admitted that the individual, especially if he is a worker in a city, is often attracted by the prospect that, along with the rest of a crowd of unknown persons, he will at last find himself suddenly jerked out from the dreadful groove he has too long been in—the prospect that he will behold the full sky on waking, the stars at night, and live among wind, sunshine and rain, not merely at week-ends, but all the time; moreover, that he will be called upon to face the Unknown—possibly that strangest of all Unknowns—Death. In accepting all this he is often dimly aware of following a long line of well-advertised high tradition. If an old soldier, he will not forget the pain, and the boredom, or the long nights and the end of leave.

There occur other thoughts and feelings by no means unpleasant. There is the novel, necessary surrender of will and consequent acceptance of semi-fatalism. He does not know where he will be sent, whether he will come through, and, if not, when or how he may fall. It is all an exciting gamble. But these vague feelings of strange elation at last wear off as the novelty of it all passes and gives place to monotony and fatigue and the depression that inevitably accompanies them.

But depression is a poor word to describe what follows as war-time drags on. It is in the first, the ecstatic, the emotional mood that men flock—and can even be made to stampede—to war. If, in any war fought as was the last, the infantry were allowed, after three months' fighting, to vote for or against its continuance, the war would probably end then and there—almost certainly if that period included the winter. By that time the old boredom and the old groove would have been considered infinitely preferable. Now that aircraft have arrived and war has become a struggle of a whole people against a whole people, this period may safely be shortened to a month. When, instead of the citizen going forth to war, war comes the whole way to the citizen in his home, then, instead of romantic adventure, there will, from the very outset, be only increased worry and complexity in

a life already difficult—a life, moreover, left in the same old groove except where this is changed by the course of a bomb. In such circumstances a few days might suffice.

On the other hand, although, while looking forward through the eyes of a combatant of the old style, there are moments of misgiving, the individual fighter meets each wave of fear with the instinctive self-prompting that he will, in all probability, be only one of a massed crowd of men. This, at any rate, was certainly so in the Great War. The future hour of impending hell loomed ahead, drew nearer, slowly but inevitably arrived and then went swiftly by, only, however, to be succeeded by another. But whatever hell lay ahead, it was usually hoped, at least before hostilities opened and when the full plunge had not yet been taken, that it would be a hell at least to be entered along with one's companions—the mental refuge not least of civilian soldiers and particularly of Continental soldiers whose imagination often surpasses ours.

As "peace" recedes and "war" advances, fanned by the breath of Leviathan and spreading from one to another the fever runs through the crowd until the sum of passion available is some multiple of the aggregate of the individual interacting hates which overflow into massed emotion that can suddenly but imperceptibly rise to the pitch of mob madness. Then, in a moment, the strange, the awful thing has happened, the point of view is fixed, the blinkers are on. Thereafter man, no longer man, but only an element without identity, fixed with countless others into a strange composite being, is aware only that his feet are moving automatically along with countless other feet inevitably towards war.

Later, it is true, there comes a reawakening when that once vaguely imagined reality of agony is at last actually witnessed as one after another falls—and the reawakening is even more abrupt if the agony is experienced. Thereafter fatigue, monotony, hunger and pain can be relied on to remove, in due course, the last trace of the war-fever and the blind determination which is its mood but which, however, rest, refreshment and, above all, victory, can nurse back.

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This is the fighting spirit which by all people is considered essential to victory. Could each of us leisurely view his ancestors shoulder to shoulder in a long line reaching out across Hyde Park, we should find them more filled with this same fighting spirit the further our walk of inspection continued. We, scarcely less than they were, are the products of a process of selection and survival governed by this principle of combativeness.

Thus has the fighting spirit been preserved. It is the main-spring of human nature which it has fashioned. By the instinctive emotion of this fighting-spirit, more, perhaps, than by anything else, we are linked in human nature to those strange beings of our remote ancestry who have never known us but whom, through ourselves, in some measure we can know. Tracing back this fighting spirit takes us farther along that long, strange line than many people would comfortably admit—past fighting savages of common blood with ours, their limbs shorter and sturdier, their chests broader and hairier, their faces coarser and less thoughtful, yet their eyes more watchful and alert than those of any human we have ever seen. Their fighting spirit having conditioned our very survival, we, their modern successors, while justly entitled to pride ourselves on its control, are dishonest if we deny that it still survives. Indeed the direction taken by western civilization has not tended to sublimate this quality, still less to eliminate it. On the contrary. Once aroused, the individual's fighting spirit is intensified by that of the mass.

Now reason and the fighting spirit do not well keep house together, and, if reason vacates, then the fighting spirit is left in sole charge. This is what happens when the "all in" moment draws near, at least after that nervous trembling and stomach-retching have passed and the blood-lust rises. Between the early bouts, however, it is not uncustomary to experience a deathly sickness—a respite during which reason clambers back and holds a survey. This is the after moment of the Happy Warrior whose fighting spirit, temporarily weary, must therefore, if the war unit is to be doubly efficient, be supplied purposefully beforehand with mechanical reserves. It can be re-aroused by further propaganda once the

individual, through habitual administrations, has become properly propaganda-minded.

At any time, when sufficiently aroused, men can be made to feel and act much alike; and, even when, after a course of intensive routine drill the fighting spirit becomes battle-weary and run down, it can be wound up again like any other machine. Even public opinion, it is now discovered, can be formed and re-formed and made to conform in whatever direction the reaction to it is desired by Leviathan.

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To recapitulate a little. There can be no absolute peace but to-day there is not even relative peace—there is only war in peace. While this dark side of human nature remains as it is in the world, the law of supreme power must likewise remain as a first condition of even relative order among nations as among men. From time to time this supreme order, which eventually will emerge among the nations, may be challenged, and riots, rebellions, and civil wars may still occur; but when this happens the centre of political gravity will shift and the supreme power will reassert itself.

Even relative peace, then, will not arrive at once. To end the prevailing anarchy among nations involves the transcending of nationalism. This surrender of nationalism will provide the supreme test of man's growth seeing that it constitutes the price of peace—a price which to the sub-human seems tremendous, but to the super-human pure gain. Peace, this relative peace, can be had only at this price. The payment of this price cannot be made or avoided by artifice but must be preceded, as it will be facilitated, by an adjustment in man himself. That price, so far, man has withheld. Nevertheless, it will have to be paid by the individual and by the nation alike. It may not be paid until man has advanced farther and has come face to face with that super-spectre of unspeakable terror in the nude—the organized, super-scientific violence of war personified in Leviathan no longer respectably camouflaged but unmasking at last the hideous shape he has possessed all along.

It is true that no individual can pay the price alone, but

what each one of us can do is to resolve singly that that price must be paid sooner or later. Moreover, seeing that by no subterfuge can there be avoided the final alternative of law or war, the sooner that price is paid the better.

The price of peace, then, is the price of law. Although, on the face of it, this grave alternative has that about it which stamps it as belonging to the stupendous design of the universe, yet there are those who think they can avoid the alternative and evade this inevitable test of human life on earth. Law, which man discovered and accepted as providing for his most pressing need of peace in order that he might work and live, now requires re-acknowledgment wider and deeper than ever. Vastly magnified, the ancient problem returns with a new and terrible urgency. Man, the Rebel, still wrestles with Man, the Spirit. It is the old contest between freedom to revolt in anarchy, and diminished liberty to live in peace.

The choice, either law or war, provides sure test of the growth of man's evolving spiritual nature engaged in the eternal contest with human nature—the new man measuring himself against the old.

It may be that this test supplies a necessity in the scheme of things even more urgent than man's direct quest for God which, indirectly, it furthers in so far as it depends on, and as it may have to await, sufficient development of human character. The test is an acid one the very acceptance of which is possible only to the unselfish, the courageous, the intelligent man who has once felt the truth that just here is the dilemma that he must risk his life to save it.

No less is the test a safeguard of freedom and liberation itself, for the spiritual growth required is that by which man comes to see that his progress lies not in the accumulation of rights and possessions, but in liberation from the old self discarded for the new. In order to survive the test, the human spirit must dispense with the measure of worldly possessions as the criterion of success and progress. It is therefore a test carrying some risk which man must accept if he is to prove worthy of peace.

War is utilized as a method to vindicate not man's right

to subsist among his fellows, but rather some prior right to exist before they exist. Blinded by the fear that this right—as is dinned into him by Leviathan—is in jeopardy, man fails to see that by war he is holding up the world-plan which alone could provide for his needs and his fellow-men's as well—a plan suspect by man unreformed because in it his individual priority is seen to disappear. And as with men so with nations.

Thus, only by recognizing the right of his fellows can man achieve his desires. His physical welfare comes after—because it is conditioned by—his spiritual well-being.

That is the eternal law. It is a law that can be accepted and obeyed only within the reign of law, just as it is rejected in the reign of war. It should by now be evident to grown and thoughtful human beings that, whatever else God is, at least He stands for law. And no less evident that law, whether as perceived in mathematics, in biology or in justice, is inexorable. And finally, that on law, as on nothing else, peace ultimately depends. Communism, therefore, may be expected to re-emerge vastly changed, and to survive not as a state-instituted war in peace, but only as a spiritual economic advance toward the world commonwealth of peace through law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

WE have seen that justice can be administered at all only in the reign of law which again is dependent on common and supreme power. If then, as at present, there is no such supreme power which any member, let alone the majority of the members of the family of nations, readily obeys, it follows that there cannot yet be said to be any administration of international justice whatever. Further the administration of legal justice—the only justice that can be *administered* among men—requires a law-giver, a court to administer the law and a supreme power to exact compliance.

None of these requisites will be found to be present in the international society to-day whose units, the component states, all insist, in effect, on retaining full power to act as they please and to be each one the sole judge of its own conduct.

But if, so far, no administration of justice between the nations has ever arrived, what is meant by international law? Is there any common meaning to the phrase? For instance not long ago when Mr. Winston Churchill declared that Germany, on the occasion of her re-occupation of the Rhineland, had flagrantly violated international law and must be dealt with appropriately, did the many who sprang forward to agree with him accept this statement as based on the British or the German view of international law as it is, or only on Mr. Winston Churchill's personal view of what international justice should be?

It is important to observe that the absence of a supreme power is wholly vitiatory and that, without it, international law is law only in name. On looking into the facts it will be found, as one would expect, that the Permanent Court of International Justice is regularly circumvented as a matter of course and that in vital matters it has no jurisdiction or

authority whatever. So far from there being a common measure of justice, each nation, in regard to any reserved question that is of importance, insists on applying its own criteria which, if the opportunity is sufficiently promising, it will compel others by force to accept.

That this is beyond dispute will appear on reference to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which was constituted under the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1921. This Court is often described as the nearest approach to a judicial body that has ever been set up in international affairs, for its purpose is to arrive at a decision in law whereas the object of the courts of arbitration that preceded it, and which are still available when desired, is compromise, each party being represented on the court of arbitration and the umpire's duty being to try to discover a formula acceptable to both.

To the layman the Permanent Court at first sight may appear to be almost, if not quite, perfect. In the first place, instead of the judges being merely judicially qualified employees of states, they are independent, "elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character and of recognized competence in international law," by the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations. So far as possible every care seems to have been taken to safeguard the independence of the judges and to make their position secure from the influence of any state or states. Being open to the members of the League as also to certain other states indicated in the annex to the Covenant, the Court thus reaches out beyond the League, its scope promising a usefulness world-wide. Unfortunately the imperfect design of the Court made it inevitably unserviceable, a further difficulty being that there is no law for it to administer. The flaws in its structure are not accidental in any way but were expressly inserted by common consent of the states lest their full-throated authority and fully-armed independence should become impaired. Let us consider the facts.

Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court is as follows:—

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"The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in Treaties and Conventions in force."

This Article means that any state has the right to refuse to allow any dispute in which it is involved or the question of the justice of any act it has committed to be considered by the Court. Now this is so because the whole body of international law has always been and still is permanently subordinated to a certain *paramount issue* and, when this issue arises or a state chooses to say it has arisen—whether in connection with the interpretation of a treaty or convention or in any other way—then the whole body of international law is thrown overboard at once.

Stated briefly this *paramount issue* is the preservation of the existence of the individual state. If a state chooses to say that its existence is in any way threatened, then, according to the present so-called international law, it may behave just as it likes and is freed of all obligation. This paramount issue of national existence is considered to include any "vital" issue—a phrase conveniently vague and comprehensive enough for any purpose. What would be the result if any individual could defy the law of the land every time he considered that some "vital issue" personal to himself was involved? The doctrine not only excuses but actually exploits war, for the preservation of the existence of a state nowadays is said to justify not only "preventive" war, but, for instance, a violation of neutrality in order the better to resist "threatened invasion." Equally well the principle might be considered to justify a wholly unprovoked war of aggression and conquest the unconcealed object of which would be to obtain territory for an overcrowded population, an outlet for unemployed capital, a port "vital" to effective defence, or even the colonies of another Power yielding raw products indispensable to success in war-waging.

Most of these objects, several of which, according to Mussolini, have been connected with the Italian spoliation and seizure of Abyssinia, are justified by the "authority" of Italian international lawyers and publicists. Accordingly,

such objects may be said to be supported by no less authority than that of so-called international law, Mr. Churchill's views notwithstanding.

To proceed. When it is said that any question relating to the state's welfare or existence—or to any other of its "vital interests" such as its prestige, or "its right to a place in the sun"—must remain outside the scope of "international law," this means merely that that particular brand of state ideology is set above the ideology of any other state. Thus the doctrine of "vital interests" at once precipitates the clash of ideologies and perpetuates the international anarchy. A parallel case within the state would arise if, when there arose between citizens a dispute that was about to involve a breach of the peace, either party could refuse to permit the court to intervene or to decide the dispute or to punish for the offence merely because such party chose to say that a vital interest of his was involved. If, for instance, he were accused of having committed murder, he might refuse the court jurisdiction on the ground that "his existence was in peril." Supposing again, a man were accused of a vast public swindle or an act of high treason to the state itself, he could, on the same ground, successfully contend that these were not justifiable issues because he had been actuated by motives of self-preservation. It is obvious that disaster would threaten the weak. Eventually, however, in order to remedy that weakness, the weak would combine to form superior power and the process of growing combinations would set in once more.

This but illustrates that the progress of law upon the earth depends on the widening process of larger and larger combinations. To this process a limit can effectively and permanently be nowhere set—neither at this or that faction nor even at the national state itself.

To the present day the retention of the doctrine that "vital interests must inevitably be reserved for the sole decision of the independent, sovereign state," is no chance survival of phraseology, but as deliberate and calculated a policy as anything could well be. Indeed, among the *exceptions* which stand out far more clearly than the "rules"

of international law, this principle of "*vital interests*" is clearest of all. It is a remarkable fact that from the earliest times it has been this one doctrine that all nations, whether conquerors or oppressed, have alike agreed about. To omit the reservation, it is true, would require men firstly to trust not only insignificant questions but also matters of first importance to the sense of justice in others—and this no nation has ever yet agreed to do. This fact shows that men have as many ideas of justice as the Chinese have gods, and shows also that the human nature in man is not above "passing off" as justice whatever his interests suggest.

Secondly, to abandon the reservation of vital interests means to forego the joy of battle and the prospect of victory with its resultant power. And man in the mass, no less than man the individual, takes instinctively to violence as final arbiter. His conviction that this will involve less risk of misfortune than if he were to chance the caprice of others or to trust to whatever mercy happens to be in men's minds, is one of the outstanding facts in the human story. Indeed, it is this very fact—the need for more power to repel ever increasing power—that has always been man's one incentive to wider union.

It is a little remarkable that he should so often have preferred the test of battle seeing that the outcome of quite a number of wars fought, at any rate in modern times, must have been fairly assured from the start. This further illustrates the human nature in man besides illustrating his instinctive knowledge and distrust of human nature in his fellow-beings. He prefers the risk—through defeat in war—of being left to the mercy of the unbridled will and mood of an elated, conceivably even of a bloodthirsty and unsatiated man-of-war to the risk of a judicial pronouncement, however imperfect, by a man-of-law. Except that the will of the community has intervened along with the supreme power of the community, the individual, when in the appropriate mood, might prefer that risk still.

Now the flaws inseparable from the human nature of the individual persist in every government but, as might be expected, most of all in the totalitarian form of dictatorship

where, having annexed the will of the remaining individuals, the individual dictator proclaims the common will to be whatever he finds most convenient. The peril of totalitarian dictatorship is not only that of imperfectible man assuming his own perfection which he dictates to others, but of independent criticism—and that means full exercise of independent reason—stifled in each individual. In effect it decrees that human nature shall govern man's heart and his head also.

Human nature, always competitive, combative and dissatisfied, is made the more so by the modern scene. Multiplied when aroused in the mob, it furnishes a vocation for the agitator, and becomes the routine instrument played on by the human nature of the enthroned dictator. If, at the outset of Italy's Ethiopian gorge, it could have been arranged for Mussolini, as a climax to one of his wordy bouts, to butcher a full thousand Abyssinians—men, women and children—with his own hand, it is probable that he would have been satisfied with considerably less of the country. What actually happened serves to illustrate the human nature less of Italians in general or yet of Mussolini in particular, than of man in authority uncontrolled.

The conclusion advances that the explanation of these modern demagogues is not altogether unpathological. Supercharged, suddenly discharged, and then as suddenly re-charged in the manner best calculated to fire excitement and incentive in the mob, the dictator's brain, sooner rather than later, must burn itself out. Thus decreasingly he becomes a vehicle of reason and increasingly a vehicle of emotion. Especially must this be so if the demagogue is an "office" dictator rather than a man of action; and doubly so if his method is chiefly bluff, for the strain of the actual conflict (whether its outcome is overthrow or triumph with satiation) is proverbially more restorative than if the only theatre of contest is in the mind. Still more restorative, of course, than a one-way programme of war is a two-way programme of war effort as a prelude to peace activities. For these reasons the present dictators in Europe are probably far less normal than are their military counterparts in

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Asia, just as they are far less efficient and able. Thus measured against the great constructive leader, the late Kemal Ataturk, the stature of Adolf Hitler immediately shrinks.

Again, the dictator increasingly shuns the broad road. His progression is along an ever-narrowing lane at the end of which—if usually the dictator's journey were not comparatively brief—there might be expected to await him stark insanity. It is a truism that man can bear disaster better than he can bear triumph and power. The modern dictator not only represents but personifies power or he would not be in a position to dictate. A wise dictatorship, firm but tolerant, is conceivable but, if the dictator is merely thrown up by a wave of violence, hardly likely. His human nature which, given free play, brought the dictator to power, keeps him there. Consequently more than any other ruler the totalitarian dictator personifies Leviathan. The "vital interests" he values before God or man are only his own. In his single hand the welfare of the people may be in gravest possible jeopardy for, in him, as nowhere else, human nature most unbridled can be least influenced by reason at the same moment as it is most furnished with opportunity.

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But while the dictator is far from being the only custodian of "vital interests," he certainly is the last to give them up. In short, "vital interests" constitute the first stupendous obstacle in the next advance towards peace. Their abandonment is part of the price of peace that so far man has withheld. They present one of the ultimate, acid tests of which the Supreme Intelligence that fashioned this world seemed to have been so fond—the sharp alternative into which sooner or later many of our agonized doubts resolve. By their treatment of "vital interests"—whether as catered for in the Covenant of the League, or in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice—the nations one and all fixed the fate of the League of Nations at birth. The simple story of the League's so-called failure is that whenever the "vital interests" of the supporting Powers have appeared to be

favourably affected thereby, those Powers have observed the Covenant but that otherwise they have ignored it, thus re-illuminating the Hobbesian truth that "covenants" without the supreme power "are but words."

In short, the nations tried to evade the unavoidable alternative of law or war. But no man can serve two masters. If not sooner, then later when the chaos has broadened and the disaster deepened, that alternative will be squarely met and a decision taken. As usual the right decision is the hard one.

The interesting thing is that the natural distrust of man for man, increased by competition with his neighbour, has at last come to be pooled, organized, and capitalized nowhere so much as at the instance of Leviathanic power which, instead of disintegrating that distrust, solidifies and intensifies it into an enmity, false and artificial, of one nation for another, at the worst blazing out into war, at the best smouldering in peace. It almost seems as though man's chief betrayer has discovered that, to some degree at least, hate, like love, after all is also a permanent function of humanity, but offers a far more bountiful opportunity for exploitation.

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It is by the blows of the usurping Leviathans and not on any rock representing the interests of the peoples that every design for peace hitherto has always finally been shattered. Instinctively from time to time men have turned their sickened gaze from the spectacle of human nature involved in unending war to that of human nature controlled by a single mistress of the nations. The day-dreams of thinkers, the night-dreams of men of action—Dante, Charlemagne, Karl Lamprecht, even Napoleon—were gropings, instinctive if accidental, towards the truth that only when the vital interests of provincial humanity are subordinated to the supreme vital interests of humanity at large can peace arrive. And few would doubt that this means peace. There must, therefore, be a cancelling out of all lesser vital interests that obstruct.

Here, turning again to the Permanent Court of Inter-

national Justice, we find that the supremely vital issue of each nation—international justice—is completely subordinated to lesser “vital interests” which are rigorously excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, even the question what are “vital interests” being reserved exclusively to the claimant state.

The Permanent Court has indeed been well shackled by the Leviathans. If, following a gigantic catastrophe, the whole paraphernalia of rival Governments in Europe with its dictators—military, economic, propagandist—and others were suddenly removed and replaced by a single control, how many of these vital interests would remain? To suggest, as Arthur Balfour suggested, that the nations required only to be satisfied that the Court would behave itself respectably before readily according their patronage, was to state no fact but only an unreal hope. No one knew better than Balfour that the Great Powers will not give up their “vital interests” because they have not yet learned to pay the price of peace. He knew, too, that as Edward Grey said, they must learn or perish. Now if Balfour had based his objections on the ground that so far there is no international law at all, or that, in Sir A. Zimmermann’s words, it is little more than a set of phrases for the convenience of the chancelleries of Europe, he would have introduced realism into an atmosphere of political untruth.

So long as men refuse to look facts in the face, so long will peace be no more than the dream that Von Moltke declared it to be. The people must be led to know and feel the truth that neither compulsory arbitration nor peace can be drawn one yard nearer by sentimental resolutions or fiery prayers when what is required is the seeming sacrifice of self-interests all of which could be well secured another way.

Leaving aside the question of the limit set to compulsory arbitration as a means to prevent war, it is obvious that the “vital interests” which individual nations have excluded from the Permanent Court and similarly from compulsory arbitration, are responsible for much of the chaos of international law which, as a consequence, represents not law but discord wholly unresolved.

In short, there is no single legal or political picture of the international scene but rather as many pictures of it as there are Powers and, consequently, facets of "vital interests." So long as each nation remains sole judge of interests alleged vital to it but which invariably, being international matters, concern another nation in its view no less vitally, war will be inevitable. Because what may be a vital advantage to one may be considered a vital disadvantage to another, vital interests dislocate the machinery of arbitration as much as they do the Permanent Court, for no nation will arbitrate unless upon terms of reference so wide that it can, if necessary, withdraw at will by declaring that such an interest suddenly appears to be involved.

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But war, as we have seen, is not always the outcome of disputes nor yet the result of arbitrations withheld. War may be the crude method of a coolly calculated policy of arrogance that, so far from condescending to argue or to declare war, at the chosen moment purposes, without apology, intimation or excuse, to effect conquest or appropriation by brute force. Anarchy such as this nothing but awe of superior power could ever restrain, yet anarchy no less than this has increasingly triumphed since the Great War.

On the other hand there are wars which arise through grievances that could be resolved only by accord, concession and legislation—grievances which the machinery of a judicial court alone could not remove, for the province of such is to adjudge what is and not recommend what ought to be. The latter purpose has, on occasion, been partly fulfilled, although imperfectly, by arbitral bodies which proceed by way of compromise. Such compromise will be reached if it reflects a bargain not too bad to be fought about, but it will be resisted if what is at stake makes the fighting worth while. As a weak Power cannot contest the matter in any case, it may be that occasions of compromise often reflect evenness of armed strength. The full remedy will be provided only when the state no longer enforces its will on another state by supreme power, but

conforms to legislative authority which can decree for that state and for others.

Lastly, there are wars arising out of disputes concerning the interpretation of rights and obligations. These most of all can be satisfactorily determined only by a court of justice applying rules and principles applicable to all nations without exception, just as the law of the state is applicable to all individuals alike. Further, even if the law has decreed in principle, an administrator of justice is needed to apply the principle to the concrete case.

It would be erroneous to suppose that vital interests represent the only question in so-called "international law" which each nation judges for itself. At present, on the contrary, it is hardly an overstatement to say that the whole body of international law means something entirely different to each nation, and that even the rules for the interpretation of treaties—whether bi-lateral or multi-lateral—are not common to all. It would not be too much to say that there are as many possible variations in the views of international law on any one principle as there are possible variations in the ambitions of all the states affected by any application of that principle. That is to say, international law is not even international desire but only national desire.

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Let us investigate the accuracy of this statement. In the first place we have discovered that the Permanent Court is permitted to adjudicate only those comparatively unimportant matters which the nations consider not worth fighting about. And now, bearing in mind the conflicting views of what international law is in all its wide confusion and vagueness, let us see how this senior court of international justice attempts to judge even those matters which are allowed to go before it at all and the successful adjudication of which, Arthur Balfour, and many others also, hoped would in good time result in "the various countries of the world" becoming "the more glad to put their disputes before it."

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice reads as follows:—

“The Court shall apply :

- (1) International conventions whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
- (2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
- (3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
- (4) Subject to the provisions of Article 59,¹ judicial decisions and the teachings of the *most highly qualified publicists* of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide *ex aequo et bono* if the parties agree thereto.

In the first place, be it observed, the Court is given the most formidable task of applying international conventions which include treaties between several states as well as between two. The imposing difficulties in the way of its discharging this duty satisfactorily, if at all, begin to appear when it is realized:—

- (a) That the meaning of a treaty is invariably obscure because, as there cannot be said to be any rule of international law a single interpretation of which is universally accepted by the nations, the difficulty confronting the draftsmen of any proposed treaty is, at the outset, insuperable.
- (b) In the circumstances above-mentioned, nations have a colourable excuse for insisting on the relevance of their meaning at the time of entering into the convention. Rarely two people mean precisely the same thing even when their interests do not clash. Where, however, the interests of nations clash—and they clash all the time in the reign of war—their meanings are inevitably and not surprisingly discovered to have differed from the start.
- (c) As there is no binding force to a treaty other than the conscience of the parties thereto, it follows that, when the consent dissolves, then the treaty (or agreement or convention) dissolves with it. This dissolution of consent is

¹ Article 59 stipulates that the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case.

considered permissible by some international theorists if circumstances have undergone any important change—the doctrine of *rebus stantibus*—that means a change which either party considers important. On the face of it any suggestion that consent exactly conforms to the complexion of circumstances is farcical especially as how far circumstances have changed is a question determined by each nation for itself.

- (d) Frequently a treaty believed to be in force has never been in force at all for the reason that it never meant the same thing to all parties, or else involved conflict which, with some underlying intention, was not disclosed at the time but kept in reserve for certain emergencies.

Now these difficulties, while grave enough in a bi-lateral treaty and doubly formidable in a general treaty, are nevertheless not altogether dissimilar from difficulties which present themselves to any court of the state, however much more weighty the treaty issues may appear. But if the state court can administer justice and overcome such difficulties only through enforcing compliance by the authority of the supreme power, then it is no ground for wonder that the Permanent Court of International Justice, stripped of essential authority and left powerless, remains paralysed.

As a make-weight there have been laboriously compiled an astonishing number of rules for the interpretation of treaties and generally for use in arriving at the purport of a treaty. Even these rules themselves, however, undergo variations and amplifications as they cross from state to state. Indeed, any treatise on the subject of the interpretation of treaties is as full of endless mutations as a book on international chess would be, supposing the rules regarding moves of the pieces were not the same in any two countries.

As illustrating that consensus of intention in international matters has been exploited from the earliest times, there is the story of Pericles who, having agreed to spare the lives of such of the enemy as laid down their arms (literally "laid down their iron and steel"), gave orders to kill all that had iron clasps to their cloaks; likewise the story of a Roman general who, having promised Antiochus to restore him half his fleet, caused each of the ships to be sawed in two;

and of Tamerlane who, after inducing a city to capitulate by promising not to shed blood, buried his prisoners alive instead.

By methods sometimes less crude but nevertheless in character with the illustrations just given, human nature has revealed itself throughout the long records of international disputes as prone to twist the meaning of a treaty in the direction of its advantages and, moreover, it is no less prone to do so now than it ever was. Modern instances may appear less startling but any difference is only superficial. Excuses such as that any other interpretation might involve the security of the state or imperil some vital interest, or that a change of circumstances since the treaty was signed renders the former interpretation no longer acceptable, are seized upon and presented as a reason—but the effort, which is to distort, is the same.

How pathetic is the notion that the above difficulties could ever be disposed of by the mere existence of rules in a system of abstract justice without a judiciary supported by supreme power to administer that justice! Many an agreement between citizens would be the subject of similar divergences and similar distinctions if there did not exist a court to decide what had been agreed.

It is to be observed that the Permanent Court of International Justice is directed next to apply international custom. With custom wrongly regarded as a law effective by itself alone without any support from the supreme power of the state, I have already dealt. It is necessary only to say that vagueness is inherent in the very nature of custom and, owing to this fact, the disparity between this man's and that man's view of a particular custom would, in any case, be an insuperable difficulty if there were no court empowered to decide what is any particular custom. The disparity between this nation's and that nation's view of a particular international custom or observance would, in any event, likewise require a Court to decide what the custom was. In short, for custom to be administered as law, there is more than ever need of a Court to declare it and likewise of a supreme power to enforce it.

It is not, however, until we come to the remaining rules for the Permanent Court's application that the sham of so-called international law is so apparent as scarcely to call for comment. They are:—

- (1) "The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;"
- (2) "The teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."

Here the doubt and vagueness are clearly infinite, nor could a wider opportunity for human nature be easily arranged. What "general principles of law" are "recognized" by civilized nations at all are recognized differently by each nation and also differently by the same nation, if necessary, on different occasions. The fundamental fact of disagreement underlying surface agreement upon a general principle can be conveniently considered with the considerable divergence that obviously exists between the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the nations." Indeed, not infrequently the more "highly qualified" (or advertised) the publicist, the less reconcilable is his teaching with that of other publicists. However that may be, there is an assortment of theoretical publicists wide enough to satisfy the need of the most progressive as well as the need of the most retrogressive of governments—even the totalitarian where the high qualifications of obedient publicists include an ingenuity typical of human nature in making some principle of international law fit every international crime.

On the other hand even our own "learned" and "highly qualified" British judges frequently differ in their views of the purport or application of some principle in the comparatively precise system of English law. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the philosophical views of theorists belonging to independent fully-sovereign Powers—independent no less but rather more about international law than anything else—are so far afield in the realm of abstraction that the principles as well as the professors may be accounted lost. The divergence of principle—where principle can be recognized at all—is unimportant beside the significant

accord with which the governments of all nations refuse to recognize a single yard of that realm of unreality. On the contrary, each government continues to pursue the direction judged most expedient and, so far from being influenced by the views of the theorists, merely selects therefrom for purposes of propaganda.

Some of Hobbes' views are over-stated, some reveal vital omissions, and others are no doubt wrong; but his main contention that, in the absence of the factor of force, at the present stage of civilization the voluntary compliance of mankind cannot be relied upon, is even more true of nations than it is of men. This is hardly surprising seeing that Leviathan is not more than man but, being human nature at full rein, a great deal less. It must be remembered that the manifold reasons even of educated men often lead to different conclusions, and therefore that, supposing it were possible to substitute the reason for the emotions, the administration of justice through the reign of law would remain indispensable.

Again, man does not invariably wish to pursue that which his reason or his belief tells him is right. Suppose, which is hardly conceivable, certain "highly qualified" publicists and ordinarily qualified politicians could devise a comprehensive system of broad principles readily applicable to every concrete case in accordance with recognized criteria of abstract justice, it is improbable that the majority of any large number of men, for instance, a nation, would be any the more inclined to accept the result as justice unless, of course, they were compelled.

* * * * *

From this new angle, the international, we now return to the question already in part considered: "What is Justice?" Is it a realizable right, a valuable right, an enforceable right? Or is it only a standard of human (as distinct from divine) conduct to be borne in mind, possibly to be approached, but never to be fully attained at all? Is it absolute or relative? Without a legal system, is any rule of conduct or guidance ever knowable beforehand by a nation any

more than by a man? And, if not knowable, is it just? It is not only the litigants who do not always know. The English High Court judges themselves often decide only after prolonged enquiry and even then their decisions are frequently upset on appeal.

The substance of the matter is that, as a guide of conduct in the modern complicated society—whether that society be national or international—there can be only legal justice; and, moreover, this does not consist merely of principles but involves their *administration*. It cannot be repeated too often that the *administration of justice is the distinguishing feature of the state* and that, without a state, there can be no justice because no such administration is possible. Without a supra-national state there can therefore be no supra-national or international law.

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It is important just here to distinguish two matters essentially different but frequently referred to as one both by publicists and others, with resulting confusion that obscures the path to peace:

(a) Theories of how law came to exist and of its place in philosophy as an important factor operating in human affairs.

(b) Hypothetical and general principles of law considered applicable to particular circumstances.

Grotius, the famous Dutch writer, born in 1583 and frequently called the father of international law, considered international law (the law of nations) as only that part of the law of nature which has received universal consent. *Grotius* maintained that the law of nature comprised all the principles of "natural Justice" so that he did not concede custom to be law unless it conformed to natural justice. Now, as natural justice means different things to different people, it is obvious that under such a system a nation might withdraw from any international agreement—whether Locarno or the Treaty of Versailles—on the ground that there has only recently been revealed the possibility of the agreement violating natural justice and that therefore it

must be held void from the start and retrospective adjustment made accordingly.

Puffendorf (1632-1694), a Heidelberg professor, who comes next, went further and, completely identifying the law of nations with the law of nature, logically considered consent not necessary at all. He denied that international law could be based on custom and treaties, maintaining that usages and customs only illustrated how the law of nature was expressing itself.

Wolff (1679-1754), another German "highly qualified publicist", held that international law was a study of ethics.

Bynkershoek (1673-1743), found that consent provided the necessary test, but as this made international law depend on whether this or that nation had consented, this question necessarily became widened into the further question whether a succeeding government, possibly diametrically opposed in political creed to its treaty-making predecessor, was really bound, and, if so bound, how far. Disputing all liability as a successor of former governments, the Soviet Government has frankly answered this question in the negative.

Klüber conceived the international society as a group of moral persons all anxious and willing to follow the right. He maintained that international law included only those rules which might be considered moral. But what is moral is a question no less wide than what is justice or what is truth.

"International Law," wrote *Heffter*, "can have neither lawgiver nor supreme judge since independent states acknowledge no superior human authority. Its sanction results from the moral of the universe which will not allow nations or individuals to be isolated from one another, the great tendency being the union of the human race into one great society."¹

Doubtlessly right in pointing out this tendency, *Heffter* was clearly wrong in implying that because a national state acknowledges no superior human authority, the farthest possible limit of the reign of law is the national state. No

¹ Edward Mousley: *The Place of International Law in Jurisprudence*, ch. ii.

state is absolutely independent. And, so far from the nations following the moral law uniformly there is not even uniformity in their immorality of disregarding it. Their very excuses clash.

Bluntschli and the later German writers continue the philosophic treatment of international law. *Bluntschli* declares international law is the sum of facts and principles "recognized" by the different states; that international law is not obligatory as it "necessarily exists"; and, being based on "human nature," it therefore exists for all nations. All persons being endowed with instincts of Right and the sense of Right, this, in *Bluntschli's* view, is sufficient basis to support international law.

Holtzendorff saw international law as an ethical plan moving athwart human society, while *Von Martens* saw it as a collection of rules through which nations could obtain "satisfaction" of their interest in their mutual relations.

Savigny, a conspicuous authority on Roman law, insisted that international law was and must remain indeterminate for it is moral, not positive, and its principles can be tested only by the consciousness of "right" common to mankind.

Bulmerincq conceived international law as the "crystallization of right and order" among the nations and believed its principles do not exist for the purpose of being carried into effect but are meant to "signify" only.

Lasson declared international law was neither law nor morality but comprised merely rules of custom. He argues:

"States as sovereign moral persons cannot be limbs of a law-abiding or custom-abiding community. . . . Between different states the struggle of Nature predominates. . . . The State orders its relationships with other States out of the necessity for peace. Compacts between the States are the expression of the reciprocal relations of power. . . . War is the means of obtaining a new agreement."¹

These teachings of the "highly qualified" publicists above-mentioned are a few of the thousands available to anyone who has the inclination to penetrate deeper into

¹ Lasson: *Prinzip und Zukunft des Völkerrecht*.

European literature. They all belong to what has been called the Continental School; all have been "recognized" sufficiently long for their "law" to be considered "settled"; and the conceptions of their successors reflect similar views.

Consider, for instance, the Continental *Oppenheim* who was Whewell Professor of International Law in my own time at Cambridge and who held that chair there before, during, and after the War. While stoutly denying that for him international law consisted of "national" principles known or unknown, observed or unobserved, nevertheless he was blindly and utterly uninterested in the fact that the so-called rules of international law are always persistently violated and ignored by the Powers. Actually his views bear a woolly resemblance to those of the "highly qualified" Continental publicists referred to above, most of whom are not concerned to inquire how far this or that rule, which it is contemplated applying to a specific concrete case, is settled law, or whether it has ever been observed at all, but are concerned only to deduce the rule from what they understand as a sort of international conscience without criteria of any sort. In regard to customs, conventions and treaties, they follow the opposite method of induction and, however crude or one-sided the custom or treaty may be, they declare it represents some moral principle of right by agreement and is therefore worthy to belong to that august system, the body of international law. Whatever absolute right amounts to no one knows, but it is fairly safe to assume that at least it is not something reflected by custom *qua* custom or treaty *qua* treaty. The only principle that a custom ever reflects is—whatever is, is. The principle that a treaty most often reflects in these days of calculated repudiation is—whatever seems to be, is not.

We will consider *Oppenheim* for a moment further because views like his, up to the outbreak of the World War and still echoing in our midst, have done immeasurable harm to the cause of peace by shirking the facts, by falsely reassuring the public, and by implying that no further price need be paid for peace. On the one hand *Oppenheim* not only threw

the whole influence of his professorial position on the side of those who maintain that war is respectable and inevitable, but he did so exultantly. On the other hand he was for ever insisting that so-called international rules and regulations were quite adequate for the safeguarding and regulating of war as of peace. It was as though, viewing war as a normal and indeed desirable function of healthy states, *Oppenheim* thought that the purpose of international law was not to replace war but to reflect it. At any rate men of his outlook have induced a good many people to rely on the observance of international rules not only in peace but in war; and, moreover, have encouraged men to console themselves that all the peace that is good for them can be had through international law as it is at present. Any such view is calculated to beguile humanity farther along the old, broad, tragic road of past centuries. It thus not only holds out a false security but obscures the truth that the price of peace is higher than is usually supposed, and that that price must be paid in advance.

Just before the War, on returning from one of my visits to Germany where I had been continuing my research upon this very problem of international law, I happened, in the course of conversation with *Oppenheim*, to refer to a passage in a book I had just written which advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the provisions of international law as regarded in Germany, the German army would not hesitate to violate the neutrality of Holland if the German Staff desired, say, to advance via the frontier at Bentheim, *and that therefore, to this extent, the ordinary doctrines of neutrality or neutralization could not be said to be any part of international law so far as Germany was concerned.* *Oppenheim* indignantly and sharply disagreed but, on my drawing to his attention a considerable cleavage between the views of certain German international lawyers and those of the German Staff, he insisted that, notwithstanding whatever might actually happen, neutrality rules, so far as Germany was concerned, were certainly part of international law for Germany had agreed that the basis of international law was agreement. To which I replied that this was not law at all but only a

voluntary agreement to pretend to consider something existed which did not.

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Now as the Statute not only allows but directs the Permanent Court to found its decisions upon, *inter alia*, the views of "highly justified publicists," and as *Oppenheim* has regularly been cited by British Government officials, including members of our diplomatic service and the legal and other advisers in our Foreign Office, as also by public men from time to time during recent years, it may be as well to examine a few of his utterances:—

- (1) "As within the boundaries of the modern State an armed contention between two or more citizens is illegal, public opinion has become convinced that arms contests between citizens are inconsistent with Municipal Law. Influenced by this fact, *fanatics of international peace*, as well as those innumerable individuals who cannot grasp the idea of a law between sovereign states, *frequently consider war and law inconsistent*. . . . It is not difficult to show *the absurdity* of this opinion. . . . Although with the outbreak of war all peaceable relations between the belligerents cease, there remains certain legal obligations and duties. . . . If they choose to go to war they *have to comply* with the rules laid down by International Law. . . . That International Law, if it could forbid war altogether would be a more perfect law than it is at present there is no doubt. Yet eternal peace is an impossibility in the conditions and circumstances under which mankind live and perhaps will have to live for ever, although eternal peace is certainly an ideal of civilization."¹
- (2) "Since *War is not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness*, International Law requests that belligerents comply with its rules in carrying on their military and naval operations." (After informing us that "illegitimate acts and omissions can be committed by belligerent governments themselves" and others, *Oppenheim* proceeds), "experience teaches that on the whole illegitimate acts and omissions of some kind or other committed by single soldiers are unavoidable during war, since the passions which are roused by and during war will always carry away single individuals."²
- (3) "Thus in time of war *belligerents have a right to violate one*

¹ *Oppenheim: International Law*, Vol. II, pp. 55-56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 254.

THE CONTEST

another's Personality in many ways; even annihilation of the vanquished State, through subjugation after conquest, is allowed. Thus, further, in time of peace as well as in time of war, such *violations of the Personality* of other States are excused as are *committed in self-preservation or through justified intervention.*"¹

(4) "Five morals can be said to be deduced from the history of the development of the Law of Nations. (A small sample of these morals will suffice)":

- (i) "The first and principal moral is that a law of nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium or balance of power between the members of the Family of Nations. If the Powers cannot keep one another in check no rules of law will have any force since an over powerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey the law." (It may even throw discretion to the winds.) "As there is not and never can be a central political authority above the sovereign states that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the Family of Nations from becoming omnipotent." (*Oppenheim* apparently could not grasp the idea that if one state were omnipotent it would not have to enforce international law against anyone. It would maintain the rule of law within its jurisdiction by supreme power as any state does to-day.)
- (ii) "The second moral is that International Law can develop progressively only when international politics, especially intervention, are made on the basis of real state interests." (He means something more substantial than the question of a dynasty.)
- (iii) "The third moral is that the principle of nationality is of such force that it is fruitless to try to stop the victory." (*Oppenheim* was a German Jew. Jews belong to and enrich every nation now except the German. This has been encompassed by Hitler, Austrian in nationality. If, for "principle of nationality" be substituted "principle of race," *Oppenheim's* view suffers still more.)²

Oppenheim complains that he cannot understand why Westlake recognizes custom and reason but not treaties as sources of international law. Westlake's answer would have been that custom is a source of law as, being a going concern, its momentum provides it with its own power of influencing

¹ *Oppenheim: International Law*, Vol. I, p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

men to follow it; also that reason is a source because, in the view of some people, the test of whether a rule can be regarded as part of international law is its reasonableness. A treaty on the other hand, being based merely on consent, is wholly dependent on the duration of consent, and therefore, in Westlake's view, is not international law. Such points as this, arising through the British habit of regarding law as a regulator of conduct instead of as a mere thought, *Oppenheim* dismissed as "controversial and unimportant," thereby revealing the closed orbit of his mind and the dilemma of the Permanent Court.

Let us suppose that a state, accused of violating some principle of international law, "reasons" that it has merely observed some ancient "custom." When the point arises whether the custom in question is part of the law or not, one "highly qualified publicist" will assert that it is, another will insist that it is merely a source of international law and not international law itself. *Oppenheim*, as another "highly qualified publicist," might then be cited in support of the astonishing view, impossible to anyone who has ever given serious thought to the subject, that custom is law apart from any approval of the judicature or other organ of sovereignty, the only point remaining being whether the culprit has varied the old custom or really begun a new one.

We cannot afford to pass over the contribution of *Oppenheim* as it discloses the type of mentality that has befogged and bedevilled the international scene for so long. Moreover, it is imperative to reveal the vast chasm separating the English school of jurisprudence from that of the Continental philosophizing "publicists" engrossed in personal theorizing and word-play without any reference to facts, the ground most common between them being the bland assertion that international law can be regarded as law and legally binding even if it is often, or, for that matter, invariably, broken. Indulging in fruitless inquiry possible only by investing law with a special meaning wholly inapplicable to the human political society, they ignore the insistent fact that so-called international law to-day neither binds, regulates, nor influences the Powers in any degree as ordinary state law

influences the individual, but, on the contrary, *is ignored by them at will* when they do not actually exploit it. Or, what comes to the same thing, international law is interpreted by each nation according to caprice or self-interests whether vital or otherwise. Further, the Continental publicist usually overlooks or chooses to ignore that, whatever his own conception of international law may be, the Powers will not take the same view of it. As a result there is shirked the practical question whether international law in its present form could ever be worth consideration as a legal system for the *administration* of justice.

The special British genius for governing is illustrated in its policy that right government is based not only on integrity of thought but on that of the forethought of the administrator—a further reason why the future Commonwealth of Nations may well have to be built on British scaffolding. Here also, in considering the alternative to war, the British emphasis may be expected to insist that it is with the question of the *administration* of justice that we are primarily concerned and not with theory. It is the practical Anglo-Saxon view of law as seen from the standpoint of the problem of actual government that puts the English jurist far ahead of his opposite number on the Continent who has been chiefly preoccupied with his own attitude in the contemplation of abstract justice. A remarkable fact tremendously responsible for the chaotic state of international law is that nowhere on the Continent is there any system of jurisprudence that approaches ours in realism. There, in a single step, one passes straight from state law into the province of philosophy. Their philosophers, Kant, Wolff, Leibnitz, Krauss, Hegel, Trendelburg, Fichte are represented in our literature of philosophy by Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Mill, Spencer. Continental legal literature, however, has nothing equal to the English line of Austin, Maine, Markby, Maitland, Holland, Pollock, Salmond—the English tradition which, in its criteria of truth, never loses sight of practice and fact. It is true that Hobbes' theory of a social contract is expressed in legal metaphor, but he would, and rightly, admit that its literal validity could not be established without reference to

actual history. His main theme that men have been proved to obey only that law which is based on supreme power in a human political society, is no literary roundabout but a photographic reflection of actual fact and which, moreover, has been reflected never more clearly than during these twenty years since the Armistice of the Great War.

Now in order to demonstrate that international law is perfectly good and proper law in every sense, and neither possesses force nor needs to be enforced, Oppenheim, instead of judging law by its supreme test of purpose—that of the replacing of war by the administration of justice—merely draws up an analogy between international law and what he calls customary law—an illicit test. Beginning with the English school's conception of "law as a body of rules for human conduct set and enforced by a sovereign political authority," Oppenheim rejects this conception because "it covers only the written or statute law within a state," and does not "cover that part of municipal law which is called written customary law."¹

Here Oppenheim's blundering assertion that it is only written law which is supported by the supreme force of the state exhibits not only profound ignorance of English jurisprudence but a bad lapse in reasoning. Now, if he had concerned himself with the consideration of the administration of justice more than with the contemplation of justice in the abstract, this error would not have been made. Oblivious of the world of practical affairs which might have shown him that he was astray, Oppenheim declares that some—

"... maintain that the customary law has the character of law only through the indirect recognition on the part of the State which is to be found in the fact that Courts of Justice apply customary in the same way as the written law and that the State does not prevent them from doing so."

This, he contends, is a fiction because, the courts of justice having no law-giving power, could not recognize unwritten rules as law if these rules were not law before that recog-

¹ Oppenheim. *International Law*, Vol. I, p. 5.

dition; and, he winds up, states *recognize unwritten rules of law only because courts of justice do so*.

This nonsense reveals the danger of guidance by a "highly qualified publicist" untravelled in the domains of jurisprudence and constitutional law. Here Oppenheim talks as though the state and the court are separate and rival concerns, now the state, now the court being superior. The right view is that the court of justice is an organ of sovereignty and articulates the will of the sovereign (the supreme power) in administering the law, just as the legislature articulates the will of the sovereign in making the law. The state, therefore, cannot be said to recognize what the court of law does, for it is the state itself that acts through the court of law. And one of the things it does is to pronounce that, in certain circumstances, conduct in conformity with custom shall be approved by the court as being in conformity with law. But it is because the court has so pronounced in similar cases and it is believed that this particular custom would probably be similarly considered if the necessity for judicial pronouncement should ever occur, that custom is sometimes thought to be a law unto itself.

Actually custom is merely an observance now approved, now disapproved by the courts which can, in certain circumstances, cause the custom to be discontinued forthwith. As far as the distinction between written and unwritten law goes, nothing turns on this whatever. The will of the state may be expressed verbally as well as in writing and the decisions of its court may be unknown to some and forgotten by others. Nor does it follow that such expressions of will or even such decisions are always or ever perfectly consistent. If there were behind international law any compelling power corresponding to that behind a custom approved by the state—such approval being either express or implied—it would be a happier world than it is, for a supreme power would have arrived above the nations and the reign of supra-national law might be said to have begun.

In short, while, as we have seen, the advance towards peace is an advance towards law, that must be genuine law and not a fake. It must be capable of being administered in

the world of everyday affairs, that is to say a law based on supreme force which is the only law that men will obey. If I have made this important truth clear then this excursion into jurisprudence will have been justified. The question how, if the law of supreme power is alone universally valid, the advance to law away from war should proceed from now on, will be dealt with in a later chapter.

At present, then, the individual teachings of the "most highly qualified publicists" among the nations—for the most part irreconcilable—are not in the least likely to result in any such common formula as would "immobilize" human nature. Nor is human nature itself a constant and calculable thing. On the contrary it is capable of infinite gradations and variations. It exists inevitably in the hearts and minds of all, even of "highly qualified publicists" for, consciously or unconsciously, man is for ever holding some brief. What brief this is depends on his environment, on his upbringing, his native language, the outlook of his set and, not least, on his inheritance—as, for instance, a confused medley of the law of war and of the law of philosophy all in one.

The following two fundamentally different but characteristic views illustrate how even "highly qualified publicists" can differ. One is Hall, the renowned English international lawyer, the other Oppenheim, of whom we have been speaking. The important thing, of course, is not that they differ but how much they differ.

The question which each writer was considering was the old wearisome theory that war is between states and not between individuals, the argument being that if the inhabitants of an occupied country are not enemies they have no business to resist the invader who, if they do resist, is justified in shooting them. In the words of Hall:—¹

"... the spontaneous rising of the population becomes a crime and the individual is a criminal who takes up arms without being formally enrolled in the regular armed forces of his state. The customs of war, no doubt, permit that such persons shall under certain circumstances be shot, and there are reasons for permitting the practice; but to allow that

¹ Hall: *International Law*, p. 69.

persons shall be intimidated for reasons of conscience from doing certain acts and to mark them as criminals if they do them, are wholly distinct things."

Then in a footnote, Hall refers to a certain speech by one Baron Lambermont, a speech that also happened to catch the eye of Oppenheim. Hall's note is as follows:—

"In speaking upon this point in 1874 Baron Lambermont, one of the Belgian delegates at the Conference of Brussels, said: 'Il y a des choses qui se font à la guerre, qui se feront toujours, et qui l'on bien accepter. Mais il s'agit ici de les convertir en lois, en prescriptions positives et internationales. Si des citoyens doivent être conduits au supplice pour avoir tenté de défendre leur pays au péril de la vie, il ne faut pas qu'ils trouvent inscrits sur le poteau au pied duquel ils seront fusillés l'article d'un Traité signé par leur propre gouvernement qui d'avance les condamnait à mort.'¹ The efforts (comments Hall) of some of the great military powers at the Conference to suppress the right of a population to defend itself were so sturdily resisted by several of the minor States that the draft rules originally proposed were modified, as a result of the discussion which took place, in a sense favourable to the right."

Oppenheim's comment on quoting the identical passage of Lambermont is as follows:—

"The high-sounding and well-meant words of Baron Lambermont . . . have no *raison d'être* in face of the fact that according to a generally recognized customary rule of International Law hostile acts on the part of private individuals are not acts of legitimate warfare and the offenders can be treated and punished as war criminals."²

It is clear that Hall regards war in an entirely different light from that in which Oppenheim does. The former writes regretfully that international law:

" . . . (firstly) . . . ought to mark out as plainly as municipal law what constitutes a wrong for which a remedy may be sought at law. (Secondly) It might also not unreasonably go on to discourage the commission of wrongs by investing a state seeking redress with special rights and by subjecting a wrongdoer to special disabilities."

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*: Miscell, No. 1, 1875, p. 92.

² Oppenheim: *International Law*, Vol. II, p. 62.

Hall says international law performs "to a certain degree but very imperfectly," and he goes on to point out that:

" . . . in most of the difficulties which arise between states, the grounds of quarrel, though they might probably be always brought into connexion with the wide fundamental principles of law, are too complex to be judged with any certainty by reference to them.

"And the second purpose, being destitute of judicial or administrative machinery, International Law does not even endeavour to attain."¹

Since Hall wrote that, the Powers have attempted to make, the phrase "Collective Security" perform what the phrase international law pretends to do.

Oppenheim, on the other hand, as we saw in his diatribe against the "fanatics of international peace" who "consider war and law inconsistent," appears very well satisfied with international law as it is and sees nothing much wrong in war either. After informing us that war "is a contention between states for the purpose of overpowering each other," he explains that:

" . . . victory is necessary in order to overpower the enemy; and it is this necessity which justifies all the indescribable horrors of war, the enormous sacrifices of human life and health and the unavoidable destruction of property and devastation of territory. . . . As war is a struggle for existence between States, no amount of individual suffering and misery can be regarded; the national existence and independence of the struggling state is a higher consideration than any individual well being."

Oppenheim not only justified war as the extended instrument of policy for normal use but here, as elsewhere, seems to have regarded its continuance as indispensable to the career of international law itself if not to the career of its professors.

"Political causes of war," he says, "may correctly be called just causes. Only such individuals as lack insight into history and human nature can, for instance, *defend the opinion that a war is unjust which has been caused by the desire for national*

¹ Hall: *International Law*, p. 60.

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*unity or by the desire to maintain the balance of power which is the basis of all International Law.”*¹

He finally arrives at the conclusion that the majority of the European wars during the nineteenth century were wars that were, from the standpoint of at least one of the belligerents, necessary and therefore just wars. If he had not been a Jew, Oppenheim might have been considered by the Nazis as the publicist “most highly qualified” of all for their propaganda. If, on the other hand, during his occupancy over a long period of years of the Whewell Chair of International Law in a famous English University, he had acquired a modicum of respect for the great line of English jurists—the most clear-sighted the world has seen—he might have helped to shatter, instead of striving to prolong, the deadly illusion that international law and international war can exist together—an illusion behind cover of which totalitarian Leviathan now prepares by national purge for an international scourge.

* * * * *

Now let us look at the proviso at the end of Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court which we have been considering. It runs, “this provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case *ex aequo et bono*, if the parties agree thereto.” That is to say, if the parties do not agree, then the conclusions of the Court shall not run along lines of equity but follow the precise path of international convention and customs and the principles of international law as recognized by civilized nations and the teachings of “highly qualified publicists.” This is just as well for, sharp as is the conflict between the irreconcilable teachings of publicists in regard to the present rules of international law, it would be nothing compared to the clash of their opinions in regard to rules of *international equity* which would involve pure speculation about the principles of abstract justice, the variations of the moral law and the nature of God.

¹ Oppenheim: *International Law*, Vol. I, p. 55.

It was none other than the Permanent Court of International Justice that incurred unpopularity over its decision in the Austrian-German Customs Union case, a decision obtained by one casting vote and in which the view of the "highly qualified" British jurist agreed with that of the "highly qualified" German jurist, but opposed that of the "highly qualified" French jurist. Later, Members of Parliament and others made a public attack on the Court and advocated, instead, a decision *ex aequo et bono*. This, of course, would have been not a judicial solution but a compromise, and compromises are usually determined by power.

Now it is to be observed that whereas the use made of equity by the English courts was to round off the hard corners of the Common law, the express introduction of equity in international law would merely impose vagueness on vagueness. To substitute for the machinery of the Permanent Court that of arbitration *ex aequo et bono* is but to provide the stronger power—or the power most prepared to risk all—with additional opportunity to "exploit" equity by insisting on a more favourable compromise. No system can bear the faintest semblance to legal justice if either party is allowed thus to meddle in the decision.

Nevertheless, with all its faults the Permanent Court is the nearest approach to a genuine international court that the world has ever seen for, in so far as principles of law or of equity are considered at all, they are considered by judges independent of and disinterested in the dispute. What frustrates any administration of justice by that Court is only the want of a supreme power behind the Permanent Court to compel disputants to submit their quarrel to it and to accept and abide by the award. This deficiency cannot be remedied by the reference to principles of equity as each nation, like each individual, has its own ideas of equity as of law. There remains the determination of questions of fact the very presumptions governing which are themselves highly debatable. These likewise indicate the indispensability of a single authority to decide, as of a supreme power to enforce compliance with the finding.

Apart from the application or *administration* of international

law, it is rarely possible, in its present chaotic state, even generally to know what rule so-called international law provides on any particular question. At the present moment one "authority" will hold that international law is no more than international custom, a second that it comprises merely treaty agreements (the substance of the treaty dissolving as the consent wanes), a third that the appropriate rule can be deduced from natural law, a fourth that all this material must be considered together before a true view can be taken. So long as each nation constitutes itself sole judge of the principles of international law and there is no single system of rules, no common meaning of a single term acceptable to all nations, in short, so long as there is no independent authority to resolve the doubts and differences and administer and enforce international law, so long will international law itself be merely a phrase.

* * * * *

Mr. Winston Churchill's statement, therefore, that Germany had violated international law by re-occupying the Rhineland, was unfounded, misleading and merely oracular. Indeed, the following argument might have been advanced by a German jurist with considerable "weight" of "international law" behind it:

Suppose that Germany had won the War and, dictating the peace, had denavalized British Channel ports from Bristol to London; that subsequently England, Germany, France and Italy had signed a treaty embodying principles of mutual esteem but directed towards the furtherance of peace; that later on Germany and France had signed a subsequent treaty directed against England in such a way as to upset England's defensive arrangements and possibly to a degree jeopardizing her existence; that although England had, from the very first, protested against the German-French treaty, the French, notwithstanding, had proceeded with it and, in the teeth of British opposition, had ratified it. If, acting on the advice of her defence experts, British warships overnight had then re-occupied the denavalized ports, this British action could have been

justified by international law—arguments, no doubt, fundamentally Leviathanic the only answer to which is, of course, the reply of power as Mr. Churchill so rightly sees.

It might be objected that, although international law is in an unsatisfactory state, nevertheless the proportion of wars that arise through legal points honestly taken is comparatively small. And this is probably true. It is, however, not the uncertainty of international law that is the fact of supreme importance, nor even its lack of power to require legal disputes to be submitted to it instead of being fought about, but its inability to ensure that, whatever the reason, the peace shall be kept and not be broken. Leviathan does not require a legal difference in order to maraud.

However imperfect and crude the body of international law happened to be, so long as there was a supreme power behind it, an imperfect court, even the Permanent Court itself, could work very well. And whether it worked well or indifferently there would be no war. Indeed, a court like the Permanent Court might proceed at once to resolve the difficulties of international law just as our state courts dispose of problems no less profound. The decision itself may be sound or unsound, but in either case it is effective in preventing the parties from fighting the issue out. Similarly a court fully empowered to decide and enforce its decision would immediately bring to an end the reign of anarchy in which each nation not only insists on being its own judge but tries to impose its judgment upon another.

Again, the farce of treaties being constantly repudiated because conventional international law cannot outstay consent would likewise at last be ended, for, if the treaty were thought to be obsolete, then it would have to be brought to an end by legal or judicial means—for instance, the Court might be asked for a Declaratory Judgment. At present this is effected by the arrogant announcement of any nation determined to exploit its armed power—a power as often as not built up by the money of the very nation whose treaty rights it is proposed to violate.

Further, the still more farcical fiction by which custom is mistaken for international law would also be over. Customs

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may be rational or irrational, stupid, outworn or even unjust. To define justice in terms of custom, therefore, is absurd. From one standpoint the *status quo*, which is never completely covered by express enactment, is custom.

Finally, there would be rediscovered the truth that nations, after all, comprise men, and that frequently it is but one pen, one mouth, one mind, one man that makes war. Over this man as over his compatriots, and as over the nations themselves, in order for there to be effective law it must be based on supreme power. This would be true international law, not *between* states that voluntarily agreed—a mere concord while the agreement lasted—but law imposed from above, beneath and around. What is imperative is irrevocable submission and not mere voluntary consent given, taken back, and given again according as the self-interest or caprice of the consenter determines from moment to moment.

To avoid making this irrevocable submission and, while outwardly agreeing, nevertheless to retain “full freedom of action” which includes making war on the other party to the agreement if necessary, the wit of man in his human nature has been much exercised throughout the centuries, the method conventionally acceptable being voluntary arrangements among the nations made by consent which can thus be withdrawn at will. These are commonly advertised by some as being a very good substitute for the reign of law, and are asserted by others (as for instance Mr. Attlee¹) to amount in themselves to “the rule of law.” Such voluntary arrangements are doubly convenient in that they can be utilized to represent the nation as respectably pacific yet leave it free enough to be bellicose if need arises. A fair illustration of such arrangements is that by which one Leviathan agrees with other Leviathans to limit its armament on condition that they limit theirs. What armament is we shall now proceed to consider. Already we know that it is as breath to Leviathan.

¹ See Conclusion, Sec. I.

ARMAMENT

THE confusion of thought on this subject under which the true issue has recently almost disappeared begins with the failure to appreciate that now war has become a contest between peoples and is no longer an affair of guns or men-of-war, henceforth armament must be conceded to reach the whole distance, in Sir Maurice Hankey's words, from "boots to battleships." Thus the term disarmament is misleading and for it we must substitute limitation of armament.

Again, limitation must be considered as including restriction in use as well as restriction in quantity or quality. Thus to restrict aeroplanes in any event from sinking merchantmen without first enabling provision to be made for the passengers and crew, is to limit that particular armament. It will be recognized at once that we are here back again already among the rules of war the violation of which, according to the degree of distress, has usually been accepted as a matter of course. The hard truth is that if nations could be got to agree on how to fight and could be made to keep to that agreement (vital interest or no vital interest) they could equally well be required to submit to arbitration without fighting.

It follows that the faith placed in agreement for limitation of armament as a peace factor and which exceeds that, for instance, placed in the hope for the observance of rules of war, is somewhat misplaced, for here no less than elsewhere all turns on the need of supreme power to exact compliance. In short, the inescapable alternative of law or war remains untouched by the question of the limitation of armament.

Armaments, the argument runs, must be limited if not abolished, firstly because they are the sinews of war, secondly

because, more than mere sinews, they are the arm of Leviathan himself which cannot continue indefinitely to threaten unless it occasionally strikes. And, armament including more than guns, it follows that Leviathan may be disarmed even if he holds the guns. A nation driven sufficiently far away from gold or, as a consequence of a falling currency, compelled to choose between food and munitions, may find itself disarmed no less than if its armies were cut off from their commissariat.

It is contended that, if nations lay down their military weapons, they will not be able to fight even if they so desire but that, in fact, once disarmed, they will not want to fight at all and so peace will have arrived. This is a wholly optimistic view of Leviathan who often presses for all-round disarmament in order to be able to win the race in armament.

In a contest against a rival people the mental, no less than the economic and physical, health of the community must be sustained. To ensure peace doubly by disarmament, therefore, would involve paralysing the whole life of a strong people as of her potential allies also. In order to disarm itself completely and put potential power for war—whether as combatant or as ally of a combatant—beyond its reach, a nation might have to commit not only military, naval and aerial suicide but economic suicide as well. On the other hand, experience shows that a defeated nation forcibly deprived of the engines of war or the ready means of war, instead of being really disarmed, merely builds up in its heart a resolution for war stronger than ever and a determination to make up for this partial disarmament at the first possible opportunity. True, a nation nationally pacifist may elect to disarm, but so far this has not been tried.

In short, the road to disarmament is not the road to peace at all. Disarmament is not substantial unless absolute and it cannot be absolute unless it includes submission. This submission must be to the reign of law which involves submission to a superior power. To disarm highwaymen is not to secure their submission. The reign of law involves something more than the disarming of the tribes, more than

the deprivation of weapons whether after or before the commission of a threatened crime.

Now the reign of law involves a substantial margin of certainty that the law will be kept. It can be kept only when the majority of the citizens co-operate. That there will always be deliberate law-breaking and chronic crime is highly probable. In any event the reign of law is supported by the majority, never by unanimity. It is, therefore, with a section of the community of nations, as of men, that a start must be made.

Here we catch a first glimpse of a fundamental flaw in any scheme for an international society which invites a universal membership that is more a matter of words than of conversion. Collected and unsorted Leviathans replete with the paraphernalia of Leviathanic power, vital interests and all, rarely hesitate to give paper undertakings to limit the quantity and quality of certain weapons or the occasions on which such may be used, not intending for a moment ever to observe those undertakings. The point to be observed here is that, just as this limitation in each case is self-imposed, so each nation is free to throw up such self-restraint when the occasion demands.

The League of Nations has only led us back to the Hobbesian truth that, human nature being what it is, a revocable consent to accept this or that principle is not enough. If, says Hobbes, men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, there would be no need of a coercive power. But even then they would, which Hobbes overlooks, have to rule themselves on *uniform* lines as otherwise they would be getting in one another's way. There would still have to be a directive intelligence. What, however, Hobbes rightly emphasizes is that compliance must be irrevocable. Under the reign of law man surrenders himself *irrevocably* to obey the law and to the system of the administration of justice. The first rule of that administration is that no man shall be sole judge of his own cause. Human nature explains that, too!

It is time to recognize that so-called disarmament, and *a fortiori* limitation of armament, instead of leading towards

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peace, leads away in so far as it postpones deciding the inescapable alternative, law or war. If the submission of nations to the reign of law is, indeed, sincere, then the greater the available force of each adherent the more is there augmented that supreme power which alone can uphold the law. If there is no such sincere submission, then limitation of armament may be a disservice to humanity because treacherously misleading man to think he can avoid payment of the price of peace. He who would befriend humanity in regard to war must endeavour to bring man face to face with the sharp alternative and with what it implies.

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Confronted by the perpetual nightmare of war that still overcasts his future as it has overshadowed his past, civilized man's feeling of helplessness against the forces of destiny is balanced by an instinctive prompting, all-preservative, that there must be a right way. In this mood he finds himself to-day once more at cross-roads the signs of which he looks at but cannot read. Much of this doubt and perplexity will fall away only when he learns to substitute law for peace as the only alternative to war. Once he sees this issue he will at least know where he stands. Then he will have to ask himself whether his anxiety after all goes no deeper than the wish to avoid the blood-red bloodshed part of war, or whether, logically and actually, his supreme concern is to substitute law for war in any form, whether that form be bayonet red, poison gas green, plague yellow, famine white or purple propaganda.

Here it is necessary to observe that, from the standpoint of Leviathan, armament is potential violence, just as we shall find later that, from the standpoint of law, it is potential power. A diplomatic victory will usually be found to have been secured through some consideration of strength somewhere of someone in war—strength existing or potential, including possibly even a superior readiness to take the field. This is borne out by every crisis since the World-War. It could not be otherwise seeing that, only with the arrival of a proper system of supranational law and an effective supra-

national court, will justice be administered and decision in law become possible. If not in the field of law, "political grounds" must lie within the field of war. At the moment, as we have seen, so-called international law even provides that certain disputes coming before the Permanent Court may be decided politically, that is to say on political grounds.

It is to be observed that a dispute may be politically viewed just as it may be legally viewed. Any dispute may be made to look political to the nation most advantaged by the avoidance of its legal aspect. The point is that the phrase "political grounds" implies that the standpoint taken is to be not that of the law but that of the power of one of the Powers; that is to say the decision must have regard to the power of this Power or the power of that Power. But true justice, the only justice, is blindfolded to all but the law and takes no need of the power of either party.

Thus whenever politics enter into the consideration it follows that armaments do likewise. It, therefore, may truly be said that in certain cases the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice is not only influenced by the factor of inferiority or superiority of armed strength but is based on it, for what factor is more political than armament and power to strike? Here then, are judges who do not administer justice but merely assess power, and by so doing themselves take a hand in the game of power-politics. To award the palm according to power is war, not law.

The German appropriation of Austria, like her re-occupation of the Rhineland and like France's invasion of the Ruhr, was effected by political methods on political grounds. In each case the initiative was taken after a calculation of warring forces. Apart altogether from any question of the rightness or otherwise of the decision of the Permanent Court in finding against Germany on the question of the Austrian-German Customs Union, it is obvious that Italy, on that occasion, would not have egged on France so successfully to thwart Germany unless both Italy and France had been re-armed.

In the years immediately preceding that event the self-willed obstinacy of the French Leviathan—amounting on

occasion almost to truculence—reflected accurately the degree of her military superiority over all combinations. One recalls at the Washington Limitation of Armament Conference her stiff-necked, if logical, attitude to the question of abolishing submarines; the occasion of her treacherous intervention on “political grounds” during the Chanak incident; and her persistent refusal to listen to reason on the subject of reparations and war debts. Who can forget her bellicose spirit shown frequently towards her old ally England throughout the post-war period, and culminating in her military sequestration of her gold hoard like any other war commodity before we went off the gold standard? Or her camouflaged, shamefully false propaganda campaign which no traveller round the world in those years could have failed to notice? Yet who will deny that in so doing France acted, according to her lights, as other nations acted before and since, merely on political grounds?

The truth is that in a crescendo of post-war effort France strove for power and its admission in men’s minds until her hegemonic strength, in any war that might befall her, overshadowed the whole political field of Europe. So soon as France began to lose that predominance of power it is not unnatural that her prestige too declined, for prestige is estimation based on potentiality in war. After France there came Italy who started the mass-production of prestige.

In 1930 Mussolini is said to have declared :

“There is a shout for peace but nothing more . . . the civilized world is assembling and reinforcing, day by day and piece by piece, a formidable war-machine. And while its hand is on the starting lever, it turns its head in the opposite direction to babble of peace. . . . The statesman who would place his trust in the abstract theories of peace and the demagogue speeches in parliaments and at Geneva would see his country unprepared if the next climax were to swamp Europe. The peace lambs would be devoured by the ravenous wolves.”¹

So Mussolini armed and decided to turn wolf.

The pacifists, whose attitude will be considered in a later

¹ Groves: *Behind the Smoke Screen*, p. 44.

chapter, have pondered on those words straight from the wolf's mouth but still do not consider their programme needs amendment. Since then the voice of Mussolini, drunk with power, has grown louder, his thirst increased and his mouth opened the wider the higher his armament pile has grown. Gone into training the Italian Leviathan informs the world, "This will I do, with the League or against the League." His olive branch, "sprouting from eight million bayonets," might seem within a razor's edge distance of pure farce or else a symptom of oncoming madness. Actually it is appropriate politics in a country whose personal leaders have always counted but the crowd hardly at all. But if the olive branch sprouting from his eight million bayonets produced only an olive apiece for his eight million stomachs, where would Mussolini be? So far Leviathan has not proved himself in economics but, the days of tribute and barter being over, he will now have to do so. Already the breach of his oath's pledge on marble never to devalue the lira proves Mussolini an indifferent prophet and incidentally reveals the Achilles heel of Leviathan.

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An appreciation of the changing contemporary political world scene inserted in a study like this which is not a survey of historical facts but of dynamic forces never so active as now, is permissible or tolerable only in so far as it illustrates some principle under examination or draws attention to some important factor overlooked. I have said that war exists in peace, that preparation for war is likewise war because "political" decisions—whether in the arbitration court or in the League or elsewhere—are based on the outcome of trial by ordeal; and, if this is actually not resorted to, its chances nevertheless are shrewdly assessed by military minds. The new outstanding fact is that competition in preparation for war (which, as we have seen, is a form of war) is primarily an economic contest. The economic view taken of political events cannot, therefore, fail to be of importance and it is interesting to note that, however much economists differ about other manifold problems of econo-

mics, their views show a surprising conformity in the conclusion that from an economic standpoint not only war but even victory is disastrous. Civilization is therefore perpetually weighted down with war.

As illustrating the Leviathanic angle of view across the economic as well as the political field, the following excerpts of the London *Economist* (November 21, 1936) will serve:

- (a) "On the face of it, there is nothing new in the alignment (German-Japanese-Italian) of the three 'dissatisfied' Great Powers. They are all thoroughly anti-democratic. Two of them have been convicted of wantonly levying war in open contravention of international commitments which they freely entered into; the third has elevated unilateral acts of might and shock tactics to the level of a fine art. They all deny the principles of collective security and progress by negotiation as enshrined in the League Covenant; and they all demand that they should be the judges, not only in their own cause but also in that of others. For all these reasons, long grown familiar, the world has unanimously refused to accept this week's statement of their united front against 'Communism' as the be-all and end-all of their policy.
- (b) "Financially, these *three confederates* are the weakest of the *Great Powers*. At the same time, they are all spending on armaments a far larger proportion of their national resources than is being spent by this country, France, the United States, or the U.S.S.R. It is no exaggeration to say that in Germany, Italy and Japan to-day the armaments industry has swallowed up all the others. Since such an economy can only be maintained at the price of a progressive depression of the standard of living of the whole population of a country that lives in this way, the sacrifices that have to be demanded without respite must be justified by perpetually repeated demonstrations that they are a necessary insurance against some terrible danger—Communism. These enormous political drafts upon popular credulity and hysteria cannot, however, be drawn ad infinitum without occasional payments on account, like the Japanese militarists' adventure in Manchuria and Mussolini's adventure in Abyssinia. And while these two examples make it clear that the dictators are anxious to keep the necessary payments within limits and to choose the easiest options, at the same time it is plain that in the nature of the case their inevitable payments are bound to become progressively larger.

- (c) "*Herr Hitler's Newest Exploit.* As is now becoming habitual at week-ends, the German Government informed the other Governments concerned last Saturday that it was denouncing some more articles of the Versailles Treaty. This time they were those which establish special international régimes for certain inland waterways that run partly or wholly through German territory. The Note gave an assurance that, on the German sections of these waterways Germany would still abstain from all discrimination in the treatment of German and foreign shipping—subject to reciprocal treatment being accorded to German shipping. There is an extraordinary wantonness in Herr Hitler's procedure in this case, since the door which he has thus staved-in was on the point of being opened to him voluntarily. The treaty régime on the two most important of the rivers in question—the Rhine and the Elbe—has in fact been modified at Germany's instance and to meet her wishes, through voluntary concessions by the other parties; and the facts about these successful negotiations were brought out in a reply by Mr. Eden to a question in the House of Commons on Monday. In regard to the Rhine, the negotiations were started, at Germany's desire, some two years ago, and notwithstanding the shock produced by the Act of March 7th, a new Rhine Convention was initialled in May by all parties except the Netherlands, and was to have come into force at the beginning of the New Year. (The Dutch objections were purely technical, and would no doubt have been overcome.) In regard to the Elbe, again, we comment on the Czech position in the succeeding Note—a new agreement, likewise on the eve of coming into force, had been negotiated directly between Germany and Czechoslovakia. We cannot avoid the conclusion that Herr Hitler rushed in to batter the door down just because he now knew that it would open of itself if he did not look sharp. This conclusion is deeply disquieting. *It confirms the suspicion that some half-yearly act of treaty breaking is a necessity for the Fuhrer's system of internal government in the Third Reich.* If Herr Hitler lives to the normal age, he will have to find nearly fifty more acts of the kind! Is it conceivable that he can devise fifty harmless ones? And how can we believe the word of a ruler who, on May 21st, in reference to what he had just done on March 7th, declared publicly that, thenceforth, Germany would 'only carry out by means of peaceable understanding such revisions as will be inevitable in the course of time?'"

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Only a year or two ago Germany was supposed to be completely disarmed. The speed of her intensive effort now shows that, if all had been disarmed, Germany would have won with the best "civilian line." In a world "disarmed" but still in anarchy, democracy could enter any such race only at a great disadvantage.

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An important truth often overlooked is that the reign of law does not arrive all at once but follows an expanding process; and that, for a long time, power will therefore be necessary to repulse armed hostility in the untamed wild of anarchy existing beyond the reign of law. Eventually, it is true, the reign of law must extend universally. If mankind lived on islands all far apart from one another and not intercommunicable—that is each a detached world of its own in a self-enclosed system—then a supreme Leviathan apiece might not have been amiss! But this is not the case. On the contrary, whether regarded politically or economically, the world is even now really a unit, and the Hobbesian axiom applies not only to the individual but to all Leviathans and factions existing within that world unit. They too must submit to the law. Law, in the human political society, whatever its zone, demands supremacy of power. In the zone of "international law" there can ultimately be no more than a single supra-Leviathan.

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It is an illusion, no doubt sincere in the case of some pacifists but pretended in the case of others, that peace can be secured or brought nearer by monkeying with armaments. They say in one breath that war is so dreadful as to justify the subject in obstructing and, if possible, frustrating the state's every action of war, but in their next breath argue that the conduct of war cannot be efficient unless the users' production of armament is nationalized and private manufacture abolished.

Pacifism which we shall consider in turn, is, nevertheless, a subject of great importance that is too often considered

one fit only for day-dreamers and obsessed fanatics. The great majority of people have not thought at all deeply about it and have allowed their conclusions to be formed by the slogan-phrase of some public man. Nor can many of them be expected to think their way any distance into the problem without some intelligent guidance among salient facts. If a place is to be found in English responsible opinion and policy for the honest pacifist view of non-violence, then something more than a mere case by assertion should be made out. It is regrettable that, as an appeal to reason, the bulk of pacifist current literature is unconvincing however much it may be thought to score as "corrective" propaganda. And propaganda of this sort can hardly fail to intensify the international competition in lying, just as the policy of "preventive" war cannot fail to lead to a competition in armaments. Only half-convinced and still half-bewildered, a good many people think that the safest conclusion to settle upon is that of a mild form of pacifism—and similarly, instead of disarmament, only mild limitation of armament, thus putting the responsibility for manufacturing armament as far away as possible.

A study of the material facts seems to lead to the following conclusions:

- (1) Limitation of armament, whenever actually achieved, usually has been dictated principally by economic factors and not by any genuine desire for peace. Nor can the argument be dismissed out of hand that in this respect limitation is a device whereby a nation preserves the game of war while pretending to be revolted by it—such limitations of armament agreed upon all round being merely a sort of mutual professional arrangement like the regulations of professional League football.
- (2) That wherever (to whatever extent) the nationalization of the arms' industry has been instituted as an integral part of the political system of any state whether totalitarian, democratic, communistic or fascist, in no single case does it appear that any moral or pacifist purpose was intended to be pursued thereby but only the mobilization of the whole will-power and resources of the state. That is to say nationalization has been instituted, having regard to local difficulty, in order to further the purpose of war and not to diminish the chances of its success. It

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has been so adopted as a war measure and not as a peace measure. This is the case to-day in France.

- (3) That just as we found false meanings have become attached to terms such as justice, war, peace, international law, democracy, so, on a little consideration, we shall find that the word pacifist is almost the most misused of all, and that the price of peace is greater than the ordinary pacifist is prepared to pay. Further, that the question who is to make the weapons is trivial and quite beside the only real issue which confronts the true pacifist and all mankind—an issue which false pacifism obscures—the straight issue of law or war.

The stand taken by many pacifists is really no more than a stand taken for a variation of method within the reign of *war*. It is preoccupation with means of power rather than with its end and purpose, an end upon which, nevertheless, almost all who are not abnormal in mentality are agreed. I say almost, as some pacifists seem the exception. In over-concentrating on the means, a certain kind of pacifism tends to defeat the end by overlooking that the end is not peace itself but freedom for the growth of the human spirit to which the reign of law is essential because only through law can war cease, while it is in war that that spirit is most denied. Actually peace, as in current usage, is a misleading term because really negative although understood as positive. If it means anything it means the negation of war. But there is not, and never can be, mere negation of war. Law, which alone displaces war, while still not the final end, is the immediate end; and law is a positive means, indeed one of the most positive conceivable.

The reign of law involves issues as immensely greater than that of the abolition of private manufacture of arms as the sacrifice demanded is greater. It implies nothing less than the administration of supra-national justice supported by a supremacy of real power, power none the less real because its control centre may never be precisely ascertained any more than is the swinging centre of political gravity.

The sooner the truth is recognized that peace does not equate war, the sooner will there be quickened that process in which, with adjusted mentality, man will gather courage

to face calmly the price of ultimate peace and cease trying to evade its payment by devices like the limited use of armaments, the excepting of vital interests from the reign of law, the Government manufacture instead of the private manufacture of arms. How could such convenient evasiveness, such artful "hedging" of the inescapable risk ever find a place in the one clear pattern that runs through the whole warp and woof of human story—that man must first find the alternative, then face it and decide?

The choice confronting him now is only a varied form of that which has recurred through the centuries in the lives of the nations as of individuals. In a later chapter we shall find it is that of God or Caesar, God or Mammon! The principle or the possession! For Me or against Me! The life given or the life lost! On looking closer all these alternatives are seen to grow out of the alternative, law or war, and to make identical demand upon the spirit of man.

It becomes clear that our approach towards the Heavenly City is conditioned by a change within ourselves. As, bit by bit, man sheds his self-interest, his self-pity, his self-centredness, so, on the farther side of irony and cynicism, of fear alternating with cruelty, of doped reason and returning despair, will he one day be able to look back on the present gloomy scene in the human story as a setting indispensable to the purpose of man's suffering on earth—the development of human character which is measured by man's recognition of fundamental alternatives and by his unaided and right choice between them.

Now the nature of the private gain which is won by man's right choice of alternatives is self-liberation and this, there can be no doubt, is more important than peace, particularly the peace of the jungle. What is the liberation and what essentially the self we shall consider later. Meanwhile it is clear that man cannot climb to heaven while he remains wholly on earth. He cannot, while saying yea as a political member of his nation, say nay in his soul and yet hope to escape, for this would not be self-liberation but entanglement. The state, the nation, these are the conveniences of humanity, not its soul. That limitation of armament, the subject of this

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chapter, is regarded by some as the nearest approach to peace that can be hoped for, is evidence of the acceptance of the hypocrisy of human nature. The minimum of armament must be that ensuring supremacy of power for law over power for war.

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But, asks someone, if war is evil, is it not better to limit war by limiting armaments? The answer is that, with the advent of aircraft, warfare has become less limitable than ever now that war is not an affair to be settled between armies, but a "Völkerkrieg"—a war of peoples. More than ever the alternative has now become law or war, and not war more or less.

Already, as nothing hitherto has done, the new factor of aircraft, sinister and incalculable, promises to influence man towards the right choice of alternative. All things seem to be working to the end that now he will be forced to decide and that new progress towards peace will take place in the not distant future. It may be that at this very moment the hopes for peace are in one of the last, deep depressions, but are due soon to be borne up and onward upon the crest of a great wave. It is probable that the advance towards law will be made by spasmodic spurts of prepared power as favourable opportunity occurs between the surge and re-surge of war. But what is certain is that, on each occasion, the territory newly won will need consolidation against hostile forces, and that, even when hostilities cease, any advantage gained will dissolve unless the advance is held. It will be opposed by armament in all its modern manifestations of power.

The advance cannot be held without all-round power, physical, mental, and spiritual. In the first place knowledge is power, and knowledge comes with education. It is, therefore, with education that the advance begins. It should be brought home to man that he must repulse war not only because it is dreadful but because the demand of modern life is that men must co-operate to exist at all—a fact that may yet prove to be not the least of the compensation for the elaborate

drawbacks of present-day civilization. It follows that if the necessary, organized co-operative effort proves impossible among the democracies, then civilization will fall to the sole keeping of the dictatorship. Armament being power and power involving obedience, organization and direction, it can be recognized here how only law can win in the end.

It may be contended that while a totalitarian dictatorship stands for war, still, no less within its frontiers, it stands for law, and that, in striving to expand and impose its will on others, such a dictatorship may also be regarded as a widening circle of law. In one sense that is true. Even Leviathan is dependent on law in order to wage war. Stated at its highest the case for non-violence—the negation of armament and which we shall consider shortly in the chapter on pacifism—is that Leviathan has only to be given free passage and fullest room for expansion in order for the reign of law—albeit Leviathanic law—to extend, world-wide; but that, at this point, Leviathan would die because, existing for war, there would be no one left to conquer, and the world would make way for new and better management.

There is something to be said for this argument which apparently contains the private hope of the vast majority of German men and women. The fatal disadvantage, however, would come from what had happened to man in the meantime. Eventually there might be peace but it would be the peace of death, for, as Leviathan became more and more totalitarian, there would, at the end, be no minority whatever because all men would be the same—devoid of the human spirit, de-created and pro-created and re-created for war, a prospect far more dreadful even than is the outlook to-day. With no more wars to fight, the hundred per cent pure spawn of Leviathan would obviously have to fight among themselves.

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The supreme end, then, is not peace nor yet war, but something else which only democracy and not a dictatorship is supposed to preserve. Nothing is possible, however, without law which alone presupposes power and preserves it.

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Pacifism therefore is only the peace of the reign of war before which it bows. To be properly understood, pacifism, as we shall find, must justify itself and be examined less in relation to war than in relation to law. Properly understood armament must be regarded not only as the means of violence at the service of war but as the means of power at the service of law.

These things the rank and file of the nations must be led to understand. At present they are misled and made to misunderstand, partly through the crass ignorance of those who presume to lead them, but chiefly through the deliberate and purposeful suppression of fact and truth brought about by modern Leviathans for ulterior ends. This is achieved by what is called propaganda, the antidote to which is sometimes said to be contra-propaganda. Now the evil of propaganda is partly that, in sequestering the reason of men, it stultifies their mental and also their spiritual growth; but chiefly that its end is war. Propaganda, the most modern and almost the most formidable form of armament, can reinforce the fighting spirit of one's own people or weaken that of the enemy. It can even invent a cause for war, an excuse for conquest, and a reason for defeat. While this power may be equated by contra-propaganda, it can be eclipsed only by the power of knowledge through education.

Now the education of the public might well begin with the shattering, once and for ever, of the notion that international limitation of armament makes any substantial advance towards ultimate peace, when the most that it can do is to leave matters as they are. Indeed, in one aspect, it may be regarded as an influence against ultimate peace inasmuch as it tries to regulate war, to rationalize it, and even to stabilize it on an economic basis. In the same way elaborate rules of war—certain to be violated in the future just as they have always been violated in the past—may be said to have served not peace but war by lending it a convenient respectability and by obscuring the real issue.

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A further illustration of misleading the people is the

proposal, as a peace factor, for the state to take over all activities connected with armaments of whatsoever kind. Here a state monopoly is recommended as likely to remove one of the chief causes of war, to prevent many wars arising at all, to diminish the horrors of war, and incidentally to remove from our midst businesses and business men of a standard of morality alleged to be considerably lower than the average. False reasoning, falsely presented evidence, emotional lying and inverted truth, together with the subtle artifice of the propagandist are nowhere better illustrated than in a study of this particular campaign against the private manufacture of arms—a campaign that also has helped to bury the real issue and which has misled a good many of the less thoughtful and more sentimental of our public men.

It is no excuse that the harm caused by most of the disseminators was unintentional. As low stooping propaganda considered likely to assist the advance towards peace there might have been some question of its justifiability. But a little consideration shows that this quack remedy is worse than harmless and that it would eventually divert the very seekers of peace along the road to war.

It is not necessary to enter here into that controversy—the private versus the government manufacture of arms—except in so far as may serve to illustrate the confusion surrounding this whole question of armament considered as a factor the removal of which might promote peace. The evidence taken before the Royal Commission and also the findings of that body only confirm what was already obvious to those who had thought upon the subject. The simple truth is that just as the question of the nationalization of the arms industry turns on the larger issue of the general nationalization of everything within the state, so the abolition of private manufacture as *a move towards peace* turns on the larger issue of the abolition of all means of defence whatsoever, even psychological. That is to say disarmament implies pacifism, thoroughgoing and absolute. Full pacifism and nothing less is the only honest rôle for those who pretend to secure peace whether by ceasing to manufacture arma-

ments privately and buying it from the surplus store of some Leviathan, or by preparing for a bacterial contest. For the most part those who have advocated nationalization of the arms industry, instead of appealing to reason with a reasoned case, appeal only to men's emotions just as do the war-mongers. While clinging to pacifism they lure well-intentioned peace-lovers down a side path which, with devil's advocacy, they then declare will lead to "greater efficiency in war"—a war, it must be assumed, which they will leave others to fight.

There can be little doubt in the mind of any man of the world who cares enough for peace to investigate and consider the facts, that, so far from making for greater efficiency in war, such government manufacture at any time in England and at this important hour most of all, would restrict our liberty to follow whatever seemed the most expedient path in the interests of peace. It is possible that it might, by our confusion and enfeeblement, impair the prospect of England's forming the vanguard of the advance towards the reign of law that lies afar off at the end of that untaken road.

Some pacifists represent merely Method, just as do the Leviathans, and would not be above ensnaring us into catastrophe to be encompassed by an all round nationalization of "armament." Others, in their misdirected zeal, are merely blind to the risk to which their proposal would expose us—the dreadful risk that the reign of peace might be indefinitely delayed because, in a decisive war, England would have succumbed.

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The hot-gospellers who preach nationalization of the arm's industry more fervidly than they pray against war—just as others look to the passive Covenant of the League rather than bestir themselves for a positive alternative to war—point out that in several countries in Europe some measure of nationalization of armament has already taken place, for instance, Russia, Germany, and now Italy. But these are all totalitarian states where state nationalization is the rule and not the exception.

In France the only song of nationalization comes from the cannon's mouth, not from pacifism. In so far as her government is assuming control of the manufacture of arms, France, always nearer to a Continental war than we are, is at the moment (1938) actually putting her house in order, that is all. In effect she is mobilizing, not nationalizing, her resources of armament and industry, as Germany and Italy have already done. She sees over one frontier people who have twice invaded and laid waste her territory, a whole nation, largely unaware of it, now being moved forward as one man towards war, and developing instantaneous striking power. Across another frontier France sees a country likewise ready and not yet wholly disillusioned but about whom she has herself been disillusioned. She sees these two countries forming large-scale "pincers" preparing in certain events to "pincer" her, in other events to "pincer" someone else. In her own free land France sees herself confronted less by the price of peace than of democracy—disunion and open hostility between her rival factions. Strikes, both stay in and lock out, jeopardise the efficiency of her armament output while other armament firms are of doubtful efficiency and loyalty.

On the other hand the French see, clearer than we do, that for the first time since Napoleon the chances have evened up in her favour; and, further, that the auspices in certain conditions favour democracy, for the preponderating millions of Germans need not be decisive, or an important factor at all *so long as the opposing air-fleet outnumbered and overflies the German*. They recognize that in any event, if the worst should happen, nothing can stop the Rhineland industrial region from being wiped out and doubtless much of Berlin too, in the first onslaught, even in single combat between the two Powers. With two bombers to Germany's one and even with Italy against her, France, if sufficiently prepared, can win the first round, even without the participation of Russia. But preponderance is not all. It may have to include replacement too. Victory may go to the winner of a competition in mass production. She sees it as worth while because, if their challenger Leviathan were

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vanquished for the second time, the German people would clearly have to be absorbed into a greater state there to learn, and no doubt, ultimately to adorn, democracy.

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The theme that the *reign of war*—which is the arbitrament of force—can end only by being replaced by the *reign of law*—which implies the administration of justice enforced by supreme power—justifies some reference to the confused notion that force is in some way more illegal than power and that violence is most illegal of all. Later, when examining sovereignty, we shall consider the question of the limitation of sovereign-power. Here it will suffice to point out that whether “armament” be regarded as the embodiment of power or only its reinforcement by special weapons, any restriction of its application—however much demanded by morality—cannot be said to find any place in law for, as we have seen, no international law exists nor is there the slightest proof that any such has ever operated to compel such restriction. Rather is it true to say that many such rules are given the phraseology of law in order to camouflage their real complexion.

Thus at the great Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921-2) when the auspices for peace among assembled nations were brighter than ever before or since, Balfour, the chief Delegate for the British Empire, said :

“ . . . if anyone looked back even upon the history of the late lamentable war, he would see that greatest rising of public indignation against some gross and immoral use of the weapons of war, had had a profound influence upon the history of the world. He believed that the outraged conscience of the world would rise in indignation and that any nation would be very bold and very ill-advised if, in the face of that universal opinion, it deliberately violated the rules.”¹

Those rules, whether relating to gas, bomb or aeroplane, have since been systematically violated by totalitarian Powers. Warfare is totalitarian because warfare is lawlessness.

In a famous episode, earlier in the same international

¹ Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-22 : *Official Report*, p. 750.

Conference, on the question of the inhuman use of the submarine, the British First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord Lee) drew the attention of the French delegation to an article written by an important French Naval Staff Officer (Capitaine de Frégate Castex) then serving and well-placed for influencing French naval opinion.

The article ran :

"In the first place, before throwing stones at the Germans, we should have recalled that this war of the torpedo was, like so many of the novelties of our planet, the application of an idea which in its origin was essentially French."

The article proceeded to justify as absolutely correct the use of the submarine to which it was put by Germany in the Great War.

"In the dead of night, quietly, silently, it will send to the abyss the liner, cargo, passengers and crew; then with a mind not only serene but fully satisfied with the result achieved, the captain of the torpedo boat will continue his cruise."

The article continued :

"After many centuries of effort, thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the martingale is at hand which will overthrow for good and all the naval power of England."¹

Despite the assurances of the French Naval Delegates that this was not an official opinion and that, of course, the French Navy would not resort to it—an assurance that was readily accepted by their British colleagues—the clear view of Captain Castex cannot so lightly be passed over. Re-expressed a little more temperately, the view is one of substance. Just as, militarily, the aeroplane may be regarded as a flying projector of the projectile the projections of which in the last war exceeded 30 miles, so, navally, the submarine can be regarded as a submerged projector of a projectile directed from a point nearer to the target.

That this mathematical view is prevailing one has only to recall the latest Oriental degradation of humanity whereby

¹ Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-22: *Official Report*, p 654.

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a one-man torpedo is personally directed right to the end, not only the torpedo but the man also forming part of the explosion—a live torpedo indeed! In other cases soldiers carry fitted bombs with a view to being blown up with them. It may be that, in the next war when ammunition runs low, the enemy will not bomb the civilian population at large but, having descended in parachutes, will walk up to choice objectives and there perform the same feat. What is clear is that, in competition with these Oriental war-methods, the renowned Teutonic prowess in battle will hardly stand a chance.

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To withstand and throw back the onslaught of Leviathanic power and thus extend law's domain, the forces of law must employ whatever force is required—and by what name this is called does not matter. In the future, war-in-peace armament can be expected to undergo more scientific changes and to effect changes no less startling. It is probable, for instance, that the proximity of London to Paris may even compel the two Powers to agree, for certain purposes, to form one. Even at this very moment it is plain truth that, in certain circumstances, any aggressor pouncing on France or Belgium would be opposed instantly by the power of England. It may, therefore, be said that, for certain purposes, some fusion of Anglo-French-Belgian statehood has happened already. The same applies to the United States and Canada and, in less degree, to Australia also.

This is by no means the far-fetched fantasia it may appear at first view. For evidence of such fusion one need hardly look for a written constitution of agreed formulae arrived at in cold blood after a lengthy conference of Anglo-French plenipotentiaries. Nor need any such dual statehood ever necessarily be expected to provide that some representatives of the French democracy are admitted to the British Parliament or British representatives admitted to the French Parliament! It might not take any more specific form than such a degree of liaison of executive for common policy and common action, that is to say for pooling power,

as would be judged advisable to permit of overtaking the dictatorships.

Again, unless considered in terms of actual user, armament is inoperative and powerless either to found or to support the reign of law. Unless transformable instantly into use whenever necessary, the guns might as well be left dismounted, the aeroplanes unassembled. Armament, then, means *potential power* and not necessarily applied violence.

Fortunately it is this very imperative and urgent need to achieve the necessary superiority of power that will influence, and, in the end, compel fusion. This may be expected to occur suddenly in fact, ahead of formulation, in the emergency of dire circumstances, unless it is effected earlier and more efficiently as part of the indispensable planning for victory by the chiefs of defence. The range of the efforts of the British Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defence, ought, therefore, to span the whole reach of potential armament, including the possibilities of a propaganda deluge incomprehensible to any old-time outlook.

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The purpose of the state being the administration of justice through the erection and safeguarding of the reign of law, the question whether a state can be said to exist is partly a question of fact—and one to be approached from more than one angle. Thus the view that, however far apart are England and France in ideas on other subjects, they are, at this moment, one and indistinguishable in their common preference for democracy and in their determination to uphold it jointly, may seem to confirm that a certain degree of common statehood has already been achieved by France and England, but this depends on the two peoples having a common understanding of what is meant by democracy. This common understanding as part of the process of the fusion of statehood would, of course, proceed much faster on the approach of extreme peril such as might occur in case a totalitarian dictator—fearful for his life or his reason if the strain persisted too long—decided on a last desperate throw of the dice and, applying the totalitarian's total

Method, struck at the "morale" of the civilian enemy in continuing relays of air-raids until a totalitarian "peace" was acceptable. If, which seems to be generally admitted, only the immeasurable peril and the unknown consequences of an attack on the Earthites by the Marsites or other starites would instantly unite all men, then man's amenability to wide and essential political union seems proportional to the proximity of incalculable disaster which the largest possible accumulation of power and the broadest planning would promise the best chance of fending off.

The disconcerting factor in any calculation of available armament is the mutual untrustworthiness of the Powers and, therefore, the hazard of unreliability in alliance. But this applies most of all to the alliance of dictators. This is illustrated by the speedy manner in which Hitler bolted and barred the Brenner against the day when Italian Fascists should discover that Nazidom, the possessor, was less interesting and entertaining than Nazidom, the suppliant. Now this international element of distrust disappears only to the extent that fusion takes place, and because, while not necessarily deep, fusion is real, just as alliance is unreal.

Armament, meaning potential power, being only a comparative matter after all, it must be measured against another power in order for its strength, as its weakness, to be properly assessed. Thus measured against the German and Italian dictatorships, the Anglo-French democratic front is to-day suffering from the weakness of the French Constitution. This not only stands in the way of further effective fusion of the wills of the French and the British peoples, but seriously impairs the efficacy of such union as has, in fact, already been achieved. If the first consolidation of the democratic front can be obtained only after an interregnum dictatorship in France, then the sooner that arrives the better, especially seeing that there is no necessity for it to assume a totalitarian form.

Further on in our inquiry we may find that the cohesive and co-operative influence missing in such situations as that to-day in France where governments usually last only a few weeks, is not a social but a spiritual force. It is not to be

overlooked that the political godheads of the totalitarian states are fervently if pathetically worshipped. Do the democracies really care as much about democracy as Leviathan has taught his worshipping totalitaria to care about dictatorship? Would dictatorship have the same appeal if it could not truthfully assert that its victories were due to sacrifices made, and that, if necessary, it would be defended by further sacrifices yet to come?

It but remains to demolish the assertion that union necessarily implies standardization or the disappearance of individuality. The unquestionable Anglo-Saxon genius for government, ripened by experience through the centuries, has only to point to its existing achievements in the great federal systems within the British Commonwealth, and to that Commonwealth itself, to prove that the contrary is true. As the art of governing is not to over-govern, so the secret of co-operative government is not to over-co-operate. Nevertheless the essentials of concord must be complied with. If, in the case of Great Britain and France, these, unfortunately, are not yet all assured, in the case of the League of Nations they are wholly missing—the reason that reduces so-called collective security to a mere assortment of insecurities.

Nor, in that other great democracy, the United States, now busily engaged in amassing armament, is the position greatly otherwise. There, too, the wastage of war in peace, the difference between boom and slump, is so great, the time-lag between policy and performance is so long, the gap between the ideal and the real so wide, that here it is only on looking deeper that one ceases to ask whether democracy is necessarily inefficient. When, scarcely a year after the election of President Roosevelt by the greatest confirmation of democracy in American history—probably the largest free vote ever taken in the world—that united will is seen to be dissembled, in discordant cries of discontent about new deals, undistributed profit, taxes on capital gains and the like, one recognizes that, by itself, traditional democracy, like patriotism, is not enough. It is not the self-directing of democracy that requires strengthening but undirected democracy that requires leadership and control along the

lines of broad principles generally accepted, and which may be called Christian.

What form it is essential that leadership should take we shall consider later. Primarily the direction of leadership is towards the reign of law. Here the point to be made is that if armament is potentiality of united and collected power, then fusion and control of the power for law of democracies is indispensable. And if the safeguarding of that power is reposed in a democracy, then democracy itself must provide for continuity in that control. Not to maintain that control after it is once obtained is to run the risk of Leviathanic power first escaping domestic control, then gaining international control, and finally of exercising complete mastery over democracy itself.

Among the many disadvantages of democracy is the shortness of view upon which democratic votes and therefore democratic decisions can be taken, the vote changing as often as the view. The strength of the dictatorship, on the other hand, is that it insists on a long period of office, and this offers the possibility of length of view and therefore of continuity of plan. Its drawback is that, however long the view, however great the achievement, the individual is increasingly submerged in the process until he becomes a speck in seething totalitaria, all identity lost.

Thus, however great its defects, it is via democracy alone that man stands his best chance of achieving that supreme end of life—the growth of the individual spirit. But seeing that democracy, too, is a growth, now that it is threatened with extinction it must follow that line of development along which it will best survive. That line is armament. Democracy throughout the nations must fuse, widen, arm, and triumph—or else succumb.

That fusion can take place upon the single basis of the Christian principle—Thy neighbour as thyself. And it does not yet appear on what other basis it could take place. Appeals to self-respect, to the instinct of self-preservation, even to the delights of peace and its comparative happiness, will not serve and have always failed. Universal membership of an international body we have found to be valueless.

ARMAMENT

What a Christian democracy can achieve is the consolidation, on the broadest front possible, of a continually widening reign of law. Only superior power can triumph, but to accumulate this power will involve a very high degree of Christian principle and practice. That triumph will be the triumph of power over violence, the violence that of Leviathan the usurper.

The present problem, then, of taming Leviathan, is not a simple contest between man the individual and man in the mass. It is more than arithmetic that divides the contestants. On the one hand there is machine-man mentally enslaved by Leviathan into the conviction that there is no liberation anywhere but in and through war. On the other hand there stands man, the growing spirit, resolute and apart, trustfully awaiting leadership in the faith that the only liberation is from self effected by the self. And the contest will be decided by power.

WARFARE OLD AND NEW

WE have found that peace depends on order, and order on the administration of law which depends on the supreme power of the state for it is to this power alone that human nature in the end has always submitted; and that this is so whether the society in which human nature is being considered is provincial or national or international. We have also found that the word justice is often misused and that the only kind of justice civilization has produced applicable to human society generally is legal justice. It follows that the reason that there is no peace, order and justice between nations is that there is no administration of law to the "nation-members" of the international society such as there is to those individual human beings, the subjects of any presently existing state. This being so, in the absence of any supreme power over the nation-members, one aggrieved nation inevitably endeavours to remedy its wrongs by a trial of strength, just as, by the same method, another nation seeks barefacedly not to remedy any wrong but to augment its "rights" and possessions. However much we may criticize other aspects of Hobbes' views there still stands unimpaired by the centuries the truth of his main statement, that only supreme power imposed over human nature can substitute order for war among mankind.

Next it is vital to recognize that it will not serve mankind to attempt to retreat from the realm of war or merely evade it. All encircling it can be broken through only by a positive advance towards the realm of law. Now as that advance involves not only clear-sighted leadership but intelligent following if the progress made is to be held, we have had to consider what is meant by war and by power. We have

found that there is war in peace in the sense that armed power "tells" not only in the clash of war but in the peace of diplomacy. There are other forms of pressure no less feared than the invasion of armies. This pressure is never constant but increases and diminishes with the rhythms of history. This is why the progress of civilization like that of art has been an affair of spasms, a spasmodic advance ahead of the labouring steps of the masses. Nevertheless in the end that advance has become consolidated only to the extent that the consciousness of the individual has recognized it by striving, however blindly and subconsciously, to understand and conform if not to assess and appraise.

While it would be a wrong reading of history to regard the political leadership from the earliest times as a continuing betrayal of the people, nevertheless in politics the chief plaything is human nature. Indeed, human nature is both player and plaything. It exploits itself when the human nature of the politician plays up to and plays on the human nature of men. Even in the most stiff-necked dictatorship a pretence of democracy is kept up, the people being led to believe they are being borne onward by their own individual wills.

What is wrong is not dictatorship in itself but that the dictators dictate war and not peace, Mustapha Kemal being the brilliant exception. The world awaits the conversion of its dictators and their educating the people on the subject of war and law. Not until their international consciousness has been awakened and strengthened into a majority-will, can war between nations as between men be superseded by the reign of law. While factions born of force live on it and usually die of it, one day it will be clearly understood that the mandate of any political leader is given conditionally. The understanding is that the suppressing of war comes first, that the power of Leviathan is but the means of encompassing the chief end—order out of disorder, and of peace through law—and *that peace in the group but war among the groups is not peace at all.*

With Europe in ruins these truths would be the starting-point in the mind of every surviving individual whose

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education could then be said to have begun. This quickening of the individual intelligence on the vital issue is likely to be brought about by two main factors, designed, it almost seems, in the scheme of things, to work towards the desirable end. Those people will fare best who most speedily recognize these two factors which, by the way, not only appeal to human nature, but promise in the long run to subdue it. They are economics and aircraft.

* * * * *

Since the Great War the discovery has been made that very little is known of the science of economics. But one fact that no one would dispute has emerged in the aftermath of the War with its haunting tale of inflations and deflations, directed currency movements, barren reparations, repudiated debts, falling price level, exchange restrictions, and, worst of all, hostile trade barricades, all involving victor and vanquished alike in a common disaster. The fact is that the lives of the subjects within every nation are intertwined with countless lives outside it—with Fascists, Nazis, Communists, and Jews.

But the truth is not merely that war aggravates these phenomena of national selfishness, or that the underlying factors can precipitate war. The truth is that they are a form of warfare and the point is that at present, therefore, there is war in peace. And this is still so even if the argument be conceded that, while it is undoubtedly true that some economic setback and loss must inevitably result from every war, nevertheless it is conceivable that, in any but a world-war, certain material advantages may be considered far to outweigh any resulting economic loss. In war the competitive rivalry of economic nationalism has merely passed from a less to a more active form. Even now the economic weapon operates also in the power politics of the reign of war. A nation heavily in debt through the piling up of tremendous armaments, and confronted with the dilemma of either disarming or risking a revolution through a serious fall in the standard of living, may prefer to escape from that dilemma by a war even if it involves stupendous sacri-

fices in order to gain a barren part of the earth's surface. The morality, as the intelligence, of the herd is always lower than that of the individual, and when a totalitarian political society can be shown some Promised Land of sorts ripe for exploitation, its members may easily be induced to undertake the adventure if only as a temporary respite from the struggle for existence in which fate seemingly has involved them.

It is true that, at this moment, with the decline of enlightenment over a great part of the civilized world, a succeeding twilight seems to have obscured the one clear landmark recognized by men of every race and nation (even in the totalitarian state) throughout the human story—that it is not of his own welfare but that of others that man must think and for which his sacrifice must chiefly count. It may even come to pass that the personal pride and lust for power will increase yet farther in the leaders of certain sections of humanity until, twilight deepening into night, the truth that the political leader is given power only in trust for purposes of peace may be completely obscured. But man will not remain lost. History still can count on dawns ahead, and in the reaction from dictatorship freedom will be reborn. Dragging back its bruised feet towards the lost highway, mankind, sooner or later, will resume the march.

The true leader, the light-bringer whose work alone will endure, cannot fail to see in the human drama a continuous episode which holds increasing promise only if man's struggle is directed towards maintaining the progress won. Else it is not progress. The new revolution has yet to establish that the legacy of humanity must not be jeopardized, and that it has been left to mankind in trust. Nowadays so much of modern life, as civilization has fashioned it, rests on balance that delicate adjustment and not violent experiment is clearly required. For the leaders, as for the citizens, it is the contribution of patience to the struggle that is of importance. It is easy to conjure up the alluring spectacle of green pastures which can be seized at a cost that it will fall to others to pay, but there is a limit beyond which daring experiment in the directing of men's lives will not be per-

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mitted to go. That limit is bounded by the vastness of the problem and the smallness of any one man's capacity. It is the criticism of contemporary dictatorships that there this truth is most of all ignored.

The economic revelation, now more clear than ever, is that notwithstanding any spoil or "pickings" that may be snatched up during the chaos of war, succeeding generations will have to pay tenfold. It is also no less true that even the most materially-minded of men for the most part recognize that the commercial game of profit and loss can proceed best in peace.

This truth, perhaps more than any other, is not only generally accepted but acted upon—so far as they are allowed to act upon it—by business men of all nations, even by those whose livelihood at first sight appears to depend on and to encourage war—for instance, war insurance agents and the much maligned private manufacturers of arms. It is fairly certain that if business men were exclusively in control of the destinies of Europe the peril of war would be comparatively remote. Indeed, the present attitude of the dictators to war is due in large measure to a startling ignorance, shared by many politicians, of the most primary rules of economics if not of commercial affairs generally. In the case of the more bellicose and arrogant governments, this ignorance can even frustrate the very policy it is intended to advance. Lenin, whose short-sighted directions for the retention of stolen property which even now (1938) is identifiable, and of which Stalin may fairly be said to be the receiver, has been the loser owing to greater resistance thereby set up throughout the world to Russian propaganda and claim for sympathy. There is the ignorance of Mussolini who, in an inverted rôle to that of Canute, insinuated his oath into marble by letters cut deep to the effect that the winds and the waves would have to obey him and that the lira should not be devalued—and who was ridiculed by the subsequent fact. There is the innocence of Hitler in trying to pass off Goering's Four Years' Plan for testing Germany's siege capacity in war to do without that raw material which England offers to share with a peaceful Germany.

Even our own would-be dictators are mad-hatters when it comes to economics. Sir Stafford Cripps would fight without an army yet involve us in engaging in a world-war with what would have to be unpaid and unfed forces. If Sir Oswald Mosley were dictator and followed Hitler, his police bill alone would certainly exceed our present army, navy, and air force estimates, seeing that, if they had to choose between freedom and most things, an imposing number of Englishmen would soon be found united. And if President Roosevelt, dauntless to include in his fight for humanity the welfare of the plain man, seems the exception proving the rule and he can truly claim to be the only democratic dictator, this may be because, however many mistakes he has made, he has always been and still is alert to the economic factor, to its universality of operation and its indifference to political frontiers. He knows that Tory, Communist, Nazi, Fascist, Home-Ruler, Democrat or Republican alike have to bend before its law.

Already the joint stock companies, great and small, have spread out their branches over the frontiers of the principal Powers. It often fell to my lot as legal adviser upon the claims for compensation in respect of enemy war damage which came before Lord Sumner's Commission, to consider what was the nationality of the claimant suffering the damage. I realized, as I had not done before, how very artificial is the conception known as nationality. Originally nationality equated territoriality, yet now, out of ninety-five million American white nationals only fifty-eight millions were born in the United States. When that country entered the Great War it became evident that many of her nationalized "foreigners" had never really become assimilated into American life. Their allegiance became unstuck. Good enough Americans on the domestic plane, nevertheless, on the international plane where they were called on to give battle, their allegiance was divided and their nationality stopped short of war.

The basis of nationality cannot be said to be either territorial or yet descent but, with exceptions, both, and sometimes neither. More than one country can and often does

claim the same national. A joint stock company deriving its nationality from its locality of incorporation, may number among its shareholders citizens of nations spread throughout the world; and most of its shares may be held on lien by a bank which, in war would be considered registered in a neutral country, yet the preponderating shareholders of which are of enemy complexion. Again, the shares may be bearer shares which it is impossible to locate at any moment save by some arbitrary rule of presumption. The proceedings of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals adjudicating on cases arising in the Clearing Procedure between ex-enemy states and necessitated by the sequestration of enemy property in the various countries, must have opened the eyes of many business men to the stupid and self-destroying course the war-machine takes once it gets started. It is no discriminator of nationalities. The horizontal movement of finance across the earth and the indiscriminating universality of all economic laws which is becoming more and more apparent, explains why, if premeditatively manipulated, the use of the economic weapon is necessarily a form of war.

Recently there has been afforded a remarkable instance that economic forces can operate on an entirely different plane from that whereon the political forces play. At the very moment when the nations seemed on the brink of war over the problem of intervention in Spain, representatives of England, France and the United States surprised the world by arriving at a complete agreement for the safeguarding of the exchanges. It is chiefly by such hard economic facts that the super-Leviathan will finally come to be fashioned.

* * * * *

The second factor, no less important in its bearing on war and peace than is the economic factor and, as a time factor, far more important, is aircraft the invention of which, with astonishing suddenness, has brought about the strange and unexpected disequilibrium between offence and defence and new political and strategical alignments among the Powers. Of a number of marauding planes, some, it is admitted, can always get through. By flying at different heights

or in the dark, or at such a tremendous altitude as to defy pursuit, the planes that will get through may even be the majority.

The full significance of this aspect of the air factor and the tremendous revolution it involves, have only just begun to be dimly perceived. Overnight the aeroplane has changed incalculably the interests, the importance, the vulnerability and, therefore, the classification of the Powers. In a night great factors, long consolidated in the course of history, have shrunk while others have appeared for the first time. The interpretation of "vital interests" has undergone a violent change. It would, for instance, involve—in the case of some nations who consider their self-existence justifies anything—a preventive war without warning by bomb and submarine. All that need happen before this appalling *dénouement* occurs is some exacerbation of the personal feelings of a Leviathanic dictator. Or, it may be, even without such exacerbation, the same thing might occur in the case of a dictator suffering, let us suppose, from some secret insanity which suddenly developed a further phase in the inevitable course of that malady.

The decisive manipulation of the new air-arm might depend on a nation's superior organization and super-efficiency in a few thousand highly skilled airmen as well as on artisans to replace losses. A small but intelligent and highly organized nation like Belgium which, up to the present, has been regarded as a weakling in comparison with any one of the Great Powers, might conceivably emerge victorious in a conflict with an adversary hitherto considered as invincible in any encounter possible between the two. The very size of Goliath may tell against him in vulnerability. A state insignificant in size without any fleet or harbours to defend, yet with adequate petrol supply against the enemy's petrol shortage might well, through superiority in her air-force, paralyse her giant adversary. The menace of air-fleets, conceivably established in strategic air positions maintained by relays and there fuelled from flying tankers, has not yet been measured.

Suppose Belgium, for instance, possessed of a modern

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air-force equal if not superior to the German air-force, in circumstances otherwise identical with those existing at the time of the German advance in 1914. Frustration, if not catastrophe, would assuredly have overtaken the invading army. Already it may be assumed that the German operation of 1914 could never succeed in the same way again, and it may be that the day for such success to be possible, either militarily or politically has passed. The advent of aircraft, which of course is not the final word in the arbitrament of violence, is on any estimate, a far-reaching factor the range of which is to-day immeasurable.

Let us for a moment try to divest ourselves of any sentimental feeling, reactionary or otherwise, we may have for Germany and turn up the back pages of the English Press, the French Press, and the Belgian Press in the opening war days of August 1914. There comes back to those who lived through those days the old-time feeling that the last ramparts of humanity are falling before the onslaught of brute human nature, animated, so it falsely seemed then, as brute nature never had been in modern times and never could be again. There re-passes a moving picture of the slaughter of innocents directed by a fiendish genius which nothing could withstand. There is the triumphal progression of the war-machine, soulless, superbly efficient, mowing down rich and poor, soldiers and civilians, labourers in the fields and at home, children at school or at play, mothers and wives, patron and garçon, the navvy in his overalls swept down from the scaffolding, the miner entombed beneath the shattered shafts. Stories of drunken rape that sound true keep on arriving, also photographs and pen-pictures of that advancing wave—black, grey and red—before which home and shop, café and cathedral, factory and library, totter, fall and become changed to mere smoke and flame. Events, let us assume, have reached that stage once more when the Belgian Air Force climbs by night into the highest sky and makes for Germany's industrial region and the German capital. Through air heavy with propaganda, soon bombs, fire and poison gas, begin to fall and to illustrate the Hobbesian law. In the dark, the explanatory voice of Goebbels

silenced, it is a matter of deduction that Berlin's lighting, gas, power stations and underground systems are shattered, that craters gape and hills of concrete and twisted girder rise up in the heart of the city. There men and women, no longer National Socialists, Jews or Communists, but only human creatures, choked, blinded, maddened, at last are one in a common determination to destroy Leviathan. In short, this air touch in war may yet make the whole world kin.

Consider further, the industrial region already having been demolished, how the German Leviathan's plans of aggression will be dislocated by the blowing up of roads, bridges and railways, by barrages of gas blocking the lines of the main thrusts. As demolition increases, the soldiers may again have to fall back on the horse, this time wearing a gas mask. Some new and secret variety of gas may reach life and extinguish it via the skin, and there is no reason why the reward for such efficiency should not fall to the smallest country.

But the German forces would not be left to advance so far even as their own frontier if 1914 were to come again. It can hardly fail to be in the vital interest of the smaller country to strike first and hardest. The defence to the destruction of morale and fighting spirit of bombed masses has yet to be introduced.

The very characteristics of countries seem changed. For the slowness of the Russian steam-roller there is substituted the Russian parachute jumper, the Red Winged Force. The British sea-fleet can be what it was only when the British air-fleet is what it must be. Nor do the long frontiers mean the same. For the present, at all events, as aerial inventions multiply daily and speeds increase, so the defence seems to be left farther and farther behind.

In the Great War only thirty tons of explosives fell on London, yet 1,800 were killed. These bombs, however, do not stand comparison with the modern bombs for efficiency. As a "war potential," to use a favourite phrase of Sir Maurice Hankey, its weight has already gone up from a few pounds to over 4,000 pounds, while its range of total

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destruction is over one-third of a mile in radius. One up-to-date bomb dropped anywhere near the heart of Paris might include the Louvre, the Opera, the British Embassy and all between, while two could obliterate the Napoleonic span from the Arc de Triomphe to his dust in Les Invalides. In Berlin the same two bombs could turn into heaps of girder and concrete the German Foreign Office, the whole of Unter den Linden, the Victory Column. In London one bomb could demolish Westminster, the British Houses of free Parliament, all Whitehall, the royal palaces and Piccadilly, while two bombs might include St. Paul's and penetrate well into the City. In Rome two super-bombs might level the Vatican as well as the monster statue of Mussolini.

Nor is that all. Daily, hourly, as with experiment after experiment the efficiency and power of the aeroplane increases, New York draws closer to Europe not only via the Polar regions where there is reported to be good landing, but via the Atlantic that has recently been crossed in ten hours. Some of the larger buildings in the United States contain several thousand persons. Anyone who has ever been involved in a street blockage in New York when the day to night shift of employees in big factories occurs, can exercise his imagination in regard to what would happen if a half dozen of the largest demolition bombs—not to mention poison gas—fell among New York's "skyscrapers." The narrow streets lying between these stupendous walls would become ravines half filled in with concrete and girder, and what buildings were left standing would be twisted and buckled, all egress being cut off. With the shattering of power stations all lifts would be out of action. Burst sewerage systems would promise a plague when the fires had burnt themselves out. That America will not alone escape the ordeal awaiting man except by a right choice of alternatives is certain, nor is it right that she should escape. On the capacity of Americans to recognize that the time is approaching for them, as for us, a good deal of the hope for civilization depends.

The highly inflammable thermite bomb weighing only a few pounds and therefore transportable in considerable

quantities has somewhat dimmed the lustre of the famous tradition of the Samurai whose services henceforth, it is possible, will be chiefly enlisted in extinguishing fires sown among the picturesque but somewhat flimsy Japanese houses by the Russians sallying forth from Vladivostock. It is not inconceivable that a black army will be created or will arise in North Africa. At the back of their minds there is even now being built up a relentless resolve the intensity of which the white man is incapable of feeling—a resolve to do unto others even as it has been done unto them. It is conceivable that in the streets of Rome, Florence and Milan, the sons of Abyssinia's conquerors will be dropped living from the skies with notes of reminder pinned upon them. No possibility can be ruled out once armies exploit politics to direct revenge and to prove how the power and the glory can go the rounds.

Another important feature of the aeroplane is its comparative cheapness. Some 5,000 aeroplanes, more or less, according to their range and power, it is said, can be constructed for the cost of one battleship like the *Lord Nelson*. And if world peace could be kept by twenty *Lord Nelsons*, would they not be cheap? The casualties in aeroplanes will be heavy but no one as yet has ventured to question the certainty that some, and possibly a good many, bombers will get through. It has been stated that Germany, the country of far-seeing organization, is preparing the necessary manufacturing plant so as to be able, if necessary, to turn out a mass production of 100 aeroplanes a day—that France is following suit and that Russia, having adopted the methods of Henry Ford, is already ahead of the rest, realizing that her organizing capacity is not equal to her rivals.

Thus, even if Germany could replenish the faster, with the better start Russia might win by preventing her. Ten thousand Russian planes that could reach Berlin in half an hour from the territory of accommodating allies and cover Cologne, Essen, Elberfeld, Düsseldorf, Leipzig within the hour, might create havoc incomparably greater than could 4,000 German machines by bombing Moscow. Nor are mere numbers the only factor. High and fast flying will count

also. The fleet that can fly highest and fastest may win the first round without loss.

The aeroplane has also made necessary a new reading of geography. As Air Commodore Charlton points out in his *War from the Air*, Paris and Rome, almost equidistant from their frontiers, are approximately 300 miles apart, but industrial Turin is only 50 miles from the French frontier and Milan only 90, while France's industrial region is in the north and menaced by the German air-arm rather than by the Italian. Thus, notwithstanding the proximity to Italy of Marseilles and the manufacturing cities of the Rhône Valley, France would seem to be able to paralyse Italy's industrial centres first. London and Paris apparently are only 225 miles apart via the air, but the nearest French point to London is only 85 miles as against our 165 to Paris, which city, again, is only half the distance from the German frontier that Berlin is from the French frontier. Berlin and Stalingrad are equidistant from their frontiers but the latter city is twice the distance from the Polish frontier that Warsaw is from Berlin. Russian aeroplanes could reach Berlin in less than an hour, while to reach Moscow German planes would take at least four times as long.

As the aeroplane develops, in time these differences may diminish in importance and eventually mean no more than a delay of a few minutes. Nor is it to be supposed that the evolution of air warfare will be confined to the development of the aeroplane or that science will leave the offensive permanently with aircraft at all. Men may find a beam capable of paralysing an aeroplane's magneto or that can penetrate through to the petrol supply or through to the gas in the cylinders with resulting explosion. To any such discovery no adequate reply for a time may be found. It is possible that, deeply entrenched from behind a series of first, second and third "Hindenberg" lines of bomb-exploding shelters erected in the air—the lowest at a sky-scraper's farthest distance from the ground—man will struggle to regain the mastery from the machine; and possible that long-range guns may throw high explosives and gas bombs

from Paris to Berlin and from Berlin to Moscow, or secure the same result by aerial torpedo.

It is not impossible that, turning backward in his tracks, surviving man will revert to the open-air life and that, thereafter, for some thousands of years, he will recuperate and grow strong again in his body as are the animals—and possible, too, that when he has grown more like the animals he will begin another cycle. It is far more probable, however, that sooner or later the battle will resolve itself into a struggle for control over men's minds which, left open to all else, may eventually have to be foreclosed on this subject of war—and possible that by some psychological mass subjection of certain sections of the human race, the world will be spared warfare because the minds of the warring hordes will be permanently demobilized.

In the meantime human nature, so far from preferring any other criterion to force, lends itself to force and even forms its mainspring. To withstand organized force something more, therefore, is required than preaching the noble part. Superior organization, superior intelligence, superior sacrifice are essential. Nor is Leviathan likely to make any exception in favour of democracy.

The aeroplane has levelled up not only the nations but also the fighting units. It must now be recognized that the old legend that one Englishman is equal to, say, two Dutchmen, three Frenchmen, four Spaniards and five Italians (the Germans seem usually to have been omitted, no doubt because they were oftener on our side) is due for review. A bomb can be released from an aeroplane as well by a diminutive Latin as by a brawny Anglo-Saxon. Indeed, in one respect, the Englishman is at a disadvantage. Whether the reason is his love of sport, his ingrained sense of what constitutes a fair match, or some similar psychological factor, it is probably true that he finds compliance with certain military orders more difficult than do soldiers of other nations. The dropping of live, captured native chieftains from aeroplanes into their own villages, the sending to the ocean's bed of enemy passenger ships on sight, the encircling, during an offensive or defensive, of his own kith

and kin with sustained shell-fire lest they back out prematurely from a choice little sector of hell, or even allowing black men a free hand over the white women of a subdued invader whose territory is occupied under peace treaties—the Englishman is no good at this.

On the other hand, the higher an aeroplane can fly and bomb, or the farther off a warship can shell the civilian population, the better may the Englishman also learn to confine his attention to the sighting of his infernal machine and, letting his mind go blank, learn to consider, at that moment, nothing except the pulling of the trigger as efficiently as the best of them.

Until supplanted the aeroplane will overshadow man and earth and fly ever faster and higher. Perhaps, in time for the next, real conflict, it will have learned how to manœuvre even in the stratosphere at 60,000 feet, its pilots equipped with oxygen. High up there in what apparently is an almost windless sky, any embarrassment of British airmen in bombing "unfair" targets may shrink to a minimum because, at that remove, the old problem will cease to count—the problem, hitherto unsolved, of how to gauge windage and so locate "fairly" the military target on the earth's surface miles below the clouds and hidden from the pilot's vision. The scaled map electrically driven, wireless captive balloons for reference points, and all such rough devices may, in a single day, become obsolete because of some discovery about the vast mystery of etheric waves and the vacuum. In the meantime the margin of error by radio direction may well be more, and for some time is not likely to be less, in a high flight, say, from Berlin to London, than half a mile, or from some secret spot in the interior of Russia to Berlin possibly a mile; or, substituting Rome for Berlin, two miles. Such marginal distances of error render utterly unfeasible any rules of warfare for the air corresponding to the rules of warfare on or under the sea.

That this margin of error in bombing is unavoidable and that no plane will be permitted to fly low enough to search out its target may thus well prove not the crippling limitation but the all-determining potentiality of the aeroplane.

The proceeding aircraft programmes of the nations, who are all aware of these facts, reveal to man that he is gulling himself and doping his conscience with rules passed off as international law which each nation has every intention of violating as and when considered desirable. Whatever comes to pass in the actual event, a few professors, no doubt, will still be content parrot-wise to reiterate that international law condemns these dreadful practices.

The aircraft weapon, then, is perhaps the most promising factor of peace at the moment, for, seeing that there is as yet no complete protection from the aeroplane and that "some will get through," it follows that, for the first time in the world's history, war will be really a Volkskrieg—a war of peoples. Warfare will no longer be camouflaged as the pastime of noblemen—a form of sport rather more arduous than most and which affords an opportunity for widening the personal experience of adventurously inclined individuals—"in winning their spurs." It will be recognized as a contest of power for supreme power which, once won, must be held if it is to last.

The hour of the test of world-leadership approaches and cannot be evaded. Neither propaganda, political theory nor electoral bribery can permanently circumvent the truth or prevent the lesson of the aeroplane from reaching the people. To those who have not already seen it afar off, disillusion revealing the stark alternative, law or war, will be brought to their very door by the new factor. If man will not choose law because he likes it, he may nevertheless be left with it on finding that he dreads war still more.

In the Leviathanic states the leaders can hardly fail to know that if it is to be war—but the new war and not the old war—they themselves will be among the first to be destroyed and at the hands of the mob. Nevertheless so terrible is man's lust for power, so stupid his decisions when his reason is subordinated to his emotions, so rare is it for him to follow truth cost what it may, that, even when at last many see the truth, the chance of all the Powers in Europe doing so and sparing themselves the learning of the last

awful object lesson, must still, I fear, be regarded as remote.

* * * *

Can any nation keep out of it by side-stepping it? The answer to this question has long been thought to turn partly on another—the difficult and important question of neutrality. But this question has also been re-cast by aircraft. It is utterly useless to dream of clipping the wings of the new air-arm. To Grotius, as to others, the sacred inviolability of rules of war no doubt appeared real enough—indeed, in the title to his famous book *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, it will be observed that Grotius puts war first. There can, however, be no law of war because war is the denial of law.

Now it is sometimes advocated that the solution lies with an international air-police force. As, however, commercial aeroplanes could still drop bombs, a European policing *not only of the air but of the nations*, would appear to be necessary. To attempt the solution of the vast problem by any such method is useless for, until the people of the nations have progressed to the point of earnestly discarding war from their minds as a policy, organized police forces will obviously be opposed by organized war forces. Moreover, when, at last, the majority of the subjects of the nations have agreed to discard war, there will be no need to set up a police force to subdue the recalcitrant Powers, for then the supreme power will have arrived and be a police unto itself. In short, the police force must be the outcome of solid agreement and be based on agreement. *It cannot be substituted for agreement.* And the test of solid agreement, as we shall see later, is fusion of interests and of resources.

Here, by supreme power, is meant the major enforceable will of the nation, measured not necessarily by numerical strength of individuals but by that strength which alone can control human nature—power physical, mental and even spiritual, but nevertheless power.

If not in the dry light of reason, then by the revelatory light of science so clearly does further war appear to be insanity, it is hard to resist the conclusion that its perpetua-

tion in an era of civilization can be encompassed only through the process of the usurpation of the individual wills of a people formed up *en masse* and become mechanized. That process, already started, is now proceeding apace in Germany and elsewhere. The mechanization is effected by Leviathan, the machine, which threatens to preserve the continuity and content of dictatorship even after its human vessel has dissolved. But once man can tear himself away from the machine, Leviathan *ipso facto* will be dissembled. The vital contest, be it noted, is not that of Leviathan versus Leviathan, or even of an antipathetic supreme power against Leviathan. It is man who must revolt against Leviathan for the issue is between man and Leviathan as only one can survive.

It is therefore with the people, and not with a so-called international "police-force" ahead of the people, that a beginning must be made, for, when the challenge is pushed home, even sovereignty itself is seen to be based on the majority-will of the people. Thus, in Europe a single sovereignty may fairly be said to have arrived only when the majority of its peoples unconditionally reject war as an instrument of policy, thus squarely facing the supreme alternative—law or war. This inexorable requirement cannot be evaded by any such cheap expedient as the setting up of a "police-force" among a number of so-called sovereignties each fully independent, each fully paramount, and all, with their vital interests fully intact, mutually hostile.

Here, again, power behind the law and located within the reign of law is not, for a moment, to be confused with raw force unrelated to any administration of law and therefore operating only within the reign of war. The policeman may, of course, appropriate the office of the lawgiver and be at once arm, mouth, and mind of the law—for instance, as is the Gestapo in Germany. But the *administration of justice*, as we have seen, is something more than this.

We recall that it is laid down in the text-books of so-called international law that, to preserve its existence, a Power may proceed to any extremity of measures. In a certain scene outside Europe during the Great War, inculcated fear

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no less than refined hate led to a revival of the ancient practice of sewing up the mouths of prisoners and placing food and water within reach; and to tossing up on the points of bayonets the live, trussed bodies of wives, children and comrades of enemy individuals in the confronting line to whom names and addresses of the proposed victims had thoughtfully been supplied beforehand. The reprisal victims, three for one, were bound alive and soused with petrol as were the horses and carts in which they were stacked, and the cortège then was set on fire and sent careering over the plain. This was police-force versus police-force, but without, not within, the reign of law.

The direction of the future variations of "measures" necessary to the preservation of a state's existence may in part be guessed at. Instead of bodily torture, there is, for instance, the choice method of scientifically unseating the reason of any relatives and friends of outstanding personalities on the opposing side who happen to be captured. By the torture of sustained and sufficiently intense psychological bombardment the individual within Leviathan's power can be made to *say* almost anything.

Scarcely less terrible is the compulsory inoculation of the minds of large sections of humanity who, once sufficiently reduced by fear and famine, are forcibly made part of the totalitarian machine.

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And now, at the end of this chapter on "Warfare old and new," it is necessary to face a question that arises in the consideration of this very factor, the new air-arm of Leviathan. Should "extreme totalitarian measure" be resorted to only later in the campaign after a Power has been the victim of that measure and when, as a mere reprisal, the like measure will be robbed of the valuable element of surprise, or should it be resorted to at the most effective time—from the very outset? In short, should that measure be adopted militarily or resorted to revengefully, it being recognized that a previous dire visitation of like nature from the enemy might be so disastrous in consequence as to put any

possibility of employing a similar measure beyond the power of the state that had not got its blow in first. Must millions first die by "the extreme measure" at the red, raw hands of Leviathan before like measure is fallen back upon by the Powers on the side of law? It is true that hitherto extreme measures have not often been invoked at the outset but then, hitherto, there has never existed, as there does now, a weapon providing the full possibility. Like the preliminary "spit and handshake" of old-time sham fighters, the mock ritual of declaring war has gone by the board. Leviathan, up-to-date and determined to maraud, is not so obliging.

Such obsolete formalities no longer in count, it will be recognized that all that separates the citizens of London, Rome, Berlin or Paris from waking up among a vast conflagration of falling buildings is only the grace or the caprice of this or that Leviathan. The reason that consummation has not happened so far, despite crisis after crisis having reached high climax, is partly because the preying Leviathan fears that the measure might miscarry, and shrewdly calculates that partial success would not be worth the risk of unquenchable hate and immeasurable consequence that would certainly follow; but, chiefly, because totalitarian Leviathan's most private, yet most assured, conviction is that the job of dictating in a first-class European war of any duration would be incomparably harder than merely threatening. When once hostilities have begun, this consideration, no doubt, would weigh less and less. Nor is there room for much doubt that, once the die were cast, the totalitarian dictator would set a good deal on getting a speedy decision, and, rather than reserve the extreme measure for the appropriate moment in the inevitable crescendo of reprisals, he might, in a moment of nervousness, fearful of his gamble, venture all, convinced that, in the new obscurity of modern warfare, he would stand a considerable chance of not being detected—at least for a time.

On a moment's thought this and no less than this is what, after all, the "power politics" of Mussolini, of Hitler and

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now of Japan, clearly involve. The degree of Mussolini's hesitation to lead off an adventure by either of them against a foreign Power with a wholly unprovoked and unexpected bombing of a capital city is the measure not only of his bluff but of his knowledge of this truth. The attack by submarine, bomb, or gas deluge, if not precisely and immediately identifiable, still, by a process of elimination, could be proved connected with like-minded Leviathans in league.

The moral is that all this not only may but must be made to cut as deep both ways. What Mussolini might do at the outset of an offensive planned beforehand and the zero hour of which was known to him alone, *the threatened Power must also be prepared to do at the very outset of its defensive*. That and that alone might deter Leviathan who is not likely to be softened by any hesitation in his opponent's attitude or action, but, on that account, would be all the more likely to take his clear run while he could, and only then, prepared and expectant, await the reactions of the stricken enemy.

The contention of the strategists that an air-force cannot occupy a country and that the last word still rests with the defence, probably under-estimates the results on the population of the vast confusion and chaos following an onslaught invisible and altogether unexpected. No conviction whatever is carried by the opinion of the tit-for-tat school of military writers that a nation could safely afford to ignore the possibility of certain extreme measures being employed because of the enemy's fear lest reply should be in kind. This view is merely that a warring Power might not have enough devilishness to employ the measure at the commencement of a war but might generate enough as time wore on. The uncovered risk is there, and it remains uncoverable while totalitarian dictatorship stands. Leviathan can be met never half-way but in only one of two ways, firstly by national pacifism that means subjugation to war and acceptance of war, secondly by an opposing front of superior power assembled for law—a confrontation that permits of no compromise.

Some advantage must always lie with the Power that

begins the onslaught—that is to say with Leviathan who monopolizes the initiative. In order to discount that advantage as far as possible, there must be an instantaneous reply—all-surpassing in its magnitude of power, in its instancy and in its inevitability; and as relentless as is necessary. In a contest with Leviathan, to hesitate about the rules of war, to consult the phrases used at some conference by this or that delegate, or the view of this or that “publicist,” can be, at the best, only to hold up the advance to the realm of law, at the worst to give Leviathan a walk-over. If war is insanity, then the men-of-war are mad and they must be overpowered by the superior power of the men-of-law. Is it more irrational, more immoral to bomb, in their houses, civilians who, as likely as not, are engaged in some service, great or small, for the war, than to drive tanks over the wounded and dying that have finished with the war? In what way does the thought of bombed civilians goad us unless that thought is primarily for ourselves? If the ruthless slaughter of a million youths can be obviated by a week’s ruthlessness that would take toll of but five thousand Leviathanic totalitaria, is not the latter ruthlessness to be preferred? Do mere numbers of individuals outweigh a principle of right or of moral justice?

Right and justice, which belong to the reign of law, can neither expect nor find place in war which, as we have seen, is a competition in ruthlessness. To engage in such a competition, yet, at the same time, to attempt to set the limit of ruthlessness at some measure short of the enemy’s, is therefore not only to invite defeat but to ensure it—and it may be to deserve it. Only stupidity or hypocrisy could deny this. It follows that, because they are conjoined to anarchy, there is no half-way house between absolute pacifism and absolute war. Nor, because of the chasm between, can there be any half-way house between law and war. The Hobbesian truth that, with the union of power there comes wider law, reaffirms not only that the false alternative, peace or war, must be rejected, but that the only real alternative, law or war, is *absolute*. We have seen that there is war in peace. But to rely on law in war is to insist on the untrue

converse that there can be peace in war—for it is only through law that peace comes.

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Thus, despite the advent of new weapons and a new age, the grim meaning of warfare does not change. It is always essentially a competition in the ruthlessness of force. The great service that it has fallen to the new air-arm to perform for mankind is to unmask the spectacle of the Great Powers of our civilization confronting one another in the realm of anarchy, the people supporting each Power liable at any moment to be destroyed where they congregate deepest, each Power likewise itself ready to destroy the people of any rival Power. It is fairly probable that if the German Power had had little doubt that Great Britain would have taken the side against her she would not have invaded Belgium or gone to war at all. What is far more certain is that, at this very moment, any likelihood that, in the event of war—now a Volkskreis—a people would hesitate to attack the civilian population of the attacking Power, is being carefully weighed and taken into account by Leviathan. In so far, then, as intimation of a policy of firmness is considered to be a deterrent to Leviathan, this interpretation should be included.

No lingering doubt of principle on this matter must be among any “gaps” in our defences suddenly discovered by the government of Shakespeare’s England when, as recently, zero hour begins to strike. That that occasion did not reveal a degree of preparedness that might suggest an adequate realization of their trusteeship for civilization by the Empire’s leaders, can be deduced, as reports from Germany confirm, from the widening of Leviathan’s mouth since that event.

The stewardship of the British trust, now and hereafter, is not discharged at all merely by demonstrating a superiority as compared with previous preparedness. That stewardship must be justified or condemned by reference to the minimum degree of assembled power necessary to overthrow the Leviathanic challenger, cost what it may. The contest in which we may engage is not one for a bouquet

awarded on points adjudged for comportment in the ring, or even for preliminary endeavours, but may well be an affair of life or death for the human spirit. If the episode that has sunk Czechoslovakia from a vital democracy to a mutilated totalitarian appendage, is not to be accepted as a butchery occasionally required by democracy to requite Leviathan, then it must be regarded as a godsend affording a brief respite to civilization to prepare to face the ultimate alternative. If the rallying call of the democracies is indeed "Save our Souls," it cannot be only "Save our Skins!"—or purses either. The price of failure this time will be not merely a change of inefficient stewards but their replacement by unsatiated Leviathan. What is the maximum price to be set for civilization in terms of aeroplanes? Despite the omens, the leadership of our democracy has, until quite recently, assessed it at considerably less than the price of one battleship.

If war, then not law—if not law, then war! By confronting humanity with a close-up view of inhumanity in war, aircraft will sharply focus the ultimate alternative and write plainly for all men to see that the price of peace is determined by the condition of law—union for superior power.

PROPAGANDA

DURING the Great War the word propaganda, as ordinarily used, signified the dissemination of lies by the enemy regarding their opponents. Since then it has sometimes been used to mean the guiding of the opinions of others—a view of propaganda which is itself propagandist. To propagandize really means to build up a mass-mindedness stolidly biased so as to be proof against counter-bias; or to manipulate the mind of the masses in regard to some view or course of action. The striking feature of propaganda is not its degree of truth or falseness but its preoccupation with public opinion, a public mind, or, in other words, with mass psychology. Propaganda proceeds on the fact that the crowd is more stupid than the individual, and that, while it “feels” more it thinks less. Hitler states this fact in black and white—the characteristic attitude of dictators not to the public but to propaganda. On his statement the end of propaganda might, of course, be truth—truth, that is, by the concealment of truth. The content of propaganda is not opinion, for opinion, presumably, is preceded by thought. Propaganda claims to give a view but, actually, all it gives is a sound. Its object is to close the mind’s eye so that it can see nothing.

Thus our English Magna Charta could not, in itself, be considered propaganda so long as its provisions reposed on some library shelf, nor would that necessarily be propaganda if I were to set out the charter’s provisions correctly in correspondence with someone else. Still less could it be considered propaganda if it formed the subject of a public debate in which the expression of opposing views was permissible. But if, for instance, on the eve of the Zinovieff trial, the editor of some Russian newspaper had suddenly gone sane and devoted the whole space to setting out the

full terms of this charter of English liberty even without one word of comment, that would, no doubt, have been regarded by the Soviet authorities as treasonable propaganda calculated to present two sides of a question—a practice dictators cannot bear. "Two sides to the question?" exclaims Goering, "I am not concerned with both sides. I see only those who are for National Socialism and those who are against it, and I know how to deal with the latter."¹

Indeed, the Soviet prosecutor of the editor would probably have found it unnecessary to read further than the first words, *Omnia ecclesia Anglia libera sit*—the English Church shall be free. It would not have been propaganda if Trotsky had tried to preach a sermon on the principles the charter contains to Stalin privately in single audience, even although Stalin could instantly have made those principles law in Russia had his conversion so directed his desire. It might, however, have been said to be propaganda—even supposing that Stalin had believed utterly in Magna Charta—if the bare principles of the Declaration had been broadcast but without revealing that they had derived from that sentimental democracy England. In short, it becomes obvious that propaganda is not so easy to define after all.

Nevertheless as distinguished from mere publicity of news, and, likewise, from the mere publication of opinions, propaganda, which is essentially part of the Method—War, does possess certain characteristics. It strives to build a mass mind, to fill its building with conclusions, and then to deny that it has done so lest those conclusions should be questioned. Above all, the method is secretive. Its material is foisted upon others not by a straightforward proclamation that it shall be accepted, but indirectly and unsuspectingly by presenting, as matters of authoritative fact, statements favourable to the adoption of the desired view while withholding other facts considered likely to lead to its rejection. That is to say, propaganda "doctors" some facts and suppresses others, its method proceeding by way of information but never by debate and discussion. Contra-propaganda—the reply to this propaganda—follows the same method,

¹ Stephen Roberts: *The House that Hitler Built*, p. 246.

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the result in international affairs often being a ding-dong competition between the spokesmen of the nations in down-right lying. While the conflict between the two versions is exploited by the authorities respectively, each to its own advantage in international affairs, the public has little opportunity for checking the statements and none at all if the form of state government happens to be totalitarian. Thus propaganda is no less the enemy of reason than reason is the enemy of propaganda. Essentially a method it is part of the larger Method—War of which, indeed, it is both a means and a form. Propaganda, therefore, is chiefly power—a power formidable and far reaching, a power striving to weaken the enemy's will and reinforce that of its own Leviathan.

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An important, perhaps the essential, difference between a democracy and a dictatorship is detected by considering the different way in which propaganda works in each. In the democracy rival propagandas everywhere freely compete, for here the alignment of political parties is never definite, the letters of such labels as Conservative, Liberal, Socialist frequently running into one another so that, for instance, on many occasions, a Socialist member of Parliament is not only "a little Liberal" but also considerably Conservative. So soon as the elections are over, a great number of people in the British, American and French democracies immediately begin to drift away from their party front formed up for action; and thereafter, if not outwardly at any rate inwardly, they often re-form behind the banner of any cause that appeals—such freedom to separate broad human interests from political alignments being a distinguishing feature of true democracy. There thus results a steady and continuous competition—which in moments of crisis rises to sharp contest—of one propaganda against another. Nothing could better afford opportunity to the citizen for reasoning or for testing the claims of leadership, and some such process would appear to be indispensable to the education of the people. Now as

this truism holds good not only in the domestic but in the international sphere, it is obvious that the intellectual advance towards peace must begin in the democracies.

In the totalitarian dictatorship, on the other hand, there is no conflict whatever between rival propagandas because there is only one totalitarian propaganda for all purposes. Not only by direct bombardment through the radio, the cinema and the Press, but, more subtly, by insinuations among the teachings of science, of art, of morality and of religion, the dictator, while pretending to educate the individual, seeks merely to standardize him by suppressing his independence of mind. The reason of this is that the dictatorship, which invariably arrives by violence, has perforce to keep its place by continued violence and, accordingly, violence has to be glorified and occasions have to be coloured to justify it. Thus the object of propaganda is not always conversion of view at all, but may be to kill monotony which is so fatal to dictation. The troubles of the dictator like the sorrows of a dictatorship can be most easily relieved, apparently, by continual agitation in the realm of international affairs which provides a safety-valve for public emotion. This most often takes the form of propaganda representing that war is never very far off and that rigorous discipline, therefore, is more than ever necessary. So soon as the masses begin to fume under their restraint they can thus be diverted towards the throats of neighbouring human beings whom, with this end in view, Leviathanic propaganda all along has painted as enemies. By ostensibly seeking to do a little dictation beyond his frontiers and constantly stirring up as much trouble abroad as possible, the dictator creates a valuable diversion, distracts attention from his dictation at home, and helps to perpetuate a secure war footing for the social order.

A carefully calculated degree of opposition in view, fictitious and arranged, is often connived at by the propagandist so as to give the dictator an excuse for tightening up discipline in one direction in order to forestall criticism from another; and, incidentally, to provide necessity for more propaganda. Just as dictatorship itself is wrapped up and dis-

guised, so propagandist medicine is administered sweetened by a social programme. As a further precaution the people are then induced to accept any inconveniences they may experience in a dictatorship by being committed to it only for a given period, such as by a three years' plan, a five years' plan, and so forth.

Without propaganda the dictatorship—which at best is the rule of a few men each over his own sector of affairs, and in international matters possibly of only one man—could never maintain its hold for long. The favoured procedure of the dictator is concealed *commitment* and revealed *fait accompli*. It follows that propaganda is not confined to words but can also be expressed in deeds as, for instance, aggressive action excused as anticipating aggression from another state. In order to make the danger appear real, the dictator must perforce actually antagonize the rival state even if the result should end in war. The most ready method for encompassing this is by propaganda.

In the dictator's hands this perilous instrument now casts a new and ominous shadow across the path to peace, an additional reason why humanity must reject the dazzling advantages of dictatorship and explore yet further the possibilities of democracy. For if, in addition to being pinned down behind the ramparts of competing sovereignties, the people are denied all direct access to facts and, likewise, all real personal contact with one another's minds, then the advance towards the reign of law cannot but be delayed. The advance must be preceded by educating the community that there is nothing inevitable about war except the price of peace. In the absence of education by process of reason there is only the process of trial and error. The result of unchecked Leviathanic propaganda may be that only after bomb, shell, gas, demolition and starvation have done their work, will the survivors discover that, if men are neither all brothers nor even all friends, still they need not be enemies locked in perpetual war. If Russian, German, French and Italian individuals can all live peacefully together, as they do, not only in the British Commonwealth but in other states, they could do so likewise in a widened state united

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on the single resolution that between them war had forever ceased.

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Unfortunately, although by night men cry for peace, by day they return to their desires. It is this weakness of human nature that has brought about the Leviathanic structure of governments, and, it may be in certain cases, left no alternative but for government in the near future to approximate to some sort of dictatorship. Nevertheless it is not until the world shall have outgrown totalitarian dictatorships that the nations will be ready for the main advance. This is so because it is chiefly the dictator that most exploits the human nature of the subject and who, having been lent power for the control of that human nature by law, not only proceeds to misapply this power for war but, further, by means of propaganda conceals his betrayal of that trust. The multitude is not allowed to see far into the facts of dictatorship or any distance at all into the dictator himself. If they were, it is possible they might even find that he knew he was mad, or again that often he was only sky-larking. To de-educate the masses, to immobilize the individual's power of thought is Leviathan's first act in that betrayal; to ignore the masses afterwards, the second.

"It is my will—" begins the decree of Hitler after Hindenburg had gone. *Mein Kampf!* *My* will! not thine be done!

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Goebbels, the Nazi Überpropagandamensch, declares that Germany is a democracy which gives its command to a few men who in turn admit the right of democracy to criticize them but only at the elections and in accordance with the Editors Act (1933). This Act in effect gives the German Minister of Propaganda the full executive powers of a despot whose word is law, and incidentally it reflects the official Nazi view of statehood to which I will refer in a moment.

What must happen to the reason of a people where the crime of thinking differently can incur the sentence of professional death? What advance towards peace and the reign

of justice is likely for a nation where an editor is heavily fined because, although he has taken steps to obtain the fullest information and has done all that could reasonably be expected of him, he has nevertheless committed a libel on the state?¹ What is to happen to the human spirit when a national Chamber of Culture (Reich Kultur Kammergesetz) which is run in connection with the Ministry of Propaganda, lays down across the fields of literature, journalism and entertainment, of painting and the kindred arts and even of religion, rigid lines like railway tracks along which only those mechanical minds approved by a political department or a propagandist bureau are allowed to proceed?

Thus with brute impertinence Leviathan proceeds to devour not only man's body but also his soul. So the coveted Schiller prize for literature (7,000 marks) was not awarded in 1935. The following Press extracts are illuminative:

- (1) "According to a semi-official report the Prize Commission has proposed not to award the prize as such this time . . . since this extraordinary official recognition can be extended only to a poet of greatest talent *who works in the spirit of National Socialism*, and since, as yet, such a decisively preponderant dramatic work or dramatic post does not exist."²
- (2) "Dr. Slam, German Minister at Oslo, to-day officially expressed to the Norwegian Foreign Office his Government's regret that the Nobel Peace Prize had been awarded to Herr von Ossietzky, the German pacifist recently released from a concentration camp."³

If Spengler, the author of *The Decline of the West*, had lived long enough to witness this he might have added to that sobering remark of his on Hitler's achievement, "This was no victory, for the enemies were lacking," the further comment that there could never be final victory in Germany until there had first been German defeat in other lands. Hitler, not content with "über Deutschland," "über Austria," and possibly "über Italy," claims to be über art, über truth, and, in the end, über God.

¹ See *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, Princeton University Press.

² *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Wochenblatt, März 12, 1935.

³ *Daily Telegraph*, November 27, 1936.

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Of all people Germans have long been notorious for their singleness of thought. "They think, as they come on, in battalions," I find I wrote after continued observation many years ago. When such a people adopt a dictator, then, unless he is a striking exception, their subjugation by propaganda and their engulfment in war is but a matter of time. In the words of official Nazi propaganda :

"National Socialism cannot be judged right in this and wrong in that respect. . . . As we, the National Socialists, are convinced that we are right, we cannot tolerate anyone in our neighbourhood who claims also to be right."

But Russia, a state similarly totalitarian and likewise propagandist, claims "also to be right" although in respect of opposite conclusions.

At least one difference between these two resembling dictatorships is that the Russian is trying to induce mankind throughout the world to participate in the Soviet blessings while the present German dictatorship, convinced that the German Nordic man comes first among mankind—provided, of course, he is first Nationally-Socially circumcised—is not only uninterested in the conversion of outsiders but would far rather conquer them in battle than bother with them in any other way. However sinister, therefore, are the methods resorted to by the Russian dictatorship for the converting of humanity to Soviet ideas, that fanaticism, albeit distortedly, at least recognizes the world-wide brotherhood of man.

The advance to peace can proceed only at the pace of the common education of humanity which can be helped along by the liberal admission of ideas across national frontiers. In other words, we must do differently what, in this regard, Russia is trying to do now. If, for instance, at this moment, Russian world-wide propaganda and stimulation of unrest, Komintern or no Komintern, were directed towards inoculating humanity with the anti-war serum—even towards hypnotizing men like Hitler against war—then it would be Russia who might rightly claim to be leading the nations towards the reign of law and so to peace.

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It was long predicted that the vast Russian problem of human degradation would one day call for a desperate remedy—a degradation instanced in the low poverty of the peasants, their bodies hugging the earth for warmth as do the beasts of the field yet without the protection afforded to the beasts by nature—a poverty vastly more terrible in the country than in the cities. Desperate and despicable indeed have been the means and methods of revolution adopted. But Russia has not, like Germany, been always a military nation, nor can her people be identified with the Stalin method to any large extent. Mighty in her suffering as in her spaces and her millions, Russia is not likely to endure an unchanged dictatorship for long. Her vast movement, essentially agrarian, may also seem only a matter of slogans, a march of peasants wheeling at first towards Communism then wheeling away, the ultimate direction unpredictable. But it is a revolution broadly based and whatever victory it has in the world will be one of ideas. However red their Leviathan the truth remains that, behind and even obscured by that Leviathanism, the quest proceeds, whereas the objective of the still redder German Leviathan is not the victory of ideas but merely mastery by that race which can spill most blood, and even lose it, and yet survive. In Russia redness is chiefly the means but in Germany to-day the redness is Leviathanic, both means and end.

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The propaganda warfare proceeding from time to time between the Russian and the German Leviathans, and which, superficially viewed, is marked by such intermittent ferocity, on closer scrutiny is seen to be so shrewdly contrived to appeal to the Russian and German peoples respectively that the two dictators might almost appear to be acting in collusion. The German people, industrious, patient, home-loving, above all amazingly trustful of their leaders, believing in their destiny yet astonishingly undeveloped because unliberated from themselves, are told in ceaseless propaganda that the Communist Russian monster is still about to devour them. Being what they are because of a

thousand years of fighting and of the legacy left by that stupendous stretch of savagery, the Thirty Years War, they thus allow their Leviathan to loose them first against sister Austria whom they violate "lest Austria becomes Communist," and then against the Czechs whose country they appropriate as a selected *point d'appui*.

But against that gregarious German suffering must be set another suffering infinitely more lonely, that of the Russian who, his life-spirit stifled to its last breath, is now driven into accepting gregariousness at any price which to-day happens to be the mechanization of humanity. But at any rate, and as never before, the Russian people have won a measure of escape from individual loneliness and they are told and they believe that, whatever happens, it will accompany them to the end whether that overtakes them on the farm, the factory, or on the battlefield. So, if Germans are as loyal and communal in their minds as ever, Russians, too, are not lonely any longer but provided with something to fight for. In a contest between the two peoples decisively influenced by the air-arm, it is in every way possible that the new Russian character and resources might be found not inferior to those of German Nazidom in war. If such disaster should overtake Germany the guilt will be that of her totalitarian dictatorship which, having struck off what were declared to be the fetters of Versailles, has proceeded, by means of a propaganda flaunting freedom, to rivet permanently on to millions of German limbs the manacles of war.

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Let us suppose that Stalin and Hitler were to exchange places. Who would doubt that Stalin could dictate to Germany as successfully as he dictates to Russia, or that Hitler, confronted with a choice of dictating in Russia or not dictating at all, would hardly fall behind Stalin in versatility of dictation? In all probability the situation would not be so greatly different from what it is now. Indeed, Germany might even benefit, for, with Stalin's conversion from communism completed by Schacht, there would re-

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main only the question of world-wide propaganda. The far more astute Stalin, master in his own house as apparently Hitler is not, would no doubt start off by executing Goebbels and Goering for high treason. Then, realizing that Germans are more difficult to crush than are Russian peasants, and, furthermore, realizing that Russia has a vast empire and Germany none, he would assuredly find a change of tactics was called for, involving friendship with England and therefore peace with France. As for Hitler, he could at last indulge his desire to travel. With half Asia as a colonial Empire he could revert to his former view and disdain colonial expansion. In short, as has been asserted of love, dictating might prove to be no more to these dictators than but single moments of desire. At any rate it cannot be conceded that, if the dictators were changed, the people of either country could not be made to believe by effective propaganda that they were being led along the best possible of roads. "Trust comrade Stalin!" Stalin would say, and Germans would. "I am the greatest Russian and I am never wrong," Hitler would keep on telling his Russians. And they, too, would believe him in the end and so be quite content.

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Propaganda, then, the principal prerogative of the dictator and which, by prejudicing the mass mind, enables him to exploit it, must be regarded as the chief instrument of war and, until countered, the supreme danger to peace. At this moment there can be little doubt that the first need is to educate the minds of the vast majority of human beings in Europe, warped, as they have been, by centuries of false ideas on the subject of peace. Such education involves the rejection of the very conception and objective of dictatorship based on an arrogant nationalism with war the best policy. Education, therefore, is certain to be opposed by the dictators, even if it took the form of that golden dream, an international journal, partisan of no one Power but giving straight news to all Europeans and others prepared to stand it. The dictator's answer to the question, what is truth? is

only that truth is to be feared and hated. That is why it is suppressed, concealed or distorted by the inversion of facts or by the calculated prejudice produced by contrived events.

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Now the best fact-finder in this imperfect world is a court of law where trained minds sift evidence and consistently apply rules of presumption. When, at last, the supra-national supreme power has arrived, then it will serve no purpose to conceal facts concerning one people of the earth from any other section of people, as the facts of each will then be the truth for all. In the meantime, if the influences working for law are to win increasing support, it is highly important that a beginning is made in every country by setting against propaganda methods those of straightforward advocacy. The country possessing international reputation for honesty and truth has a powerful political asset well worth exploiting, and which must always be beyond the reach of totalitarianism, however powerful. Eventually humanity will choose. What shall it avail if man gains the whole state but loses his own soul?

Next among the chief offenders in propaganda come the false pacifists. Here the loathing of war as the supreme curse of life on earth takes the crude and childish form of concentrating an offensive against everything to do with war, whether it be armament firms, soldiers, die-hards or mere equipment—except, presumably, gas-masks. To help on the advance towards the reign of law, hard reasoning and not the fire of rhetoric or the cheap violence of condemnation is the need.

In the present breathing-pause, between battle and battle, man is beginning to sense that he is fairly near new cross-roads. A dim awareness is brightening into a conviction, for long wholly unformulated, that the supreme purpose of life has something to do with self-liberation and that, therefore, only by his own effort can man become free. Emboldened even to the point of taking a chance by breaking away from the old paths of history, he is ready for a new survey. For several hundred years the average period of peace in

Europe has never much exceeded a single decade in each century. We remember the big wars but the Indian Frontier Wars, the Egyptian War, the Zulu Wars, the Afghan Wars, the Balkan Wars—these we forget. The spectacle of the missionizing, white races locked in a life and death struggle in the Great War must have left a vast doubt in the native mind. Anyone who has ever had anything to do with the backward races can feel what is behind their question—Why, if these forward races fight all the time, may not we?

Signs point to a great spiritual revival maturing in the reactionary period not far ahead. It will be distinguished from all preceding revivals by the absence of dogmas and authoritarianism, as well as by its insistence on sincerity. The present popular assortment of cheap politico-religions in every variety of jargon indicates only that man rebels against the particular rôle that modern unplanned conservatism would assign him. True, at this moment, just where his heart is most in revolt against the limitation set upon him, there his very rebellion is most exploited by the propaganda of Leviathan.

Ultimately, it may be hoped, the authentic voice of true leadership will assert itself, a quiet voice neither hysterical nor impassioned. The first footsteps to follow will be those of silent men, walking slowly and probably out of step because each is preoccupied with his own thoughts. It will, in short, be no affair of mass psychology, no rush of emotion-fed fanatics responding to the reflex call of feeding-time, but an individual response of the private reason. Just as, in the end, peace must depend on truth as truth depends on reason, so it is by its denial of any place or opportunity for contradiction and reason that propaganda takes its place in the modern armoury of armament.

In a democracy the risk of dictation by propaganda is reduced to a minimum by the free reign given to propagandists of every kind. In England where the bulk of the people accept the lead of the sensational and sporting news but try to think out political matters for themselves, the risk that a millionaire owning a chain of newspapers reaching across the country might, through his power, achieve some

warlike end, is not a serious one. And yet, so great is the influence of him who selects the facts, publicity cannot be left much longer as a wholly commercial and competitive affair. The full evil is seen only abroad. In France, for instance, it appears that bribery of the French Press by the political party in power has become the established vogue under the name of subsidizing.

The question is not simply that of lies versus facts. There are facts in favour of any view and facts against. The selection of facts for the public—and some selection is imperative—is an important matter and, if the authorities for broadcasting purposes cannot accept responsibility for such selection, they must be held responsible for the selection of the broadcaster. If the problem of ending war is one of the gravest, as it is the most urgent, confronting mankind, then the importance of the right publicity and education on this subject is surely very great. It does not invariably or even often result that the oddities and distortions of cranks cancel one another out, for, frequently, lingering ignorance is implanted. The best-selling novelist, usually a purveyor of mass entertainment, is not, as such, necessarily qualified to bring enlightenment to mankind—particularly on the problem of war and of what its solution demands. The views “aired” by some of these and similarly “well-known” gentlemen who, from time to time, are afforded audience by the British Broadcasting Corporation, have not usually been informative, educating or profound.

It is facts more than theories that are wanted, but facts that are properly marshalled against war including war in peace. The marshalling and editing of facts is indispensable. As Leviathan marshals and, indeed, subverts facts for war, so democracy must marshal facts for law.

It might be supposed that where there is a plurality of Leviathans the same fact will usually be found to be subverted differently, and this proves amply to be the case. Now, the more the subversion of fact, the more will there be divided men who not only might but who already really agree. Thus the more Leviathans the more propaganda, and the more propaganda the more war.

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The main question here is not whether the golden lie is justified in order to seduce mankind from war towards peace, but whether the distortion of propaganda—whether pacifist or bellicose—is not in the long run a factor for war rather than for law.

As illustrating that, in certain cases, the end may justify a lie, Bertrand Russell relates how, on one occasion, when questioned as to which way the fox had gone and, being moved by the plight of the exhausted animal, he told a deliberate lie. Now, for moral courage, intellectual integrity and fair-mindedness it is not everyone who can surpass Russell. Applying, as he has applied here, a higher scale of values than the criterion of literal truth, he has apparently provided an explanation of the universality of propaganda and, from one standpoint, a possible justification of it, his view being that there are two kinds of propaganda, good and bad. This, however, must result in a crescendo of competitive lying and, when the warfare of words has generated sufficient heat, it becomes a warfare of acts. Bertrand Russell is, therefore, after all no true pacifist. To qualify he must recognize that propaganda is an instrument, and an instrument of the greatest importance in the new warfare. And his sweeping statement¹ that state propaganda has proved powerless when opposed to national feeling is disposed of by the fact that propaganda does not oppose national feeling but directs it.

It is frequently urged that the rank and file of men, especially in a democracy where they have some power, cannot be trusted with the truth about facts; and, conversely, that democracy actually does not exist inasmuch as the votes of the masses, in so far as they are freely cast, are invariably given upon a misconceived or misrepresented view of the facts. Similarly it is urged by others that merely to put men in possession of the facts and stop there is but to leave the facts to be worked on by their prejudices more than by true reason. This is not altogether untrue nor, as Hobbes saw, is there a single reason common to all men. The

¹ Bertrand Russell. *Power*, p. 102.

answer, as we shall see presently, depends on what we consider to be the fundamentals of democracy.

Herbert Asquith is reported to have said that some persons think only when they talk, that a very few can think inside themselves, but that most people cannot think at all. It is curious that, while this is not the over-statement it might appear to be, nevertheless time and time again it proves to be the people themselves who, at long last, correct the mistakes of the leaders. They are generally supposed to achieve this result by political instinct which, perhaps, more than any other nation, the British people possess to the full. But in order for this instinct to come into play it is necessary that the facts be furnished and thought upon. Instinctive guidance of this sort is the very opposite of blind emotionalism. Rather is it the voice of the spirit that speaks—a prompting of intuitive knowledge which, whether reasoned or not, is never opposed to reason—indeed it sometimes seems to be behind reason and to reach farther. To have to entrust the common people with the truth revealed by facts is part of the price of democracy. Given the proper facts, reason can check emotionalism. One-sided facts or lop-sided facts are inadequate. In short, to convey truth via facts involves some planning for, so long as facts determine the emerging aspect of truth, one man's truth will be different from the next man's, if, in each case, what facts are available is left a matter of pure chance.

Again, if it is true that the main advance to peace cannot begin in earnest until men's reasoning powers have been strengthened, then other things must be subordinated to the free growth of man's spirit and reason which make for self-control—that is to say self-control of human nature. Reason alone, it is true, is not enough, for it is possible to reason a way even into war and, moreover, calculate and reason out the hour and the method of invasion. It is the facts on which reason operates that it is so urgent to supply. When the full facts of a war and of its calamity are available for consideration, reason, in nine cases out of ten, can hardly fail to reject that war. In all cases?

This question, which will become increasingly important

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in the world from now on, will be considered in the chapter on pacifism. Peace we have discovered to be a high-sounding but false alternative to war. If, therefore, the only real alternative to war is law, how is pacifism related to law? Is pacifism positively for the reign of law or only passively against war? That, once more, must be the testing angle of approach to the enquiry, for it leads back to firm ground on which, and on which alone, it has long been established that man can build. So far the only territory won from war has been the province of the law.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

TO many people, collective security, if not a magic formula to ensure peace, is at least a homely recipe the disasters of which will, at any rate, be shared, while to others it is no more than an empty phrase as, so far, it has collected nothing and secured nothing. The real significance of the term, however, has scarcely been enquired into at all.

Collective security is commonly taken to mean efficacious security against war—that is to say it represents an alternative to war. Now, as we have already seen, the only alternative to war is law. What is meant by war we have considered. We have now to inquire not only what is meant by security but what by collective. Is the security to be that of all through each or of each through all? Even if the security is only relative and not absolute, is not this better than nothing?

The more war is considered, the more rigid appears its problem and the less capable of compromise its solution. War, that dogging curse of human life—at once the infallible revelation of man's lowly origin and the supreme opportunity for his final emancipation—appears to be fixed in the Creator's mind as furnishing an important test for man.

Is this test too high? Must man pass it or perish? At other points of life in the universe—as we only can conceive life—has the same test been evaded? Has life of any sort, anywhere, so far, survived it?

On all this we can only intuitively surmise. Only it is clear that the suppression of war has provided a test which hitherto has baffled man; and clear, likewise, that contention and competition, thrust and counter-thrust, victory and defeat, are alternatives repeatedly confronting life at every stage of its passing, whether evolution, revolution, or devolution across time or space. If there is truth in this

view then the stupendous super-alternative of war or law can hardly be disposed of by a portentous phrase like collective security. There has become distorted the truth that war is not so much a disease as a biological habit of humanity which it will take something more than a legalistic phrase to cure.

Does the security meant include security against internal "civil" aggression menaced by some force or faction as inimical to the state as, say, Fascism at first seemed to Italy or as Nazidom would to-day be to Spain? Or is the security contemplated only against armed forces operating officially on behalf of some foreign Power? Would this security include, for instance, exemption from sinister influences set at work subterraneously within the realm by some foreign ideology as detested, for example, as Bolshevism is detested in Germany? Could that security be adequate unless it involved exemption from "peaceful" penetration of undermining and unhealthy foreign propaganda whether economic, social, religious, or political? Is it security from risk or only from actual attack, and does it carry with it a surety that there shall be no diplomatic pressure from arms that speak in "peace"? Is it a security against competition in armament—that is to say, is the security contemplated as permanent or only temporary? Is it a security against open hostilities or only security against defeat? Finally but chiefly, if it is the security of the state against change, and if by this is implied anything more than the mere prolonging of the political régime of the moment and investing Leviathan, man's servant, with the immortality of man who is Leviathan's creator—then what is the state?

Already our inquiry has brought us to recognize that collective security, as commonly spoken of, means not security at all but only arms and power, for security becomes meaningful only when the chief thought is given to what it is sought to secure.

What is the state? Its purpose we have already found, in the words of John Salmond, to be the *administration* of justice. On looking deeper, however, it will be found that the conception of the state in civilization means and can only

mean an opportunity to man to live and grow. What then is life? Is the life and growth of man merely physical or spiritual? Is man's outlook to be merely that of remaining chained to circumstances and to himself, or is it to include the chance of self-liberation?

Here at last there will be found to be but one answer. However restricted or unrestricted are his bodily movements, at least man's chief scene of freedom must always be the world of mind. Finally, what is important in this self-liberation is not even freedom but that man must find his own way to it—the emphasis there is not on liberation but on the *self*.

Besides civilization's conception of statehood there are, of course, others such as the totalitarian, which, according to Reich Minister Frank, the president of the German Academy of Law, sets the Nationalist-Socialist Party—that is to say, Hitler—above the state, the objectives being that strange trinity, race, soil, and work.¹

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So appears security when viewed as permanent value across the distance. Viewed from close up and over the shortest span of time, the obvious weaknesses of the "collective security" doctrine appear only multiplied, not diminished, by its "collection" being general. Actually collective security, that slogan of politicians, is no cry for law but really a call to war. Moreover, while consciously it envisages war, unwittingly it invites defeat.

Sometimes collective security is represented as the policy of threatening one international combination with a still stronger international combination prepared beforehand against a moment of crisis that might arise over some question undetermined but "political," and therefore undeterminable judicially, its interpretation being a political matter and any decision regarding it likewise political. Thus the outcome, which is to be "collectively secured" by preponderating power, is not necessarily related to any administration of justice at all *even among those collectively secured*.

¹ *Berlin Weekly News Letter*: Ultrapress Berlin, Vol. IV, No. 25, June 22, 1938.

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Now the administration of justice which, as we saw in an earlier chapter, is perhaps the main achievement of civilization, has been brought about by man relinquishing a part of his individual freedom in order to further the welfare of the community. We saw, too, that in international affairs the governments of states have never yet seriously faced the old problem, while mankind—the individuals composing the states—has never been allowed to do so. We saw that even if men have the chance they cannot individually and personally set up the rule of justice except by means of a law proceeding from a law-giver and resting on supreme power—that is to say the reign of law within the state.

This is so for several reasons, the chief being that to no two men do facts—still less principles of law—appear the same, even assuming the same number of facts were within their common view which is never the case. Even the very light in which any single fact is beheld depends to an incalculable degree upon the make-up of the individual and upon his particular experience. We are never the same after our experience but are modified by it, and whether this experience be pleasant or unpleasant. Soundness of view may be thought to depend on education, on heredity, and on a man's capacity for independent thought and judgment, but, actually, it turns on little more than the central point of intellectual gravity which varies not only from man to man but in man as he moves from self to self. Even in a world where propaganda did not exist, justice would still be impossible without a law-giver—an independent body to pronounce what *is* the law. In short, as we have already seen, the alternative to the reign of violence among men is the authoritative reign of justice which means no more than the administration of law.

Thus collective security is only another device advocated as a means by which man can evade a sharp and awkward alternative and obtain peace "on the cheap" without paying its price. To many unthinking, simple souls the policy of collective security no doubt promises an alignment separating angels from devils through the pooling of resources for a new advance towards peace. It is, however, merely the old

advance towards war. It represents no constructive effort of international peace at all, for it overlooks the very foundation of peace which is law.

All that it offers is a shifting alliance, undetermined and, indeed, unpredictable until open hostilities have begun. Only then can the promises of nations to support by arms an arrangement of collective security be put to the proof, seeing that each of the collective security states insists on sovereign power to decide even this "vital" interest for itself.

Now, it may be contended that, even so, an international democratic front would represent collective or fused power. But that is the whole question—is there one power fused and united or are there several, mutually antagonistic or competitive?

There is an acid test. It is the surrender of individual rights to determine justice for oneself and nothing less than that which distinguishes supreme power amassed for law from the collective power amassed for war.

At the present moment, in deciding whether, when the time of action comes, it will remain in the "collection" or not, a state retains a free hand to the last moment—a policy justified on the ground approved by any opinion selected from amongst those of the "most highly qualified publicists," that the state's own existence, that is, its self-preservation, is involved. Again, strange to say, it is usually overlooked that international law is needed, perhaps most of all, among allies. In short, being at present based on voluntary, revocable adherence and not on supreme power, international law is only rule "by courtesy" and ceases to be of any significance so soon as agreement is withdrawn or whenever, through change of circumstances, agreement has lapsed.

As we have found, war cannot henceforth be regarded merely as actual battle, pitched or moving, commencing after the official declaration of war, continuing until peace is officially proclaimed and conducted during its course by rules and regulations. It is a conflict between the massed will and power of people against people, to be decided ultimately by violence in a competition of ruthlessness and not

by the administration of justice in the reign of law. Moreover we have found that war spans not merely the period of armament engaging armament in actual clash of battle right up to capitulation and dictation of terms, but that, in reality, war includes the period of the race for armaments. Thus the saying that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton may be more true in the future than in the past. Except for gigantic blunders of the enemy the World-War might have been lost to the Allies by the pre-war activities of Krupps.

This "peacetime" dispositioning for battle is now proceeding again in Germany at great speed. What security, except that which the reign of law offers, can ever prevent this continuance of war in peace, particularly seeing that the new warfare promises to arrange that, without a shot being fired, a nation may be vanquished and even enslaved? Until the reign of law supersedes the reign of war it would therefore appear that the term pacifism, which we shall consider in the following chapter, is a misnomer and should be discarded or else spelt "passivist." At any rate now that war is a Volkskrieg and will come to us instead of our going to it, the George Lansburys, the Dick Sheppards, the Aldous Huxleys, the Bernard Shaws, the Bertrand Russells, willy-nilly and despite their claim to be pacifists, cannot expect to be regarded as anything less belligerent than serving Mädhens out of uniform for, even if they should refuse to help the gas-brigade adjust the gas-masks of children, they will probably find themselves, whether by reflex action or otherwise, party to adjusting their own gas-masks at the twelfth hour. From such limited co-operation in defence to the willingness to man the crewless, anti-aircraft gun as terrified children scream, choke, and die, can hardly be more than a matter of seconds for any of these men whose human nature, no less than whose courage, can be counted on to oust for the time being their logical convictions. As for Bertrand Russell, who so boldly lied to the huntsman to save the exhausted little fox, I can almost see him, regardless of his own peril, firing a pistol into the petrol-tank of the bomber crashed, but not yet alight, among the

havoc it had caused. In that case the argument that if he did so he would be acting emotionally and not rationally would but confirm the human limitations that cannot be ignored.

Again, if this collective security is security against war, it must be a security against other methods of violence which are no less tragic but only less televisionary, as, for instance, blockade, whether belligerent or "pacific," on which subject I have already touched. Finally, collective security against war, as including preparation for war which is an affair of economic competition, would have to include succour from economic war, from the menace of hostile tariffs and challenging subsidies—in short, from the competitive pursuit of wealth to which men dedicate their lives.

What could secure all this but the reign of law supported by supreme power? It begins to appear that what it is proposed to collect is not the security of the reign of law supported by supreme power, but only an aggregate of overwhelming violence without law—and that is war.

How, then, does such violence differ from the supreme power which supports the rule of law? The answer lies in the submission of the component elements of the supreme power to that power, that is to the rule of law which supreme power supports. Have the nations who, to any degree and at any time, have believed themselves to be collectively secured against Leviathan, ever subordinated themselves to a common rule of law? Not in the least.

As currently used in all its undisclosed ambiguity the glib-sounding collective security doctrine is one of the first considerable obstacles that block the advance to peace. The very notion not only preserves the fallacies that prolong war but conceals the terms of the sacrifice that forms the irreducible price of peace. Nor is this all. The illusion of collective security will be found to lie even across the path of neutrality. Instead of narrowing, it widens war. Instead of extending, by every means possible, the anti-war front, it makes of Leviathan, already the God of destruction, the God of security.

Actually it is Leviathan himself that once more would decoy mankind with the old illusion dressed up afresh as

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collective security—the illusion that war, after all, is itself a “sanction” of peace, that violence can permanently subdue violence, that war can bring peace—whereas the only power that can subdue violence is the supreme power of the reign of law. That alone can secure the security of peace.

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But, it may be contended, have you not maintained that the zone of law must be forever widening, and is not this widening taking place wherever there is collective power, which is only power on a broader basis? The answer is that just as security for the individual cannot arrive before the reign of law, but only with it, so collective security of the nation follows and does not precede collective law.

We have found that law for men assembled in nations cannot be different in kind from law for men in any one nation. And law involves the reign of law and that requires not merely the collection but the pooling and fusion of power and a common submission to the administration of the law for the supreme end, justice. Now, from whatever angle it is examined, so-called collective security reveals nothing resembling pooled power at all. Nothing takes place beyond the most superficial agreement “secured” by formula on formula. Even among the most ardent collective-securitists, there has not taken place, nor has the slightest provision been made for, any real unification of fundamental principle, unison of intention, or union of will such as could be said to provide the cohesion necessary to give a single momentum to the resistance or to the overthrow of even external menace.

No man can serve two masters, no nation divide its allegiance between full independence and union. The test is whether, in arriving at their collective arrangement, the collectivist nations have not merely *declared* their willingness to renounce war and, if necessary, to overthrow war-mongering challengers, but have actually subordinated all reservations and interests to that end; that is, whether they have accepted the reign of law *over themselves*. If so, the forward step has been taken, and then collective security

is no more than a description of the reign of law offering extended protection because widened.

It follows that, in this event, theoretically something of each nation's "independent" sovereignty will have been shed. Instead of independence there is mutual trust of one people for another people. It might appear that the risk such trust ran of being misplaced, and the opportunity for treachery, were too great for any nation to accept. When, however, the alternative peril is considered, there appears not only little reason against but overwhelming reason in favour of such a trust being sincerely exchanged and the risk honestly shared between nations like-minded about war, who, by so agreeing, will have added to themselves a new individuality, and indeed have begun to put on, all unconsciously, the first vestments of fuller sovereignty than ever. Like men in the early stages of human society, they will have gained much by so doing and lost comparatively little. Unified on so supreme an issue beforehand, they could prepare and success should be more assured in their defensive, however long or intense.

At present, so far from this being the case, the collectivist nations are quite unconverted in heart, full of reservations, distrustful of one another. On the look-out for chances of betterment, governments, differing only in the degree of their Leviathanism, have exploited the collective security policy as a variation of power-politics and have used the structure of the League of Nations alternately first as a stalking-horse behind which, independent and unsubordinated, to advance collectively secure, and then as a screen to cover collectivist retreat. This is no hard phrase. If not union for law, then union must be union for war.

History furnishes no other device offering equal opportunity for the convenient and cowardly exploitation of mass hypocrisy by calculating Powers. But, so far from failing, the League has magnificently succeeded in confronting man with the supreme alternative and in proving anew, the axiom of Canute, that words are powerless against the force of nature and no less so if that nature is human. Or, to quote Hobbes, that "Covenants without the sword are but words

and of no strength to secure a man at all." Here, be it observed, this scientific truth as stated by Hobbes can be applied no less devastatingly to those self-righteous apostles, the Security Collectivists, than to the arrogant violators of the Covenant themselves.

On the one hand, in the actual events that have recently happened, and in the absence of any supreme power, some of the original collectivists decided on treachery, turned their backs on their promises, and drove their teeth into their own colleagues. On the other hand, similarly devoid of any supreme power but deluding themselves that a degree of revocable agreement among them would do as a substitute for that supreme power, the more staunch collectivist guardians of the Covenant at first pretended to stand but soon likewise forsook the cause. It is as well that they did so for otherwise they might have been defeated or, if successful on initial occasions, would thereby have been lured on to certain and more costly defeat later on, for the simple reason that as time went on the more their own divergencies increased and these, in the absence of provision for their removal, would before long have proved fatal.

The scheme of collective security must not merely be abandoned, it must be exposed. Moreover, it is right to reject it not as a noble dream that proved unrealizable but as a sham, a fraud, a stumbling-block to peace, and the mounting-block to war. It is a sham because it represents that it possesses unity possible only after contending rivalries have been cancelled out, leaving a single supreme power predominant which all in the community are willing to obey—whereas, in fact, it is only a superficial and wordy alignment of Powers behind a formula expressed in the most general terms. From the start every Power was awake to the obvious fact that no two nations would or could interpret the formula in the same way, any more than any two men could singly ever be found to pronounce an identical judgment even if the criteria sought to be applied were the same.

Whatever the formula adopted in any agreement, arrangement, or understanding of collective security, it has been recognized all along that each nation concerned would view

it from the standpoint of its own "vital interests" and interpret it according to its own conception of so-called international law. In short, whatever the undertaking, and whether given or contemplated, it means something different to each party to it and also undergoes further changes as one political party succeeds another in the same state. Thus if Germany, for instance, had remained a member of the League, the Nazi notion of statehood, law, jurisprudence, justice, nationality, and other vital matters must have proved more disruptive than her absence has an embarrassment.

The fact is that the "collective security" programme does not propose merely to put the cart in front of the horse—it asks the cart to do the work of both cart and horse without any horse in the shafts at all. It attempts to identify supreme power subordinated—however consolidated—to the rule of law, with accumulated raw force—that same, un-legal, crude weapon of old-time anarchy. Supreme power emerges only after the rivalries have been resolved and the individual and tribal jealousies have been suppressed. Only then can the several strengths of the contending, competing and individualistic factions all become merged and amalgamated into a single power. Now security collectivism studiously avoids so drastic a process. Instead of anarchic factions and contending Powers pooling or sharing their separate interests thereby eliminating friction and promoting unity, these they secrete scrupulously intact in the background but illuminate and magnify so soon as the real business begins.

It is obvious that, in the absence of any administration of international justice, the foreign policy of the nations must necessarily be determined by political considerations. Actually, as we have seen, the Powers, including the security collectivists no less, have expressly provided even for the principles of so-called international law to be regarded *politically* and applied *politically*.

In adopting the notion of collective security as a system, the League of Nations became a political society shorn of two requisites both of which are indispensable to an effective political society. Firstly, there was no single foreign policy

because there was no single political unity or single political aim but only a medley of rival and competitive nations "collectively secure." Secondly, there was no single administration of justice for the same reason. Thus the move against Mussolini in his invasion and conquest of a colleague's territory was a League policy only, not a British policy or a French policy. It is not too much to say that each Power at any time only sheltered itself behind the League, and at no time lost any of its identity in the League. This is obvious from the fact that, when the occasion for its application arose, the programme of collective security was variously interpreted by the several states according to their varying interests.

In the result the pro-Covenant policy of the security collectivist nations was still-born. The super bluff of the international anarchist, Mussolini, which might have been quickly called and as quickly dropped in direct discussion across the table with any Great Power, precipitated a situation of ferment and dilemma the proposed outcome of which was—for England at any rate—a decision neither remotely resembling moral justice by any known criteria nor yet politically satisfactory. As the moment for the test of the believers' faith and concord drew near, that faith and that concord shrank. What "collective" concord was left would have disappeared likewise if the real business of open hostilities had begun. Nothing united the totalitarian dictators but knowledge of this fact.

Moreover, while, on the one hand, no degree of honest union whatever takes place in the collective security system, the programme contemplated by the system was perhaps the most ambitious task conceivable for any political union, a task indeed possible only for the strongest and most consolidated union such as that of a supra-national sovereign state—the policy of collective war. While events may explain what occurred they cannot justify or excuse. At the back of the mind of collectivist France was the secret thought of her fear of Germany on account of which her Government had come to a private and disreputable agreement with Italy the year before. Exploiting this French fear to the

uttermost, it happened that once again the Italian Leviathan double-crossed his former friends and colleagues and set *en train* both German and Japanese aggression, in each instance the consideration demanded being the loan of additional power. France, on seeing Italy and Germany now suddenly become friends, and having to choose between the League (which her Government had never viewed much other than as an insurance against the risk of defeat at Germany's hands), and a move against Germany, she chose the latter. Thus Abyssinia, a ward of the League, seeking sanctuary under the Covenant, was left, unfriended and alone, to repel the Italian Leviathan. In Germany, at the time, a frequently expressed German opinion was that the chief thing Italy had done in the Abyssinian affair was to prove how easy it was to exploit France's fear of Germany and England's trust of France.

In short, in the changing scene of the international field, the "collective security" policy utterly failed when pitted against measuring diplomacy and power-politics. And as a check to the threat of war it hardly counted at all in spite of its brandishing the stolen word sanction which implies compulsion by power existing in the reign of law, not the threat of conjectural power in collective war. Yet in the circumstances Italy might more naturally have been expected to be France's ally against Nazi Germany before Germany first overshadowed and then finally absorbed her. But with her dictator ambition came first. The centre of political gravity in France on the Abyssinia question was governed by her obsessing fear of a German invasion which comes last as it comes first with her. In front of both, as was the case with other collective securitist countries, there stood the principle of inviolate national sovereignty; and behind that sovereignty some nationalistic paramount policy it was hoped collectively to secure. In the result nothing was collected save fear.

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But if the factions faithful to the idea of the Covenant suffer from the absence of the reign of law, the ringleaders

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of international anarchy are no less embarrassed by a similar want, there being no provision for regulating the relations between themselves. Thus, if by any chance Germany should engage in a war alongside Italy, the German command would dovetail German military dispositions among the Italian forces in order to maintain control in all the key positions. Nor could Germany afford to run the risk of Italy again changing sides or making a separate peace. "Du kannst nicht treu sein!" sang German war veterans over their beer-mugs while Mussolini was working himself up to the well-rehearsed climax of congratulation over his welcome to Berlin. On the other hand, with the lesson of Nazi Germany's exploitation of the Treaty of Versailles now available as a warning, no ally of Germany could expect a peaceful peace-making, however victorious.

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There is no need here to stretch the logical conclusions of the totalitarian premises. In the case of approaching disaster Italy, for instance, would contrive to get let off more lightly by making a separate lightning peace—if she had the chance. This, of course, she would be perfectly justified in doing according to the views of many "highly qualified publicists," supposing that, in her view, her very existence were at stake. She might likewise make a surprise peace separately if Germany were heading for an overwhelming victory—an action that doubtless could be justified by Italian publicists on the ground that, if German military success had been allowed to end in triumph, the "peace" negotiations might have been so one-sided that nothing to speak of would have been left over after Germany had appropriated her share.

For Italy there might, of course, be substituted another nation, nor is Mussolini's Italy likely to be the permanent Italy any more than Hitler's Germany is the only or the true Germany. It is undeniable that a country is not what it appears to be at any particular moment but rather the radius of its possibilities as they appear in the future against the background of its past characteristics. It is at least obvious

that the three dictatorships of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini occupy that common ground where method is all; and that, if they fought shoulder to shoulder against a common foe, final absorption of the weaker victor by the stronger would be not only the inevitable but the logical outcome.

This being so it becomes important to enquire how these totalitarian states could possibly take part in any collective security system, even supposing it were in any way workable. The answer can scarcely be in doubt for, of all forms of statehood, the totalitarian is the most arrogant in its assertion of full and complete sovereignty and therefore the farthest away from conversion to the first principles of law. "Slay or be slain" is the eternal war-cry of the totalitarian Leviathan. The rally of the leadership of the democracies on the other hand, is "We must unite or perish!"

The question under consideration here is of considerable importance. Few statesmen of lengthy political experience could resist the doubt whether anything but a material self-interest could ever induce nations to co-operate together to the bitter end of a strenuous struggle. Could nations, still so unsoftened of heart that they cannot surrender a vital interest or two let alone surrender full, independent sovereignty, be capable of cohering in a grave and awful struggle with the object of no material gain other than that of the outlawry of war?

One difficulty is that it is not only the collective securitists who can "collect security" through collecting force. The violators undermine the collected security of their enemy by collecting force likewise, but do so with more chances of success for, being the challengers, zero hour is alone known to them. Only after having calculated and surpassed the strength of their likely adversaries do they proceed to immediate business.

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Collective security, then, does not avoid the ordeal of actual contest. Nor is it likely, as is commonly assumed, that any violator would fight single-handed. On the contrary, like any buccaneer, he would prefer the certainty of pos-

sessing doubtful Powers as allies to the uncertainty of leaving them neutral with the possibility of their taking sides against him at the last moment—an uncertainty which included the risk that, in the hour of victory but also of exhaustion, the neutral might become too interested in the disposal of the booty. During the struggle the challengers bent on violation are to a degree bound by the old bonds of desperadoes—the excitement of the gamble, the lust for the exercise of power, the thirst for more power, the private knowledge that they have turned against the pack and must win at all costs and regardless of method because they are fully aware that the penalty for failure will not bear contemplation.

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Here once again the conclusion is that security feasibly can be collected and expanded only in so far as it represents a widened zone of supreme power to support the reign of law. That the scheme of collective security is unpractical and unfeasible entirely escapes the collective securitists who merely assert that if you collect *enough* security you would be in a position to accept instantaneous trial by combat in a dozen directions with enemies unascertainable beforehand. That is a large claim based on an assumption of security at the start that could only be proved at the end. Once it is recognized that power is the basis of security the question of wide security is simplified by the practical demands of strategy; and then it becomes obvious, on a moment's thought, that a permanent, solid, strategic front involving considerable planning if it were to stand, would have to be formed beforehand. Now the formation of that front would meet with certain difficulties, particularly at the start.

The memoirs of Mr. Lloyd George show that in the Great War the smooth running of the Allied Army's High Command in France was a grave problem the early failure to solve which proved costly and very nearly disastrous. In the light of his revelations the difficulties of that problem would increase tenfold in a war waged by whatever "security" collecting army, navy and air-forces were available, without efficacious planning. And if collective security

were so planned as to be efficacious, then interests would be pooled, power fused, and the reign of law begun—and the cumbersome phraseology therefore needless. Indeed, the Minister co-ordinating and consolidating the defensive power would really be one of the architects of the expanded state based on widened power enforcing widened law.

Most of all would those difficulties fall heavily on an empire-power like England whose geographical dispersion might even spell catastrophe. One must consider what the problem may look like in fifty years' time even if the swing of the birth-rate and of the social order generally is influenced by permanent planning directed towards the ultimate reign of peace. It is not impossible that the European's problem now will later become the Indian's, the African's, the Chinaman's problem. To set all on the hope that future menace from coloured, non-European elements must eventually result in a hand-shake all round and in the inauguration of friendship among former enemies—the anarchist sovereignties of Europe—is a childish hope. The reign of law will be reached by an advance *eventually* extending to a world-front, and that must be contemplated from the start. The comforting thought that civilization is waiting only for the education of European electorates with which, at some far distant date, those multitudes of our brothers coloured differently from our colour will have to fall into line, is already belied by the Japanese bid for ultimate Asiatic and Eastern hemisphere hegemony. Events already in full march will not wait, before proceeding further, until European civilization has set its own house in order. To dismiss as negligible the risk of Leviathan arising outside old Europe may prove fatal. Profiting by bloody and chronic dissension among the missionizing Westerns, the Eastern vanguard of the challenge to European civilization has already been adopted by Leviathan and is going the way of Leviathan.

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The task ahead is hard and long, for, as we have seen, it comes down to a question of values—of what may be called

a spiritual code. Far on in the future supreme power will have to hold the fort for the backward races long after the surviving vanguard of selective civilization has learned to obey without any suggestion of enforcement. Only by power can those races be shielded from the mentality of recruiting Leviathan and spared the cruel inroads of Leviathanic propaganda and conversion. Any permitted totalitarianizing of these peoples would not only stand to the disgrace of the civilized and older Powers but inevitably result in the supersession of that civilization by the masses whom its neglect of responsibility had betrayed.

Could betrayal go farther than where civilized man, on finding that reason has weakened his sword-arm and brought home to him the insanity of war, yet hires and trains his backward brother to go to war for him?

The world has yet to discover that the fixed price of democracy (and hence the hatred felt for it by the war-worshipper) is the renunciation of war for law. And that the democratic advance is therefore a spiritual advance prepared to renounce whatever the reign of law entails.

Thus the far and supreme alternative, law or war, becomes, when viewed from another angle, the near alternative—democracy or war.

This however will be a democracy revolutionized in order to be renewed at all.

The implications of these stupendous alternatives can be revealed only by education. The credulity and indolence of unenlightened man betray him into taking up such catch-ideas as collective security which, considered as a practical policy, is seen to promise only certain and deserved catastrophe. Thus, throughout all these runs a deep purpose. In this world, however much the scheme of the Creator is hidden, it is at least plain that man must continue his life's progress through continuing and pursuing difficulties. From the pattern of life, even as we know it, it is safe to assume that the stupendous problem of war is scarcely likely to be resolved by a gratuitous fool-proof scheme in which any payment for earth's supreme blessing is conveniently begrudged and withheld.

The policy of collective security is a pretentious attempt to evade the supreme alternative—law or war—merely by verbally renouncing war while clinging to those old self-interests—the demand of each individual nation to be sole judge of its own cause, to decide principle solely by force, and to set sovereignty above the reign of law. And, not least, to do all this blasphemously in the name of justice. But the proposition for man is nicely set. “My will or Thy will” is the alternative re-stated.

The more it is looked at, the more there appears something shoddy and slippery about collective security which is visibly anti-Christ even if you believe no more than in the life of Christ. How could God desire or permit man to attain final security merely by a gregarious policy of his unfaith?

What is God? We cannot say but we know that certain facts, if fitted into the conception of Him, may supply a clue. Recently a youth in Sweden, having announced to his companions that he would climb a high electric pylon and stand on his head on the top of it, proceeded to do so. When he arrived at the top all lights in the neighbourhood suddenly went out until, through darkness, the onlookers beheld a single flaming mass of electric fire in the shape of a youth standing on his head—and a charred lump was eventually brought down. There is terror in that, and tragedy. Equally there is inescapable law. While, in the final assessment omnipotent God cannot conceivably be unmerciful, nevertheless in the fashioning of man there is clearly something inexorable about the law of life. That law encloses the alternative to war. Man will not begin effectively to grapple with the problem of war until he concentrates not on peace but on law. Peace may be an end but law is the way.

Yet awhile—indeed for the next measurable stretch of history—the reign of law and of order in the political society will inevitably continue to be conditioned by supreme power. This power can arrive only as the result either of irrevocable agreement or of submission after conquest. The fact that power is necessary at all may seem to leave little doubt that the method of the institution of supreme world-

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power will be by conquest. The wiser method, the way of salvation, is that of fusion of power for a widening reign of law. That is the very reverse of the passive submission to violence, the surrender and subjugation involved in pacifism which we will now consider.

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ACCORDING to the late Dick Sheppard a pacifist is one who refuses to take part in any war, whatever the consequences of his decision may be. While pacifism does not mean the same thing even to the most ardent pacifists, it at least involves this. Used in the absolute sense its method is to follow reason to the very end, and it is therefore a thoroughgoing system applied logically and practically to finality of its outcome. There is claimed for its method that it can be put into practice at once and that, whatever its faults and limitations, it would, if generally applied, abolish war from the earth. This is an ambitious claim which we shall consider in a moment.

Pacifism, however, is not merely a method but also a faith resting on a spiritual basis not, of course, necessarily religious—a view of it conceded by men so diverse in outlook as Dick Sheppard and Aldous Huxley. Thus it is not too much to claim for pacifism that it can promote a communion of spiritual faith by reuniting that which religious belief has disjoined. It is, claims Sheppard, implicit in the whole life of Christ. It is the only means, says Aldous Huxley, by which we can avoid the complete catastrophe of modern war. Moreover, the cost of pacifism to a nation, it is generally contended, would be surprisingly small and, in any event, whatever loss it entailed would be temporary and but a fraction of the colossal disaster in a great war.

To anyone who, having passed through it, can bring himself unflinchingly to return in memory and re-enter that awful corridor of the last war from which no side door led but only the egress for survivors at its end, there must recur that one prevailing thought of the utter unreason and insanity of it all. Nor has memory forgotten that that was a madness which one could only continue to accept by dis-

crediting the self. From that private desolation, that self-degradation of moments in between when reason insisted so firmly that even sacrifice seemed stripped of its last purpose, the real man who tries to resolve his experience turns his eyes towards pacifism, if not with a new vision in his heart, at any rate in desperate wonder whether even so strangely sounding a prescription might not for all that do the trick. From the very nature of its claim pacifism deserves the examination of all good and reasonable men. If there appears any prospect whatever of its doing what is claimed for it, then, assuredly, men will be found ready to try hard for it, even if trying means dying. It has never been tried out in a big way so far.

There is something strange, almost a little fascinating about the oddity of pacifism that attracts attention. It appeals primarily to reason but also to that deep awareness in man, recently strengthened, of spiritual dissatisfaction with a great deal of life—that feeling of challenge to old conventions, particularly of national conduct, that questing desire illustrated by the Oxford Group and similar movements to make way for new ethical and religious conviction which would be applicable to ordinary, week-day life. If one is to be killed in a war in order to oppose some principle, why not, so prompts the urging thought, risk something on this bid for the hope of all? Perhaps not quite the hope of all, but surely of almost all, for, if a war like the last could be stopped midway, pacifism would receive a full trial provided that it got the chance.

In an almost forgotten little collection of essays written during the War and entitled *Justice in War-time*,¹ Bertrand Russell, who, during the Great War suffered imprisonment for his pacifist activities, stated the case for pacifism so fearlessly and completely that it is worth quoting in full:

“Let us imagine that England were to disband its army and navy, after a generation of instruction in the principles of passive resistance as a better defence than war. Let us suppose that England at the same time publicly announced that no armed opposition would be offered to an invader,

¹ London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

that all might come freely, but that no obedience would be yielded to any commands that a foreign authority might issue. What would happen in this case?

Suppose, to continue the argument, that the German Government wished to take advantage of England's defenceless condition. It would be faced, at the outset, by the opposition of whatever was not utterly brutal in Germany, since no possible cloak could be found to hide the nakedness of aggression. All civilized countries, when they engage in war, find some decent excuse: they fight, almost always, either in self-defence or in defence of the weak. No such excuse could be found in this case. It could no longer be said, as the Germans now say, that England's naval preponderance keeps other nations in bondage, and threatens the very existence of any nation which depends upon imported food. It could no longer be said that we were oppressing India, since India would be able to separate from the British Empire whenever it wished to do so. All the usual pretexts by which aggression is justified would be lacking. . . .

If England had no army and no navy, the Germans would be hard put to it to find a pretext for invasion. All the Liberal elements in Germany would oppose any such enterprise; so would all other nations, unless Germany offered them a share of the plunder. But let us suppose all home opposition overcome, and a force despatched to England to take possession of the country. Such a force, since it would meet with no military opposition, would not need to be in the state of mingled fear and ferocity which characterizes an invading army among a hostile population. There would be no difficulty in preserving military discipline, and no opportunity for the rape and rapine which have always been displayed by troops after victory in battle. There would be no glory to be won, not even enough to earn one iron cross. The Germans could not congratulate themselves upon their military prowess or imagine that they were displaying the stern self-abnegation believed to be shown by willingness to die in the fight. To the soldierly mind, the whole expedition would be ridiculous, causing a feeling of disgust instead of pride. Perhaps a few impudent street-boys might have to have their ears boxed, but otherwise there would be nothing to lend dignity to the expedition.

However, we will suppose the invading army arrived in London, where they would evict the King from Buckingham Palace and the Members from the House of Commons. A few able bureaucrats would be brought over from Berlin to consult with the Civil Servants in Whitehall as to the

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new laws by which the reign of Kultur was to be inaugurated. No difficulty would be expected in managing so tame a nation, and, at first, almost all the existing officials would be confirmed in their offices. For the government of a large modern State is a complicated matter, and it would be thought well to facilitate the transition by the help of men familiar with the existing machinery.

But at this point, if the nation showed as much courage as it has always shown in fighting, difficulties would begin. All the existing officials would refuse to co-operate with the Germans. Some of the more prominent would be imprisoned, perhaps even shot, in order to encourage the others. But if the others held firm, if they refused to recognize or transmit any order given by Germans, if they continued to carry out the decree previously made by the English Parliament and the English Government, the Germans would have to dismiss them all, even to the humblest postman, and call in German talent to fill the breach.

The dismissed officials could not all be imprisoned or shot; since no fighting would have occurred, such wholesale brutality would be out of the question. And it would be very difficult for the Germans suddenly, out of nothing, to create an administrative machine. Whatever edicts they might issue would be quietly ignored by the population. If they ordered that German should be the language taught in schools, the schoolmasters would go on as if no such order had been issued; if the schoolmasters were dismissed the parents would no longer send the children to school. If they ordered that English young men should undergo military service, the young men would simply refuse; after shooting a few, the Germans would have to give up the attempt in despair. If they tried to raise revenue by customs duties at the ports, they would have to have German customs officers; this would lead to a strike of all the dock labourers, so that this way of raising revenue would become impossible. If they tried to take over the railways, there would be a strike of the railway servants. Whatever they touched would instantly become paralysed, and it would soon be evident, even to them, that nothing was to be made out of England unless the population could be conciliated."

It is clear that Bertrand Russell was reckoning without the new realism of totalitarian Leviathan who, as Dr. Gilbert Murray recounts, does not hesitate to order his Fascisti to slit the throats of milkmen insistent upon stating their grievance instead of milking the cows. Competing in bravado

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with the Nazi dictator whom at the same time he loses no opportunity to impress, Mussolini is quite capable of marching a large section of the Spanish people through a lethal chamber if, as would be perfectly justifiable, Spanish aircraft were to bomb and poison-gas Rome. The past, we must admit, is back on us and if, in a European conflagration, Stalin were to capture the person of Hitler and give him the choice between further demolition of the Reich or delivering over Mussolini, the epic story of Bayazid I whom Tamerlane carted round like a beast in an iron cage, might quite conceivably be re-enacted. A variation would be if Stalin were to hand over Mussolini to the Abyssinians—the sort of grim joke that would appeal to Stalin. In short, recent tragic events in Germany, Austria and Russia hardly bear out Bertrand Russell's forecast, and the extent he has been proved wide of the mark is the measure of the mischief his leadership might have caused.

And yet if pacifism is right, and, in the end, effective, why not then adopt it for all occasions? Should a nation continue to hurl back the crude barbarian from its gates but turn out in workmen's overalls and "pacificate" only when more formidable and respectable adversaries appear—so respectable, indeed, as to halt because they would be hard put to it—in Bertrand Russell's words—to find a pretext for invasion?

Is it to be pacifism against war but not against victory and still less against defeat? Does the technique of pacifism differ from that of militarism? Is pacifism to be an individual act or only an act or policy of the state? Could there be said to be any policy of the state, any administration of justice, or any state at all, if the invader overran the country and took charge? The power of the state, possibly assertive, but no longer supreme, could be considered dissolved, and the reign of law, so far as the old régime was concerned, would be at an end. It follows that, except for the rule of the conqueror, there would be anarchy, a mere reversion to that pre-law stage in which human nature invariably recognizes its opportunity as events in various parts of the world continue to prove. And where would pacifism be then?

Unmasked, pacifism is seen as the negator of law, yet as possibly existing only in the reign of law.

The closer the matter is looked at the more clearly appears this startling truth. For the individual to be allowed defiantly to declare that, whatever the state decreed to the contrary, he would limit his co-operation to a sit-down strike against the enemy and would do all in his power to hinder defensive measures, challenges the reign of law and the basis of law, for, if this defiance is successful, law is overthrown and replaced by anarchy. Thus individual pacifism of this sort urging the individual to rebel against the reign of law, unmasks pacifism as anarchy, and the pacifist, therefore, as an anarchist.

The irresistible conclusion is that, however much the pacifist's desire may be for peace, his method is a challenge to law. His choice, therefore, must be adjudged as one for war. His unwitting and tragic blunder of deciding the supreme alternative in the opposite way to that which promotes the end he really desires is due to his overlooking that peace comes through law.

Is this an over-statement? For the individual to declare his defiance to the state's decrees is clearly to put himself above the law. Now individual pacifism appears respectable just because it fails and, except in times of crisis, is regarded in countries of freedom and toleration more as a safety-valve than as a serious menace to constituted law and order. It might, however, if permitted, attain a dislocating potentiality of such magnitude as to overshadow and even paralyse the reign of law. But at this point pacifism itself would be defeated for, to apply it, as to apply any other policy, requires the reign of law without which there would be no law to decide what was the official brand of pacifism that had to be followed. There would still have to be available a court to decide each concrete case, that is to apply the rule of law. Was this man's act properly "pacifist" or not? Was that man's utterance "pacifist" or not? The varieties of pacifism are manifold but all hold in common that pacifism is not a matter merely for belief but involves a certain course of action. Unless, therefore, the pacifists were

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to be left at cross-purposes, the need for an official version would be imperative.

As individual pacifism thus reduces to a meaningless phrase, it follows that the only serious pacifist proposition is national or state pacifism—that is to say pacifism as an accepted policy of the government in office enforced and administered by the rule of law in times of “peace,” of “war,” and of “neutrality.” No lesser statement encloses the essential truth. It is often contended that the revolution of pacifism, like any other revolutionary movement, can proceed only by way of individual conversion depending on individual interpretation, but that in this way a sufficiently strong consensus of will to overthrow a government’s policy of non-pacifism becomes possible. Where national pacifism essentially differs from individual pacifism is that it recognizes (as no pacifist yet has recognized) that in order to operate at all, pacifism, like any other policy of conduct of a people, requires to be *administered* by authority—and the only authority so far found to work on earth is the rule of law. Even in dictatorships this is recognized. National pacifism recognizes that to frustrate or oppose one’s government by direct action because it is non-pacifist—unless constitutional methods are followed—is worse than useless for any such course would be but to deprive one’s fellow citizens not only of the rule of lawful non-pacifism but of the rule of law altogether. This, however, is precisely what is risked by tolerating individual pacifism. Now national pacifism looks beyond the passing day of surrender and possible subjugation to what comes after.

National pacifism, presumably, must have a programme if the miracle of pacifism is to pass from thought to action. What is that programme? So far no world programme for national pacifism appears to have been considered. Yet it is evident that any plan for national pacifism would have to be international in its scope. Now, being based on reason, pacifism must be logically applied. It follows that from the very outset national pacifism must reject warfare of every kind—whether economic warfare that chiefly determines whose are the big battalions, propaganda that shackles man

to untruth and reconciles him to the mechanization of humanity, or any of the remaining antagonisms of war in peace. Indeed, national pacifism would seem to involve the acceptance of at least two points of view—(a) an economic standpoint that regarded property as so far removed from personal possession as to approach the communistic ideal of holding it in trust for humanity at large—and this, so far, has proved unattainable—(b) a spiritual standpoint that not only sets truth at higher value than power or suffering but, in actual deed, is prepared to follow truth even at the cost of diminished power or of increased suffering. Here also it is true that not only are the great majority of men a long way from this noble standpoint, but that even when the vanguard reaches it there will still be the long rearguard of backward races. What can safely be said is that whatever real progress man makes towards adopting either standpoint in his practical affairs will not be effected without the disciplining of his own human nature by the instrumentality of the law.

So man, even man the pacifist, eternally returns to law. National pacifism could proceed by way of the factors promising it permanence only if it, too, rested on supreme power safeguarding it from overthrow within the state. But if, whatever that is ideal, worthy or to man's advantage in the policy of pacifism, can be safeguarded only within the state and by the power of the law, why should not its safeguarding from external aggression and overthrow threatened by a foreign Leviathan rest on power likewise? Here the bottom falls out of the case for national pacifism also, for, sheltered within the realm of the law, it will be supported by power, and outside the realm of law it will be subjugated by the violence of war.

The problem of pacifism between nations is, indeed, not fundamentally different from the problem of pacifism between man and man. Just as in either case peace does not equate war, so the problem of war can be solved only by law and not by pacifism. Accustomed to the domination of supreme power even to the point of our often forgetting it is there, we are reminded of it only by the need of it in emer-

gency. Then we look for it as did the French people the other day when, anarchy lifting its head, the anarchic-minded were given the option of returning to work either as civilians or as soldiers with all the rigorous procedure the latter implied. *La liberté, l'égalité, la fraternité* were then quickly proved once again to rest on supreme power.

In order to operate at all pacifism has first to be adopted as a national policy within the state and only then can it be applied as part of foreign policy. It is therefore only as a national policy submissive to forward planning that pacifism need be considered at all. What could be more futile than to overthrow a non-pacifist government by the obstruction and defiance of individual pacifists before any national pacifist programme had been thought out? The apparent consensus of will thus obstructing and defying the law would turn out to be superficial and unreal agreement the most cursory examination of which would at once reveal a violent conflict in the views of all concerned.

What, then, could be more certain to follow than chaos and catastrophe when, the rebellion successfully accomplished and the government overthrown, the individual pacifists found themselves at sixes and sevens? What would be their prospect of forming a government, whether in the face of impending invasion or of a challenge within the state? It would be the task of reconciling the propagandizing Noel Bakkers who advocate disarmament at home yet armed intervention abroad, with the Bertrand Russells who desire some wars some of the time but not no war all the time; and, moreover, with the Dick Sheppards who, so long as the blue-uniformed policemen dealing with law-breakers operate only in batches of two or three, would lend a hand to aid the rule of law, but who, when the police were marshalled in force to quell a Sydney Street riot, would stand by and watch anarchy win. It could hardly make all the difference if the Sydney Street rioters were international nondescripts instead of the authentically labelled advanced post of, say, Nazidom.

The outlook for any country whose government was suddenly overthrown by "pacifism without a programme"

would be disaster, there being scarcely any pacifists claiming qualification for government other than that of a large order of undigested ideas on pacifism. If pacifism is anything more than obstruction, if its aim is construction not destruction, what is its programme?

The radical changes involved by pacifism taken seriously could hardly be comprehended in a decade, for those changes would necessarily be revolutionary to a far degree. In the first place for any government to adopt undiluted pacifism as a national policy ahead of adequate education of the public would be to put an intolerable strain on the allegiance of the subject. For instance, to require a man to stand and watch a family, possibly his own, burn to death or suffocate without affording help would surely be to order a revolution resulting in a sudden and violent shift in political gravity from pacifism to extreme militarism.

Human nature, the *raison d'être* of law, and controllable only by law, is more than a match for pacifism without the law. It is thus on the rock of human nature that absolute pacifism finally is shattered for it is human nature itself that pacifism leaves wholly out of its calculations as was proved in India where it was tried by Gandhi against a pleasant and almost obsequious Government regarded by him as grown-up schoolboys reared in the English public-school sporting tradition. For a time moderately successful, it had, in the end, to be called off because of the great strain it put on human nature in the pacifist himself.

Here, however, human nature must be reckoned with not only in the pacifist but in the warrior also and, most of all, in Leviathan. Pacifism is a game which, not unlike free trade, may be successfully played by peoples believing themselves like-minded upon the subject but which cannot be played by one nation alone. The new totalitarian machine has seen to that. Leviathan's public enemy number one, and whom he could never afford to allow to succeed, is the pacifist and particularly if outspoken and highly intelligent as was Ossietzky whose last years were bravely endured in rigorous imprisonment at the hands of the Nazis for pacifist activities in time of "peace." Now in the stress of open

hostilities, all like him, whether German or British pacifists, would be shot by the Nazis or penned up for exhibition and left to starve if the occasion were sufficiently desperate and the method sufficiently served.

Nor must the diabolical science of the military technicians be left out of account—there is the new hypnotism of the Soviets and that prolonged torture, the reduction of will by famine—methods apparently highly successful in securing a change of political faith even as a stepping-stone to the scaffold or, as in Russia, to the wall. If the Bolsheviks were to invade Germany and get the wave-length of German fear—as they might of British fear—it is in keeping with events in Russia that the leading men of Nazidom headed even by Goebbels might turn pacifist and insist on confessional suicide. Just so might the most fanatical pacifists succumb in the end to sinister reversion similar to that which has been such a feature of Russian state trials recently.

Again, it is hardly in doubt that the “combative” pacifist would not be differentiated from the “preventive” pacifist, and his hope of doing any “in fighting” at close quarters would be negligible. The truth is that the mechanization of war has put the pacifist technique quite out of date and Leviathan beyond its range. The “nobility” of his passive suffering would not deflect the machine. But even the mass action of the mass machine in blind war would be more calculable than the insanity of the dictator. If that is to be left a free run it is not inconceivable that at one stage of his malady the Leviathanic despot might ask for the eyes and tongue of each pacifist.

* * * * *

Reverting now to Dick Sheppard’s view of pacifism as a decision to take no part in war, let us recall that we found war to include diplomacy and even the fierce competition for raw materials and trade. Thinking a little further than most pacifists, Aldous Huxley finds that one must be a socialist to be a good pacifist. There would thus be as many sorts of pacifism as there are shades of socialism.

If the non-resisters declined—even though they were in

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the majority—to compel by plain coercive force those bent on resisting the enemy not to resist, it is obvious that two things would happen. Firstly, the two policies of resistance and of non-resistance against the enemy would be in force at one and the same time, either policy ruining the other. Secondly, to frustrate the enemy from outflanking them, whether on the fighting front or on the propaganda front, the resisters would be compelled to turn on the non-resisters and there would be civil war and an engagement with the enemy proceeding simultaneously.

Now when three parties become involved in a triangular fight it is obvious that the struggle, sooner, or later, will become resolved into a straight-out contest between two factions only. Thus the non-resisters would then have a variety of rôles to fill. In the first place they could try to force the non-pacifist section of their countrymen to accept the national policy of non-resistance, while at the same time they could attempt non-resistance against the enemy—a somewhat difficult proceeding of being violent with one's right hand and non-violent with one's left. Alternatively they might try to non-resist evenly all round by taking no stronger measures against their compatriots. This, however, would obviously give "the soothing effects of non-resistance" no fair chance to operate psychologically on the enemy who could hardly be expected to react in quick alternation—first in military wrath with his fighting instincts in full play and, immediately afterwards, with reasonable moderation in dealing with the non-resister who opposed him another way. That surely would be to expect of the enemy a biological impossibility. Actually, of course, it takes two to make a successful non-resister.

The pacifist's frequent mistake is in assuming that it is on his own terms that he will be considered by the enemy. The illustrations, interesting and doubtless authentic such as are often furnished by sincere pacifists, are wholly unrelated to modern warfare. When men fought hand to hand in lengthy encounter the technique of non-resistance might have stood some chance of success but, with modern indirect fire whether by mortar at close range or by gun at twenty

miles, the story will be different. The method of pacifism of the noble Sikh in the moving story told in Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence* unfortunately no longer promises any success whatever. Bomb or gas does not spare the home or the person of the pacifist, and the possibility of any pacifist being on board the passenger ship does not unnerve the hand that touches off the torpedo—nor is the instrument of blockade any more discriminatory. On the contrary, if that “vital interest”—the very existence of the state—demands it, the modern military mind is compelled to stoop as low as is necessary in order to conquer. This is how it comes about that non-resisting opposers as well as non-combatant men and women may actually be selected and preferred by Leviathan for slaughter on account of the high terror value of the effect of such devastating callousness upon the remainder. This, again, is but a further illustration that war is a Volkskrieg.

The case for individual pacifism thus falls to bits not only as a movement towards peace but as a movement at all. It is unfeasible and can be considered not as a practical measure to be adopted towards the enemy in time of war, but only as a conscience reminder, that is to say as propaganda. More thoughtful pacifists like Aldous Huxley admit that “non-violent resistance cannot be used to any extent in modern war.”

“Once war has broken out,” says this writer,¹ differing from Russell, “pacifists are almost helpless. Therefore it must be prevented from breaking out. But it can only be prevented from breaking out,” he declares, with a tell-tale obscurity rarely found in his writings, “if at least one government of an important sovereign state chooses to act pacifically towards its neighbours. A practical task before pacifists in this country is to persuade the Government to act pacifistically towards other Governments.”

Now it will be observed that Aldous Huxley, apparently unconsciously, has here substituted pacifism for non-violence. If non-violence is now useless in international war, then it is obvious that the only persons the non-violent

¹ Aldous Huxley: Pamphlet, *What are you going to do about it?*, p. 17.

resisters can resist are their fellow-subjects prepared to obey their Government in matters of defence as in other things. The troops of non-resisters trained to withstand the violence of the enemy must therefore deploy against their fellow-subjects or else disband.

In ruling out modern war as a test-ground for pacifism Aldous Huxley appears to have had in mind only foreign war and not civil war. If he did not intend to include civil war but meant to convey only that the policy of non-resistance, while useless for application against a foreign government, can nevertheless be used within the state, then to Mr. Huxley the pacifism of non-violence is a policy for the individual within the state. This, however, is but to contemplate pacifism as revolution and internal anarchy—that is to say the pacifist citizen has perforce to precipitate war inside his own country in order to prevent war with a foreign power—a war of civil anarchy to end international anarchy! If, on the other hand, Mr. Huxley meant to include civil war in “modern war,” then non-violent resistance loses any particular significance, and what he has in mind comes down to mere persuasion to vote against war which, in England at all events, is certainly within the law.

Moreover, in so far as the reason for doubting the possibility of non-resistance in international war is the long-range feature of modern weapons and the callous indifference of the machine, these considerations would equally apply when the “in fighting” possible in civil commotion and disorder developed into organized contest and even into long-range fighting. In short, it becomes obvious that the pacifist spokesmen have not thought their way far into the problem at all.

Thus when Aldous Huxley urges pacifists to persuade the Government to act pacifistically towards other Governments, it might at least be expected that here, by pacifism, he means to signify “*national pacifism*”—that is to say non-resistance as a national policy in which case the disconcerting factors of modern weapons, long-range gunnery and so forth, would not arise because the whole nation would refuse to fight. Surprisingly enough it turns out that this is not

what he means at all as appears in his comforting advice to a convinced pacifist who, having signed a pledge to take no part in another war, asks what he can do now to prevent war from breaking out.

From his own confessions, one would have expected Mr. Huxley to reply to his questioner thus: "You may have signed the pledge but, as pacifism does not work in war, your pledge will, of course, not amount to anything. Now if you should ever be asked by the police or in court whether you are a confirmed pacifist, say you are out for nothing more revolutionary than peaceful persuasion. Further, as you can hardly urge others to do what you will not risk doing yourself, you must not ask others to sign a pledge not to take further part in a war or anything else to that effect, for you may be put on urgent air-raid, fire-brigade work and get flung into the fire by the lawless mob if you don't help to put the fire out—and, of course, if that happens you have no real complaint because you yourself started to defy the law. But now, if you ask me, what you as a good and sincere pacifist can do, then try to persuade people everywhere, particularly in other lands, to combine in urging each his own government to unite with other governments against war whatever the price. You will have to equip yourself with knowledge before you can hope to succeed. You can urge on all, for instance, that, instead of alliance, we must all think of *federation* and fusion of national interests and power—a union so real and irrevocable that the augmented supreme power available to help us all on towards a wider reign of law will equally suffice to deter others from making war on us and from compelling us to follow war instead of law. In short, you must preach that the wider the state the wider the peace—and that peace depends on law and law on power. Furthermore, you must strive to educate mankind that only when, in this way, a single, *civilized*, human state comes to be built up, can there be law widely obeyed and consequently wide peace. The true pacifist, therefore, is he who supports the reign of law not only in the nation but in the world beyond it."

Now actually Aldous Huxley tells him nothing of the

kind. Declaring that once the disease has broken out any cure will be impossible, he recommends exercises as usual but prescribes, in addition, a dilution of spiritualism resembling a watered-down Buchmanism. The pacifist order, he declares, must take the form of a literature-distributing and pledge-signing society—of a religious order following a certain way of life and comprising “local teams” for mutual strengthening of the common faith and for propaganda.

In a half-hearted echo of Oxford Groupism Mr. Huxley points out that, in regard to the subject of international policy, a pacifist cannot be a bully in his home—we cannot hope to convert others until we have converted ourselves. The pacifist’s chief job is to urge his government to call a conference to discuss the economic and political causes of crisis and a world scheme for elaborating them. In short, the Oxford Groupist recommends that a government should pray for Leviathanic Spirits to come from out the vasty deep, whereas Aldous Huxley advises they should merely be called. So at the end the pacifist is left wondering as at the beginning—“Whether the Leviathanic Spirits come or not, I, personally, have refused to take any part in any war. Now these lorries I am invoicing—are they commercial or non-pacifist? Shall I invoice them or not?”

It must be admitted that the state of mind in which he is left is not exactly that most likely to draw resolution from the forces of reason. Yet it is on grounds of reason that pacifism is most often justified.

In some degree Mr. Huxley’s particular attitude of pacifism proceeds from his opinion that, though force plays a part in preserving order within a community, that part is extremely small. This view, as has appeared in the course of our foregoing enquiry, is fundamentally unsound. A better acquaintance with English jurisprudence—that subject unfortunately neglected by all pacifistic writers, some no less erudite than Aldous Huxley—would have corrected his bias in this regard.

Henry Maine’s remarks on customs notwithstanding, the fact that the police in England are not armed does not, as he imagines, reinforce his contention that force is dispensable,

but amply proves, as he says, that the English are a law-abiding people. All this amounts to is that they not only recognize force as being behind the law but approve its purpose. Being a democracy they realize it is *their* force, respect it and comply with it. It is wholly incorrect to assume that there is no element of force present merely because men obey the law. On emergency, as Bertrand Russell's personal experience in the war demonstrates, that force can assert itself whenever it is challenged. Nor is it necessary to be able to identify the particular force or to indicate the amount of force behind every or any principle of law. It is enough to know that force, the will of the state, generally supports the whole body of the law. Anyone doubting the truth of this has only to attempt a general strike or an unauthorized Fascist march through London to be convinced.

It may be that Mr. Huxley's advice to pacifists and his view that force plays a negligible part in preserving order within the community, are alike in some degree influenced by his discovery that he is not forcibly restrained from preaching what, from one standpoint at least, might well be regarded as an incitement of the King's subjects to rebellion—a construction, it may be pointed out, which might depend on circumstances now changing.

Whatever its faults one boon of British democracy is that we would rather have our Aldous Huxleys stepping over the limit than no Aldous Huxleys at all. No doubt well aware of this fact Mr. Huxley watches his step and limits his transgression so far as he is aware of any transgression. His latest work, *Ends and Means*, reveals plainly that he had not thoroughly considered the policy of pacifism as a practical measure but only as a phase in evolution. This is wholly inadequate, for the pressing need which pacifism has been advanced as likely to satisfy is for some means of displacing war while the evolutionary process is taking place.

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Bertrand Russell who is justly famous for deep thinking and clear expression, and who certainly cannot be accused

of reluctance to take his views to their logical conclusions, has, moreover, throughout attempted to deal with pacifism in a practical way as a workable policy in the life of man and of the nation. A conscientious objector in the Great War who has had pacifism in his mind for over twenty years, it may not be uninteresting to see what he makes of it now.

In the much reproduced article of his (*Atlantic Monthly*, August 1915) he admits that war is sometimes necessary and he prefers a centralized police force of the Powers to non-resistance as a method of securing peace. But as, then, he would justify force only if it were ordered in accordance with "law" by a "neutral" authority, it is obvious that he had a somewhat imperfect understanding of the problem and did not realize what events must occur before there can be said to be *law* or a *neutral* state. What apparently he meant was that no party should be sole judge of its own cause, and with this all will agree.

That imperfect understanding is further revealed by words that follow: "The use of force is justifiable when it is ordered in accordance with law by a neutral authority in the general interest and not primarily in the interest of one of the parties to the dispute." The administration of law, of course, has no concern with any interest whatever. The question is what is the law. Either it is the law or it is not the law. Moreover, the insuperable difficulty of securing a disinterested authority outside the reign of law and, even if a "neutral" acceptable all round could be found, the problem of dispensing justice where no system of justice exists, do not occur to him. He appears to consider non-resistance might be good policy if any nation "could be induced to adopt it," but whether he means induced by a rival power superiorly armed or by non-resisting subjects he does not indicate.

Bertrand Russell then concludes: "To oppose force by passive non-obedience would be likely to preserve the best element of national life." By this he does not mean to imply that all non-resisters would immediately be despatched and that the rest would survive, but he bases his view on a prophecy which, as we have seen, has already been wholly

belied by new factors like aircraft and by the old factor human nature:

"If England has no army and no navy, the Germans would be hard put to it to find a pretext for invasion. . . ."

Such optimism is as unfounded as the statement is inaccurate for, as will be recalled, "the most highly-qualified publicists" are always ready to supply any number of pretexts, and of every variety.

The somewhat sky-larking style of Bertrand Russell's following remarks above quoted in full must not deter from critical examination. He propounds the view that the enemy could not take away the self-governing part of the British Empire since they would encounter there the same difficulties as would prevent them from governing England.

The criticism of the above view is that, firstly, what would happen would depend on who did the invading. If the Germans were in their baulked mood of 1914, then, plus the hardened experience of maltreating, wounding and even killing non-resisting Jews, history for once might not merely repeat but surpass herself, and the non-resisters of force would promptly become non-existers.

Secondly, lest the spread of non-violent resistance should lead in the end to the same civil war between them and their conquerors as previously occurred when they resisted (non-violently to begin with) their own fellow-citizens, the invader would despatch the lot. This would happen, at any rate at the hands of totalitarian armies, unless the numbers of non-resisters were great enough—as is the case with the peace-loving Chinese—to be "famed off" the land.

Russell's view as above quoted takes no account of the old military eventuality, let alone the new. The example of Napoleon who, according to the text-books, was justified in coolly slaughtering his prisoners at Acre rather than risk defeat or even awkward insurrection, might be followed by a Japanese invader of Australia or New Zealand. Non-resistance would not render military precautions any the less necessary, and, lest non-resistance became resistance, the Japanese could be relied on to take the surer course. By a

conqueror drunk with success the non-resisters might be regarded as insane and prescribed either the occupation of bearing arms or performing second-line duties under rigorous supervision in case they suddenly recovered and changed their minds.

It must be admitted at least that the steady deterioration of the "comity" of nations during the twenty years that have passed since the termination of the Great War, and particularly illustrated in certain sinister aspects of totalitarianism, points to the likelihood of the invader's mood being not merely ugly but itching for new records of ruthlessness. "A peace now," wrote Bertrand Russell in 1915, "giving no definite victory to either side, would probably leave Germany for many years determined not to go to war again." That is a guess that could not have been further out, for subsequent events leave it hardly in doubt that the Leviathanic Spirit, installed in Germany as nowhere else, would have been no more appeased by a "draw with honour" than it has been by a victorious peace with "recovered honour."

But with the deterioration of the comity of nations there has also been a deterioration in pacifist thought. For instance, during the Great War Bertrand Russell's view was that, while passive resistance adopted under certain conditions deliberately by the will of a whole nation might achieve much, it was hardly to be expected that progress would come that way because the imaginative effort required would be too great. He concluded:

"It is much more likely that it will come as the reign of law within the State has come, by the establishment of a central government of the world, able and willing to secure obedience by force because the great majority of men will recognize that obedience is better than the present international anarchy."

There, finally abandoning all else, Bertrand Russell indicates a final preference so sound that Hobbes himself might almost have written those words. The astonishing thing is that he exhorts men to follow a method which runs directly counter to that conclusion and is, indeed, wholly

incompatible with it, the conclusion preferring law and rightly prophesying the arrival of the reign of law via power, the advice advocating personal anarchy. Bertrand Russell cannot have it both ways, nor yet law and war together for they are mutually exclusive alternatives. And if he objects that he means war *now* in order to have law *later on*, then this can only be a war waged by the organized power of the reign of law *so far as that reign extends*, against the forces of anarchy. But progress towards the ultimate, full reign of law will not lie in destroying the reign of law, *so far as it exists*, by individuals unconstitutionally resorting to direct action and reverting to a state of anarchy.

Now, over twenty years later, we have Bertrand Russell's matured views on pacifism in a volume devoted to the subject and appropriately entitled *Which Way to Peace?* On the jacket of the book the publishers give prominence to the author's view that, within a few years, war on the Continent is almost certain. Here, therefore, one might reasonably expect to find a plain working catechism for plain men, a straightforward statement responsible yet unmistakable, especially as humble folk mean something to this ardent socialist. Others who fought with them and share his regard for them and his hatred for war, desire no less that they and theirs shall be spared fruitless ordeal or fool's errand, and that, if they are urged to take extreme measures, their minds will not be left in doubt as to what they are to do and why this is required of them.

After traversing the old ground Bertrand Russell restates his pacifist faith thus:

"I conclude, then, that every argument, both national and international, every consideration of self-interest and every hope of producing greater sanity in the world, is in favour of the policy of gradually disbanding the army and navy and air-force, disposing of India and the Crown Colonies, and announcing that we intend never again to fight another war. This policy is simple, straightforward, and intelligible; it gives hope for our own country and an example which others may follow."¹

¹ Bertrand Russell: *Which Way to Peace?*, p. 146.

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Here Bertrand Russell omits to mention what is to happen if the invader's idea, and the British pacifist's idea, of what is "gradual" do not tally; or in case the remnant of the armed forces, not liking the outlook, insisted on being excused other action than non-violent resistance; and he omits to explain how, even if they did not so insist, they might hope to survive disaster.

A subsequent chapter Bertrand Russell begins by saying:

"Before proceeding further, I wish to repeat for fear of misunderstanding, the limitations to which my own pacifism is subject. I am not a believer in the doctrine of non-resistance. I do not desire abolition of the police; I do not hold that war is always and everywhere a crime. . . . I am not prepared always to condemn civil war."¹

Thus, it now appears that Bertrand Russell too "desires to go to Heaven but not to-night," and not even quite so early as he once did.

Suppose his fellow-pacifists, suppose the majority of his fellow-countrymen, had committed themselves to Russell's former policy which he no longer considers safe, could history now be changed or the mistake retrieved? May not Bertrand Russell's views change yet further?² We are not considering the merits of debaters but an urge to action, the most serious action that can befall the individual.

He declares: "The purpose in peace and the way to achieve it is to say *We will not fight.*"

Is it possible that here Bertrand Russell means no more than that they may merely *say* they won't fight but may fight all the same?

We reach the last page of the book and there find a final exhortation and, printed in large letters in order to catch the eye, the pacifists' pledge:

"TO ABSTAIN FROM FIGHTING AND FROM ALL VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN WAR BETWEEN CIVILIZED STATES."

¹ Bertrand Russell: *Which Way to Peace?*, p. 151

² This is highly probable for in a later volume [*Power*, p. 289] he declares that "it would not do for Christian Scientists to announce that they will take no precautions against infection because they might infect others." Similarly, it would follow, duties should be required, willy-nilly, from pacifists in case of air bombardment.

Such advice from the rationalist Bertrand Russell, the sub-title of whose brave, original outburst was "an appeal to intellectuals," is the more amazing coming on top of his conclusions to the effect (*a*) that the Hobbesian view of law is correct and (*b*) that he does not believe in non-resistance. He has, it is true, introduced the word "voluntary." Could participation be considered voluntary (*a*) if made under threatened pain of death, (*b*) if instinctively one went to the help of the maimed, perchance to rescue children from destruction—even possibly from the flames of incendiary bombs? Who would decide what was to be regarded as voluntariness or as participation? These and similar questions are not unimportant as a mistake might involve the forfeiture of life, yet they could receive no answer unless by an administration of law. It is at least certain that a pacifist's conqueror would see that the participation required of that pacifist was clearly indicated and the underlying obligation and penalty underlined no less clearly.

What finally emerges is the pity of it that Bertrand Russell's conception of how he can help his fellow-men to solve the desperate problem of war does not reflect any large measure of his rare aptitude for consistent thinking displayed in the field of mathematics. Thus, while, as a pacifist, he lays down that good pacifists must absolutely abstain from fighting, whatever their minority, as a democrat he insists that good democrats "must be willing to submit to the decisions of the majority when it goes against them."¹ We are at least entitled to deduce therefrom that a good pacifist cannot be a good democrat or a good democrat a good pacifist! As a start off, therefore, one would seem to have to choose between pacifism and democracy. Seeing that pacifism, as I have shown, could result in the overthrow of democracy, it is to be hoped that man will prefer democracy and, as and when necessary, take appropriate measures to guard it against the pacifists.

If open hostilities were to break out, some individuals might try to put Bertrand Russell's advice to the test. True, he has himself stated that reason must be the sole guide. The

¹ Bertrand Russell: *Power*, p. 310.

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danger is that the mind of the simple man would jump to a conclusion upon a view which, proffered as an appeal to intellectuals, however finely meant, neither indicates nor permits of any conclusion.

And yet it is out of this garbled pacifism that one day the new pacifism will come. That new pacifism will involve sacrifice no less. It will be but a name for the demobilized mentality of man as of Leviathan. Non-violence it will exchange for power and for the sake of law. The ultimate truth is that true pacifism is not non-resistance, neither is it peace without law, for there is no peace but in law. So far from being non-resistant and passive, therefore, the business of the new pacifism will be the active upholding of the law.

The conclusion is that pacifism, although advocated by pacifists as a method and a means, is neither method nor means but, truly considered, is a great end, the end peace—peace that cannot precede law, but that comes only after law because only through law.

NEUTRALITY

THE rules of neutrality in international law are commonly supposed to ensure that a nation desiring to remain wholly outside a conflict between warring states may safely do so. Actually they are elastic principles which not only can be stretched but often are stretched as far as prudence dictates in order to enable a Power to exploit either or both of the combatants as profitably as possible. It is true that the new possibility of a "neutral" being bombed in its capital city is now a fresh deterrent to any nation inclined to intervene by furnishing means of power to one side or the other, or possibly to both in turn, provided the resulting profits offer sufficient inducement. But so mechanically automatic has the process of international life now become that, however much a nation wants to keep away from the vortex, it may nevertheless be dragged in. This risk, vastly increased of recent years, and which hangs over even the greatest of the Powers, is one of degree, for, as we saw in the chapter on War in Peace, they are always already involved to a certain point.

But now, as never before, the peril presents a widening problem which points to nothing less than an international solution and promises to mark a turning-point in international affairs. To avoid being sucked in and down by moving events, nations will have to combine as already the current proves too strong for any single power. The growing certainty that here, as elsewhere, there is no escape otherwise than by co-operation and union, is a hopeful feature of the present outlook.

That mankind in the past has not really detested *war* as distinguished from *a war*, and particularly an unsuccessful war, is evidenced by the fact that, for centuries, hair-splitting neutrality questions—amounting to little more than how

near profit-seekers can sail to the wind—have provided one of the most common and fruitful causes of wars. So, in the Great War, the question of the rights of a neutral actually drew England and the United States to the verge of calamity, and a conflict between them was avoided only with the help of the German blunder over the submarine ruthlessness—a German violation of American neutral rights which, eclipsing the British violation, made the two potential enemies firm allies against Germany.

That instance is by no means exceptional. The outlook of the modern Leviathan is as materialistic now as ever, but the dangers of neutrality doctrines are tremendously increased owing to world trade being increasingly interwoven. The modern artificial entity known as the joint-stock corporation alone is sufficient to cut horizontally right through the perpendicular national divisions of humanity. The economic affairs of different nations and of different nationals have become inextricably interdependent. In addition to this there is the factor that war is now a *Volkskrieg*—a struggle which engages a whole people against another people—and is not merely a clash between the armed forces of the contestants, the result being that contraband ceases any longer to be definable in terms of military as distinct from civil requirements. Cocoa, we recall, can both feed the pilot's children and supply gelignite for his bomb.

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The essential difficulty of the problem the aspect of which changes according to the angle from which neutrality is examined, remains the same—there can be no real neutrality where there is no reign of law but actually war in peace. No nation is really ever neutral-minded. This is so because its interests, which range from commercial to ideological, cause it to lean to one side or to the other. It is to be observed that neutrality does not mean equal treatment. Thus by merely applying the neutrality regulations, a nation not a party to the dispute may affect one belligerent more than its antagonist for the simple reason that the normal flow of trade in peace time may favour one side more than the

other in war time. For instance, it was objected by Continental countries that the American "Cash and Carry plan" by which either belligerent pays for the goods on the spot and transports them thus obviating risk of capture to American ships, wholly favoured the Allies who commanded the seas.

Again, henceforth neutrality involves a positive attitude. In future a nation wishing to be neutral, so far from merely sitting back and doing nothing, may have to take active steps in conjunction with other Powers whose notions of neutrality, however, vary and conflict—a conflict that can be satisfactorily resolved only within the reign of law. It follows that those nations which desire to remain as neutral as possible must unite to form a widened reign of law, wide enough, for a start, at least to shelter themselves under a common understanding of what neutrality requires.

In short, here, at the outset, we are halted by the question, what is neutrality? If it means standing absolutely aloof and assisting neither side, then there neither is nor can ever be neutrality for, since war proceeds in peace, by arming a potential belligerent or augmenting its power, a nation has already taken sides. If, again, neutrality is to be understood as not assisting one side *more* than the other, but maintaining an even balance of supply, this may mean intervention and re-intervention, first on one side and then on the other, according to the ebb and flow of battle and of the need to replace equipment. It cannot mean avoiding, whatever the cost, being drawn into war, for the nations are already in a state of war all the time.

Actually neutrality at present amounts to no more than a third Power's relatively indirect concern with the objectives of armed forces of two contestant powers—an ambiguous position which any belligerent can be safely trusted to exploit by embroiling the neutrals among themselves and so broadening and improving the outlook of the issue. Even relative neutrality, therefore, must be maintained, and it can be maintained only by supra-national law resting on power widened through union. Unless neutrality is maintained it may mean little more than becoming a deferred instead of a preferred target.

By the "publicists," however, neutrality is seriously regarded as some sort of "legal status involving rights and duties." The rules conferring such rights and duties during open hostilities are part and parcel of so-called international law the observations on which, therefore, in a former chapter apply *a fortiori* to them. The law of neutrality comprising, as it does, conflicting and obsolete rules, is not only convenient to competitors in obtaining prizes and profits, but no less useful to Leviathan wading waist-deep in blood. Neutrality is an attempt to evade the alternative of either law or war by respecting both. The governments prating of neutrality are no more inclined to observe this part of international law than any other part but rather less, if anything, for here human nature is doubly active because there are involved two of its most powerful factors—self-preservation and material gain.

Now, even if all nations were entirely honourable and could be relied upon to follow the rule as they really saw it, there would still be the need of a law-maker to bring the law up to date and a tribunal to apply the principle of law to the particular case. One of its first tasks would surely be to discard the term neutrality and replace it by armed detachment. A neutral Power is an armed observer.

There must be shattered the illusion that neutrality involves no more than a negative and passive attitude. On the contrary, whatever degree of detachment a nation desires, that it must *defend actively*. The firm union of two great Powers upon agreed principles of neutrality with judicial machinery fully empowered to decide between the signatories to the agreement—and *whatever* the belligerents might say about it—might well become the first, clear landmark in the realm of international law. That, the first step, now depends more on the United States than on anyone else. It will involve some sacrifice which the British Commonwealth might equate in a general economic agreement of union that will prove inevitable sooner or later.

In any neutrality agreement the minimum sacrifice by both sides would be a solid undertaking to accept the ruling of the tribunal constituted with authority beforehand to

decide any question arising upon the agreement as between themselves. In this event, here would be a declaration of neutrality rights of which all nations beforehand could have notice and which would be backed up by the united will of united peoples. It might be disputed by certain factions within those realms but they, nevertheless, would have to submit to it as to the ordinary law of the land. Similarly, it might be disputed and even challenged by one of the belligerent nations themselves and, therefore, supported by the opposing belligerent: but the outcome would not be affected thereby. In the likely event that one of the belligerents welcomed it, the other belligerent, for that reason, could be relied upon to resent it, but, in any event, the purpose of the agreement would not touch the approval of either belligerent. That purpose would be solely to find, by process of law, consensus between co-neutrals and thus diminish the chance of dissension being sown *between them*. How far the policy of such neutrals might rouse or soothe a belligerent is another question which would have to be decided when the common programme was amplified and set going by the neutrals on outbreak of open hostilities.

The objection that although such agreement to co-operate by joint action might succeed in preventing a dispute from deepening into open strife between two nations, and particularly so if an authoritative tribunal were set up to decide all questions arising upon the agreement, nevertheless such agreement would be impossible unless there were surrendered "vital interests" indispensable to the integral sovereignty of the state, will be dealt with in the following chapter. The further objection that a joint agreement over neutrality questions between two or more nations would prove difficult to maintain if one of the parties to it afterwards became a belligerent, demonstrates that union for purposes of neutrality as an isolated issue is to be recommended only as a step towards fusion for the whole purposes of the reign of law. If, as a first step, like-minded nations really co-ordinated their neutrality rules and provided for their administration, there would be less risk of a belligerent embroiling any one of them which it is frequently the calculated policy of

belligerents to bring about, seeing that two major independent wars never proceed simultaneously without eventually joining up in a single war.

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An economic programme comprehensive enough to envisage the active co-operation of co-neutrals in order to keep out of the ring, might develop, in time, into a broader economic programme none the less applicable in the eventuality that one of the would-be neutrals has been made a party to the conflict against its will. From this point the evolution would soon proceed a stage further until the growing legal system, first necessitated by the indispensable *administration* of the programme, could, more ambitiously, deal with responsibility for aggression upon a widened economic front.

Again, to assign aggression and stay the aggressor is a step less far than it would seem, as the ruling would in any case apply on the united front and not depend on the belligerents. In its first phase supra-national law will assuredly begin to run only among like-minded people. Of what like-mindedness consists is a question we shall examine further on. It can hardly fail to exist among two great and friendly peoples like America and the British Commonwealth, neither of whom covets anything from the other, and whom no clash in ideology separates or any ambition seriously divides; yet who, nevertheless, through want of prevision and precautionary arrangements, only just escaped being at each other's throats, before uniting to defend democracy in the World-War. Here, at all events, where there is a common experience in this regard, a beginning to save civilization might auspiciously be made. A survey of the salient events leaves little doubt that, here also, in the problem of neutrality, the chief obstacle is human nature, and that, accordingly, provision against that factor must be arranged for in advance.

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In the Great War, British Prize courts consistently con-

demned American cargoes bound for Norway and Sweden whose imports had enormously increased, the inference being that there was a new procession of such goods into Germany. America objected and friction between the two countries steadily increased. In 1915 President Wilson cabled to Colonel House that

“a very serious change is coming over public sentiment in this country because of England’s delays and many arbitrary interferences with our neutral cargoes.”

A year later he wrote :

“I am, I must admit, at the end of my patience with Great Britain and the Allies. . . . I am seriously considering asking Congress to authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict exportations to the Allies. . . . Can we any longer endure their intolerable course?”

Finally, in November of the same year, Wilson informed House that the American people were—

“growing more and more impatient with the intolerable conditions of neutrality, their feeling as hot against Great Britain as it was at first against Germany.” (Seymour. *American Diplomacy during the World War*, 1924, pp. 77-79.)

Just previously (August 13, 1916) the British Ambassador had written to the British Foreign Secretary,

“There may be a breaking point. Do not deceive yourself as to that.”

Notwithstanding their exasperation the Government of the United States admitted, in the words of Secretary Lansing, that, in case they became a belligerent on the British side, they should see that their hands were not too tightly tied,

“for our object would be the same as theirs, and that was to break the power of Germany and destroy the morale of the German people by an economic isolation which would cause them to lack the very necessities of life.” (Jessup: *Neutrality*, Vol. IV, p. 67.)

In 1915 Secretary Lansing urged President Wilson to permit belligerent governments to float loans in the United States as he did not think that America could—

“afford to let a declaration as to our conception of the true

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spirit, neutrality, made in the first days of the war, stand in the way of our national interests which seem to be seriously threatened."

In 1917 the United States Ambassador, Page, cabled to the American Secretary of State expressing a fear that a reduction of Allied orders would bring on a panic in the United States:

"Perhaps our going to war is the only way in which our present pre-eminent trade position can be maintained and a panic averted." (Jessup, Vol. IV, p. 31.)

That, a little later, when she joined us, the United States strove to intensify the very British policy which had brought the two sister nations to the verge of war, shows that any reluctance to starve the German people into submission formed no part of America's motive which was purely and simply *to snatch profits regardless of how or whence they came*. Nevertheless the indictment levelled at the United States that she had, in cold blood, decided to do a deal by capitalizing a Gethsemane, is not only fantastic but altogether wrongly drawn. It was rather that, looking out on a mad world, hard-headed Americans took the practical viewpoint of the famous American Statesman Jefferson who, a century earlier, had expressed himself on the Russo-Turkish war thus:

"I hope we may prove . . . that the life of the feeder is better than the fighter; and it is some consolation that the desolation by these maniacs in one part of the world is the means of improving it in the other parts. Let the latter be our office, and let us milk the cow while the Russian holds her by the horns and the Turks by the tail." (Ibid., p. 28.)

The increased chance of capture at sea which renders such "Business as Usual" methods somewhat hazardous, has resulted in the formulation of the American "Cash and Carry plan" above referred to, the belligerent himself paying for and fetching the goods. This plan, which has little to commend it, represents a retreat from the reign of law. It is probable that American assistance to Germany, before contending against her on the Western Front, cost the lives

of many American citizens; and also that, if the United States had had her way in following the full course effectively blocked by British designs, still more Americans would have contributed to the price of victory with their lives.

The objection to the "Cash and Carry plan" is not confined to the technical weakness that it leaves the problem of how to ship to a co-neutral as undecided as ever. The plan does not face the cardinal realities, present and future, and, most of all, it seeks to evade that supreme alternative, law or war. It evades the facts the first of which is that henceforth the trade routes will have to be kept open for America as for Great Britain. Faced with the sudden loss of three-quarters of her markets in a major war, the ensuing economic catastrophe might be only less serious to the United States than the imminent prospect of a famine. From the nature of it, the "Cash and Carry plan" must be fortuitous and incalculable in volume, and, therefore, it could not be relied upon for any purpose of calculating commercial yield or of planning. Worst of all it is a complete surrender to Leviathan who has the whole world available as the arena of his method—war.

The present attitude (1938) of America is one of marking time for the electorate to catch up. Here is well-exposed the weaknesses of her democracy where the dangerous proposal has made headway that there should be a referendum before embarking on war at all—and if war then likewise neutrality. With equal reason there might be required a referendum to decide strategy such as whether next week's defensive should be changed to this week's offensive.

Referring to the inhuman and sub-beastly Japanese Leviathan's violation of China, Mr. Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, indicated that

"both Japan and China were free to purchase war supplies in the United States, subject only to the provision that the material must be transported in vessels not owned by the United States." (*The Times*, January 31, 1938.)

Now as, for any great manufacturing country with sea-borne traffic, total isolation is impracticable, the only

alternative is the policy of an armed programme for keeping as far out of hostilities as possible and, at the same time, of carrying on sufficient trade to stave off economic disorder if not economic death.

Even if, for a start, small beginnings only can be made, it is obvious that any degree of co-operative neutrality must involve superior power. Between, on the one hand, a neutrality armed and intentioned to keep out of war, foregoing profits and even accepting privation and loss, and, on the other hand, an aggressive neutrality prepared to enforce the long string of worn-out principles reaching from the doctrine of continuous voyages to the "sovereign right" of resisting visit and search—or of now insisting upon it before being destroyed—there is a considerable distance.

The insistence on such full-blooded rights is not neutrality but straight-out intervention. There is, however, a difference between these latter interventionists and those who, renouncing neutrality rights altogether on a downright interpretation of the League's Covenant, insist that there can be no neutrality by a signatory of the Covenant towards adjudged aggressors. The former desire to intervene on both sides for commercial profit, the latter only against the aggressor. Thus, to-day, by alternately supplying goods first to Japan and then to China in turn, the United States is obviously intervening by business as usual, now to help China but also now to help Japan whose troops, notwithstanding, have destroyed America's gunboats and slapped her diplomats. Similarly, in supplying enormously increased quantities of petrol to the Italian forces in Abyssinia, Great Britain belied her words at the League and intervened on the Italian side. Not thus can the advance to the reign of law proceed. As history shows, intervention is usually a protest for furthering the selfish, if "vital" interests of the intervening state, and is rarely a measure motivated to reinforce the independent will of the "befriended(!)" state.

The jargon of international law mystifies the subject of intervention no less than that of neutrality. To quote once more from the "most highly qualified publicists," there is Vattel, the Dutchman, who "considers it permissible to

succour a people oppressed by its sovereign"; the German, Hefter, who, "while denying the right of intervention to repress tyranny, holds that as soon as civil war has broken out in a state, a foreign state may assist either party engaged in it"; Fiore, the Italian, who thinks that "States can intervene to put an end to crime and slaughter," while Mamiani, another Italian, refusing "to recognize intervention on this ground," presumably coins another name for it under which heading he will recognize it, and so down to our own authority Phillimore, "the only writer who seems to sanction intervention on the ground of religion."¹

That the problem of intervention is small in comparison with that of neutrality for the reason that a nation intervenes by its own wish, whereas a neutral is frequently embroiled despite its every effort and desire to keep out—seems to be a false view when it is remembered that one can be intervened against as well as intervening. German, Italian and Russian intervention in Spain illustrates how to fight a third party through a second—a varied form of war in peace.

America, it is said, will never abandon her isolation except (a) when the extended radius of the aeroplane from the storm centres of the world over-reaches her cities, or (b) when hostilities have completely shattered her economic position. It is to be hoped that she will hardly be so blind to approaching calamity.

The problem of how to preserve neutrality in the face of a foe determined to embroil a nation is considerable, and several volumes would be needed to examine the broad possibilities arising in the various combinations of nations against a possible neutral—the simple truth being that only the reign of law, and no doctrine of neutrality, however elaborate, outside that reign, can stand. Among these is the problem of continuity, seeing that what a government thinks to-day it may repudiate to-morrow. Thus, while embarking on the *George Washington* for the Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson declared that neutrality would not subsist in a League. Later, Kellogg's view in another connection

¹ Hall: *International Law*, p. 285.

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was that the League Covenant imposed no primary obligation to go to war. But Wilson was completely disowned and Kellogg left a mere gesture. In 1920 the report the League adopted recommending the international blockade committee to study plans for a vigorous international blockade and for sanctions, happened to be that of Signor Tittoni, the Delegate for Italy. And at Washington, two years later, Senator Schanzer, another Italian Delegate—to quote from a letter of mine to *The Times*—“Led the enthusiasms towards sanctions.”¹ Then followed Mussolini. Against such a direct reversal in a country’s policy there can be no insurance. The security of neutrality, like that of so-called neutralized countries as, for instance, Belgium or Switzerland, proves in the end utterly worthless unless supported by power—the superior power of real union. And, given that, law automatically follows.

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As armament includes propaganda so neutrality would seem to involve a particular attitude in regard to propaganda. If it is the case that for future wars the minds, even more than the bodies, of the people will have to be mobilized, then, as neutrality may involve complete silence, something like armed observation may be necessary in order to preserve some liberty to hear the truth.

Just as it is certain that wars may be prosecuted and won or lost on more than one plane, so neutrality should operate on all planes. The Allies gained a military victory but it is not yet clear who won the economic war. It is, however, certain that by a process of systematic and sustained whitewashing, the German Leviathanic Spirit has gained the “peace”; and, that having happened, the German people are being inveigled along the road leading towards a venture wherein her leaders desire to reconstruct the Great War with a different military ending. As a re-insurance against disaster, the prospect of embroiling neutrals and so of widening and thus changing the balance of the conflict, will certainly be made the most of in the next war—and,

¹ Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-22: *Official Report*, p. 738.

moreover, in the totalitarian countries is already being carefully improved in military circles with a view to ensuring that non-success in the field, can, by that means, be prevented from degenerating into catastrophe. It is certain that protests will be useless in result although, possibly, not discouraged on account of the chances they may afford for contra-propaganda.

Only if neutrals are superior in power can they hope to constrain belligerents "to keep the ring." In any case their provocation is likely to be terrific. Their war cult will not only permit but will require the totalitarians to stoop any distance in order to conquer. They will not, for instance, be averse to bombing from a considerable height, in conditions and by methods affording sufficient cover from detection, even a great city of a friendly-disposed neutral. If identity is discovered, the usual repudiation of nationality will follow. It is conceivable that both belligerents, when heartily sick of the war and not daring to call it off, might compel intervention by bombing the capitals of neutrals and sinking their merchant ships, the excuse always being available that the ship was only technically anyone's national. It is probable that the right and duty to "visit and search" a suspected neutral vessel before capture or destruction, would, in the new urgency of air patrol, hardly be bothered about at all, but that, for reasons given above, there would be straight-out "sinking on sight." The prohibition against sinking unless there is provision for saving the lives on board—and which has been totally ignored in recent years—may be considered already dead, the reason that this is no longer feasible being decisive. All civilian enemy planes will be shot down without question and an unfriendly neutral's probably treated likewise. The practice of holding and despatching hostages recently resorted to is likely to develop.

The self-respecting reply of "neutrals" to all such crudescence of barbarianism, failing all else, could best include the form of severe economic measures, the retribution falling not on a few individuals but on the people that tolerated them. A blockade by air, land and sea, the wholesale destruction of growing crops by a chemical deluge, may

be all that could preserve civilization from an unconditional surrender to Leviathan. At the "psychological" moment, reply might even take the form of a flood of propaganda dropped by massed neutrals to the people on both sides, the ultimatum being a demand of both belligerents to allow uncensored broadcasts of straight facts from the "neutral front" and the appointment of committees from the people on both sides to verify those facts. The position might even justify drastic demand by armed neutrals for the persons responsible for certain outrages to be handed over to such neutrals for trial and punishment. It is unlikely that the recent practice of the Japanese of saying "Sorry!" yet continuing to add outrage to outrage, will be long endured by a great Power.

It may be objected that all this would not be neutrality at all but intervention, and that this line of thought leads right up to the absolute position that neutrality is dead, seeing that a nation must be either for the aggressor or against him. This, however, would be an over-simplification, for the aggressor cannot be known until he is so adjudged and that is possible only through the reign of law. Until that exists neutrality can no more stand inviolate without the shelter of power than can a nation's right of sanctuary or right to humanity.

Now although, as has been demonstrated in an earlier chapter, war continues on in peace and therefore no more than relative neutrality is possible, there is no reason why the depth to which a "neutral" nation gets involved in a war need depend wholly on the wish of either belligerent. Neutrals, therefore, must arm to maintain whatever "detachment" they decide upon and, if circumstances so demand, to take any measures to reply to outrage or, possibly, to end a position no longer endurable by the world. The fact that, even in name, there has been a Hundred Years' War spanning several generations, is a disgrace to civilization and a warrant for intervention which, at its highest, is the intervention of authority and its overruling of anarchy.

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The chief obstruction standing in the way of the consolidation of a "neutral front" of national states, even if operative only in case of emergencies, is still the same Leviathan who limits the reign of law to the boundary of the national state by opposing any expansion of that reign of law beyond that limit. The factor that opposes the union necessary for purposes of neutrality, therefore, is the same as that which perpetuates the reign of war in which a place for neutrality is so desired by nations not party to the dispute. The Leviathans who hold up the extension of the reign of law and the expansion of the supreme power (which they think would involve the loss of their own identity), frustrate this wider union for the reason that, once attained, such union for purposes of neutrality could easily become union for the whole purposes of the reign of law against war. If government means leadership, then a true government must lead the people past that obstruction instead of mounting guard over it.

One test whether a government is Leviathanic or not depends on whether it is prepared to take that first step in the advance to peace. I say the first step because nations are more likely to forestall or fend off a common peril than to unite for purposes of the greater hazard—the clash of open war. Real union for armed neutrality by like-minded nations, with the eventual extension of neutrality to include intervention and the mutual sanctuary of peoples, is one of the earliest tasks the people must urge their governments to take and, conversely, which governments should educate their people to desire. As union is steadfast only in so far as its basis is like-interestedness, the economic union of national states will automatically lead to such political union if it does not, in fact, precipitate it. In order to ensure that neutrality will mean the same thing to both or all parties of the union, the machinery of an authoritative judiciary with power to impose its decision would have to be set up. That done, then, in short, the full process of union would at last have begun.

Once convinced that union is inevitable, and that war is the alternative to law, the democracies who have most to

guard should now be roused to insist that this advance shall no longer be delayed by their governments. After the first, limited steps were taken, other limited steps would indispensably follow on.

Even this beginning of the reign of law's expansion requires a minimum of favourable auspices. For instance, at the moment, France is in no position to unite even for the precious objective that she most desires. This is because her parliamentary system actually ensures the maximum amount of instability of the government in office through the absence of the proved remedy of authority to dissolve parliament. France is thereby confronting the strongest feature of her dictator adversaries with her weakest—a factor fully assessed in Berlin. There is no excuse, however, for the British Commonwealth nations which should join in the union for specific purposes at once and be represented permanently on its executive.

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At the end of a scholarly study¹ Mr. J. A. Spender concludes that government is an art of a highly experimental kind, and not a science from which rules and principles may be deduced. True, it is not an exact science that permits of quantitative reasoning nor yet a pure science that proceeds by deductions from self-evident truths. Nevertheless here government means the government of mankind by the rule of law. Now there is a science of the rule of law, one of the oldest, least developed, but most important branches of science, called jurisprudence, the astonishing ignorance of which as revealed by political thinkers and others is greatly responsible for the erroneous views examined in our enquiry and for the hesitation in leadership of the democracies. This neglect is the less excusable as the exposition of jurisprudence by Anglo-Saxon writers is not only the clearest in the world but also most firmly based on the practice of government.

It must not, of course, be supposed from this that a textbook on jurisprudence gives any perfect statement of principle concerning matters so evolving as the law, the

¹ J. A. Spender: Preface, *The Government of Mankind*.

state, and sovereignty. It is a science to which this very study makes a contribution. In examining such principles, as, for instance, the principle that there can be no peace without subjection, we have considered these in reference to definite policies that actually figure in the programme of the Powers such as armament, the rule of international law, collective security, and now, neutrality. These policies, again, we have examined from the standpoint of the reign of law enforceable through supreme power. As the result of that examination we have confirmed that, at the present stage of the world's evolution, law is an extending process which has been arrested at the frontier of national states—a barrier that imperils the prospect of union for even effective neutrality.

Now the setting of that limit to the reign of law has resulted, as we have discovered, in the perpetuation of a multiplicity of legal systems, in an array of contemporary reigns of law not only competitive and in rivalry, but now, owing, to the fanatical projection of nationality by Leviathanic ideologists, reigns of law which overlap and are in conflict one with another.

Through man's failure to recognize that only wider than national power gives wider than national law, Leviathan, re-incarnated the spirit of violence, has found and kept the way open for the organization of violence for war. Not until the obstructing Leviathans have been brought down and brushed aside can we breach these barriers and allow the process of expanding union to continue. The reign of law must be left free to grow. To effect this we have to shatter once for all that long-dying shibboleth that there is something vital to the national state called illimitable sovereignty which, if disturbed or limited, would result in the death of the state.

It is appropriate to examine the question of sovereignty here, for the very meaning of neutrality which we have just been considering, depends on the purpose of sovereignty which some jurists conceive as operating externally to the state as well as internally. If so, how far, if at all, can neutrality shelter a Power not party to a dispute? Do

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sovereignties overlap? Does the sovereign of one power ever overshadow another state? Who or what shall be sovereign? What shall that sovereignty entail for those within the state, and for those outside the state? What is the nature, and what the purpose of sovereignty? Finally, what is the nature, the purpose, the limit of the state itself and whither bound its evolution?

In what we have been considering up to this point in our study, the light has fallen upon Leviathan. But now, with these farther questions, the light falls upon man himself, for it is on him increasingly that these questions will be found to turn.

BOOK II

THE ISSUE

SOVEREIGNTY AND STATEHOOD

ON looking back over our survey it will be noticed that many of the difficulties holding up the advance towards peace are related to that principal problem of sovereignty—how to restrain the sovereign, or supreme, power which is indispensable to the reign of law. One obstacle is the supposed illimitability of the sovereign, that other name for supreme power in the state, whether located in one man or distributed among different bodies.

We have seen how, after continual extension, the sphere of law at last reaches a limit which is commonly known as the state and beyond the frontiers of which there is only inter-state anarchy. Up to this point the process has been one of ever widening union with a corresponding broadening and consolidation of supreme power to enforce the law. This process is that of harmonizing different units, each a political society with its supreme power, into an all-inclusive and larger concord. The popular notion is that, with each advance, the reign of law is expanded until, when the state is reached, the process can go no farther for the reason that the supreme power of the state (as distinguished from the supreme power of a subordinate society, e.g. a so-called semi-dependent state), for some mysterious reason is sacrosanct and illimitable. That is to insist that limitation of sovereignty is incompatible with effective statehood, an implication which could only perpetuate a condition of international anarchy where a number of political powers claim each to be paramount.

This stupendous flaw in man's understanding is largely responsible for the fatalistic view that war is chronic and unavoidable. Without knowing it man has been taught to

worship the state, formerly with superstitious, later with religious awe; and, only now, when in full totalitarian dress, Leviathan, surpassing any graven image, proclaims himself God, does the truth begin to dawn. As we have seen, a state, after all, is only that very ordinary thing a political society which may be understood as an association of human beings united by the fact of their concord for certain purposes the supreme of which is the administration of justice.

Substitute, then, political society for state and at once the illimitability of sovereignty begins to fade, the sacredness of the state to dissolve, and the sovereign becomes a matter-of-fact affair called power, relatively supreme, and varying as we pass from nation to nation. Sovereignty conforms to no single type and, being conceived only with reference to its object, cannot adequately be adjusted merely by reference to any supposed innate nature. It possesses no distinctive norm beyond that of predominant power—whether sword power, or gas power, or gold power, or purchasing power or propaganda power. Thus a group state exists independently of its constituent states all of which, although taking different roads, pursue that same purpose which is to administer justice between men instead of allowing man to attempt to obtain it for himself. Each state therefore is limited, just as its sovereignty is limited, by the width or narrowness of the objectives to which that purpose is applied. The important truth that sovereignty, the supreme power of a particular state, can be properly considered only in reference to that particular political society and not independently of it, is derived from the fact that there is no standard pattern of statehood beyond the fixed criterion of effecting the administration of justice. To maintain, as do some worshippers, that sovereignty is illimitable power, and, as such, vital to the upholding of the state, is to make the astonishing claim that the sovereign is something separable from the state—something, that is, superior to the state, which may deflect even the purpose of the state from peace to war.

The two commonly accepted marks of statehood are the administration of justice and the "right to make war and

peace." These are sometimes called the two functions of sovereignty also, but that is to confound statehood with sovereignty—a matter we shall examine in a moment. Here "the right to make war" presumably means the right of a nation to give a good account of itself rather than to fill the rôle of victim of unresisted invasion. What else can this *right* to make war mean? Right against whom? Right pronounced by whom?

The inference here is that this "right" is a prerogative which any subordinate power would not or should not possess. But clearly there can be no prerogative or right whatever, in this respect, seeing that war is merely another name for anarchy. What, then, beside the *exercise* of the power could provide the *right*? And what particular sort of war is it which full statehood is alleged to possess the right to make—a war of defence or also a war of aggression? And how is one to describe war made by powers not possessing that right to make it? If, for instance, the air-minded population of a semi-sovereign state were to put on gas-masks and seek shelter during an air-raid, would not these be measures of making war? And might not a very subordinate state indeed resort to such measures or even turn on a few anti-aircraft guns into the bargain? Is not war purely a question of fact?

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Statehood, which in every case is a growth of political life, nowhere reflects self-evident classification. In the absence of a judicial authority fully empowered to decide, it is as difficult to categorize statehood, or to discover what a state's powers actually are, or to say where they begin and end, as it is to postulate about life itself in any manner as acceptable to others as to oneself. *A fortiori* would this apply where a state proposed not only to define its own status but that of others as well, which is often attempted. It may propose, but the facts, including those of intrigue and battle, usually dispose.

The nature of the statehood of the four great federal systems of the British Empire—itsself a group-political

society—or the nature of their constitutional relationship to one another, is extremely obscure although this obscurity can readily be determined, when necessary, by judicial machinery within the Empire. Thus it is supposed by some authorities on the British constitution that in the Empire, although there is only one king, there are several Crowns a different one of whom the Government of each Dominion separately advises. Further, that all this advice is accumulated in the person of the King-Emperor himself who, nevertheless, gives effect to all of it in his royal acts, however much that advice may conflict or diverge! And what is the relationship of each of the above political societies to the League of Nations or to one another from the standpoint of the League itself whose views of constitutional law in general, or even of the British Empire in particular, are unpredictable and, indeed, unascertainable in the absence of a judicial tribunal which, assuming one existed, would by no means be tied to the view of English writers?

In the first place it is on the answers to such questions that the nature and classification of a state, and the scope and even the direction of the sovereignty in each particular case, must depend. In the second place, as we shall see farther on, it depends on considerations infinitely more important that touch, directly and intimately, man himself. In short, the sovereign power of a political society unavoidably varies from society to society just as do the legal powers of the individual from man to man, this person being a minor, that an executor, another a partner, a fourth a bankrupt, a fifth a lunatic, a sixth at different times or in different capacities all five.

In the rule of law these distinctions can be given a meaning. One of the first tasks of a tribunal in deciding disputes between individuals is to determine their status and capacity. In the reign of anarchy, where status depends on self-assertion, classification by the constitutionalists is usually awry. Thus, because of some obscurity in her "right to make war," to deny sovereignty to a vast continent-state like the Commonwealth of Australia—with her federal and constituent state legislatures each with an independent system of

administered justice, a commonwealth, by any measurement, dwarfing many a "fully sovereign" midget state that attends Geneva—is but to reduce statehood to a mere matter of the alphabet. To measure fullness of sovereignty by the "right" to make war is to regard any particular sovereignty only in relation to a province to which it definitely does not belong and to judge it by some purpose which it excludes. In short, just as there is no fixed norm or standard of statehood, so there is no fixed norm of sovereignty; there are criteria only.

Even "full British sovereignty," then, turns out not to be a fact after all. If sovereignty is considered as something related to and inseparable from the state, and, thus dependent on the state, to be bound by the purpose of the state which is the administration of justice, then there cannot fail to appear the absurdity of supposing that full sovereignty is impaired if a state merely administers law successfully but war unsuccessfully, and, indeed, has no "right" to make war.

Thus when Hitler justified re-occupation of the Rhineland on the ground that he was restoring German sovereignty which had been taken from her by the Treaty of Versailles, he was, however ignorantly, applying this wholly false notion of sovereignty to the totalitarian state. In asserting the claim to re-occupy the Rhineland as the minimum possible "right of totalitarian sovereignty," he proclaimed no right at all beyond the right of might. In effect he merely asserted that Deutschland at last was in fact *über* the Allies, and proclaimed that every time Germany signed a treaty she diminished her sovereignty—in so far, that is to say, as she had any intention of keeping that treaty. And, on the other hand, Hitler, in effect, asserted that Germany on such occasions increased her sovereignty in so far as other nations, not expecting her to dishonour her signature, meant to honour theirs. In short, Hitler's own interpretation of his act confirms that the dictatorship that he claims is not merely national but international. Nor need his argument begin or end with treaties only. With equal reason Italy might justify her invasion of Abyssinia as "right" in order that Italian sovereignty should be rounded off, and Japan

equally well claim that only by the absorption of the whole empire of China, and the enslaving of the bulk of Chinese man-power, could Japanese sovereignty rise to that full height of Bushidoism which would enable her to make war and peace when and where she would.

Thus far reaches the full application of that very doctrine of sovereignty unsuspectingly adopted by most writers without question and without thought as good currency because in frequent use. "If," says a recent writer,

"sovereignty means anything it means the sole and exclusive claims of the state to command the obedience of its own citizens. How a government can abandon that sole and exclusive claim, without abandoning the claim to sovereignty itself, is seldom explained. If a government once concedes the right to the League of Nations to issue commands to its own subjects over its head it has merged its sovereignty in the League of Nations and is sovereign no longer."¹

On the contrary, sovereignty does not mean the sole and exclusive claim to the citizen's obedience on every conceivable matter under the sun. Nor is it a claim at all but a power—the power supreme in the state within which sphere, *its own sphere*, it is absolute. Taken literally, Mr. Curtis's view of sovereignty contemplates an absolutism of the subject's allegiance both on the temporal and on the spiritual plane to a degree that would remove conscience itself from man and entrust it to the keeping of Leviathan—a totalitarianism indeed! Even without counting the semi-sovereign or neutralized states—like Belgium or Switzerland—a superficial acquaintance with international affairs should enable one to recognize that even the largest and most powerful states in the world have contracted *out* of many of their "rights," and contracted *into* a good many responsibilities which displace a corresponding number of rights otherwise possessed.

The same writer's awe for sovereignty leads him to think that even—

"... the Dominions have not as yet acquired the character of National Commonwealths and cannot acquire it until

¹ Lionel Curtis: *Civitas Dei*, Vol. III, p. 84.

they have accepted in unequivocal terms the responsibility for either peace or war. They cannot do this, nor feel they have done it, until they have notified the world at large that they are not involved in war till their own governments have officially declared that they are so involved.”¹

To hold that the Dominions, in order to qualify for statehood, must press on where even devils fear to tread, would be to make sovereignty not only illimitable, but incomprehensible. Mr. Curtis’s further view—

“ . . . that either Australia or New Zealand, or both together with Great Britain, could construct the first foot-bridge across the gulf in men’s minds which now prevents the world from passing from the national to the international,”²

can hardly be thought to belong to the region of fantasy, as he fears, but rather seems to belong to that region of hard-boiled formalists who often, without knowing it, recognize only written or clearly demarked constitutions. In every political society facts must not only be related to the written word but precede it. The sovereignty to which we are invited here to look forward has, in fact, already in large part arrived, although we are still far away from such a government as—

“ . . . would have to include a legislature as well as executive, a legislature empowered to impose and collect from the taxpayers the revenues required to enable the executive to discharge the international functions imposed on it.”³

In short, progress from nationalism to internationalism is not likely to proceed by way of constitution-making, nor by substituting formula for formula expected to work visibly in a centralized government. The point here is not that the farmers of New Zealand would have considerable doubt whether the further promotion in the status of New Zealand was worth the inconvenience of leaving their cows and crops, and that, therefore, they would prefer to chance relying on the radio which their fathers never had. The point is that New Zealand might quite well form part of an international

¹ Lionel Curtis: *Civitas Dei*, p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

society or commonwealth without destroying or in the least impairing Dominion status, Dominion statehood, or Dominion sovereignty. Nor could any "international commonwealth" depend on whether New Zealand's representatives sat in Wellington, or in Ottawa, or in London. Rather will the arrival of an international society be helped by a correction of the unsound and harmful views that only the fullest sovereign power is compatible with political liberty—views which circulate in the Dominions as elsewhere, with the result that, fearing some integral point of their own sovereignty is threatened and, fearing still more, that they may find themselves under some sovereignty strange, if not sinister, that they did not bargain for, they become sovereignty-minded and then they, too, delay the advance.

Thus, having found the truth that only through the supreme power of a political society can there arrive the peace which, following on law, displaces the anarchy of lawlessness, man has been led astray into the unrecognized fallacy that the supreme power known as sovereignty, and by Hobbes named Leviathan, is supremacy itself against all and sundry. And, believing that this quality about sovereignty, its illimitability, is unalterably elemental and fundamental, man has come to believe that that very shelter which, by its law the state affords him, requires him to insist that sovereignty shall never be limited or impaired. From that vast lie man has been led on by the Leviathanic Spirit into one still greater—that sovereignty, thus sacrosanct and illimitable, exists for the purpose of war, whereas, in truth, its only purpose is law.

The delusion of this false view of sovereignty is serious and far-reaching. Nor is the true answer merely that nothing is absolute and that sovereignty, too, is only relative. The hidden truth, which man must discover before his march towards peace can begin in real earnest, is that sovereignty is indeed absolute if its power be regarded, as it ought to be regarded, in the true direction of its process and purpose—a direction that is *centripetal* and not *centrifugal*. The sovereign power of any government is limited, not only by the available degree of power it represents, but by other determining

factors attendant upon it—whether of time or space, or thought.

From generation to generation this utterly false doctrine of the illimitability of sovereignty has passed unchallenged until, with the greater range of man's destructive power, war at last threatens his very existence. Ahead of his leaders, if not earlier then in the next holocaust, man will discover, when he is put to the proof, that *the state is not something supreme and absolute, replete with power both within its province and beyond its province as well*. Then, indeed, facts will be found to precede the law. The view that to limit the exclusive jurisdiction of a state in some single particular, as, for instance, in regard to matters of neutrality, is to destroy the state, or to impair the stature of statehood, is but to mistake the purpose of a political society, and moreover to confuse, as Salmond rightly indicates, subordination with any limitation whatever—even a limitation, as I have shown, consequent on the specification of particular purposes for which the state may have been set up. So far from destroying the state, to surrender certain of its powers concerning its relations, say, with other nations, might be to give its life a new permanence by substituting for international war the possibility at last of international law. In other words, any such limitation of the zone of the sovereign power, so far from shattering the state, might actually assist the state to achieve that purpose for which it exists and by the fulfilment of which, therefore, any measures of state action must be judged.

There is nothing mythical about the state, nor does it form part of the Ultimate. Its chief purpose is neither the game of politics, whether in practice or theory, nor yet to provide salient points from which Leviathan can maraud in his game of war with other Leviathans—but simply the *administration of justice which substitutes a reign of law for the reign of anarchy*. This administration of justice involves the creation of law and the conscious self-direction and self-adjustment of the state by government to that supreme end. Law is not the supreme end of life, but, as the means essential to the administration of justice, it is the nearest concern

of the state. It is obvious that the question whether there shall be law at all precedes any question of what shall be provided by the law. Without law the life of man, afore-time most precarious in its primitive lawlessness, could hardly now be regarded as a physiological probability. What is certain is that, from the standpoint of the spiritual plane the gate to which, once discovered, can never be closed, a life indefinitely lawless to-day is become for ever inconceivable.

The idea that sovereignty is illimitable need be traced back no farther than the error of Hobbes who, like Austin, failed to see that the supremacy of the power has reference to its employment in the state and not to its employment beyond it. This becomes obvious if one considers the problem where there are similar states existing with contiguous frontiers. Here a state's sovereign powers, if claimed beyond its frontiers, would clash with the indisputable sovereign rights of the adjacent power exercisable within the latter's frontiers. Several states whose frontiers join cannot all be supreme, each over the rest.

While the functions of the state are commonly considered to be twofold, it is accurate to say that sovereignty, purposeful only within the state, is devoid of significance outside the state in which it is the supreme power. Although its administration of law lies within the state's particular realm, it is true that the state may have to protect that reign of law from external menace. Sovereignty, however, is not to be confused with such protection nor with any right of the state to protect itself, nor yet with the state's capacity to defend itself. When, beyond its jurisdiction, the state operates against external forces by means of power which, inside the state is so supreme as to be called sovereign, it is nevertheless the state and not sovereignty which operates externally. In short, *sovereignty can be conceived as operating only interiorly and not exteriorly.*

Most of all—a fact rarely acknowledged but of outstanding importance—sovereignty is not merely any power whatsoever or wheresoever, but that particular kind of power which operates within the realm of law and beneath the

reign of law. It therefore follows that, whenever the state exercises its power against an external adversary, this power cannot in the international arena be called sovereign power because, in that arena, external to the state, there is as yet no reign of law, neither, therefore, can there be sovereign power operative, as sovereignty only can operate, within the realm of law. Indeed, instead of the reign of law, there is, in the very international arena where sovereignty is most acclaimed, only a clash of might.

Thus, if, for example, a political society called A hands over its active concern and interest in neutrality questions to another society called B, this would not disturb the remaining interests of the political society A or the main objectives of that state. Again, if the United States and the British Empire were to agree that all disputes between them upon, say, the doctrine of "continuous voyages" in time of war should be decided by a fully empowered judicial body whose decisions, binding on both countries, were in no way dependent on the interests, "vital" or otherwise, of either Power, then it might be said that such concord between the two Powers had resulted in a new political society, limited, it is true, to the one objective. Consequently there might fairly be said to have arisen a new political sovereign power authorized and empowered to administer justice on a widened realm of law which included, for the envisaged purpose, the United States of America and the British Empire. It would be inaccurate to say that there had taken place here a "merger" of sovereignty, for "merger" implies shrinkage and loss in one quarter and augmentation in another. No sovereignty would have been lost because none over the matter in question had previously existed. What, in such case, has been transferred is not sovereignty or sovereign power but whatever right an interest (although not necessarily an exclusive interest) can give. Nor, conversely, would the new sovereignty that had arisen, in any way affect the existing sovereignties whether of the United States or of that still independent group-state, the British Commonwealth, or yet of any one of those constituent, independent states, the British Dominions.

Again, if a nation were to cede or concede to the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, or to any other body, the right and power to adjudicate upon a question such as that of the conduct or convoy or any neutral offending ship, and to direct its future movements, there would be no "merger" of sovereignties as the author of *Civitas Dei* supposes. If a government were to delegate some authority or to divest itself of authority, in either case there might be some question of the transference of a portion of its sovereignty elsewhere. But, in either event, the authority of which it had divested itself, or the authority which it had delegated, could not be a sovereign authority in the sense of illimitable. In the international sphere it could not be regarded as more than a claim arising from an interest of its nationals to decide the movements of that ship. But this claim would be opposed by a similar claim of another state to direct the ship's movements otherwise. In short, what happens on such occasions is not that the state exercises sovereign authority but that the state merely advances a competitive claim against rival claims.

Thus the barren question whether sovereignty is illimitable is fairly met everywhere by the answer that the sovereign power of a particular state is determined, as the state is determined, by the objective of the particular state—determined, that is to say, by the state's particular ideology which is reflected in the administration of justice within that state.

Again, it is wholly erroneous to suppose that the sovereign power of the state can decree its own illimitability or even its own particular degree of limitation which, in fact, is already set for it in part by the supreme purpose of statehood and in part by the particular manner in which the consensus of human wills forming the basis of the political society desires that that purpose shall be carried out. The prevailing confusion that sovereignty, or sovereign power as referred to in this study, is to all intents and purposes the same thing as the state and identical therewith, will be found, on investigation, to have supplied Leviathan with

his greatest opportunity for exploitation. *L'état c'est moi* is but the prelude to the still larger claim that, while the state depends on Leviathan, Leviathan can transcend the state—the claim that, although the state is limited, Leviathan is, and must remain, illimitable. And, more impudently still, that claim is advanced to mean that it is on this very illimitability that the reign of law itself depends. Mephistopheles, to subdue whom man created and submitted to Leviathan in a realm of law, recognizing the boundaries of that realm, uses the glittering lure of sovereignty concealing unchallengeable authority to decoy Leviathan away from the truth by subtly confounding power for war with power for law. Thus, at the end, it is Mephistopheles who, re-entered into possession as the Leviathanic Spirit, leads man in the very name of the law farther and farther astray into the darkness.

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The popular confusion on these subjects—sovereignty, the state, law, justice—reflects, as it is prolonged by, the varying confusion of the jurists themselves. They overlook that, of these four, justice, that is to say the administration of justice, comes first both in importance and in order. Not only does the administration of justice justify and call for the emergence of a supreme power, but the scope of that supreme power depends on the intended nature and radius of the administration of justice. Without the need to administer justice, there would be no need either of the state or of supreme (sovereign) power within it, whether that power resides in one man, in the three estates of the realm, or elsewhere.

According to John Salmond, a state or political society is an association of human beings established for the attainment of certain ends by certain means.¹ These ends Salmond considers to be peace, order, and civilization. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that a state need not, therefore, possess territory at all. It is, indeed, conceivable that a community could exist nationally on ships upon the high seas or in a fleet of aircraft. Its subjects, domiciled in the

¹ John Salmond: *Jurisprudence*, ch. v.

air, would be visiting aliens when on earth. In short, they would have no country but a region, a political refuge to which stateless outcasts from totalitarian states might retreat in order to prepare a final counter-stroke—a state, be it noticed, landless and more or less boundless except by its purposes and ideas.

Administration of justice, then, which gives rise both to sovereignty and the state, must be considered not only as the governing and continuing purpose of both, but as also partly determining the scope and the growth of sovereignty and of the state—their scope and growth, of course, being more fully determined by other factors depending on a man's outlook on life.

It is here where we must part company with John Salmond, as well as with the run of jurists and, pioneering further into the field of jurisprudence, throw back the limit of statehood to its proper place and adjust the conception of sovereignty as truth requires. We will consider the views of Salmond in preference to others as his work stands out most free from hesitation, and at least his meaning is clear.

Following Hobbes—who informs us that Leviathan carries two swords, the sword of war and that of justice—Salmond declares that this twofold function is, “the irreducible minimum of governmental action.” He proceeds—

“It is not difficult to show that war and the administration of justice, however diverse in appearance, are merely two different species of a single genus. The essential purpose of each is the same, though the methods are different. Each consists in the exercise of the organized physical force of a community and in each case this force is made use of to the same end, namely, the maintenance of the just rights of the community and its members. We have already seen that in administering justice the state uses its physical power to enforce rights and to punish wrongs. Its purpose in waging war—that is to say, *just* war, which is the only kind that can be regarded as an essential form of state activity—is the same.”¹

The unsoundness of this view, apparent on a little thought, becomes obvious to all when, in the lines that follow that

¹ Salmond: *Jurisprudence* ch. v.

quotation, Salmond endeavours to explain the essential difference between the two functions in question as that the administration of justice is the judicial, while war is the *extra-judicial* use of the force of the state in the maintenance of "right."

The criticism is that war and the administration of justice, so far from being two "different species of a single genus," are precisely as far apart as are justice and anarchy, or as law and war—which, of course, is to say as Heaven is from Hell. We have seen that no war can properly be called just however moral it may well be, for justice is that which is administered in the state by means of law. To this it but remains to add that if the so-called international law of to-day is rejected as being unrelated to justice because there is no supreme power to pronounce what it is and to enforce it, in short, if it is rejected as a system of justice because it is not *administered*, then the outcome of international war cannot be justice either. In the international zone the only decree "administered" is that made and enforced by one party to the dispute, that is the party proved the stronger. Whatever ethical adjustment the result of war may secure, it cannot be said to be justice administered in a political society which, as we have found, alone provides the reign of law over human weakness and ignorance.

The confusion of Salmond here, which reveals the influence of other greatly inferior writers, follows on his confusion which unconsciously he allowed to creep into his sound conception of law originally defined by him as a body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice—a confusion which Hobbes similarly escaped when he defined law as "the command of him who is endued with supreme power in the city." Admitting that this view of Hobbes "emphasizes the central fact that law is based on physical force," Salmond in the first place¹ even goes on to declare that "law has its sole source, not in custom, not in consent, not in the spirit of the people, as some would have us believe, but in the

¹ Salmond: *Jurisprudence*, ch. iii.

will and power of him, who, in a commonwealth beareth not the sword in vain."

But afterwards Salmond proceeds to declare that although that view of law "contains the central truth," it is not the whole truth inasmuch as it disregards the ethical element, and he complains that—

"as to any relation between law and justice, this theory (the imperative) is silent and ignorant. . . . If rules of law are from one point of view commands issued by the state to its subjects, from another standpoint they appear as the principles of right and wrong so far as recognized and enforced by the state in the exercise of its essential function of administering justice. Law is not right alone, or might alone, but the perfect union of the two."

It is obvious where Salmond goes wrong here. Rules of law must, in his contention, conform to two requirements. Firstly, they must be commands issued by the state to its subject. This can be readily ascertained. Secondly, he here contends that the rules of law must appear as the principle of right and wrong. That is to say they must appear right not because the state so commands—they must be state commands because they appear right. But how, then, is it to be decided whether they "appear just" except by the administration of justice appointed by the state? Here Salmond retreats from his own definition and conception of the law. It is a retreat that ends up at the view that justice can possibly be secured by war without any administration of justice at all; in short, that there can be administration of justice where force is the only arbiter. And if, as he declares, "law is not right alone or might alone, but the perfect union of the two," then which fixes that union and arranges that perfection—does right decide what's might, and might decide what's right? Then what *is* right? As we have seen earlier in this study, what is right, or justice, can be known only through the *administration* of justice which, as Salmond himself concedes, is possible only through the law.

The simple truth is that law is a system of regulating human conduct by enforceable rules, and that while some

rules may appear better than others, or again, some may be regarded as wholly good and proper, and others as wholly bad and improper according to the views of the subject, certainly if there is no lawgiver there will be no law. In that case there will be no bad rules but also there will be no good rules because there will be no rules at all; and that is complete anarchy. Now often a bad rule is better than none at all for at least it secures uniformity and precludes strife.

The second reason Salmond adduces for finding Hobbes' definition inadequate is that it is not true that every legal principle assumes or can be made to assume the form of a command, e.g. permissive rules of law. The answer, however, is that the command of the state supports the whole body of the law and, whether any particular law says, You shall, or You shall not, or You may, does not matter in the least. In the case of a permissive provision the supreme power of the state confronts and, if necessary, constrains anyone disposed to hinder or challenge that permission. Indeed, at another place, Salmond himself returns to the sound view of law.¹

"Law is merely the theory of things as received and operative within courts of justice. It is the reflection and image of the outer world seen and accepted as authentic by the tribunals of the State."

To strip away any remaining possibility of confusion it may be useful to point out that, however much the law happens to offend orthodox ideas of morality, nevertheless no one could deny it the name of law. English law has itself performed some strange antics in its career. Until 1873, as Salmond himself illustrates, England "presented the extremely curious spectacle of two distinct and rival systems of law administered at the same time by different tribunals"—the one law, the other equity, the latter intended to correct the severity of the former. No one would have the hardihood to aver that, before the two systems became merged into one by the Judicature Act, the principles of law administered in the one system were not law because they were not just,

¹ Salmond: *Jurisprudence*, Appendix, p. 471.

or that the principles of equity were not law because they differed from the former system.

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This little excursion into jurisprudence but confirms that war is not related to law in any way whatever except as its alternative. From this it follows once more that the true function of sovereignty is law and not war. Further, that statehood conceived as necessary for law must be regarded as an expanding process proceeding simultaneously in the reign of law.

To set the boundary of the state at the boundary of the national state is to leave unreclaimed in the realm of war a part of the province of the reign of law. To halt the process of law at that boundary is to deny to the state itself the expanding process which is prescribed by the purpose of the state, which is the administration of justice, and which, in turn, must always govern the conception of statehood and sovereignty. Salmond rightly maintained that, as a matter of fact, sovereignty is not illimitable. The larger truth is that sovereignty never could be illimitable when such illimitability paralysed the essential process which forms the *raison d'être* of sovereignty as of statehood itself.

It is worth pointing out that the foregoing examination incidentally disposes of the popular prejudice often voiced on the public platform by social as well as by spiritual reformers, that the imperative theory of the law takes a cynical view of humanity that is harmful as well as untrue—a view, moreover, alleged irreligious and unspiritual inasmuch as it forces mankind into a mould shaped only by power because it regards “man as nasty and brutish.”¹ The serious misquotation of Hobbes’ words and the inferred misrepresentation of his view, which is indisputably the right one, is varied, on occasion, by additional paraphrase in the same direction of distortion.²

It is not man, whether redeemably or irredeemably, that

¹ Lord Lothian: *The Future of the League of Nations*, p. 103 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs).

² Lord Lothian: *Observer*, November 27, 1938.

is nasty and brutish but the life of man under the reign of war which only the reign of law can end, as Hobbes clearly saw and accurately stated :

“Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a *time of Warre*, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. *In such condition* there is no place for Industry because the fruit thereof is certain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation . . . no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Art; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all continuall feare and danger of violent death; *And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.*”¹

To misinterpret so clear a plea for culture, art, literature, society, and peace—in short, for civilization itself, by thus reversing it, is to bungle the work, and, in this instance, to thwart the spiritual purpose, of the great dead.

However wide of the mark may be Hobbes’ view—taken in that far receded century—of sovereignty and other matters, nevertheless his most complete and authentic word, by its revelation of naked truth, now strikes at Leviathan as once it struck for Leviathan. Throughout his work Hobbes is chiefly purposeful for law. After a long captivity and personal experience reaching from the first week of the War in France to its end, I can vouch that a great many Englishmen beside myself would have considered Hobbes’ words very fairly descriptive of war’s occasions; and that, whether passed confronting No Man’s Land or on Mesopotamian mud, the life of man seemed often solitary, unquestionably poor, nasty in the extreme, precisely brutish, and sometimes almost too long.

German Nazism, says so good a scholar as Mr. J. A. Spender, is the modern counterpart of Hobbes’ Commonwealth. Except in so far as Hobbes saw the state instead of the sovereign power as Leviathan, this statement hides the truth that Hobbes saw man as the artificer of the state contemplated as a “Christian Commonwealth in no wise contrary to the word of God or good manners.” Actually

¹ Hobbes *Leviathan*, ch. xiii.

Hobbes' central position is not far off that taken up by Mr. Spender himself when he informs us, with truth, that when "two arbitrarinesses are opposed to one another, that which has an army behind it is bound to prevail."¹ Mr. Spender might have added with equal truth that when one arbitrariness, with an army behind it, is opposed to reason, morality, common decency and common sense with no army behind them, the result invariably is that the former likewise triumphs.

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It is of less importance to reinstate Hobbes respecting his main contribution regarding the fundamentally imperative nature of law, the alternative to war, than to demonstrate that, provided the adequate power is supplied, the direction of the application of that power is left wide open—if necessary, to the choice of the most religious, idealistic, spiritual ideology conceivable. Here, where we approach the heart of our enquiry, it is of paramount importance to recognize and keep before us this aspect of the truth, for it alone can provide common ground of view for the sectional leaders of democracy. That to achieve and maintain supremacy of power is indispensable to supremacy of law, should reconcile views as diverging as those of Mr. Winston Churchill, now dauntlessly advocating the effective safeguarding of man's spiritual liberty; of Lord Lothian, progressed from mere modification of the *status quo* to the quest of an international order; of Mr. Neville Chamberlain who is prepared to fight for certain things but to prepare, that must mean, to win; and, say, of Dr. Lang the Archbishop of Canterbury who, recognizing that what portends is a spiritual crusade, must perforce admit that how we fight depends on the enemy we must overthrow.

To assert in this regard, as Lord Lothian has done, that national frontiers are the trouble, is not enough. We must search, unravel, try to prove, and strive for constructive truth in which any false quantity shall dissolve. Thus, if read at the end of this book, the brief for Leviathan, whether

¹ J. A. Spender: *The Government of Mankind*, p. 231.

German or Italian, should raise no issue other than that of law or war—provided that my task has been satisfactorily accomplished.

The personal cry of Hitler is now, for any purpose, indistinguishable from the decoying cries of Leviathan—that is of Nazi Germany who has made Hitler's cry her own. So the issue, law or war, remains. That issue cannot be disposed of by mere assertion one way or the other—either that the German people in any case require natural justice, or that the German Leviathan is building up a position on the international chessboard with a view to uncovering check to the forces of humanity. Restored to the true greatness of her former self, how much would it matter if Germany, the beneficent foster parent of nursling civilizations, the Good Samaritan of unbefriended humanity, were to spread her wings across Europe, or even farther still? The latest strategic tattooings upon the body of Czechoslovakia seem to show only too plainly that the dominant forces in Germany desire to perpetuate war because they hope to gain thereby, and expect only to lose by law. It may be so. But in an enquiry of this nature neither assertion nor authoritarianism will serve. The sole hope is to clear the ground for facts and for assertive reason. Nothing less can provide an all sustaining strength outlasting the energy of passion that at the moment unites, but which, sooner or later, will divide the forces of Leviathan. And, what is the most important and desired prospect of all, in no other way can there be encompassed the overthrow of Leviathan himself by the instrumentality of his own betrayed. Forward, then, once more toward the emerging issue—one overriding because governing all the other questions, whether of law, war, sovereignty or statehood—the destiny of man himself in this world's future.

MAN AND THE STATE

TO shatter the doctrine that sovereignty, illimitable in all directions whether within the state or beyond the state, can thus transcend as it can overshadow the very state itself, is not to dispose of the menace of Leviathan altogether. It still remains to be considered how far, in the political society commonly known as the state, the sovereign (supreme) power is ever actually supreme. Does it exist over the whole life of man or only over a part? What is meant by supreme power? Of what nature is that power, how wide or deep its supremacy?

Having already, on the subject of armament, considered the breadth and depth of power internationally, we must now first of all reconsider it in relation to any opposition within the state which its purpose is to overcome—to consider it, that is to say, as supreme power behind the law.

Such questions at once involve a reference back to the purpose and objectives of the state itself which may be said to limit the scope of the sovereign power, just as we have found them to reveal the true direction of the sovereign power as centripetal and not centrifugal.

While that broad purpose of the state—the substitution of law for anarchy—gives the main direction in which the sovereign power must move, the precise objectives of a particular state, as reflected in its constitution and practice, vary according as the ideology of one state varies from that of another. It might be supposed that in a democracy the nature of the sovereign power, its reach and significance, is determined by a people's attitude to life, to the future including death, and to God—questions permitting of very great divergence of view because, however vast and vague, they are, in some degree, real questions that occur to all. Likewise it might be supposed that in a dictatorship it is the

sovereign power itself which determines these matters. The truth, however, is rather that, in the conventional democracies the sovereign power leaves room for these things and reflects no more than the liberty of the subject to do whatever he likes about them, whereas Leviathan increasingly defines, formulates, and divides. It is significant that in either case man's submission in modern times is quicker than it was in his tribal days. His acknowledgment of the need of the reign of law, or partial reign of law, is now so universal as to appear to be instinctive. He submits to the reign of law in act before he does so in reasoned deed. This fact has facilitated his betrayal by Leviathan.

On first view it might appear, similarly, that in the totalitarian state the sovereign power provides the gods, while in the democracy the sovereign power merely provides the opportunity to be ungodly at will. On deeper scrutiny, however, what is seen of importance is that in all the totalitarian states (not necessarily dictatorships) it is power alone that is the god, and that all other gods are in fact excluded. In the case of Russia, Italy and Germany, by no stretch of the imagination can it be made to appear that any spiritual god whatever is to-day given house-room by the presiding demagogue. That Leviathan is that strange oddity—a self-confessed atheist—is indeed one of the marks of limitation by which Leviathan is identifiable.

Re-examined, the revealed totalitarian creed that power, the god, otherwise violence, is wholly related to war and unrelated to law (except within the confines of the totalitarian state the better to de-create human beings there into totalitaria for war) is now seen to have left its imprint upon the formative process of the state no less deep than its deformative influence upon the doctrine of sovereignty. Instead of sovereignty representing supreme power radiating from the ascertained centre of political gravity in a community of human beings for purposes of law, the doctrine, in Leviathan's hands, has come to mean not only the marshalling and requisition of the whole resources of the state but also for its utmost augmentation by coercive power from outside—for war. The farthest limit that the Leviathanic

arm of that accumulated power can be flung is then the radius of sovereignty claimed and appropriated for the totalitarian state. There statehood is seen to be conceived from beginning to end not as a means of effecting and securing the administration of the reign of law but as representing and extending the reign of war. In short, the radius of totalitarian sovereignty is nothing but the radius of power within the reign of war.

Whatever its faults it cannot be said that democracy is in similar case. On the contrary, however much, through failure to unite, democracy has contributed to the continuance of war, it everywhere escapes the charge of having actively planned for the reign of war. What the deeper scrutiny really reveals, therefore, is nothing less than that, unless steps are taken by the democracies in time, the outcome of this conflict of processes will be disastrous to democracy. Against a process of power unplanned for law, the rival process of power planned—and planned with terrible efficiency—for war, must win; and with its triumph the mould of Leviathanic efficiency would be finally set upon man himself. The more the two systems are examined the more it becomes clear that they do not merely differ in feature but are wholly incompatible in essentials, and there can, therefore, be no compromise between them. Man is confronted here by an inescapable necessity of choosing between two processes which affect, more than anything else, his own destiny.

This becomes clearer than ever if we read aright any present survey of Europe with its two dozen rival political societies called states, the full world panorama of anarchy being further extended by twice as many more. The reading that sees merely a somewhat unnecessary arithmetical reduplication, or an absence of uniformity that makes for friction in such matters as currency and adjustment of the balance of power whether political or economic, is wholly inadequate and its translation far too piecemeal. A proper reading, must, to begin with, be taken from the standpoint that, as the reign of law is single and not multiple (however relatively this truth be accepted at the present stage of

evolution of the political society) so must the statehood reached at the top of the hierarchy of law be single too. Although that consummation of single statehood lies in the distant future, the important truth is that the process of expansion thither has not only already set in but has been proceeding for a long time. The result of trying to dam up the waters of an irresistible stream is seen in the present totalitarian inundation of war sweeping over the barriers of law.

The picture of the present array of national states is truly meaningful only if it is recognized that they stand for something more than a disorderly array of units to be made uniform and stabilized. They are, as it were, the elements in the crucible of a final product not yet visible. Or, rather, they are incomplete and evolving sections of a future design the final pattern of which will not come up until the end. It follows that the development of that unit, the present national state, assumes a new importance and is of concern to every other national state, seeing that the process of individual state development is part of the general formative process of the major, ultimate design. As there can be only one state ultimately reflecting the ultimate single reign of law in the hierarchy of law, so, from what is happening to the component units, can the future world state be dimly foretold.

What sort of state is that to be? When the final pattern emerges will it bear any recognizable resemblance to what—since St. Augustine's day—has been known as the City of God? Will man's spiritual features be conspicuous by their absence? Is the machine's hand only to influence the pattern or is the ultimate design to be left wholly to chance? In that design the chief feature must be man himself. What hand, therefore, is he to take in his own destiny? The touch of man, the artificer, must first fall on the national state.

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If it is true that detailed patterns can hardly be determined and distributed, one apiece for each community of mankind, so that, when assembled at the end, all will fit like a picture puzzle, and the design then come out, it is no less true that

the general outline of the ultimate design can be influenced here and now by man's rejecting some things and setting store by others.

Now, whatever the things that are prized by man for himself, it is not in doubt that unless Leviathan is refashioned they will not come into the picture at all; or that the final picture itself will be of a machine-man of war. It emerges then, that, as Leviathan must be refashioned and, secondly, as the refashioning of man must not be left to Leviathan, man must therefore set about fashioning both Leviathan and himself at once. To be in a position to attempt this, man must first break free from Leviathan. This is so because increasingly Leviathan is a machine of which man forms part.

* * * *

Here, at last, we stand before the final question to which all else has led, and the answer to which conditions both statehood and sovereignty as well as the reign of law itself—as what sort of being does man wish himself to develop?

It is in the light of this question, awful in its responsibility, yet sublime in its opportunity, that tumbled Chaos and tottering Cosmos now require to be re-surveyed. If any embodiment of dictatorship, whether Stalin's, Mussolini's, or Hitler's, can show us a finer, prospective man as time goes on, then we should fall in behind its banner and take its road. At the moment, however, the only clear answer appears to be that no man at all will emerge at the end of that road as, long before then, man will have become de-created into a machine and lost.

The sublime, the mighty event, would come to pass if, in time, the great German people were to answer that question for mankind by overthrowing and refashioning their own Nazi Leviathan which, more than any other Leviathan in the world to-day, is leaving no stone unturned to see that the final pattern shall be Leviathanic only.

Are we to accept that? Is it appreciated now that that might be the eventual outcome? Did Niemöller, marching with the first Nazis, in the front rank of fours, realize then

whither that march led and could only lead? Are others profiting by his experience?

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What of the outline of the final design? The first mark of that outline begins with man's choice of certain alternatives. Of these we have considered the first, law or war. Our study has revealed that the price of peace, which is also the price of law, is inevitable sacrifice. Now, while this price of law is easy sacrifice for spiritual man but a concession difficult and, indeed, pointless for the totalitarian man, it is altogether out of the question for unspiritual Leviathan. Clearly, the spiritual factor cannot be ignored in organising the advance to peace.

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It is upon this very issue of *law or war* that man will increasingly be confronted with the duality of the two planes, the spiritual and the temporal, which persist in presenting different demands on his allegiance the more he tries to elect between them. And, according as he elects, so he will be shaping himself a future destiny,

St. Augustine found the City of God high above Earth, and brought it nearer, if ever, only at moments of pagan twilight that lingered around one essentially earth-born however inspired. Whenever the hard light of day crept back upon the world, so, from the saint, the City receded. A long span of time passed and Machiavelli, super-man-of-this-world, made the jungle the only Delectable City, the war of the jungle the only law, and took for his hero a Prince certainly of darkness. In between St. Augustine and Machiavelli there came Dante, the Light-bringer, who, beholding the eternal conflict between Heaven and Earth, at least found truly that the society of nations was the farther off the City of God by the measure of their ceaseless strife. That he saw in Rome a power appointed by God to be the means of imposing order upon their profitless rivalry, was as natural as for us to imagine salvation can proceed from the democracies, or the reign of law expand

world-wide outwards from the British Commonwealth of Nations.

More centuries have passed and we have only drawn closer to the issue and recognized its inevitability, that is all. The problem remains.

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Is there a stairway leading from the lower plane, the temporal, to the higher, the spiritual? If there is no stairway, and the two planes can be brought no nearer, how can man avoid a devastating division of the self, if he seek both—avoid becoming a quick-change artist of double character, either character a stranger to its twin and accepting no responsibility for its doings? This duality, nowhere successfully resolved on earth, has achieved its completest discord in the problem of war which clearly is forcing man to take his stand.

In these questions we reach for something fundamental, and factual—in short we seek the meaning of spirituality in practical affairs. That which is of vital concern to man in life has no less bearing on the acceptable interpretation of sovereignty. Here spirituality means Christianity as distinct from Christendom which is only the sphere of Christianity—but Christianity in its supreme essence as contained in the unalterable command: “Thou shalt *serve* thy neighbour as thyself.” Now, to obey this command clearly involves action and not merely thought or hope or intellectual adjustment. It means that man’s bid for comfortable evasion by keeping the spiritual and temporal wholly apart on parallel lines along which he can simultaneously live his life, is not the teaching of Christianity which is that the two directions, so far from being parallel, intersect at the Cross itself in the very heart of Christ.

This is the meaning of sacrifice—the acceptance of the struggle, not the exploitation of its enigma. Christianity is Crosstianity. It is not man that is called on to be crucified, but his struggle that has to be Crossified. Thus the struggle cannot be conveniently ignored on one plane, in order the better to be resolved on the other. This is no partial truth of

midway compromise but the whole truth implicit throughout the life of Christ and illuminated afresh at His death.

The divergence in emphasis of thinkers holding to the one or to the other partial view, whether reflecting temperamental reaction upon any world survey or indicating the degree of actual experience of struggle in life, is often only superficial disagreement and explained by the method of approach. Thus says Mr. Christopher Dawson:

“Whenever the City of Man sets itself up as an end in itself and becomes the centre of a self-contained and self-regarding order, it becomes the natural enemy of the City of God.”¹

It appears from the context that in emphasizing the danger to Christianity—not of being eclipsed but of being transformed for the worse—Mr. Dawson accentuates not only the difference between the planes but the propriety of their parallelism. The validity of any such criticism of this passage, however, turns on what is understood by “this world” to which Christ declared the Kingdom of God did not belong. Clearly there Christ had in mind the worldliness of that day, but not this world as it might later become. That is to say Christ left open the possibility of man raising a spiritual kingdom on earth where God’s will might be done as it is done “in Heaven.” So far as Mr. Christopher Dawson meant to leave wide open the door for this event, therefore, the above criticism fails.

The point is too important to be dismissed as mere emphasis for here emphasis is all. The common interpretation of the Roman Catholic view that there exist the two worlds in complete parallelism has provided the temptation for man to regard them as irreconcilable, his delinquencies on the lower plane, which are washed out by the confessional, thus being no hindrance whatever to his joy of fulfilment on the spiritual plane.

Now the spiritual stand made by Pope Pius XI against the totalitarians’ application of the doctrine of sovereignty, not

¹ Christopher Dawson. *Religion and the Modern State*, p. 104.

only, to a degree, discounts this criticism but surely promises to help narrow the gap dividing the Christian Church of Rome from the other provinces of Christendom, and to prepare the way for that major movement of spiritual co-operation indispensable to the advance towards peace.

In a criticism of the passage quoted above, a surprising assumption that by the City of Man Mr. Dawson means the state, leads Mr. Lionel Curtis¹ to denounce it as the "potent view" that the Church is higher than the state. Unless, therefore, they are on the same level, then, according to Mr. Curtis the state is not only sacred but is higher than the Church. Such totalitarianism would dwarf even Hitlerism which so ardent a constitutionalist as Mr. Curtis actually abhors. His observation here excellently illustrates where leads that fetish worship of the state due to overlooking that the state is nothing more than a political society of no fixed norm or standard but may take any form of an assortment of living political growths. Without asserting that Christ was primarily a politician Mr. Curtis's argument could not be far pursued.

"The reactions," he states,² "produced by such teaching, can now be gauged by the millions who bow their knees in the temples erected by Marx and Hitler. In our hearts there is that which tells us that life and the world about us are good with a goodness to be brought into being by ourselves."

Nazi Germans, it is true, might conceivably agree that the assembly halls built by Hitler to house them were good and that this goodness was brought into being by themselves. But, on the other hand, even in Russia, Marx cannot be recognizably resurrected whether as good, bad, or indifferent.

Neither Mr. Dawson nor Mr. Curtis, however, can dispute that the conflict between spiritual values and material values must sooner or later be joined on the very plane of this earth's practical affairs, particularly on its scene of anarchy. Nor can anyone deny that, so long as the very

¹ Lionel Curtis: *Civitas Dei*, Vol. III, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*

centre of the human scene is occupied by that insane spectre War, that issue has not even begun to be joined. No less to-day than ever, the harshest discord in man's soul that keeps breaking in upon the earth-song, even long after it has answered and silenced his first, fresh song of youth, mounts to its greatest agony as he turns from the retrospect of futile sacrifice to the prospect of future battle, more blind, more mechanized, in yet more violent clash of war by night, and, unless promising to be one day resolved by the meeting of the two planes at the intersecting Cross, no less futile.

It is clear that Christ knew that these two planes do meet in the mind of man for whom, therefore, a spiritual outlook can never cease to count. Once this is admitted the question of the acceptance of the sacrifice required before war can end becomes negligible because inevitable. The remaining difficulty, then, is not that the sacrifice entails detachment from the world, but that, since the machine took charge, man's attachment to the machine intensifies his detachment from his fellows so that his proffer of sacrifice is frustrated or ignored, his prayer for forgiveness is drowned in the clanging of wheels, his very attitude of supplication is distorted into that of the goose-step.

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That this study of sovereignty could not be adequate if all reference to the difficulty of spiritual-temporal parallelism were omitted becomes obvious with a little thought. Even in "The Leviathan" of a fading century we see the dim tracing of the outline of future hope in what Hobbes calls the Christian Commonwealth. Sovereignty being power, and power varying not only in degree but, as we have seen, in kind, now of armament, now economic, and now spiritual, it must be recognized henceforth that sovereignty exists on more than one plane, and that it is multi-dimensional. Recently it has been demonstrated that the nation that wins the war can lose the peace, that a dictator may dictate invasion only to have to capitulate to an economic crisis, that while a full-fledged totalitarian can enter with armed

men and carry off the things of Caesar, nevertheless, upon asserting his title to the things that are God's, he finds himself at open war with another realm whose sovereign power in one instance—the Church of Rome—promises to triumph. It is important to recognize that the repercussion of this repulse has not been confined to the spiritual plane but, reaching to the temporal plane, has involved and will involve consequent adjustment there also.

The totalitarian claim, therefore, to sovereignty illimitable and indivisible throughout the whole length and breadth of the life of the individual, must henceforth be rejected not merely as undesirable but as so far unestablished in its possibility as to be of no proved reality.

This discovery is of very great importance for it encourages the view that the expansion of the reign of law may proceed across frontiers by infiltration of ideas wooing the allegiance of the mind and likewise of the heart. In short, like light, sovereignty need follow neither geographical nor political frontiers. And, moreover, despite the most rigorous pursuit of the dictator, if man retains sufficient courage he can remain free. For instance, although an individual may have to conform in the movements of his body to a Nazi decree, so far as he can place his interests in free countries or so far as he has the power of communicating thought and speech to assist the free movement of goods and credit abroad, to that extent he is helping to weight the other scale and to assert his freedom.

Thus the wind that bloweth where it listeth is the very element on which the breathing of man itself depends and this, like the ocean, flows round the earth in disregard of the dictator's wand.

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The more the ways of out-flanking Leviathan are explored the stronger does hope become. Apart from the spiritual plane man does not have to begin to build on nothing even on the temporal plane for, to a degree unsuspected by Leviathan, already in the field of economics there is common ground trodden by the feet of all nations. Already a study

of finance, trade, materials, manufacture and credit, as also their distribution, increasingly reveals that the foundation of the temporal plane supporting not only Leviathan himself but all Leviathans is economic and that, on this plane, a rival supra-national power is now in process of being created. Humanity's chief hope lies in the conscious fashioning of the new Leviathan, there as elsewhere. It may be that, when the young life of civilization on this planet has progressed another thousand years, the convergence of divers roads will not only be observed but begin to be co-ordinated, that man in his onward march upon one plane will hear the footfall of the advance proceeding satisfactorily upon the others and thus be enabled to check his compass bearing. Truly, the nearer he approaches the Celestial City, the nearer will the converging roads bring man to man, however dispersed appears human activity, however divided the human self. That is in the far future.

As our enquiry proceeds we shall discover that, through man's disunion, the machine is already in undisputed and in undirected control save for that of Leviathan. Under the inexorable exigencies of economic forces this state of war in peace will continue, and avoidable sacrifice be exacted from man in his struggle to subsist. Alternatively this economic war in peace can be ended by a recognition of a cardinal principle fundamental to economic law which strangely coincides with the commandment of Christ, "Thy neighbour as thyself." However divided are men, economic forces promise to unite them. It even begins to appear that the nearer we draw to the City of God the more all laws will be seen to be after all only different expressions of a single law of life, and that the true economist's path leads to the City of God no less than does the good Samaritan's. However baffling in complexity is the vast problem of economics, it is unquestionably simplified by the Christly precept. Similarly, in so far as sovereignty within the state, may, in certain instances, reflect in its purpose and limitation the ideology of the particular state, nevertheless the operation of this ideology itself depends partly on economics the laws of which, already in operation, for the most part converge

in the same direction as the spiritual. More and more, therefore, the problem appears to be a spiritual one.

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According to a passage of my novel *Blow Bugles Blow* dramatizing the siege of Kut-el-Amara, as the besiegers drew in closer together upon the plain surrounding the beleaguered garrison whose fate became clear, the private reservation about God increased alike in the heart of Christian, Buddhist, Mahommedan, Agnostic and Jew. Just so toward the end of the Great War the common and re-uniting influences among mankind proceeded from a spiritual and not from a political angle. So deep was man's suffering, so unrelieved his despair, that whatever the creed to which he belonged, even while cursing God he unconsciously prayed. At the end of Armageddon men actually drew closer together because, in their common puzzle how to relate God to the holocaust, old beliefs became dim while the new outline of God remained distant and indistinct.

No survey, therefore, would be complete if it ignored that the problem of the co-existence of the spiritual and the temporal planes—which has a direct bearing not only on the problem of war generally but on the subject of sovereignty—must count in the fashioning of man of the future state.

This is illustrated in the successful resistance of Pope Pius XI to Mussolini's recent attempt to extend the fullest Fascist sovereignty over the Vatican, a struggle of interest to lawyer and layman, to priest and agnostic, and, not least, to totalitarian and pacifist.

In his now famous First Encyclical, the Pope refers to

“this dear City . . . the seat of a sovereignty, a Divine Principality which overleaps the confines of all peoples and all nations . . . the universality of the faith of Christ spread throughout the world requires that this sacred sovereignty shall not appear to be subject to any human power, to any law, even such law as might profess to secure the liberty of the Roman Pontiff with certain safeguards or guarantees, but must be an absolutely independent sovereignty and must manifestly appear as such.”

Article 24 of the "Treaty" composing the dispute between the Quirinal and the Vatican is as follows :

"The Holy See, in relation to the sovereignty which belongs to it also in the international sphere, declares that it remains, and will remain, outside all temporal competition between the States and International Congresses held for such objects, at least unless the contending parties both appeal to its mission of peace, reserving in every case the right of making its moral and spiritual power felt. In consequence of this the Citta del Vaticano will always be considered in every case neutral territory and inviolable."

This sovereignty is by no means merely figurative, but real and actual. The Pope claims to be able to give the final decision on any matter appropriate to his authority, but nevertheless what these matters are would not obviously be determined by him alone. Leviathan insists on his own selection of what things are God's. In connection with the question raised by the Italian onslaught upon Abyssinia, for instance, it is alleged that the Pope stated his position quite clearly in August 1935 as that the Emperor of Abyssinia could have appealed to him, but preferred Geneva to the Vatican.¹ The Leviathans might have suffered by comparison if the Emperor had appealed to both places.

In so far as the Pope's kingdom is independent, it might be contended that there is no reason why these two spheres should not be kept entirely distinct and apart. That this is not always possible but that, to resolve this discord between man's allegiance to the City of God and his homage to Caesar is part of his necessary struggle, would be evident in the event that the Pope and Mussolini each required the same man to be in a different place.

In short, the issue is so real that sometimes it may defy evasion, a fact confirming the reality of the sovereignty of the Holy See. At first sight the claims of the Pope that there exists a *de facto* sovereignty in the Church of Rome embracing the spiritual allegiance of millions of loyal subjects spread round the globe in all nations, may sound to some as mere theory if not an empty assertion. This view,

¹ Lord Clonmore: *Pope Pius XI and World Peace*, p. 94.

however, would be wrong for, on examination, the sovereign power claimed by the Pope proves to be one of very real substance, so much so that the Papal power might well undermine any government policy of which it disapproved. This power, which is capable of considerable development equal to surviving strenuous tests in the future, is only a section of similar powers not yet in unison—the activities of the various sections of Christian belief throughout the world.

The sovereignty of the Church of Rome is nothing short of a claim to disapprove the objective of any state's ideology likely to deny the purpose of the Church's sovereignty or, indeed, its freedom to operate. It is not without interest that even Soviet Russia may be said to have recognized that sovereignty by entering into direct treaty relationship with the Vatican.

This new plane of spiritual power throws yet farther back the problem of sovereignty and of the state. Before the alternative, "law or war," comes the question—law for what end?

To this question there can be returned only the single answer that just as peace is not the supreme end of life, so, neither, is law nor yet justice. That end is spiritual growth through a struggle proceeding simultaneously on the temporal and on the spiritual planes. Whether man be regarded less as a body which has a soul than as a soul that has a body, it is true that his spirit, no less than his body, insists on having something to do with him. This duality surrounding man can neither be avoided nor denied. On the contrary the turmoil set up in man's own soul as the result of that conflict between the temporal authority and the spiritual, has, on occasions, stirred him to rebel against the law itself and turn his feet once more towards war. However much man's religious outlook diverges from that of his fellows, it is from a common standpoint that men survey the temporal realm of civilization and recognize there a reflection of an anti-spiritual order, largely fortuitous in form, and yet apparently to be perpetuated by the reign of national law.

So, bound to both, man faces the two realms each seemingly incompatible with the other, on his lips the question—If that, then why this—if this, then why that? Is this, he asks, all that the law secures? And, if Leviathan is anti-Christian, is not man's task nothing short of converting a machine to faith?

In this moment of gloom man recognizes that the same chains of law that shackle his human nature shackle him also to what his better self tells him is utterly false and wrong. That in moments of material success such thoughts do not occur to him is of no consequence now, in this moment of failure, and frustration, of loss and defeat. Confronted with the prophecy that another war will end civilization, the most tragic utterance on earth now escapes him: "Better that it should end than that this should endure!"

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In a more reasoning frame of mind, however, the fact that these misgivings assail him more at one time than another will frequently lead civilized man to the discovery that usually on such occasions some fact of the economic category has unpleasantly protruded itself in front of him. Such a reminder of the insecurity of the temporal scene—where to suffer misfortune is to go to the wall and to suffer not only material loss but a declension of spiritual power—only spurs him to amass more wealth against the unavoidable risks of disaster.

It is rarely while he is in good health and prosperous in the things of this world that European man takes the tragic duality deeply to heart—a fact which confirms that the chief motive in the civilization of to-day is to make money, that money is the factor which almost governs civilization's advance.

Recognizing that at last he has been carried along in the world process of the machine to a point that has left his earlier gloom far behind, man's mood now passes from smouldering rebellion to flaming revolt. The alternative "law or war?" he casts aside for that of "God or Mammon?" Which, he wonders, shall the sovereign power exalt?

Thence, by a further step, man passes to a new and startling alternative altogether—"God or civilization?" At this moment his wrathful thoughts, now, mainly objective in direction, turn alike against the law of the machine as against the machine of the law. If neither peace nor war is an end in itself, so neither can be this prospect which the law upholds. The only law, then, must be not the law of civilization but the law of Christianity. How can he bring this about?

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Here we approach the ultimate frontier of man's consciousness when, vacillating between the two Cities of God and of Man, he asks of the self: "What art thou?" On his answer and on his answer alone must depend what is to be for him the supreme end of life. Nor without that question and that answer can that end ever be known to him, for no authoritarian ruling—even that of Christ—can ever here suffice. Sooner or later he will find out that essentially man is ungrown spirit still in its infancy, that spirit invades mind and one day will control it, and that the training place of this young spirit is age-old body.

It is in this ancient self, the body, that the dark history of man, the unknown, is hidden, and where human nature continues to reside. In body, then, man belongs to the past, but in spirit he belongs to the future. He can no more change human nature than he can the past, so he must leave it behind with the past by an escape into the future. This is the only escape possible. More and more, therefore, man is a Futurian because his life's purpose is self-liberation to be effected through the growth of his spirit.

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On this fundamental truth concerning man himself we can proceed to construct. The end of life being spiritual growth, no merely mechanical and automatic process can ever be acceptable on earth. That growth which provides man with struggle, eternal and everlasting, is not spontaneous and automatic, but, even if uncertainly, still, to a degree, self-

directed. The struggle of self-liberation succeeds according as the contest is made on the spiritual as well as on the temporal plane. Moreover, at its intensest, the struggle is a conflict between the two competing values wherever they clash.

Here, as elsewhere, apparently there is to be no sudden heaven but only hard-won progression. Least of all is there any possibility of solution by way of escape through abandoning the struggle on the lower plane and concentrating on striving on the spiritual plane alone. It is surely true that the best Christian is not a man who merely thinks most about Christianity, or who hopes most for Christianity, nor yet he who intellectually best interprets the preaching of Christ. "By their works (fruits) ye shall know them." To know the commandments, even cautiously not to infringe them, is not enough. There is required also the sacrifice of material possessions. Man cannot talk or even think his way to heaven nor yet to peace. The spiritual plane reaches as far into the earth scene of human action as does the temporal. Already it is the spirit most exercised on the spiritual plane that moves the deepest currents in life, in man, among peoples. It is because such a spirit, quickening at this moment the rich spirituality of the German people, could leave a fair new mark on history the like of which has never yet been seen, that the mechanization and the totalitarianization of German life by Leviathan is doubly tragic.

However sympathetic the interpretation and however apologetic the apologia, *Mein Kampf*, said to be the new German Bible, discloses a wilderness of unspirituality that would be more stark if it were less reflective of a mind for the most part commonplace in its coloured idealism—if it were less symptomatic of a purge suffered and then passed on. What could be more commonplace than to overlook the right of every German to spiritual growth and self-liberation and of which, despite their rich inheritance, more than do most great peoples, they stand in need? My struggle, not theirs! Possibly my victory and their defeat! Most certainly of all my defeat and their victory! Could such exclamations possibly be Hitlerian? Here the time factor comes in. It is

a race between Hitler's self-education and Germany's spiritual downfall from which, only after another cycle, could she recover. It is said that Germany's dictator does not read and that his ignorance of history does not deter him from interpreting it. The work of the nation-builder who leaves out of his calculations all thought of time which passes, flattens out and erases, is likely to endure more through the reactions to his contribution than in the first results he intends.

It is conceivable that Hitler, at any rate technically a Roman Catholic, would have hastened to acknowledge rather than to oppose the sovereignty of the Roman Church if he too had not placed Leviathanic power and political stature higher than spiritual growth which, in this life, Christianity insists must come first. The testing time to prove, as it will prove, that only if the dictator restores those things which are God's is his work likely to endure, is not yet come but it draws near.

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The menace of Leviathan, the usurper, which provides a sharp test for Christianity itself, is measurable by the impertinence of its self-insinuation into an alternative godhead competitor of Christ—that twofold godhead, Caesar and Mammon. The test is one of discernment, the trap that while the things that are Caesar's are being passed off as the things of God, Christianity, which is infinitely more than a comfortable, finite civilization, may be required to compete by offering chiefly things like Caesar's also. Though true Christianity should assist the amelioration of the social order, it stands for a great deal more than a social order whether of super-luxury or even super-convenience; likewise more than statehood or even society. The mansions in the capital City of God have something else to show than efficiency.

To meet the dictator's threat to precipitate a nation over the brink it may be that the characteristic downrightiness of the Roman Catholic Church, with its symbolized elimination of overpowering doubts, is well-fitted. If so, then the

extension by non-Catholic churches of the Catholic Church's front for this purpose could not be unwelcome to God if thereby the sovereignty of the Vatican could be sufficiently widened to assist replacement of war by law.

So, in approaching man's immediate problem to-day, we approach his ultimate task that must increase the more he neglects it. That is an increase of commitment no less than of tension. Each day more and more hostages are yielded, just as more and more human legacy, slowly amassed in the painful process of man's striving on earth, falls into jeopardy.

Man's remedy lies in his increased control of Leviathan through increased self-control, and that is possible only through increased knowledge of himself. Man must mount the watch-tower and look around. He may find that nineteenth-century Liberalism, despite renovation, has reached little farther than a comfortable water-closet and portable wireless civilization, and also that the urgent choice of alternative has not yet been faced let alone been made. It may occur to him that soon he may be required to resign himself to a lot where, in a world increasingly totalitarian, he will be imprisoned from birth to death in a machine.

That, indeed, must be the inevitable and final outcome if, in order to gain material security and secure material gains, man accepts Leviathan as an end and master instead of tolerating him only as a means and servant. Nor can man, that young spirit in age-old body, ever hope again to leave his conscience in permanent domicile on the spiritual plane and so, carefree, join in the race on the temporal plane for the glittering prize. That ceased to be possible when, with man's growth in self-consciousness, conscience first came to him at all. The attempt to exploit that parallelism, if much further prolonged, can only result in the stultification of the human spirit and make for the frustration of life that will become merely a time-drift in futility, heading for nowhere. Neither can he make the best of both worlds by building on the lower plane with the wreckage salvaged from the plane of the spirit.

So then, when contest is fairly joined on every plane, it

is on the spiritual plane that man must first seek concord. That comes first. "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and all other things will be added" is the authentic thought of Christ. It will be no advantage if the physiological war of men's bodies changes in form to a psychological war of ideologies. Mentality is not spirituality in spite of the dictators' attempt to pass it off as such. Here, too, appears the hand of Leviathan the usurper. Man, the brother of man, is exploited regionally by Leviathan, that is to say through nationalism harnessed to an idea. In this way the motive of Leviathan, which is power, is disguised as spiritual zeal for a religious cause in a holy crusade calculated to sanctify the impending holocaust. As a threat Leviathan offers alternative anarchy.

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Can man escape this fate, or at any rate diminish it? In an enquiry which is essentially a study of war, we have found the only alternative to be law—but law which men will be constrained to obey. Eventually it must be a law which, as well as having the common purpose of order and the termination of strife, will to a degree resolve the discord proceeding from the duality of the spiritual and the temporal planes. A beginning must be made by each individual, seeing that the fixity of the alternative, law or war, holds good for man the spirit no less than for man the age-old body.

Re-appeared and re-stated the question of the nature and scope of the supreme power and therefore of the future state and so of future man, is now seen to be twofold. Firstly it involves the choice either of God or Mammon—an alternative involving questions no less immense than the world order in general and the economic order in particular. Secondly, it involves the choice of either God or Caesar which, involving as it does a decision what things are Caesar's, overlaps the former alternative. God means the same thing in both alternatives, but what relation does Caesar bear to Mammon? In the sovereignty of Caesar, shrunken after he has yielded up the things that are God's,

does Mammon still find a place? If Mammon is rejected, has the vital and necessary shrinkage in Caesar's sovereignty *ipso facto* occurred? Clearly these two stupendous considerations laid before man by the Master call for examination together and not apart.

MAMMONISM AND CAESARISM

WE have seen that the remedy for war is to widen the realm of law into that of a political society extending across the international field with its accompanying sovereign power. Also that the principal difficulties in the way of that evolution arise from the existence of a plurality of Leviathans who, instruments of law found necessary to restrain defective human nature, refuse to submit to restraint themselves or to accept any degree of subordination. Left alone, or suddenly bereft of government, there is no reason why man who, generally speaking, has managed to exist under any one of innumerable provincial shelters of peace known as nationalities, should not exist equally well under an international roof sheltering all mankind provided that the objectors were compelled by a supreme power to submit. Of the forces that are assisting that broadening process the chief will be found to be spiritual, while that which obstructs the process is Leviathanic the two specific forms of which are Caesarism and Mammonism.

Seeing that man is spirit attached to ancient body where lurks human nature which only the strengthening of that spirit promises ultimately to subdue, his need is for a philosophy or a religion which emphasises the supreme importance of human concord and most highly values that particular concord which is most difficult to obtain—that is to say the concord reached by man in his effort to serve others as he would have others serve him. Such concord is not the fortuitous kind representing the inevitable drawing together of affinities, nor yet is it compromise. It is the outcome of conscious effort guided by recognition of the fact that the

alternative must be anarchy, as also by the instinctive feeling that spiritual satisfaction will result.

Now there are many religions which teach that war is bad, but only one that condemns war by the very words of its supreme command which, if carried out, alone can end war—"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." However many are the variations of the Christian faith, this emphasis is paramount in them all. But, more than most religions, Christianity is opposed to the fatalistic attitude to life and is not satisfied by hopes however worthy, or prayers however pure. It is essentially a religion of action and requires results. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Thus, while it would be a distorted view that regarded present world anarchy as measuring, or indicating the failure, of Christianity on earth, it is safe to say that anarchy illuminates afresh for all Christians the timeless truth contained in Christ's "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." It is to be observed that the emphasis specified throughout in this recurring thought of the Master's is on service, the service for another, never for oneself; nor is there mention of worship. To serve your neighbour is to serve God, to serve Mammon is not to serve God, therefore to serve Mammon is not to serve your neighbour. Here clearly service is love, not love left in thought but translated into deed.

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What is Mammon? Once the idol Wealth, not improbably the commodity god of gold, now that the machine age has come Mammon is transformed into the god of the machine that promises to bound man's world by this world's worldliness. Thus against Mammon, at first his choice but now confronting him as the machine of his destiny, man at last turns in revolt only to find that he cannot destroy it excepting by means of another machine. He would control it if he could but this he cannot succeed in doing alone, for other hands, each independently willed, are also upon the levers, with the result that he does not master the machine but the machine him. Become the servant of the machine and, accepting the comforts as compensation until the life of the

sickened spirit requickens within him, he at last resorts to revolution in order to attempt to destroy that which, indestructible and permanent to his problem, he must either serve or control.

This control of the machine, however, can be obtained only if he combines with his fellows. But that control would have to be not for the benefit of any man or collection of men, but for the whole community however large that happened to be. If united concord is proved necessary to win and keep the mastery of the machine, the conclusion then becomes obvious that this must involve, if it does not precipitate, the widening of the realm of law. In the case of the economic machine, for instance, the community requiring its control—because nations are now contending among themselves for that control—is no less than the whole community of nations including the backward peoples. Into the service of Mammon who at present presides and will preside over this machine in the absence of world-control, man will continue to be born until the realm of law is extended to terminate the reign of war. This is essentially the Christian advance which is inspired by the supreme commandment and, proceeding by the way of sacrifice, follows the Cross.

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To what practical considerations does this lead? Firstly it is necessary to bear in mind that an evil method can destroy the end and that a false means can reveal itself to be a false end. In a world where the end can never be expected to be attained in a first attempt, where, moreover, it is foreshadowed that the Kingdom of God is not reached at a single bound but it is chiefly the struggle that counts, the method of ruthlessness may not only fail to reach the end but even defeat it. This is precisely what happened in the case of Marxism. In order to destroy, as he believed, that machine *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx precipitated and developed that drastic method, class-war. Already it is certain, not only that he failed to destroy it, but that capital nowadays, although only a single century has passed since his thought began, corresponds only remotely to what he saw in it or

predicted of it; and, moreover, that its meaning will undergo further changes in future centuries.

It is at any rate undeniable that he neither found nor approached any remedy and that his real contribution—surely the most terrible of modern times—was the sinister method of bloody revolution in horizontal war throughout the world. This devilish desire is directly opposed alike to the supreme command of Christ as to the dire need of man for horizontal concord with the men of all nations. Notwithstanding his passionate denunciation of the City of Man, Marx found no end or sight of any end that could justify so terrible a means, and so he bequeathed only method, ending in method, method itself become the end. For all we know—a secret his pathological hate might have concealed—his method includes, as so often is the case with dictators, the personal and private end of sadist indulgence to the extreme limit, the price of that indulgence the lives of millions of men born and unborn—all butchered in order to give the fullest thrill to the spawn of Leviathan.

The worst as well as the most formidable of the materialists, Marx, annihilating the spiritual plane from all evolutionary future, preached wholesale class-war throughout society in the hope that it would sever for all time vital strands of the thread on which man's future hope in further evolution depends. The City of God now or hereafter he blotted out so that the best that was yet to be was the City of Mammon—crude and finite the struggle it offered, desolate the social millennium it promised, its only possible victory that over the spirit of man. The escape Marx preached was not to anything but only from something. He failed to see that, if war is properly understood, the root evil is always war; and that commercial civilization, ugly as it often appears, is ugliest when recognized as an economic battlefield to which the only alternative is the reign of law brought about by love, struggle, and service, not hate, comfort, and cruelty. War, especially Marx' dream of it on the large scale of madness, can cloud the mind to insanity. Was it this that clouded his outlook so that he failed to see a like effect in others or that, such inroads made, it did

not matter to him if the social millennium led out to certain failure? The Marxian revolution, begun to overthrow capital, has become a machine for mere killing or extermination, Mammon the survivor still presiding over the machine at the end and enjoying the property of the dispossessed whom it has slain.

Although the suspicion may never have crossed his mind, it is clear in the result that when confronted with the choice of God or Mammon, Marx unhesitatingly chose Mammon twice over, once when he exalted the method above the end, and again when he rejected the Cross for catharsis. The life and influence of Marx point the moral of *God and Caesar* as well as that of *God or Mammon*; and, indeed, it was Marx himself who first sharpened the alternative into *God or Caesar*. The choice he made was against Christ—that is to say it was for Caesar as it was for Mammon, for, from the outset, he assailed the watch-tower of Christendom, its watch-word “Thy neighbour as thyself.” Whereas Christ gave his life to save mankind, Marx sacrificed the lives of mankind for his personal purpose.

From that point onward it was only a step to materialism, to revolution, to power-worship, to totalitarianism, to Leninism, to Stalinism, to Hitlerism. The fundamental blunder of Marx in substituting means for end is a warning against the fallibility of the dictator who thinks he can withhold opportunity from man, the spirit, to struggle in self-liberation and growth. Nevertheless in the long run the dictators will be found chiefly to have provided something for man to struggle against when, discontented at last and suspicious, he begins his search with all things surrendered—those of God as those of Caesar—and finds himself once more harnessed to war and alone.

If Marx had lived a century later he would probably have recognized how much the new advance of the machine is due to his method; and recognized, too, that mankind’s struggle against the machine provides struggle enough—so much so that already only by a movement of wide concord among the nations can his servitude be ended.

Tracing back the history of that servitude we find that

man was confronted by the same Mammonism in Christ's day as he is now, although the economic enmeshment of the individual was less then than in our day. One pictures the bickering Jews in the market-place, the lawyers, the publicans and sinners, the pieces of silver, the farthing for which two sparrows were sold. There, too, was competition, almost to the knife. Christ's alternative then applies equally now.

How did he present that alternative? His message to his simple audience is seen to have contained no opportunity for man to escape through the intellectual finesse that, provided he dwelt in thought on the spiritual plane, he might carry on business as usual on the temporal. To serve one's neighbour as oneself involved, even then, a sharp, a tremendous spiritual struggle taking place in the actual scene of practical affairs in everyday life.

Secondly, the simplicity of Christ's message permits of no obliging doubt, "Under which flag?" or yet "Under which Cross?" A supreme relativist, Christ understood the demands of the world very well. Least doctrinaire of all great characters his words show that he was in the struggle himself, that it was the struggle only that counted, that no legalistic or retributive attitude could redeem. "Neither do I condemn thee!" "I have not seen so great faith, no, not in Israel!" On these two occasions, the first the sinful woman, the second the believing centurion, Christ saw through appearances and took fully into consideration the circumstances. Yet, relativist though he was, there always stands out in his meaning something which no relativity can disturb, as, for instance, that involved in the choice between God and Mammon. The reason of this, sufficiently evident, is that only by the alternative remaining inescapable can it clearly create and attach the responsibility of avoiding sacrifice. "Ye cannot serve both God and Mammon"—"The things ye give up shall be added unto you."

It is not open to doubt that to prefer God before Mammon would clearly now involve the surrender of national interests, "vital" or otherwise, and of national political power, even national sovereignty, among the Powers—if the City of God could thereby be brought nearer. That is the spiritual con-

dition for otherwise sacrifice is not enjoined. On the contrary, seeing that "He that is not with me is against me," sacrifice passed over to the enemy might be harmful and wrong. To divert the offerings from Mammon to Caesar is not to serve God.

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The Kingdom of God which man is invited to seek is unmistakably a spiritual city, a city of the spirit where that same young, growing spirit of man belongs and where there is work to be done resulting in renewed spiritual strength for further struggle. Now, as we have seen, it is claimed for Hitlerism as for similar ideologies that it is a spiritual religion. It is, however, only a political religion, the difference being that, while spirituality is not necessarily confined to Christianity, common ground is found in the fundamental principle of treating others as one would wish to be treated. Would Hitler, whose *Kampf* was never Germany's but only *Mein*, like to be gagged and bound? This surely is the condition indispensable not only to Christianity but to any spiritual teaching. It implies freedom for the growing spirit which is the purpose of life. From this standpoint the extermination by the spirit, Man, of his brother men is inconceivable. Is this claim extravagant?

The answer must be forever "No." It makes no difference that, until the reaction sets in, for a brief period the prospect of war for the sake of war is accepted by the worshippers of Caesarism. The heathenist view that man's proper exit is via death on the battlefield proves less and less acceptable to man when left to himself, and would be wholly rejected by him if it did not appear somehow a milder form of state-idolatry wrapped up with worship of Mammon.

Thus the antithesis of the City of God is not the City of Man for there the choice between Mammon and God is still unmade. It is the City of Caesar where no choice remains at all, where no God but only Caesar is admitted. For whereas Mammon impersonates God, Caesar displaces God.

The wholly fortuitous and chancy nature of Nazidom is suggested by the title of a recent book *The House that Hitler*

Built,¹ and is objectively revealed in the book itself which is to be recommended for its honesty and fairness.

To be effective the choice must be controlled and the control must be international. From this it follows that, in thus advocating the cult of war, Hitler destroys whatever contribution National Socialism can make. It might be contended, of course, that the war he advocates is for the good of man. But what is good for man—as to which there is much dispute—refers back to a spiritual purpose at least included in the command “Thy neighbour as thyself.” Here spiritual freedom is implicit and it is just this which Hitlerism directly assails. It may be true that Hitlerism in final form has not yet emerged because the process of revolution in Germany still continues. Nevertheless in its method, which is that of Karl Marx, it must stand condemned as anti-spiritual; nor can the assault on the human spirit be excused on grounds of capturing control. Between the Soviet octopus and the Nazi spirit-sucking leech there is only the difference in varied methods. Both are advertised to effect a cure but, privately, both are calculated to obtain mastery.

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Now this want of control of modern civilization proceeds from the fact that there is war in peace, the result being that the machine is taking its own course. There are, however, Caesars and Caesars. The Caesarism Spengler preferred to democracy could not, in his view, altogether arrest the declension of the sun in the west, but it taught, for a time at least, how to co-ordinate man's movements in the gathering twilight. The Caesarism of Hitler has not ceased to change but in its latest phase it can hardly be said to be anything very definite beyond method. True, there is some amelioration of social conditions but even this appears a part device of the method, war. The nondescript nature of Hitlerism is revealed nowhere more than in the fact that that outspoken intellectual, the author of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, has been feared and shunned by the Nazis because a comparison

¹ Stephen Roberts.

between Spengler's intellectual Caesarism and their Nazi, so-called National Socialism, would have revealed the comparative poverty of the airless wilderness for which the latter at present is heading—a wilderness utterly spiritless the stones whereof are offered for bread. The early Caesars at least created and consolidated upon the base of justice a marvellous system of law, clear in principle for those days and not unworthy of empire. The racial myth of Hitlerism which Spengler rightly rejected as untrue and contemptible may, after all, bequeath some compensation for its scourge, but when Hitler has destroyed the German soul of selected Germans, the only Germans with souls will be souls full of Hitlerism. Even if surprising events lie ahead and all that has transpired is but the prelude of revolution, the task on which Hitler is engaged is none the less the sinister one of de-creating mankind whereby, possessing a mind to reason and a spirit to withstand, man is first crushed and then re-assembled without them.

Thus in the idol worship of war that it is inculcating in the hearts of German children marching past in step, bearing red flags, their minds already bent towards the ordeal ahead, the chanting baby corpses of future battles, the method of Hitlerism is seen to be only method without end. Here, a point of distinction between control and creation, it is to be observed that totalitarianism, whether viewed as mis-conceived re-creation or as malevolent de-creation, can effect a distortion which, if world-wide, might take a cycle of years for the process of biology to reverse—a period possibly exceeding the span of human life on earth.

The totalitarian course forced on humanity by the totalitarian dictator—a male Joan of Arc who hears voices and who may turn out to be only a well-meaning figurehead unconsciously exploited—is chiefly a deflection away from the Cross of redemption towards that selected emblem of Hitlerian power—"the golden hyenas" as he nicknames the live, descending bombs.

At this moment the threat of Leviathan is less to civilization than to the ardent, the emotional, the deeply sincere and all-sacrificing German people. No magnifying-glass is

necessary to reveal that the national socialism offered them is not national, is not social and, most of all, is not German. It is racial and anything that is war-purposeful, whereas, apart from his government, the average German is broad-minded and spiritual. The unspiritual wilderness for which, in his emotional exuberance at finding himself actually escaping from his wartime inferiority complex, Hitler is heading, is most un-German of all. Hitler, the illiterate idealist, prepared to gamble away the accumulated legacy of human struggle and achievement, would clamp the minds of millions into his own mental mould, de-shaped and deformed in its ruts and indentations left by the War. Where he is going he does not know nor do they enquire. That his appeal, never to the intellect or to reason, is always to the emotions, proceeds from the appeal his own emotions have for him. He is the successful Werther, contentedly sorrowing.

In so far, then, as her dictatorship is pathological, the politics of Germany are pathological too, their objective being the product of a mentality incalculable like the movements of a straw to be blown by to-morrow's wind, and, until to-morrow arrives, quite unpredictable.

To this is a people degraded when it surrenders body and soul to Leviathan. It is possible that some dream voice, speaking to this Schlafwandler and so remembered by him in waking moments, may cause him to seize and reconstruct a fancied City of God as the capital of the greater Reich but that, on discovering in a revelatory nightmare that the vision, after all, was only a highly-coloured picture of the scene where Dolfuss fell, he will demolish it in a madman's war.

At any rate the strangest of all machines on earth is man himself, yet it is on the vagaries of one of these that 80 millions of people now depend. In a life where action never has conformed and never can conform completely to preplanned and reasoned resolution, the secret influence of the subconscious world alone would be enough to warrant some reservation about any single individual however cocksure. Here even the decision, what are the things of God, to be awarded, as such, second place in the Nazi faith, is to be

left to this startling Austrian apparition thrown up by the Great War for the outbreak of which he boasts having knelt and thanked God, but who, oddly enough, wishes for the things of Caesar in order to prove that Deutschland is not merely *über* Alles but *über* God.

But while the latest bid of Leviathan is thus for Messianic power, there is happening a more secret manœuvre of Leviathan which is hardly less ominous. Here, instead of representing the supreme power in the state and spurning the state that reared him, Leviathan sets about state-making with a vengeance. Proceeding to amass enormous armed power he then declares the Reich expanded and the frontiers flung back to the furthest reach of the radius of that power which, if necessary, he is ready to prove in war. But even while, as he imagines, he is extending sovereignty on one plane he is losing it on other planes—the economic and the spiritual.

The climax is reached only when totalitarianism, the last degeneration of Caesarism, demands the space left by the appropriated things that are God's. Now this super-Leviathanism, however spiritually retrogressive, is dynamic in its political programme and hurries on its followers so that they have no time to think or to realize what they have had to leave behind. But the habit of man's memory is long formed and, in moments of misgiving, between the rushed stages of his onward journey, he cannot help assessing the value of his compensations and striking a balance of profit and loss. So it comes about that lest, in such moments, he should venture back into the forbidden land which once was spirit, he is put into blinkers and his mind demobilized for a period of years. Such is the Four Years' Plan, and only after it is over will he be permitted to see the view "from the top of the hill"—that is, if another Four Years' Plan is not superimposed on it first.

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Although a spiritual advance against totalitarianism is urgent, unaided and unorganized it can hardly soon succeed. It is conceivable that it may even fail, for Mammon is on

Caesar's side, also the fact that the duality in man's life—the conflict between the spiritual and the temporal—is almost wholly unresolved. Finally, the machine itself seems to be preventing man from exercising what choice he has, even if he could see that choice.

Fortunately, however, these aspects are not all. There is the favourable factor of economics which, less illuminative than that other helpful factor aircraft, yet promises to influence the outcome even more inexorably by giving man a time-limit in which to make his choice of alternative. Just as Christianity can reveal, as nothing else can, that totalitarianism after all is a poor, drab idea, superficial and untrue, so economic law can reveal that the dictator's faith is as full of faked dogma as its fury is full of fear, and that his self-sufficient totalitarianism can no more over-ride or avoid economic law than Canute could dictate to the waves. When it comes to be generally appreciated, this economic weakness of the totalitarian will be man's consolation and strength.

The offensive therefore, in its first stage, should be against Mammon rather than against Caesar, Mammonism being understood as the worship of materialism and its acknowledged precedence over spirituality. Mammon here is neither capital nor ownership, wealth nor property, but only these related to a purpose directly in opposition to the purpose of Christ which strikes at the root of rivalry, competition, hate and war in the words, "Thy neighbour as thyself." The first spiritual task, then, is the dislodging of Mammonism which upholds the reign of economic war.

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Now in a sense it is inaccurate to talk of the widening of the sphere of economic law. Waiting ready for the purpose of God the realm of economic law already spreads frontierless across the world notwithstanding that the smooth working of that law is obstructed by the human nature of anarchic man. Nevertheless, despite the wordy arguments of constitutionalists or the sound and fury of the Nazi Blood and Soil orators, economic law exists to-day. That, as yet, we

imperfectly understand its vast complexity need not deter us, for already sufficient is known for all men to see that the supreme command of Christ is almost identical with the cardinal law of economics. It is not want of knowledge that is holding up the progress of man, but faith.

“Die Botshaft wohl ich hore,
Allein mir fehlt die Glaube.”

The message well I hear, it is only my faith that fails.

It is human nature that stands in the way of faith by encouraging its opposing heresy. To this end Leviathan in league with Mammon summons up the spectres Hunger and Fear, Cruelty and Avarice of economic war whose opportunities freely favour the dictator's hand. From birth-control instituted in order to eliminate unprofitable and unmalleable humanity, the dictator in ideological warfare passes in one quick step to the sterilization of all who question, let alone reject, his political programme. Scorning the suggestion that there may be two sides to a question, Goering vociferates that all he needs to know is how to deal with those that question Nazidom. How irreconcilable is totalitarian Hitlerism with democratic Christianity is revealed in the difference between the two methods of effecting conversion.

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Practical compliance with the spiritual law as operating through the law of economics is nowadays sometimes supposed to require no more than an engineered revival of the good pre-war times of prosperity. That however is a wholly erroneous view for what is involved is the dislodgment not only of Caesar but of Mammon as the godhead of a structure of a society which Karl Marx started out to overthrow. Supplying a strong stimulus for Caesar worship, Mammon is usually to be found by Caesar's side. It is a significant fact that so soon as revolution consolidates into dictatorship, socialism degenerates back into Mammonism. Mammonism is not only prostration before the idol of material well-being at the expense of devotion to the God of

the spirit, it is the prostration of man's spirit itself. And this is true of materialism whatever its form—whether collected, self-sufficient or socially totalitarianized by Leviathan for sinister ends.

Sir George Paish has recently constructed a causal chain connecting the present economic troubles of the world with the departure from those rules of liberal economics followed so long successfully in England. It is implicit in his remarks, however, that successive mistakes in the long run reflect a violation of Christian principles; and so, finally, he suggests a programme for Christian relief to the "have-nots" at the expense of the "haves." By looking forward, not back, he tries out what on the face of it appears a most reasonable programme—"to each according to his wants." Thus the United States of America should restore and stabilize the currencies and make available immense sums of gold for banking purposes throughout the world. The contribution of Italy would include handing back Abyssinia to the Abyssinians, that of Japan would include giving back China to the Chinese. France would join with Great Britain in giving colonies to Italy, while the contribution to Germany would be to give proof "of peaceful intentions likely to be carried out."

But here already we are back to the original need of the reign of law with its adjudicator empowered to enforce its decisions. It would be almost miraculous if all those Powers were satisfied with any compromise, for compromise there would have to be, seeing that each would have its own idea. Nor could the totalitarians furnish any guarantee acceptable all round that they would remain satisfied, for this would involve an undertaking never to have a totalitarian form of government which not only specializes in power-politics but brings that power up to a new degree of efficiency through the new totalitarian technique of nuisance value. Now the nuisance value of the dictator's agitation or threat of war is effective generally in proportion to the extent that the minds of the people it is agitating against have been left unmobilized for contest and the individual spirits unmarshalled—that is to say it succeeds best against the

democracy. So far from bringing about a change of heart, any success of Hitlerism, therefore, could rather be expected to cause it to unmask and openly proclaim a change in its slogan from Blood and Soil to Blood and Spoil, the only geese to be spared being those that looked like laying yet further golden eggs. In short, a return to the good, pre-war Golden Age is not the way out, but only the way back—a road that is forever closed.

But if the way out is not the way back then it may be the way forward. One of the largest political factors is the growing discontent at the precarious nature of the material fruits of continuous hard work and devotion to duty. As men grow older and less serviceable the perishability of their savings increases their risk of sudden poverty, an aspect inevitable in the existing world-order of feverish competition to accumulate large gains during the upswing of the trade cycle, but letting all things slide down the descending curve. The anarchic war of powered capital no less than that of capitalized power has often been thought to have entered on its last lap, yet it has continued on and on. Economic revolution has so far failed as, in this aspect, the new clean sweep of totalitarianism likewise fails. The reason most obvious from the standpoint of law is because attempts have been made on the narrow front to do something which could be accomplished only in a movement over a wider sector of human affairs than the national. Beginning with the dislodgment of Mammon, the advance towards economic law can be made only by a group of nations representing sufficient economic unity to possess effective international striking power and maintaining power.

We reach the conclusion that the reign of law will be approached only as Leviathanic Caesarism and Mammonism are destroyed. Their overthrow therefore represents the immediate objective of the offensive of that advance. What forces should be comprised in that offensive we shall consider a little later. Here, where the light falls on Caesarism and Mammonism from a new angle, it is imperative to recognize once more that unalterable and recurring truth that the advance, unless spiritual, will be powerless, but,

however spiritual, it must be further empowered by all-round armament. It is true enough that he is armed thrice who hath his quarrel just, but what is just will be something quite different if the power of the spiritual forces for law win in a contest with violence that stands for war.

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The desired result, be it observed, is reached only by applying the Hobbesian axiom of jurisprudence to the spiritual and economic fields. A study of the spiritual as of the economic approach confirms that power is necessary. The arguments of those who readily assert that force, though necessary within the reign of law, is wholly unnecessary to maintain the reign of law itself and, moreover, that Christianity must set its face against force in war, will be found to collapse when, instead of force, there is substituted power. Now that war is a Volkskrieg, every member of the nation willy-nilly finds himself in the combat, his function possibly a simple alternative choice of being a live target that stands to be shot at or a live target that is not above taking cover and, therefore, rationally should submit to organization to make adequate that cover which, if alone, he could not have made at all.

As it is man's spirit that both Caesar and Mammon alike fear and imperil, it is clear that the advance must be spiritual; and, moreover, it is its spiritual justification that will make the sacrifice possible at all. The United States of America is exceptionally qualified for the sacrifice by the greatness of her possessions as by the strength of her position, and yet it may be doubted if anywhere in the world Mammon is so richly or so securely lodged. Notwithstanding the efforts of President Roosevelt to dislodge that Mammonism even at the price of installing some Caesarism, the fact remains that the vast majority of the American people are still a long way off seeing the alternative, let alone facing it. It may be that those who still think of war merely as the exchange of high explosives and tottering buildings will not recognize that the sharp alternative, God or Mammon, is none other than the choice of law or of war, until the truth

is revealed in a final "close-up" of plain facts effected by that long-range European projectile, the aeroplane, which may well extend its radius to America within a very few years.

In many ways the fine intellectuality which so long distinguished the German people, their industry, their vitality, their dormant but easily awakened spirituality, and, not least, their cordial fellowship with the British people, would, in certain events, cause an Anglo-German combination to hold out the brightest promise for the advance. In some things they are more richly endowed, in others we are, and we possess much that they need. They can contribute tremendous organizing power, we the power to organize, they the ardent spirit to reform, we the experience indispensable to tell what reforms can achieve.

While, racially they are so close to us that the partnership would appear to be indicated by a natural course, temperamentally they are so different from us that a richer harmony might result. Economically, as also geographically, the combination would offer a prospect of results which appears the more splendid the more it is considered. Socially their centre of growth is not far from ours as this is determined by a common love of home and family amounting, frequently, to a commendable lack of inordinate ambition. In art spiritually ahead of us, nevertheless in spirituality, on the whole, they are behind us. In materialistic capacity far excelling us, it is in their character that they, of all foreigners, most nearly approach us. Naturally kindly although impulsive, loyal almost to the point of servility, temperamental yet incredibly weak in self-criticism and self-control, as they are, it becomes more and more clear that it is only Leviathan that divides us. At this moment their very virtues take them farther and farther away and, all unknowingly, cause them to surrender more and more. Their vitality, their deep emotionalism, their readiness for self-sacrifice and their strong sense of life's demands that finds an opening for that sacrifice, all point to Germany providing the stage whereon the drama of man in his struggle with Leviathan will reach tragedy at its intensest.

No less efficient as colonists—so far as their limited essay went—than they were responsible for the Great War by reason of their “war-cult,” the Nazi German government’s ridiculous assertion of a claim of right according to international law not to be deprived of those colonies because their great armed bid for power failed, can be dismissed as part of the strategy of Leviathan sustained after defeat. Similarly their “legal” claim to occupy the Rhine must be rejected as supported only by that most clearly exhibited political power—gun-power—and the threat of that most clearly-expressed political argument—Blood and Spoil.

Nor, on economic grounds, can the return of their colonies be justified despite the truth that, with raw materials once within their own closed circle, they would find payment easier in their own currency for some raw materials than it is at present. The true case, not only for the return of “certain colonial interests” to Germany but for the gift of others far wider, can be put—much higher—on that ground which is highest of all and on which it would stand best hope of being considered and to a degree accepted at all events by the British Commonwealth. On the spiritual ground Christians might well face the risk—in handing over some colonial interests to Germany—of an eventual recrudescence of German Mammonism and Caesarism in the knowledge that the British people would be furnishing the German people with that opportunity of gathering experience and of proving—perhaps the only way of proving—that, considering all things, Britain’s trusteeship has been a good thing for the world; but, above all, that that trust has not yet nearly been discharged, for the testing-time, as the time of fruition, has not yet come. In any event the key positions, therefore, England must still retain.

But, if the advance is to be spiritual, there is the more need of spiritual awakening. At the present moment the greatest danger threatening the cause of spirituality itself comes from Leviathan at this moment encoiling the German people. Now Leviathan is most vulnerable on the economic flank where already the combat is joined. It is certain that while there is war in peace the economic victory

will prove the easiest and the most effective because in the end decisive. In short, while economics are affected by war, armament is wholly dependent on economics. Already the totalitarians are beginning to find out that they cannot set the clock back or on in order to time a snatched victory taking place between one economic convulsion and another.

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That, despite all appearances to the contrary, only Leviathan divides us from the German people, appears when one contemplates how they would fare under British rule where they could share, if they would co-operate to that end, such peace, plenty and service as Britons enjoy, and have liberty thrown in as well. Already, in fact, German immigrants in the British Commonwealth overseas are almost its most loyal and devoted settlers. So, too, at this moment, it is obvious that most Germans, instead of being inflamed, consolidated and led in a tragi-comic processional of pagan worship, would not object to a similar destiny and would prefer to remain spiritually free. Now it is only to those spiritually free that the reform, the transformation, of the economic world-order and which sooner or later is inevitable, can safely be entrusted.

But already great tidal forces in Germany's spiritual life are augmenting and, on the re-surge, will merge with others in ours. Nothing is more certain than that the violent swing of the totalitarian pendulum will result in as long and as sharp a backward swing; or more certain that, when these violent years have passed, a period of comparative calm will follow. It is in that period of calm that we may look for a spiritual flood-tide perhaps reaching a height never before attained.

To breast that flow we must wait for the turn of the tide.

The large and generous gesture of faith and good-will forthcoming from the free English people to the German people when freed must be withheld yet longer until, with her, the advance toward law begun across Europe can continue across the world. To pay tribute alone to the Leviathanic Caesar now overshadowing Central Europe

and, overtopping Mammon, aspiring to the Kingdom of God itself, would be to ignore the command of Christ. Submerged only to reappear, the choice apparent here is that of the Cross of Christ or the ironmongery of the swastika.

Stifled by totalitarian Caesar from speaking in the ballot-box, the voice of man's spirit will perforce reply in the silent tableaux of the battlefield.

"The proletariat," exclaimed Marx in whom, as it happened, both Caesar and Mammon met, "has nothing to lose but its chains." To Marx, the anti-Christ, expecting to succeed in his Method, that might have appeared true. But Marx failed, and the spirit of man—if nowhere else, then in the British democracy—survives and must survive to continue the contest with Leviathan.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

IT is only when we pass from the national to the international scene that the traditional opposition of church and state ceases to be controversial and becomes revelatory and invested with a new significance altogether. Then a good deal of the old discordant rivalry is found by large-hearted thinkers to have become harmoniously resolved in the discovery that Christianity among men implies democracy among states. Conversely, if, as we have found, the advance to the reign of law is a spiritual advance, then, for this objective, true democracy implies Christianity. On investigation the common chord is found to reach from self-responsibility to self-liberation. Here Christianity is to be understood as a way of life the supreme objective of which is the growth, consciously directed, of the human spirit, the Pole-star of that direction being the principle "Thy neighbour as Thyself."

Those who feel embarrassment in accepting this simplifying view of Christianity may substitute any other name they please for a spiritual theory carried out into spiritual practice in accordance with that principle which, it will be observed, plainly requires man to leave his fellow-men as much liberty as possible in order that they likewise may exercise self-direction in spiritual growth. Democracy implies not only rights but some degree of permissible freedom to achieve self-direction by the exercise of those rights. Democracy is not merely a theory and, unless its rights are actually exercised, there is no democracy.

The responsibility for directing this growth lies and must lie with the individual, for such growth is not the end but only purposeful to self-liberating and, therefore, to self-

creative man. The exercise of such widening responsibility, inescapably more and more by the conscious effort of each human being, alone promises to man a life fuller and richer. In short, human progress is conditioned by democracy and Christianity alike. Now in the undemocratic state these conditions are wholly absent. Progress in the totalitarian state, instead of reflecting increased self-responsibility and self-control, is conditioned solely by the increased efficiency of state-control which first overshadows then finally engulfs the individuality of the human spirit because the whole field of the state is regarded as the testing-ground, first and last, for massed endeavour in war.

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Thus, to the latest and most audacious claim of anarchic sovereignty advanced by Hitlerism with its consequent distortion of orthodox notions of statehood, it appears that democratic Christianity or Christian democracy provides not merely a formidable counter-claim but an answer complete and final. In this claim the totalitarian dictator launches again the old international offensive claiming all things for Caesar by usurping the last right of man, the spirit, to stipulate that at least some things are God's. More effectively than in earlier times this recurring claim of arrogant, totalitarian nationalism must now be countered by Christian, democratic internationalism. Confronted with a direct challenge, Christianity, as distinct from Christendom, is upon its trial as never before since its foundation, for now the dictator's demand is fundamentally not one for reformation or even for abolition, but for slavish idolatry of false gods that are as expressly condemned by the authority of Christ as by the experience of man.

A consideration of the position reveals that, instead of Christian democracy suffering in any comparison of its weapons with those of its chief adversary, on the contrary there is every indication that, if well marshalled and directed, its spiritual forces are quite able to undermine the power of Leviathan and, it may well be, ultimately subdue Leviathan himself and so end the reign of war. Let us consider this.

The new Nazi claim approximates to the assertion of sovereignty over those sectors of foreign states where Germans or German interests happen to preponderate, congregate, or designedly infiltrate. It asserts that such sectors, however small or great and even should such a region amount to the whole of an independent state itself as in the case of Austria, must be considered *ipso facto* part of Germany. This, for instance, at the present moment (summer 1938), would involve substantial parts of Belgium, the northern sector of Italy. The economic and strategic heart of Czechoslovakia and, following the precedent of Germany's seizure of Austria, the whole of Switzerland three-quarters of the population of which might, by a Nazi, be regarded as Nazi German.

Something might be expected to depend on the question—what is a German? One answer might be that, according to some experts, the modern German represents a composite race comprising a mixture of contributing races ranging from Magyars to Jews and numbering at least a dozen, but that, as Germany has been overrun by invading hordes regularly for centuries, this is clearly an under-estimate unless the period under consideration is an extremely short one. It is at least incontestable that, as demonstrated by Hitlerism, uniformity of race does not imply any uniformity of racial ideology, seeing that those first chosen as the leading exponents of that ideology have been the first to succumb to its inexorable purge. Indeed, according to his own interpretation of it, even Hitler's own political faith already has undergone several changes. Nor could language be a satisfactory test, for Hitler's German is said to be definitely inferior to Goebbels' whose thin, clear accents of calculated offence most resemble those employed on occasion in the Germany of former days by certain rich, refined and condescending Jews. Many of the truly bi-lingual Swiss could easily evade any such Nazi test, but, on the other hand, on the Italian side of the Brenner, the south Tyrolese who do not appreciate their new hosts and have long wished to assert their German origin as being the lesser of two evils, would easily qualify.

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Other features reveal that this new claim of sovereignty is immeasurable as it is incalculable. If pressed far enough it might, for instance, in certain states, result in adding to the race in armament a birth-rate competition between Nazis on the one hand and their non-Nazi German fellow-nationals on the other. The doctrine also might lead to a state ejecting across its frontiers as a prospective nuisance any of its nationals who looked like answering the Nazi nationality questionnaire which, at the moment, comprises six questions for single persons and ten for those married.

It would be wholly erroneous to suppose that the new and pretentious sovereignty claim does no more than set beside the conventional picture of the sovereign, as the supreme power in the state, the complementary picture of the state as the sphere of racial influence. In effect Hitlerism declares that the supreme (sovereign) power of the German Reich overrides any conflicting claims of competitive nationality howsoever or wheresoever arisen. For instance, an individual is claimed by the Nazis as the subject of Nazi Germany exclusively notwithstanding that he may have been born on the territory of another state and accordingly acquired subjection thereto.

In its full extension this doctrine is politically and militarily strategic in that it enjoins pressure, for instance, on the Nazis to infiltrate wherever the Nazi dictatorship thinks it most expedient to disturb the equilibrium of power. A more dangerous, inflammatory and dissension-sowing doctrine, therefore, it would be hard to find for, if it were tolerated, any country extending a too hospitable welcome to foreign nationals might pay for its kindness with its life.

But this ingenious and underground Nazi method of acquiring power can fortunately be applied so as to cut both ways, against them as well as for them. Thus, while the Nazis claim that the National-Social Reich extends beyond its frontiers wherever Germans exist—Germans for this purpose apparently being scheduled somewhat as cattle at an agricultural show in accordance with racial tests of measurement and yield—other Germans belonging to the real Germany of the spirit, and preferring to claim national

kinship with Goethe and Beethoven, can unite both outside and within Germany to form a veritable "*Gross-Deutschland unter Hitler's*"—undermining the Nazi Reich and forming a foundation for a better.

Spiritual movements of this nature, if co-ordinated with kindred movements such as the *sortée* of the Church of Rome into the heart of the Nazi stronghold, might form a union of spiritual forces which, rallying to the spiritual front in Germany, might quite well undercut the Nazi sovereign power and reduce it perpendicularly faster than Hitler can extend it horizontally. But here again united effort is all, and the more so, because, in Christian democracy, individuals are concerned and not merely people in the mass.

It is obvious that, recognizing the danger of this power, Hitlerism has tried to forestall it by intimidation of the individual who, for protection, then seeks refuge in the mass. Most observant people would have thought that the German capacity for herd movement has already been enormously developed, yet, looking ahead, Hitler is not satisfied. He asserts that—

"Germans are without the herd-instinct which appears when all are of one blood and protects nations against ruin especially at moments when danger threatens. The fact of this want has done us untold harm. It provided a number of small German potentates with capital, but it robbed the German nation of its rights of mastery."¹

It is obvious that the German Leviathan—of which Hitler is the mouthpiece—in wanting one hundred per cent purity of blood, wants one hundred per cent of obedience in order that Germans shall prove themselves to be efficient Leviathanic instruments worthy of Leviathan by being capable of one hundred per cent of suffering. Having regard to the Nazi grievance that foreigners persist in abutting on the frontiers of the Fatherland, it is to be assumed that, now those frontiers are expanded, the German Leviathan's most immediate "rights of mastery" already extending over the

¹ *Mein Kampf*.

Italians at the Brenner, and over the Swiss, the Czechs, and Hungarians elsewhere, are only the beginning. As the variation of the marching song went, "To-day all Austria obeys us, to-morrow the world entire."

Now, as has already been made clear, the absorption of a number of political societies into one, resulting, as it does, in the widening of the reign of law, is in itself all to the good as representing some advance towards that single reign of law eventually to embrace all nations. It would therefore seem to matter little who had the "world entire" if his method of obtaining it was right, and if what he did with it after he got it was equally right. The first is no less important than the second, for, if the world is sufficiently damaged by the method, it may be very difficult and even impossible to restore it, at least in this cycle of civilization. If the purpose of human life is the self-directed growth of man's spirit, then, however desirable is the reign of law, any method which, while attaining to that reign of law, promises to destroy man's spirit in the process, must obviously be rejected. Method, therefore, in the beginning adopted as a method, must be retained as a method and watched lest it destroy the end—as happened in the case of Marxism—and becomes itself the end.

It is here we come to the parting of the ways and where the question concerning the best way to peace—whether for the individual or for the statesman—is simplified. It is a parting not between dictatorship and democracy but between Hitlerism—that modern degeneration of Caesarism—on the one hand and Christianity on the other, both mutually exclusive, each incompatible with the other. From the standpoint of our enquiry we have found that Christianity involves democracy. It remains to add that, reserving and conserving, as it does, freedom for the growth of man's spirit, democracy lends itself well to Christianity. The choice of road to peace, and of the method to be followed on that road, must therefore have regard to the preservation of that freedom. For instance, the fact that, as a method, conscription for combatant service is less imperative than formerly, points no less to democracy than it does to increased

self-responsibility as only real if realized by being expressed in service elsehow.

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What now of Hitlerism? The more National Social totalitarianism is examined the more it will be found, like Marxism, to be only Method, the same old Method—War. The socialism held out by its Nazi promoters as an End has already become a mere myth, having been struck dead at the outset by the Method—War. Being thus really anti-social, such National Socialism is un-Christian, a fact recognized when, the end and objective having disappeared, the War-Method itself becomes enthroned as the War-END.

From the standpoint of humanity, the end, which is directly opposite to that sought by Christian democracy, is the man-machine in which the human spirit has been killed. As for the Hitler means of facilitating the method—the means of establishing “one blood”—here method is seen at its worst, for it is not only un-Christian and inhuman but it is bound to fail—and alas! fail not immediately but only after the infliction of terrible sacrifices. Impossible in its assertions, farcical in its demands, Hitlerism, at its worst, could not permit of contemplation for a moment by any intelligent being unless for diabolical ends.

What Hitler is actually attempting is not merely to get the eggs back out of the omelette into their egg-shells or, afterwards, even back into the original birds, but to re-assemble them into a new Hitler strain of poultry. Nor is this all, for, in the operation, he appears, with amazing ignorance, to be relying chiefly on *acquired characteristics* to illustrate, while reversing the Mendelian law, how the chief law of heredity itself works! It is pretty obvious that the outstanding “rights of mastery” of which the German people have been robbed, are their individual rights of re-mastering their own Leviathanic monster—which rights they should assert.

Truly the mental degeneration of these “little corporal” dictators has reached new depths. Napoleon at least enquired who made the stars, whereas Hitler, excusing the wholesale

slaughter of Jews, proclaims that the institute of marriage was intended to "reproduce the Lord's image, and not monstrous beings half man and half monkey"—thereby overlooking that our Lord himself was a Jew. It is possible that, when a still higher water-mark of mania is reached, Hitler's new obsession may be that of imagining himself to be Jesus Christ in which case he will, accordingly, search into his ancestry's vast obscurity—which continues right down to a generation ago—for evidence that his own racial mixture, as that of many Germans, includes at least a redeeming touch of the Jew. And considering how, in the bulk of German scientific opinion, the range of contributing race in the make-up of any German is infinite, it is not impossible that he would succeed.

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Not content with the racial method as a means to the war method, Hitler then declares "the conservation of the ancient racial elements which, by disseminated culture, create the beauty and dignity of a higher humanity," is the chief aim to be pursued by the National State.¹

Let there be no mistake about what this involves. The danger arises from the fact that what is being created is not merely a man-machine but a machine-man—and, moreover, that it will be a machine the chief self-function of which will be the perpetuation of that machine. It is no doubt true that, if this comes about, the machine will take a lot of stopping and the standing problem of control will be magnified. Thus, having introduced a standardized, mechanical water-closet civilization into a Germany of uniform Germans, the problem of Hitlerism will be to contrive that 80 million totalitaria do not attempt to visit the apartment at the same moment.

But, be it observed, the Hitlerian end—the conservation of the racial element alleged to be an end in itself—is apparently to lead to the "beauty and dignity of a higher humanity." Whatever that means it is at least clear that what is implied is a standardization of beauty and humanity

¹ *Mein Kampf*.

also according to Hitler's particular idea of it, and that this is to be imposed on mankind whether they like it or not. What Hitler means by beauty and dignity, or how far he knows what he means, there is no telling, but the following extract from *Mein Kampf* at any rate throws a little light on his idea of the good and the true.

"... it was fundamentally wrong when discussing the subject of war guilt to suggest that Germany could not be accounted as alone responsible for the outbreak of that catastrophe, the Great War. The proper thing would have been to lay the burden of it without cease upon the enemy even if this did not correspond with the course of events."

In that regard Hitler certainly seems to have done the proper thing, a few British politicians, on occasion, at least half the "proper thing," and Von Ribbentrop the "proper thing" several times over. It is true that at the end of the paragraph Hitler adds the words "as was nevertheless the actual fact," thereby implying that in this particular instance Germany was not to blame, but then, of course, his added words only illustrate the propaganda method Hitler advises.

"An immense majority of the people," he proceeds, "are so feminine in nature and point of view that their thoughts and actions are governed more by feeling and sentiment than by reasoned consideration"—

the explanation apparently why Hitler fears the leisurely examination by the people of his written word and prefers the hurrying impetus of the shouted word.

In *Mein Kampf* while the struggle, true enough, is Hitler's, it is a struggle not for mankind but only against humanity. It is not a struggle along with mankind—the shared struggle of true leadership—but only the dictated struggle of the successful political agitator. There is little sign anywhere of caution, doubt, or self-examination, and certainly none of struggle with the self. His particular brand of national socialism is, for the whole German people (and by their "rights of mastery," accordingly for the whole world) merely a magnified projection of his personal political ego which is the very antithesis of international-socialism—that broad fellowship of all men engaged each in his own

struggle. Based on the Grand Opera myth of German race purity, how could Nazidom, which, on account of its rigidity alone, is unadaptable to wide empire, possibly qualify for the trusteeship of diverse colonial peoples? Is there any reason to suppose that a Power bent on enforcing its "right of mastery" on all peoples by totalitarianism is other than a destructor, and, therefore, the implacable enemy of the constructive state already endeavouring to exercise its colonial trust rightfully and for the most part succeeding?

Although naturally not openly expressed, the plea is sometimes advanced in the Reich, that, in passing judgment on present happenings there, it should not be overlooked by a foreigner that a revolution is proceeding in Germany. This being so and as the revolution may continue indefinitely, a great Power in the throes of upheaval must obviously put its own house in order before it is in a position to mind the houses of others. The prospect of the African negro, the South Sea Islander, of Buddhist and Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius or of Bushidoism, of the Latin Italian, the Turk, the Russian, all being cramped into one standard mould of Hitler's personal political religion, must cause even the most superficially-minded politician to think. Nazidom's plainest right of mastery is its duty to master something of its own stupendous ignorance.

Now these contentions do not in the least deprive the great German people of their hope of empire, but rather condition their eventually sharing the British trust which undeniably concedes freedom to the human spirit for all men of all nations under British protection within the generous limits required by democracy. It may well be that, for nations like Germany, Christian democracy can arrive only after the phase of violent dictatorship has been passed through. How far desire for colonies is merely a design, at the expense of the natives, for Mammonistic enrichment can be fully proved or disproved only in the discharge of that trust, and, therefore, some eligibility to make the experiment is obviously called for. So long, however, as the German Leviathan, raging in fear against the forces gathering

throughout the world in defence of human liberty, continues to assail the very spirit of man, it is clear that, by making colonial concessions, England might be throwing those under her care and protection right into the maw of man's arch enemy.

The situation of to-day will not last for ever. In the meantime the impossibility of coming to any satisfactory colonial arrangement of an enduring kind with Germany while Hitlerism remains unmodified is illustrated in the sinister menace that Nazi views of law portend. Not the least British contribution to civilization is the liberty of the subject within the rule of law. Indeed this, hardly less than our parliamentary system, forms the most important part of the British heritage. Such liberty, as Englishmen know it, has disappeared from Germany. Freedom is usually best demonstrated in the law, the safeguard being the impartial application of the law to all men alike—a view held by all civilized nations and, until Leviathan interfered, not least in Germany. The new Nazi theory of law, however, is as violently revolutionary and dangerous as that of their theory of sovereignty we have just examined or of the state itself subjugated to the Leviathanic Nazi Party, for they regard law chiefly as a weapon in the political struggle. In 1933 Hitler stated that "the motives and aims of offenders are to be taken into account as much as possible." In other words, and as Mr. Roberts¹ points out, the same crime would be considered by the Nazi authorities a different offence according as it was committed by an ardent Nazi or by a Jew.

It may be observed here how closely the German political religion corresponds to that of Russia where theories formerly held only in academic circles—such as that of the Russian Korkonov that law needs no power because it reflects norms of conduct of which all men are presumed to be aware—are now actually being interpreted and the widest and vaguest abstractions being applied to concrete cases in the Russian Courts. Thus in Soviet Russia thought has become a crime if it is about any matter that does not meet

¹ Stephen Roberts: *The House that Hitler Built.*

with the approval of totalitarian Stalinism which here is identical with totalitarian Hitlerism according to which guilt depends on the ideology of the individual, it being a crime not to think as the German Leviathan does—that is to say it is a crime to think at all. It is to be observed that totalitarian Stalinism and totalitarian Hitlerism are both anti-Christ, both anti-law, and both anti-democracy. Both strive to stifle the human spirit by denying it room for growth. Both violate and exist only by the violation of the supreme command of Christ that we should treat others as we would wish to be treated.

It is well that the full meaning of these two forms of identical totalitarian ideology should be made clear, and that it should be understood that the excesses from time to time sought to be explained away by the dictators, are only its natural and logical outcome; also that the full application of this twin ideology has by no means yet reached the last extremity. Until recently even Christendom itself remained unaware of this. When Pastor Niemöller, the dauntless U-boat commander and one of the first enthusiasts to salute the swastika, began to follow Hitler, he was in fact, however unconsciously, forsaking the way of the Cross and of Christ and taking the same road as were forces directly opposing Christ. But the gay banner "Blood and Soil" proved to be after all only the sombre, piratical flag "Blood and Spoil." Having unthinkingly chosen unknown Caesar, later on the valiant pastor is grieved to find himself enrolled as a sheepish worshipper of totalitarian Mammon as well. It is true that the Nazis assert, by no means illogically as Herr Niemöller by now will have found out for himself, that while they are in power it is their prerogative to interpret Nazi-ism from day to day, seeing that their politics supply their only spiritual criteria which, they explain, is only, after all, having the City of God in their midst. Only a political régime based on the broadest individual liberty can tolerate the hot-gospellers who preach direct opposition and rebellion. And if the hot-gospel happened to be morally justified as disclosing that some supreme end of life was in jeopardy, then this fact would merely prove that fundamentally the

political régime was morally wrong. This is but to affirm that even before the reign of law makes their administration possible, rules of morality can exist for each individual.

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Judged by the key-principle crystallized in what I have called Christian democracy, the only conclusion to be reached about Stalinism and Hitlerism—the two most menacing forms of absolute totalitarianism existing—is that both are immoral and for the same reason. Both are the offspring of German thought, both are equally anti-Christ notwithstanding the lip-service of Nazidom, both confidently rely on drowning the Christian appeal for sacrifice and submission by the call to violence selected as method; and both set up efficiency as the single criterion of what is beautiful and good and true.

The friction between Nazidom and Sovietdom is only one of particularity and policy at this moment and which, so far from being permanent and fundamental, would vanish on any union or fusion of these two political societies—an event that can confidently be expected at no very distant date in history. The chief difference in method—that the Soviets proceed by ultra-national conversion instead of by embarking on open wars of conquest—is in their favour. But this is, no doubt, only because the Soviets already possess a larger part of the world than they can manage and see no point in fighting for further extension of their domains. The Nazis, on the other hand, possess no outlying empire, having lost what they had through failing in their attempt in 1914 after a long preparation to do what, with similar guilt, they were in 1938 preparing to attempt again. But the inferiority of Nazi ideology to that of the Soviets appears in that the former desires increased dominion and power for the German people at the expense of others, whereas the latter merely desire all mankind to embrace their ideology.

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Furnishing, as they do, a propaganda smoke-screen

covering the main enveloping movements of Nazidom, the "lost" German colonies thus prove more valuable "lost" than if regained. Squarely based on the Vaterland movement which already places its dispositions as shaped in the dreams of their most influential if least advertised minds, this movement is only now gathering momentum. The plan is to capture paramount world-influence amounting to world-control by a more scientifically amassed and disposed power than has hitherto ever been dreamed of. It promises to proceed by twofold plan designed to effect diversion and to secure concealment. The lesser plan, to be used if and when necessary, is by a life-line flung across the Mediterranean to stifle the breathing of Great Britain and, if the chances of its success should warrant it, to suffocate her outright. The main plan is to move East and throw the German frontier at first deep into Russia and then beyond the Urals across Asia.

Thus the German Leviathan proposes to offset the decline of the West by a new sunrise in the East. Morgenröte is to succeed Abendröte. While the possibility of the voluntary fusion of the two totalitarian systems eventually is by no means to be ruled out, the Nazi policy of welding the German people into a dictatorship ever more and more closely knit under the pretext of forming and forging the nation into a spear-head for war, would seem to point to the Nazis preferring the method, however tempered, of securing Russia, as they secured Austria, by *Anschlag* rather than by *Anschluss*—by overpowering conquest rather than by democratic alignment of two peoples.

It is, of course, quite possible that Nazidom will be overturned but far more probable that it will be modified under the pressure of the counter-offensive now in preparation and the success of which it is safe to predict only in the long run. So thoroughly are the Nazis arranging that their creed of blood and fire shall strike deep roots in the soil, a good deal of rank growth can be expected for some time to come. On Plebiscite Day in Vienna, beginning his self-revelatory address with the words "The bases of my programme are blood, fire, and personality," Hitler, straining

after the apocalyptic effect, required every German to join him in thanking the Almighty for showing him how to get hold of Austria. After asserting that only the strong ones have rights, Hitler then declared that the Lord had defeated Schuschnigg and his co-supporters in Christian Austria, thus reserving for Christ himself the Godhead of Nazidom.

And yet it is undeniable that beside this same evil there exists some good. The Nazis' schemes of relief, social betterment and amusement, their programme of "winter help" and "strength through joy," their emphasis on health and physical fitness constitute an achievement which no fair person would hesitate to admire until discovering the number and character of the concentration camps, the havoc wrought by propaganda and the Nazi dispensation from any need of spiritual culture. The danger is that the new efficiency in organization, the provision for the increased comfort and even the entertainment of the individual as, for instance, by trips to places he has never before dreamed of visiting, will all be accepted as a practical substitute for Christianity if not as its sole standard. But Christianity is not merely bodily welfare, neither is it mere efficiency. Our effort to build the earthly city aright will be the more sustained if the City of God remains above us within clear sight. The Nazis' claim is that they have dumped it down in our midst.

It escapes Germany's propagandists and some of her self-appointed friends that the efficiency of the German people is a persuasive argument for trustful assistance in Europe and trust of colonial rights abroad only when she can answer satisfactorily the question—efficiency to what end? Is it efficiency for peace, for war or for comfort? For truth or falsehood? Is it efficiency in reclaiming areas of political discord for human concord or merely efficiency in reducing one international agreement after another to a "scrap of paper"? Is it efficiency in conferring an increasing degree of liberty on man and fuller responsibility on the individual, or only proficiency in enslaving mankind? Does it give first place to the maxim that man is a spirit that has a body or, knowing this, does it aim at reducing mankind to mere

totalitaria—a mass monster many-footed but without mind, without spirit and without hope?

That an ideology running directly counter to the principles of Christian democracy is bound to lose momentum and prove devoid of staying power, can be demonstrated from the propaganda of the Nazis who, in demanding colonies, invariably overlook these essential aspects. In effect the Nazi Leviathan asks only that the Allies will oblige by erasing from their memory—and help him to erase from all German minds—the German Macht-Politik assault on civilization in 1914 when the effort was made to establish the same German “rights of mastery” as those which are now insisted on by Hitler who, on its outbreak, fell on his knees and thanked God for the war which, apparently, was to ram that policy home.

Although his challenge was overwhelmed, the challenger, the German Leviathan, now become totalitarian, not only affects indignation at being suspect but demands the right to dictate the peace to the Allies surrounded by the swathes of their dead and the ruins of the years.

At Versailles the German Leviathan, as a Leviathan, actually fared remarkably well. He was not disarmed by a long way for, as we have seen, armament is power and one of the most important kinds of power is propaganda. By the oversight of the Allies this propaganda as a power was left wholly unlimited and uncontrolled. The overthrown Leviathan used it far more effectively than he ever could have used troops, submarines or gas, in order to get out of paying not only “unfair reparations” but—except for the first instalment or two—any reparations at all, the result being that many widows and dependants of British civilian passengers, or of British fishermen who were sent to the bottom of the sea by German U-boats, or who were shelled in open English towns, have drifted deeper and deeper into misery as the years have passed, and some have even starved. If justification were wanting for taking over the ex-German colonies, then it lies on the ground not that former German colonial management was inefficient but that it became the moral duty of the rank and file of the German people to com-

pensate in some way at least these humble sufferers even if all the rest of the reparation claims were successfully disputed. The broad principles of socialism, whether its brand be national or international, "strength through joy" or "winter help," certainly apply to these unfortunates who, for the most part, are brother labourers of the German working classes and some of whom were fellow-voters at international vocational labour congresses in the days when the labour charter extended to Germany. Seeing that Hitler has repudiated Versailles, the ex-German colonies might even now be declared to be annexed on this footing.

Despite German propaganda to the contrary, it was, as Balfour maintained, apprehension of what Germany might do in the future that pointed to the wisdom of sequestering her colonies. The evolution of Nazidom and of its proclaimed policy show Balfour's fears to have been well-founded, and the arrows of such propagandists as William Harbutt Dawson have been transformed into boomerangs by the culmination, in recent events, of forces active in Germany for many years.

In his introduction to Heinrich Schnee's *German Colonization Past and Future*,¹ Mr. W. H. Dawson refers to the view expressed in Dr. Edwyn Bevan's foreword to his translation of Emil Zimmerman's notorious book on the German dream Empire of Central Africa. In that book Emil Zimmerman and those associated with him outlined how, in return for Great Britain's throwing open her resources overseas and by which alone German prosperity had proved possible, Germany was to found a Mittel-Africa based on the policy of the shut door, the armed force of a million blacks "ready to march," and even a German African fleet—in short Zimmerman envisaged something like the Nazification of Africa. A similar War-time project for Germany's "Evolution of India" planned a serfdom far removed from home-rule whether by Swaraj or through Dominion Status. The whole people of India, from prince to peasant, were to have been made fly round as the wheels of vast whirring machinery which, putting to best account the double advantage

¹ London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

of handy raw materials and unlimited raw labour, was to be the choice German instrument of world-fashioning and world-dominion. The instrument bore all the signs that promise efficiency; and the Indian would have been de-created into a subman lower than the lowest caste. Touchable and untouchable, Mohammedan and Buddhist, were to lie together in the totalitarian net.

As Dr. Bevan rightly concluded, it is true that

“ . . . the whole question of a German oversea Empire would take on a very different complexion if the German State came to be directed by a new spirit. It would probably not be safe to count on such a spirit until a certain period of time had elapsed after the end of the War.”¹

Has Germany changed for the better since 1918 when, according to Dr. Bevan, whom William Harbutt Dawson calls a well-informed writer, she was clearly not to be trusted with the tutelage of black peoples, the reason being want, not of efficiency, but of the right spirit—a want which no mere political swing can remedy in Germany, but only a radical change of spirit? There, unfortunately, the political development has proceeded in the opposite direction resulting in a totalitarianism based, as we have seen, on “blood, fire, German personality” and German “rights of mastery”—the latest cock-crow of Nazi Leviathan.

Clearly, then, the German challenge to Christian democracy is incomparably greater now than it was in 1918. To this conclusion inevitably lead views even like those of Mr. William Harbutt Dawson who, over Oxford’s spires a dozen years ago, saw Germany “fifty years hence . . . *still* under democratic rule”! True, the German “colonial question” finds a place in the immediate foreground, but, before being answered, it must be considered in perspective against the background of spiritual democracy.

Now it may be that the answer to that question is not the obvious one. Suppose that the German people could only “find” themselves in a widened experience? How far does the supreme Christian command permit us to pick and choose

¹ Edwyn Bevan: Introduction to Zimmerman’s *German Empire of Central Africa*.

our neighbours? We know that the mass mind can be made mad, but has it a conscience?

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If it were necessary to illustrate further how opposed is Nazidom to the democracy of the British people whose extreme simplicity of political faith is centred in as much freedom as possible and toleration all round, one would only need to compare what any Nazi policy must have decreed for Ireland, for South Africa, for Egypt and, last but by no means least, for India, with what British democracy has in fact done for those peoples. On a recent occasion Lord Lothian admirably explained the traditional British attitude in regard to England's trust of empire. Of two rival policies in India—each of which had much to commend it—that was to be preferred which contemplated England not as perpetually guarding India and permanently discharging duties however beneficial to Indians, but as following that course which would ensure, as soon as possible, that *Indians would be able to rule themselves*.

The consideration is not merely that we all like to govern ourselves—in most cases properly if possible—but that the strengthening of the spirit through growth resulting from the effort entailed in the experience, is the cardinal principle generally understood by most persons when they talk of Christianity. Can any of the democracies be considered a Christian democracy? The British Empire is one of them. Let the light, in turn, fall on us. Can we?

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The more the matter is examined the more it will appear that democracy—considered otherwise than as a fictional form of government—on close inspection, almost, if not entirely, dissolves into the elements of Christianity which comprises substance no less than form. The emphasis of Christian democracy is *never more* on the importance of *individual sacrifice* than on the *welfare* of the *individual soul*; and it is mere hypocrisy to pretend that, in this welfare, the

well-being of the individual physical self does not play an important part.

Now if this is so the alternative to totalitarian Hitlerism can never be a mere mental adjustment but includes a practical programme practically applied and involving a social amelioration no less than that offered by the rival creed. Similarly the union required of spiritual forces is neither the dropping of intellectual differences nor the intellectual finding of a common formula of faith. It is a combination of human forces prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary in order to bring nearer *that order of human society whereunder man may pursue his spiritual destiny—the reign of law in a true, Christian democracy.*

It is obvious that any religious revival that does not proceed to the length of action and sacrifice will be ineffective and, indeed, unreal. The fact that the existing democracies have not, so far, seen their way to risking material advantages by pooling possessions in order to secure greater, truer democratic power *among themselves*, suggests that democracy cannot as yet be considered as Christian; and this any close-up view to-day will confirm. It is wanting in leadership, in submission to leadership, and in unselfishness of self-control. Most of all it is wanting in intelligence. Christians, whether democrats or otherwise, have failed to see that if violence is power misapplied, then the only answer to it is power rightfully applied. Moreover, that this answering power will *hardly need to be applied* at all provided it is overwhelmingly preponderant. That modern democracy is, in this regard, not only un-Christian but short-sighted, turns on the fact that, even in Christians, human nature is the same.

Once convinced that power is thus indispensable, true democratic Christians must be prepared in mental resolve to use that power, if need be, *to the utmost limit*. The mere means of power behind which there is only irresolution mistakenly commended as being proper Christian hesitation to use such means, is neither power nor yet Christianity—and in the result is bound to prove far worse than any pacifism.

Here lies the secret of the success of the present totalitarian

dictatorships whose strength, when measured strictly in material, economic resources and finance, is far inferior to what they have time and again successfully challenged. It is generally recognized that at all times and, most of all in war, the individual service volunteered adequately in response to some call of conscience—provided of course the period of training and degree of discipline are the same—is, in results, far superior to enforced service. What Dr. Edwyn Bevan calls the “great mass of merely thoughtless people,” unless made to think, are thus of greater peril in a democracy because there they imperil democracy itself. They leave the advance wholly with totalitarian Leviathan who, in seizing all things likely to prove serviceable in war and demolishing the rest as inexpedient or unsafe, demobilizes the individual conscience permanently. Like bacteria, totalitaria—the massed spawn of Leviathan, million-footed, mindless, incapable of reason, incapacitated for other than emotional response—can be relied upon mechanically to carry out any totalitarian programme in the most total fashion desired.

This is so more than ever now that warfare, always a competition in ruthlessness, has become mechanized. Whether mechanized-man or mechanized-god, what is more ruthless than the machine? War being a competition in ruthlessness, the war serviceability of the machine ranks high. It is not improbable that it is to some such reason that totalitarianism owes its rise. And now war has become a *Volkskrieg* in which every member of the nation is enlisted, it is not difficult to see how every department of life, even the spiritual, has in the war-specializing nations become totalitarianized.

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What emerges of importance is not the probability that totalitarianism is, in many respects, the more fitted for the reign of anarchy, but the certainty that democracy, unless newly conceived, cannot compete with it at all.

Leaving aside other aspects, the degree of control and also of organization is so high in the totalitarian state that, in

comparison, most democratic states seem uncontrolled and unorganized. But if control and organization are indispensable for the reign of war, they are no less necessary to the reign of law. Now, in the field of economics there are few facts clearer or harder than that the need for national planning is becoming more urgent daily, and that this planning can only be satisfactorily effected in co-operation with other nations. That is to say planning, sooner rather than later, must be world-wide. In so far, then, as democracy is planless society, it will be left behind and will have to fit into the totalitarian plan as best it can, for, to be worsted in "war in peace," is not less a defeat than to be overwhelmed in battle. In both cases the victor is totalitarian Leviathan.

The deficiencies and requirements of democracy are therefore best revealed by examining the case for totalitarianism, the consideration here not being a mere comparison of rival ideologies but the discovery that, power being essential to the reign of law, the democratic society must decide what it is for which it has exchanged the reign of anarchy. Having decided what are the things which the democrats have united to defend, democracy must submit to *whatever control and organization is necessary*.

The question that might seem to demand an answer is how far democracy can submit to control and organization without being destroyed, and whether such a thing as a Christian dictatorship is possible. These questions depend on what is democracy, what is dictatorship and what is Christianity.

We have found that no existing so-called democratic state reflects real and full democracy—which is something more than a constitutional formation. Remembering that democracy itself is not the supreme end of life any more than is peace, how, let it be asked, does British democracy compare with National Socialism in Germany, as regards services freely given instead of compelled, and as regards leadership followed instead of dictatorship enforced? If, in the time of Our Lord, a régime democratic merely in the constitutional sense had suddenly been instituted in Palestine, it is by no means certain that the course of history would thereby

have been changed for the better. If the need supplied by democracy is fulfilled by a mere plebiscite of ignorant minds and undisciplined wills, then democracy stands for little more than the ascertainment of the centre of gravity of human nature in the mass, uncouth and uninformed. On the contrary, true democracy involves leadership first and public approval or disapproval afterwards, whereas dictatorship is direction to which the public is committed beforehand and which they are not at any time free to disapprove. This—another essential difference between dictatorship and democracy—remains, however beneficial or efficient or even enlightened the dictator's leadership may be. In the one case what is sought may be overlooked or forgotten in the individual understanding, but, in the other, blind obedience is not only preferred but enjoined.

On a little thought it will be recognized that this difference turns not on the degree of unfettered personal liberty but on the *end*—which will be found to be spiritual. In a true democracy the individual surrenders partial liberty but it is in order to ensure that supreme end—the growth of man's spirit.

Now it is this supreme end which essentially determines both the form and the substance of democracy—an end of which most people have only the vaguest notion. Thus while democracy implies that man is confronted with a choice, that choice is frequently thought to involve nothing better than a two party system of government.

Secondly, in order for this choice to be a real one, democracy indispensably implies education and instruction. It is possible that if a public plebiscite by a show of hands had been substituted for the proceedings before Pontius Pilate, the betrayal and crucifixion of Jesus Christ—to which, however tragic, it is impossible to deny a setting of some dignity and nobility—might have been superseded by a mob riot, mass-stoning or man-handling. Christ might have been trampled to death in a public stampede or, before he had breathed his most tremendous words, broken in an ordeal corresponding to a public lynching not unknown even to present-day democracy.

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But if democracy involves an intelligent choice, Christian democracy implies some regard for what that choice secures. It is therefore unnecessary to continue further reflection upon Christian democracy under the heading of Christian Socialism or Christian Communism or Christian Collectivism or any other of the competitive ideologies. The Hitlerites might insist that a Nazi would be content to be treated as he treats others, that he would submit to the identical test and comply with the maxim "Thy neighbour as thyself," that Christ's love for his neighbours did not prevent him from chastening or even from chastising them, that neither usurers, publicans nor sinners were absolved from his condemnation, and that to these Christ did not turn the other cheek. Such casuistry notwithstanding, neither Hitler's national socialism nor Stalin's communism could ever bear any relation to Christianity which opposes determinism and imposes no fixed action but leaves the choice.

But while Christian democracy is not called on to compete with the ideological dictatorship whatever its form, it need not be behind them in the sacrifice and service it requires. It cannot be the more democratic if it is the less spiritual.

This is the weakness, for instance, of American democracy as of other democracies also. It is true that you are not victimized for criticizing the American Government. There are, however, the expedients of the New Deal and pump-priming, the evils of armed espionage in their factories, the "undistributed gains," the thirteen millions of unemployed, the mass production of massed efficiency that moves from place to place leaving in its wake the abandoned hopes of men in abandoned derelict homes—all of which may lead to de-creating men into machines in the economic process only less than the Nazis de-create them into machines in the Leviathanic process. Remembering that the economic power is an important part of armament power, and, therefore, that the economic front may be even the most active and decisive sector of the war front, it behoves democracy to begin assembling economic power by a regard for indi-

vidual economic welfare. Man does not live by bread alone, but neither does his spirit thrive if man has not bread.

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In the democracies, at first sight even more than in the dictatorships, the life of the average human being is passed in a feeling of economic insecurity. There is a fear of failing industry, of dismissal through slackening demand, of competition becoming the fiercer the more prices fall, a recurring anxiety that all depends on the gamble of timing the turn of the trade cycle—all intensifying the struggle to put by for a rainy day when once more the banks will reverse gear and collide with those not ahead. This anxiety increases as the spectre of war draws nearer. Periodically renewed it deepens into a feeling of hopelessness, of desperation and of being walled in—which becomes, at last, so unbearable that even war is welcomed for its consoling thought that in war walls fall down.

That evil, vaguely sensed by the most humble individual, is not peculiar to any class nor is any class particularly to blame. In America it has been found that often those who most ingeniously exploit difficulties to the disadvantage of the workers are themselves only employees who have pressed forward and got on. Now the feeling strengthens that it is the capital system that is at fault, now that the fault lies with democracy in allowing unrestricted liberty to make money; and it is pointed out that the evil is less, if anything, in the totalitarian states where, at any rate, the totalitaria may all swarm like locusts but all have an equal chance of participating in the fruits of invasion. This is almost certainly an inaccurate view for, temporary as it is, the success of the penniless dictators in financing colossal armament and subsidizing expensive self-sufficiency is only possible when there co-exist some thriving democracies who cannot afford to let world prices fall too far or the credit structure to be completely shattered. Thus the dictators are shrewdly aware that their unsound economic basis can be exposed only if the democracies were to turn into self-sufficient dictatorships, or if the democracies were far-seeing enough to combine—

the chance of which happening is usually considered by the dictators to be so remote as to be negligible.

It is on the longer view that the dictatorships are likely to be proved mistaken and, indeed, impotent. Governmental planning is daily proving to be more and more indispensable and over a wider and wider area, and on a larger and larger scale. Now while, in the case of dictatorships, this planning is easy nationally but almost impossible internationally owing to the Leviathanic nature of totalitarian, independent, sovereign powers, on the other hand, in the case of the democracies, international planning can congenially proceed abreast of the national.

This is but to say, and truly, that by its nature dictatorship is national while democracy is international; and that in the long run, economic forces being world-forces, economic power will tend to dissolve national dictatorship into democracy. The iron rule of German Nazidom forbidding trade unionism or collective bargaining does not look like deflecting one inch the direction of the conviction of America's labour democracy.

And yet, it seems, it is from this discipline in the dictatorships that the democracies now must borrow, for it has been discovered, for instance in America, that a substantial degree of the economic depression, material and mental, proceeds from lack of planning. The reason, disconcerting but true, that adequate planning is neither wide enough nor fast enough in the democracies, is spiritual—that is to say democracy itself as yet has no plan because it is not yet sufficiently Christian. The world being an economic unit and the wider the zone of planning therefore the better, democracy must prescribe a Christian economy and be world-wide or else succumb.

In short, the need is for *international economic law which is possible only under the reign of law*. That is the stark truth hidden beneath that vague and confused phrase "economic internationalism." It is true that facts precede law but, until reduced to principles and related to the reign of law, facts are formless and useless for administration.

A useful work on economy recently published¹ suffers somewhat for this very reason, the angle of approach being almost wholly factual, and, for instance, the jurisprudential angle entirely ignored. Although the passing from nationalism to internationalism may seem to be the way down a slippery slope, the international economic field must be recognized as the advanced base for the operation of earliest "international" or rather supra-national law, and not regarded merely as the international arena of international war.

As a major war is a world-war, the only way for civilization to survive is by a world-plan for law against war, and beginning with the assembling of the greatest world-economic power possible. That power would be doubly available either as sovereign power to support the reign of law or as paramount power to repulse anarchy. So long as war proceeds in peace, so long must provision against war be permanently planned.

It is obvious that, while, on the one hand, in the totalitarian state national planning is inevitably a war measure, aggressive, competitive, and Leviathanic, on the other hand in the democratic state it must be co-operative, complementary and neighbourly. So far this cannot be truly said of any democracy but for the future it must be true of the whole democratic, non-Leviathanic front. Not only so, but, as totalitarian Leviathan is perpetually striving for more and more self-sufficiency during the war that proceeds in peace in order to be the more able to bear deficiency during the war that proceeds in war, the democratic front must surpass that effort or go under. The task of the democracies is the harder of the two in only one respect. They have thus to plan against war and against Leviathan in one direction, and plan for law and for democracy in another. The generalization that, if the planning is exclusively national, then the purpose of the planning is economic war, but that, if the planning is international, then its objective is economic law, is a little too sweeping. The truth is that, while the totalitarians remain standing, international

¹ F. E. Lawley: *The Growth of Collective Economy*.

planning on more than a restricted front is out of the question.

Illustratively it may be remarked that the United States may therefore not unfairly be regarded as having, since the Armistice, pursued the path rather of war and dictatorship than, as so many Americans profess to believe, the path of law and democracy. Just as Christianity itself is not true Christianity unless applicable to and related to the international field, so it is with democracy.

It follows that the qualification for the vanguard of democracy is readiness in the first place to pay the price of peace by the cost of co-operation. If England is farther ahead in being more ready to face the price of freedom, it is because of her greater clear-sightedness. If somewhat reluctantly, still realistically she is beginning to recognize that there is no alternative. The only hope that the British Commonwealth may consolidate to endure instead of disintegrating further to final dissolution, lies in democracy. In order to survive against totalitarianism at all, the British Commonwealth of Nations must, by imposing self-fusion to the degree necessary to be a commonwealth in more than name, form the beginning of the World Commonwealth.

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Mr. Lawley's admirable array of world-wide facts right up to date re-tell the story, never too often heard, that the days of *laissez-faire* appear to be numbered and the day of world-planning is almost here. The question "Planned for what and how?" he apparently would answer, "For Socialism and democracy, through inexorable pressure of events."

His view, however, falls short of the grim truth recognized by Hobbes that, even if men know the good they not infrequently fail to pursue it; and the same unfortunately is not less true of most governments. The argument Mr. Lawley's view implies is that his imposing list of facts (which few will deny confirm the need for world-planning) themselves reflect co-operating human efforts which *nationally* are provoked through necessity, but which can be relied on at the same time to proceed internationally through some

teleological purpose attracting all these activities to some ultimate design. This, however, is not in accordance with history and does not give the accurate story of man which is that, without a human political society, only violence and human nature triumph, and that only within that society are they subdued—and subdued that is, by law equipped with power.

Teleology is not enough. The risk of catastrophe complete and final through leaving human society almost wholly unplanned, except for war, is too great for us to resign ourselves to the tempo and pattern of events as they happen to arrive. If the fatalistic outlook is to be accepted in any war and all war, then it would be far better to chance it on pacificism. The fact now slowly protruding itself just when man finds himself drifting apparently towards inevitable catastrophe, is that he must take control as, however great his risk in so doing, his peril otherwise is that of complete disaster fixed and final. He can take control only by means of the reign of law to which his advance must now be by conscious process and planned design. He must take control or perish. Moreover, once control is undertaken, to that control no arbitrary limit can be set. Control, it is obvious, will not be control if it does not contribute to the control of that product—future man.

This, of course, means leadership and again leadership, and nowhere more than in the democratic society. It is the supreme danger of democracy and to democracy as the sole preserver of the life-force, vital and creative, that it has insisted on freedom and the right to self-control yet misused that right by allowing itself to become devitalized, non-creative and passive. Here, in no less degree than elsewhere, although respectably cloaked, the shady side of human nature has taken refuge and, unless discovered and displaced, will permanently warp humanity. There is a cause for the arrival of Nazidom. It is symptomatic of the shortcomings of the democrats and not of true democracy at all.

It is not from the mass mind that salvation can come even if that mass mind should be labelled democracy. All depends, as it always has depended, on those who lead.

When the leaders have no vision the people perish. Sufficiently outraged and, before it is completely shattered, humanity may well wheel round and bring down its Leviathans, but even then only leadership will count.

Are other Leviathans to succeed them? It has been stated not without a show of probability that the arrivals of Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler—which were largely accidental and fortuitous—as also the human tragedy of Bolshevism, might have been averted by a well-equipped army corps at the right moment. But leadership ceased at the Armistice. The American contribution to victory might have borne more lasting results if she had not hastened to dismantle her economic war structures before even the Peace Treaty was signed.

It may be that the time will come when, enlightened by the common revelation, a handful of leaders throughout the world will calmly ignore the bequeathed paper and ink significance of “nationalism,” “sovereignty,” “statehood,” “vital interests,” and the like, and, turning their backs on that dreadful world of such expedients as “flight” from this or that currency, “hot money,” “well-timed pump-priming” and “high average intuition of when to get out and in again,” will simultaneously seize the controls and, whatever the cost, not only set humanity on a new course but plan that the control may not be snatched back. At the moment it is only the totalitarian dictatorships that are preparing and planning, and they alas! are doing so severally, each to assert his rights of mastery over the rest of mankind. On the broad basis of Christian democracy, however, a new world-control of co-operating leaders would be without rival and sure to win. To rely on a simultaneous, inspired stampede of converted, leaderless masses all taking the right direction, is to ask for a million miracles at once. Now it is symptomatic of the new totalitarian ideologies that their most whole-hearted supporters are those most easily led—the unthinking young. Age, however, comes after youth and will also speak last. It is futile to stand back aghast at the spectacle of Nacht-Politik, but it is serviceable to confront might-politics for war with power-politics for law.

Democracy has much to learn from the dictators—for instance, that power is necessary in order to organize no less than to condemn. Again, the followers of the dictators, and, no less their victims, dumbly testify to the rich reserves of service and sacrifice at this moment ready in the heart of all mankind to be awakened by the call of the true leader.

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The aeroplane's writing in the sky is that salvation can come only by a forward movement in will as well as in mind—the movement I have called Christian democracy. The struggle for control must be a struggle by power towards law, and the gain must be consolidated in law as it is won by law. And, when that consolidation has taken place, the power will still be found there behind the law to support it.

It is in the light of this truth which seems to elude Mr. Lawley that the evidence of international planning he has amassed should be examined, because it is this same truth which permanently conditions the arrival and maintenance of any plan, and must, therefore, not be lost sight of in the fashioning of the planning.

It is no news that the rich are too rich and the poor too poor, that "unrestricted individualism in industry can be wasteful," that international exchange of commodities and services is essential to the healthy economic life of individual nations. It becomes plain that maximum world production involves marshalling the world's "productive resources" and that the supervision of credit cannot be left forever in private hands, least of all in those machine-hands, the trusts, the combines, and even the banks. "Unco-ordinated investment of capital" can lead to over-production or under-production. It is true that the investment of capital, therefore, must be publicly controlled, and that, to bring that about, national control is not enough. It may even forcefully be contended that a uniform international currency might contribute to the overthrow of what Mr. Lawley calls "the dictatorship of gold." But in each instance here, the overshadowing need is for the reign of law. In this connection it is worth pointing out—when he insists that "the

basic economic truth is that everything depends on trust" (i.e. confidence)—that gold is commonly accepted by all nations just because they cannot trust one another to dispense with it! The printing presses cannot make gold, dictators cannot create it or de-create it, it is not a "scrap of paper," and, so far, it cannot profitably be made. These qualities are valuable because they are largely neutralizing and negative, the chief virtue of gold being as a resistant to human nature. Thus gold is better than pearls or diamonds precisely because it cannot be so easily faked.

Now the fact that the very school of authoritarian economists—which admits the indispensability of gold—differs so widely in its views of how best to use it, confirms once more that the *ultimate* problem behind such problems as these is *not* economic but *Leviathanic*. It is a problem of human organization and administration; and, therefore, of human control. That is to say it is the old problem of the administration of justice by means of law backed by supreme power—but a power which its custodian must be required to keep to its purpose, law, and not be allowed to usurp and misapply for purposes of war. Just as this ultimate problem can be solved only by the arrival of world-expanded statehood over-topping the national edifices of statehood and automatically following on the disappearance, through fusion or conquest, of the plurality of Leviathans, so the tension of the problem will be lessened as that ideal is approached and the widening process of law is quickened by the democracies.

As we have seen, in the final resort there can be only one reign of law however innumerable may be the homogeneous systems of law co-ordinating beneath it. There cannot indefinitely endure innumerable conflicting reigns of law each claiming a power not only supreme in its province but unsubordinated to anything in the world.

"It is my firm conviction," writes Mr. Lawley in an introductory paragraph, "that there can be no solid basis for permanent world peace until the world's economic life has been organized, under public authority, on an equitable basis and in accordance with sound economic principles."

But as the question what is an "equitable basis," like the further question what are "sound economic principles," would not merely fall to be considered by theorizing economists but have to be determined for purposes of practical application to concrete instances, these, and a thousand other matters, as we have already learned, could be so determined only within a system of law *administered* as justice.

"What the League needs," remarked M. Avenol, the Secretary of the League of Nations, whom Mr. Lawley quotes, "is not legal nostrums but a moral and psychological cure at the centres of will. . . ."¹

If, by legal nostrums, is meant mere legal phrases or empty legal formalism reflecting no reality in any political society, then such are useless and it would have been as well if M. Avenol's predecessor, the League's first Secretary-General, could have harped on the same lay. But as regards a "moral and psychological cure at the centres of will," it suffices to say that, unless the Leviathans consent to submit to psycho-analysis and to be divested of human nature and then require humanity at large to undergo the same treatment, the imperative necessity is *neither* for legal nostrums *nor yet* for moral and psychological cure, but for the widened reign of law secured by widened power and reflecting widened sovereignty. The mere statement and re-statement of the need will not bring this about.

"The structure of the League," says Mr. Lawley, "should be transformed so that: its Assembly should have real legislative power of action within a well-defined field related to the limited rights of constituent national governments; the Permanent Council of International Justice should be developed into a Supreme World Court, armed with a clear, written code of law upon which its decisions could be based with compulsory jurisdiction between the states and adequate power to enforce its decrees; and the League Council should be made into a modern Executive Cabinet, controlling sufficient and properly provided revenue and forces to execute the universal will declared in the Assembly's laws as interpreted by the World Court."²

¹ F. E. Lawley: *The Growth of Collective Economy*, Vol. II, p. 429.

² *Ibid.*, p. 422.

If not exactly the New Millennium, all this must lie at least a considerable distance on the farther side of the maelstrom round the vortex of which, however, at this very moment, mankind with all its civilization, with all its backward and too forward races, is spinning faster and faster. The immediate problem is how to climb up the slippery slope. It is clear that alone the economists cannot help us. The failure of Marx to contribute his quota is aggravated by the fact that his reading began with jurisprudence the principles of which, apparently, he never understood at all, his rapacious mind seeing little to go for in Continental Rechtswissenschaft. If, in the British Museum, he had studied the more practical and real English system of jurisprudence, Europe might have been spared both Bolshevik and Nazi Leviathans.

The "moral cure," which M. Avenol advocated, would have to be followed by precautions taken against relapse of the government "cured" or the back-sliding of succeeding governments. Thus, in what Mr. Lawley calls a "fine speech," the Italian delegate at the Washington Limitation of Armament Conference in 1921 declared that "the whole world must be regarded as one single, great economic system." I remember hearing the same distinguished delegate make other eloquent speeches at the same Conference against the use of poison gas and bombing and, in short, against most of the enormities subsequently committed by Italy in recent years. The turning wheel once more has come full circle. If Italy's odd vote had not deprived Germany and Austria of the Anschluss, Austria's prospect for happiness then might have been retained. In that event Hitlerism might have been still-born and never, with Italy's approval, have violated the Austrian people and seized their country by full-dress methods of war in peace to the dismay of England whose representative at the Permanent Court on the former occasion had voted straight for the Anschluss.

Before there could arrive a Permanent Court of the nature to which Mr. Lawley, like countless others, so lightly refers, formidable obstacles would have to be removed, stupendous decisions would have to be taken and gigantic resolutions

kept. These obstacles must not be under-assessed. Although the world may be an economic unit, it is the very opposite of a homogeneous one except in regard to the universality of human nature the common touch of which, properly allowed for in the planning, alone will make the *whole* world kin. A thought must be spared of the centuries that must pass before the backward races, even if helped, in any event can catch up; and likewise pass before the races wrongly forward can be brought back. No plebiscite of mankind is yet feasible. Even on the best reading of the future, power for a long time will have to be behind authority.

It is the advance to the reign of law itself, then, that more and more must be planned. And, while that planning may be helped and possibly greatly influenced by economic planning, nevertheless, ahead of the advance to law no other real advance can take place. The risks and perils that will beset that advance are manifold and incalculable, for the advance is, first of all, one in attitude of mind and in readiness of spirit for sacrifice of the old material order of Mammon. It is a spiritual advance. To ensure that progress won is progress kept, there is no substitute for permanent, supreme power. But this, in the hands of Christian democracy, is not, for a moment to be confused with the policy of Macht-Politik, still less with its Method—War. This supreme power is now seen to be even more necessary in a democracy than in a totalitarian ideology. Indeed, in an absolute Christian dictatorship it might suffice, to start off with, if the dictator were Christian, whereas, in the case of a democracy, all depends on the percentage of Christians in the community. It is hardly necessary to point out that the supreme qualification of Christianity for the great rôle is that it alone, as interpreted in this study, would be tolerant to other religions and creeds co-operating for the reign of law. The rest would follow.

Now it cannot be denied that, when it comes to a clash between human nature and Christianity, while it is the struggle that counts, nevertheless, not infrequently—and particularly when material possessions and physical well-being are concerned—it is human nature that wins. In

European and American civilization even the best of humanity are not fully Christian but, at the best, only Christian more or less while many are definitely anti-Christian. Moreover, legal personages which, in influence and voting power often outweigh and outnumber human voters, and promise increasingly to do so in the future, are lifeless machine-like entities ranging from joint stock companies to world-wide trusts.

Now what emerges here is that these legal entities, often superior in morality to human individuals because controlled by a number of minds and involving interests that demand continuity and complete insurance against being wound up, have nevertheless to be kept standardized by the law which, for the purpose, must have the power not merely to send responsible individuals to gaol but also power to prevent and anticipate the concern going wrong. Here power includes the power of knowledge, of legislation on a wide scale, of planning and, where necessary, of altering the direction of human society. In short, it is the power *not only of punishment but also of administration*.

No machine is Christian. As for the rank and file of humanity, great numbers live and die mystified in their consideration of the possibility of any divine order by thoughts of wonder why, if God so desired the example of Christ to count on earth, a clearer record of what transpired was not made available for posterity—not the mere record of evidence such as might now be taken, for instance, by film and gramophone, but a message cleared of the obscurity and conflict in thought. Even the Bible, it is said, and despite its sublime grandeur, is but a human compilation that suffers from the chanciness of any record before writing was properly in vogue. In a Christian democracy, however, the direction is Christian because the *leadership* is Christian.

However dim is the outline of the ultimate design, certain firm lines remain hard and fast. The interesting thing is not that the more men think the more they differ, but that, however much the volume of their fixed convictions shrinks—or their differences as a consequence disappear—there is here always something that remains. The very democracy

extolled by Pericles and discounted by Plato, condemned one of the noblest and greatest figures of all history—Socrates who, hundreds of years before the birth of Christ, strove not only to enthrone in his mind but to reflect in his life certain supreme Christian virtues which alone to-day can unite mankind. For daring the attempt to resolve the conflict between the temporal and the spiritual he was destroyed, and without the comfort of the Cross.

Despite any twists in the meaning of the word through the intervening twenty-three centuries, something of the idea of democracy present then is present in democracy now, as, for instance, in the United States where the Democratic Party rivals the Republican Party in an offshoot of British democracy. Nor is the responsibility facing democracy now wholly unlike what it was in the Athens of Plato's day, just as its blessings, its weaknesses and even its alternative, do not greatly differ to-day from what they were in that distant century. Then, as now, democracy stood in want of more control, more planning and more educating; but, nevertheless, over it all stood the high valuation of the individual spirit. What Athenian democracy then lacked—discipline, organized control and individual service—was similarly reflected by the early Spartan totalitarianism which, notwithstanding, was the greater failure because it, too, was without objective and, therefore, was also only Method without End.

Again, now, as then, it is not compromise that is needed between the two systems but the reinforcing of democracy with certain qualities of the rival system, and most of all by a spiritual revival. In a democracy, more than elsewhere, if the human spirit does not quicken and grow it cannot long lie fallow without being overgrown.

Little more than a day's voyage from Palestine but four centuries before Christ was born, there existed a human political society which, most favourably placed and also superbly talented, nevertheless remained unconverted by some of the clearest reasoning the world has ever known. The brutal and baser elements of human nature, justified by a section of Athenians as a law of nature, remained

unchanged and were only illuminated but not dislodged either then by the noble utterances of Plato or later by the supreme sacrifice of Christ. The change in emphasis from reason to faith in the same human setting wrought by so powerful a mind as that of Saint Paul—who patiently concentrated on setting up a slow, long impetus—was at one and the same time a democratic and spiritual shifting of position. However the archaeologists may wrangle, nevertheless, then as now, man's most intimate prayer was to an Unknown God who, in the two thousand years that have since passed, has hardly yet begun to be revealed except dimly in ourselves. In order to vitalize democracy, spiritual faith, as well as faith in reason, is needed, for the victory is not one of position successfully manœuvred but of contest fought out and won.

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Now in this contest the fundamental issue is not that of liberty in itself but of freedom for the growth of the human spirit. This being the supreme end, it follows that democracy itself demands a rejection of all other ends that imperil that end. Further, in order to attain that end, democracy involves the method best suited to that end and having regard to its own limitations. If freedom implied by democracy is understood in this purposeful sense, then it is undeniable that democracy in the future must mean less and less unplanned freedom the more the world is planned; and planned it must be, in the first place for democracy to survive at all—planned, that is, *for* democracy by being planned *against* the eternal reign of war in peace.

It is the disciplining and the organizing rather than the limiting of democracy that is so urgently needed. The statement that democracy does not lend itself to the proper discharge of this or that function of the state gives a false view. It is sometimes stated, for instance, that economic matters are usually in dire confusion in a democracy because there are so many voices and so many to please.

Now why is such an argument never applied to the judicial sphere, say in the British democracy? Because there the

spirit of democracy is preserved through the very administration of the law. Except in rare instances the public never dream of interfering with the planned course of public justice, however much they may exercise their right of criticism. To an adequate degree democracy must similarly conform in any other sphere of the state, whether that be the sphere of defence or of economics.

In other words, in order to achieve its purpose, democracy must now submit to leadership as never before; and for the reason that, as never before, democracy itself is in jeopardy. "Democracy," declared Mr. Neville Chamberlain, "can afford to make mistakes." To a degree this is true, but the mistake now of bad leadership or of leadership ineffective through misconception of what democracy stands for, and, consequently, of what confronts democracy, may be fatal.

Democracy therefore depends on, as it is proved by, its leaders not the least of whose duties it is to interpret and apply some such changed and renewed order as that which I have called Christian Democracy. Being a living thing, democracy must either increase or die.

This does not mean that the people's wishes as well as their interests are the less considered, or their prerogatives of free criticism withheld. On proper occasions, for better or for worse, they must approve or disapprove their leadership. How often those occasions may be, in theory the people themselves decide but, in practice, more often events. Again, the statement that democracy is no longer suitable, as it once was, to all provinces of a state on account of the extension of the technical field, mistakes the meaning of democracy. The concluding truth is that, as democracy involves a delegated trust of sovereign power, a spiritual leadership of democracy is indispensable in order to ensure that that trust will be rightly interpreted.

The contention that most people appear thoughtless and largely indifferent to freedom of the spirit and of the mind is not to be disposed of by straight denial. Just as intellectual culture or art has travelled forward from century to century over the heads of the masses who, like the base of a wave, drag behind, so democracy portends a rising spiritual

growth and not a falling mediocrity. Without such spiritual element and unless that element is given paramount importance, democracy is meaningless except as the fullest possible measure of universal selfishness.

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The chief change since Plato's day, in the setting of democracy as in its outlook, has occurred comparatively recently in the widening of the problem of the human political society from the national to the international. The further clearing of the vital international issue will be found simultaneously to have further cleared the outlook for democracy because, internationally, it is the only thing that will fit.

But democracy has only begun to emerge. It is not here yet. For the delay in its arrival, one is logically bound to admit, Leviathan is chiefly to blame, just as, from now on, the Leviathanic menace must result in its quickening. The future hope follows no less from the fact that all depends on the leaders, as from the earlier fact that the basic theory of political leadership—that is to say government—as of the human political society itself, is democratic. In the first instance, and whatever its precise terms of union, the base of the political society is the wide one of broad humanity. The sin of Leviathan, then, is not of power created and held from the outset, but of power taken on trust and thereafter usurped.

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If Hobbes, who lived only three centuries ago, had foreseen the widening of the national into an international society, he would have been content to emphasize as his main thesis—which, in fact, is wholly incontestable—that law is based on the supreme power of the state. The rest follows. He would not have proceeded to deify the sovereign power which is only MEANS and not END—an error Locke helped to redress. The point Hobbes missed was that not only human nature but human limitation also must be guarded against in Leviathan as well as in the individual—that supreme power is needed not only to punish or deter

but to plan and organize. The danger now is not that, as Hobbes feared, the last Leviathan might fall, but that the international scene abounds with Leviathans and Leviathanic influence traditionally usurping, because misapplying, the public power—sometimes deliberately, sometimes through ignorance of its end.

The refashioning of Leviathan is overdue. In that refashioning, the spiritual element, as never before, must be found a place. The leadership of democracy cannot indefinitely be trusted merely to professional politicians and capitalized interests, still less be left unshielded from the vagaries of the unskimmed scum of stagnant humanity indifferent to its future but promoted to rare opportunity in the aftermath of revolution or war. It is not such as they who set most value on the supreme end or who will win most recruits from the totalitarian side—for only vital, spiritual forces can achieve that. The leaders of democracy must set about revitalizing their programme which must be given fresh momentum through a new attractiveness that will rival the distraction the totalitarian offers. The essential attractiveness will be not that of war but of the preparation of power for the contest of law against war the actual ordeal of which, in all probability, will not have to be passed through at all. This we learn from the totalitarians whose chief secret is that, if power is sufficiently augmented, then, instead of merely ensuring victory in the trial by combat, it can guarantee victory without any trial at all—or that, at least, it always proved so when contending against the old democracies.

The totalitarian's lure for youth is of a new affinity, a fellowship, the end of loneliness through a new belonging. That the affinity based on blood is false, that the new belonging is only to a machine, matters little to herded civilization composed of individuals for whom the alternative prospect is no better than a return to the old monotony of choice between being crowded out or passed by. It is no longer the Have and the Have-Nots who number most among mankind but, unsuspectingly, the Futurians and the Might-Have-Beens. Capacity to preach the pious

or the noble part is not what is required of the New Democracy but, instead, the substitution of understanding for ignorance, of spirituality for sentimentality, and of courage for fear. It is on the leadership of the New Democracy that there depends the chief hope—and for all we know it may be the last hope—of the earthite, Man.

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TOWARDS THE COMMON-WEALTH OF NATIONS

I

FROM the bridge, when both panorama and the ship are moving, there can be no all round or final view. And yet the ship must be steered. All that is available in selecting and checking the course are a few phenomena of sun, stars, moon and wind—possibly now and again an identifiable contour of distant land. Something less than that being the total contribution of any survey, it may be added that the result, however humble, is important to the extent that it not only reflects but is applicable to the world of affairs. That, primarily, is the world which confronts the statesman who finds his task never discharged within the region of speculation but presenting a changing problem demanding urgent action. To be of use to him the conclusion must represent something more than a balance of academic theory. It must be capable of being fitted upon the world.

At the end of a study of this sort the author frequently takes a leap into Utopia or else refuge in the fretwork which he then finally assembles. The enquiry must contemplate action. So far from being the piecing together of a puzzle picture the statesman's task is a grim game of patience which many hope, but no one knows, will one day come out, all that is known being the certainty, if the game is not kept going, that man as man perishes from the earth. Abstractions and *a priori* conclusions, if of little use to the leader, will be of even less use to man in the mass whose education is an indispensable part of the vital process. The method pursued in our enquiry has been more to follow a story's own unfolding than to make up a complete picture out of the puzzle pieces, for it is not a picture that we are after at all. We are

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concerned with and involved in a story to all intents and purposes unending.

More or less aware of the issues examined in the foregoing chapters we pass now to consider generally the application of the main conclusions to the world of the moment, the purpose in so doing, here as elsewhere, being illustrative and not informative—for instance, Germany happens to-day to be the key-state of a problem which is permanent but, when the wheel turns, instead of Germany there must be substituted another Power. At this point what is most needed is a sketch drawn to illuminate the main theme—man versus Leviathan, and above whom, as we have discovered, is God. But if the supreme struggle of the hour pending is that of man versus Leviathan, the underlying issue for man himself is Leviathan or God—an issue, therefore, that cannot now be finally or completely stated. The governing objective of this study is not the quest for a fool-proof plan of world peace in our time or in our children's time, but, as stated at the outset, the examination of the problem of the reign of anarchy from the particular standpoint of the responsibility undertaken by government whose principal function is to substitute *law for anarchy*.

What, so far, has clearly emerged from our analysis and has been strikingly illustrated by recent events in the international scene, is that the human political society, whatever its size or form, is, like man himself, a growth; and, being such, that society conforms to the process of life, death and renewal, and cannot be finally measured by definitions or eternally bounded by any tradition. Law must be freed for growth as Beethoven freed music. The hide bonds of the human political society must either bend and stretch or break. In the course of growth the nations change rôles, for some are less grown than others. Secondly, we have seen that power is not only the basis of the human political society itself but the basis of the *assortment* of political societies in all their diversity. Just as, in magnitude of orbit and also in its superiority of chance of surviving a collision with a smaller star, one planet exceeds another according to its greater power to resist the attraction of the sun, so the

Powers, great and small, of this world take their place in the political solar system of states according to power. There is not only the risk that this basis may become the sole criterion of human life if the march of the dictators is not stopped; there is the prospect that, once he has completely identified himself with that power, man may not any longer be able to achieve the union necessary to control it.

Thus power conditions the very growth itself of the political society. The course it follows, its rise and its decline, are all conditioned by power. However noble the design or good the definition of statehood, there is always the risk that Leviathan will break through—a risk greater in the dictatorship, less in the democracy. Just as, under the reign of law, the position of man in the political society is made and kept by power, so likewise the position of the political society is made and kept by power in the realm of anarchy. And, whenever openly challenged, that position is adjusted or consolidated by war, if necessary to the last extremity of ruthlessness. Failure to recognize this has contributed largely to the deterioration in the international situation and is responsible, accordingly, for the predicament confronting the democracies to-day. On the cessation of hostilities any advantages the victor may have won by power can be retained only by power, that power, in the international zone, being *force* beyond the law just as, inside the state, it is *power* within the law. But the maintenance of any position thus by force is itself a continuance of war which, as we found, continues on in peace.

The Peace of Versailles, then, was no peace at all but only “das Diktat” of Versailles as the nimble-minded German propagandists contend—but why they should complain that the victor, and not the defeated, did the dictating is less clear. Nor was Versailles an armistice or even a “Waffenstillstand.” Our conclusions in the earlier chapter on armament are here illustrated as accurate. “Armament,” whether Allied or enemy, did not stand still on Armistice Day. The campaign continued to proceed on other planes upon which the German Leviathan launched offensive after offensive even while German representatives were preparing to accept

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the Treaty of Versailles which they signed even as they signed Locarno. At Versailles a new and important development took place in the technique of Leviathan, that was all.

The subsequent trouble arose because in certain respects Versailles was not "Diktat" enough. To overwhelm Leviathan in battle and then stake all on pacifying him with unusually favourable terms proffered with Christian forbearance in the hope that they will be accepted by the enemy with gratitude to be proved by his never causing any further trouble, is to overlook that human nature is more unbridled in Leviathan than elsewhere. Be, therefore, as merciful as you like, but, when dealing with Leviathan, and particularly if he is the challenger, still more so if he is an apostle of the Power-Method or Power-God, be on your guard, however merciful. The time for pacifism, if ever, is before the sacrifice, not afterwards. To turn pacifist at the peace-making is to betray the dead. Any such disposition at that moment proceeds either from infamous ignorance or else spurious anxiety to get back at once on to nodding terms with God. It asks those defeated by power to accept power not only as the sole criterion of justice but also as the measurer of penalty for injustice. If the defeated were not the aggressor, then a diminution of the spoliation proposed can hardly be expected to convert his view or mood from that of an opponent. If, on the other hand, the defeated happened to be Leviathan raging, rampant and totalitarian, even less so still. The steps taken on the Armistice Day of every war must, therefore, be steps towards law—and law certainly requires the maintenance by power of the position won. If they are only steps towards pacifism, then they lead backward toward Armageddon where, sooner or later, they will surely arrive.

The fundamental error is in confusing trial by combat, as it once took place within the reign of law in the state, with trial by combat in the realm of lawless, international anarchy where there is nothing *except the same force that secured the victory to maintain the result*. Overthrow in itself is not likely to produce change of heart, still less to produce change of spirit, when the overthrown is Leviathan whose

Leviathanic Spirit is his stock-in-trade. The attempt to overcome such violence by reason or moral principle and thereby achieve spiritual conversion is bound to fail for it is met by unprincipled power directed by a political authority only too aware that his power is usurped and whose programme, therefore, is planned, and proceeds, not according to reason but directly against reason—that is, according to might. The prospect of the victor turned pacifier at the peace-making becomes darkest of all when overthrown Leviathan is a totalitarian specialist bent on enforcing some warped ideology of the state by the force-method of war on all sides. There, where no exceptions are acknowledged, at the end the pacifist will be offered either the mould of all totalitaria or death. Leviathan, the defeated, may be charmed by the pacifist conqueror into stillness for a time—but the eggs the serpent hatches are hardly likely to prove a dove's.

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It does not seem to be everywhere appreciated that totalitarianism is not the manifestation, throughout the state, of fullest life in its every aspect. On the contrary, it is the subjugation of life in all aspects, except one, to the supreme object of the state—the object misrepresented by Leviathan as power but which ought to be, and was intended to be, justice to which power is merely an aid. The totalitarian Leviathan is essentially military-minded and, apt at ruses and stratagems, is necessarily a whole-hearted liar, the Leviathanic procedure being to reject the truth as the mask of a lie, and to insist on the lie as welcome truth.

In recent years some honest, German minds have freely admitted that the mobilization which, by such methods, prior to the Great War, had been effected of the hearts and consciences of the German people and of their will for sacrifice and suffering, had proceeded incomparably farther there than elsewhere in Europe and that, accordingly, the chief responsibility for the outbreak of the War was Germany's, just as it is to-day for a similarly purposeful mobilization now proceeding. Subsequent denial of guilt, as, for instance, found in *Mein Kampf*, is, for the most part, trans-

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parently motived and Leviathanic. Such is but a smoke-screen intended to cover the all-important fact that the only way in which Germany outclasses the remaining Powers is in her psychological preparation for another holocaust. Taught to worship war as a god, Nazis are never, least of all in their most devotional moments, far from the notion of "kill or be killed" which so easily undergoes the fatalistic transformation of "kill and be killed."

Truly the outlook would be gloomy indeed if the defenders had to compete in psychological training of this sort. Fortunately they do not. Psychology, now also become a developed science, has already revealed that, however carefully nursed, the red mental mood will pale down to pink and become bleached even to bloodlessness through repeated assaults upon the stomach. An important part of the counter-offensive, therefore, must be economic.

To wage successful war with totalitarian Leviathan it is necessary to remember that the line of his economic advance will be in the direction of more means to more power, in the first stages iron power ranking ahead even of petrol power. This is seen in the fact that, on the outbreak of the Great War, Germany was not much behind Russia in accessibility to iron-ore whereas, at the moment of her seizure of Austria, her supply was roughly only one-sixteenth of Russia's. The German people, it is true, could easily have arranged to procure the ore peacefully and, moreover, could have been furnished with the means of paying for it if they had not been led by their Leviathan to abuse what leniency and courtesy they have received from time to time. But in war this provisional accommodation admittedly would not apply—whence it is possible to deduce the direction of Germany's next advance. In its second stage, "Drang nach Osten" is "Drang nach Petroleum."

It is hardly disputable that the German Leviathan's advance, which was psychologically being prepared even on Armistice Day in 1918, would have continued whatever the terms of Versailles had been. The sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow apparently was deliberately contrived and decided upon as supplying a psychological urge back

to war, just as was the publicity purposefully given to the act of Pastor Niemöller in refusing to hand over to the Allies his engine of war and death. If such a piece of effrontery and impertinence had been staged by a vanquished foe, particularly if he had been the challenger, the Nazis would certainly have shot those concerned and quite probably have bombarded the civilian towns nearest to the scene of affront, "just to make up" as they did recently in the Spanish Civil War.

The tragedy of the Peace was not the Versailles Treaty at all, but the stupendous blunder of the Allies who, having the opportunity to extend the reign of law at least across a large part of Europe or, in any event across Germany, did not make the most of it. Germany should have been taken over economically and her people succoured but through measures of control ensuring that they remained free to hear the truth—that greatest educating influence of all. That present paramount obstacle to the removal of the German menace, and, indeed, to the solution of the German problem—barriers of censorship higher than the tariff walls that have shut the German people off from the truth as from the help of those wishing to befriend them—would never have been raised. If economic power had been maintained and the free circulation of facts had been secured, then the pathetic plea of the French for additional help against Germany in case of attack would not have been necessary because the Allied power would have maintained control and remained paramount. In short, the victory should have been held—chiefly on the economic plane. The earliest responsibility for it not having been so held falls on the shoulders of the United States, who, even before the Peace terms were settled, proceeded to dissemble her economic organizations that played so important a part in securing victory. Victorious democracy there and elsewhere tried to get back to business as usual—some in order to forget the war; some, who had been in it, to confirm the miracle. It is of no moment that the motive was clean when democracy failed.

Thus was the victory dissipated—and, of course, not merely the victory of arms but the victory for law and free-

dom. What, in these periodical crises, would the peace-lovers not now give for a clear three months in which to propagate the truth by circulating cardinal facts throughout the length and breadth of Germany and, indeed, of all the totalitarian states—the truth about the Great War and about war itself? There might be added the truth about the present Russian menace, the truth concerning the desire of the British people to help the German people whether in regard to colonial possessions or credit or in any other way possible upon honest terms. What would they give for the opportunity to reveal the truth that the re-occupation of the Rhineland was wholly unnecessary, a mere piece of dramatic bluff resorted to for the purpose of consolidating the prestige and increasing the power of Germany's totalitarian Leviathan, seeing that the desired concession had already been agreed upon by the Allies? Or, not least, to demonstrate that the manner of the recent Austrian invasion, similarly unnecessary, was an ugly exhibition of force recognized by the Nazis as more likely to offend than to impress democratic peoples but indispensable if a vast number of Austrians were to become quickly reconciled to their pending servitude.

As things are, and cut off from the facts, patriotic German men of thought have been deprived of all opportunity of arriving at the private view that the Nazi tactic of insinuating assertive forces of unrest in the territory of neighbouring Powers and of responding to contrived cries of succour with Nazi invasion and conquest despite a dozen pledges of German honour to respect that territory, is hardly to prove German worthiness for empire, colonial or otherwise. Given the chance to do so, some of Germany's more fearless intellectuals might at least have assured their countrymen that to emulate Japan in such a policy could only debase their people's word to the level of Oriental duplicity. They might even have dropped a reminder that although international law is as yet meaningless, some meaning, however elastic, must be attached to international morality. Left in the dark, doubtful yet loyal, the perspective of the "over thirties" in the Reich has shrunk to something

near total eclipse while the "under thirties" have none to shrink.

Now it is just this loss of perspective, so often noticeable by anyone re-establishing personal contacts with German friends after a lapse of years, that is quickly rectified without argument or discussion if evidence of the facts is produced. This is why full facts even more than opinions are the propagandist's chief anathema. As an international movement towards peace is compatible only with an advance in common understanding, facts, too, require explanation. Thus it is still being boldly stated that Mr. Frank Buchman, the founder of the Oxford Group Movement, expressed his thanks to God for Hitler. This, however, was before Hitler openly changed his programme and proceeded to oust God from Germany. Truthful statement therefore requires the amplification that, in the circumstances, it remains for Mr. Buchman to convert Hitler and then to thank him for giving back God to Germans.

The astonishing thing is that the more firmly dictators become seated, the more their outlook narrows and shortens. If, in their ambitions, their frontiers include the world, their perspective rarely exceeds that of a "Four Years' Plan." National plans for the self-sufficiency—the all-proficiency—of the racial order are obviously only castles of sand between the tides of which the dictators seem oblivious. Only hard facts, in lieu of education, can introduce these installed demagogues to the eternity that escapes them. An occasional thought of time, of a single century, might cause them to pause before exacting from a people the full cost of a design which, in any event, could hardly last longer than a few years. How very ordinary is the mentality of totalitarian dictators appears in their habit, already formed, of wandering among the departmental corridors rather than out across the open spaces. Perhaps the worst of contemporary totalitarianism is its dictation of low class ideology above which the commonplace mind of the upthrusting demagogue cannot rise unaided—and here it will not be aided. The dictator has failed to recognize, for instance, that when war, already demonstrated to be a Volkskrieg, is dis-

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covered to be in reality a Weltkrieg, only a world victory can leave his dictatorship installed.

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The failure to recognize that whatever things power has secured will stand only if maintained by power and cannot be consolidated into permanent gain by any victory however overwhelming, appears in the speeches of most politicians, in England as elsewhere, who prolong the delusion that the "rule of war" has already arrived. From the context their statement of the delusion usually implies that the rule of law can somehow co-exist with the rule of anarchy. Thus, in his recent declarations of British policy on the occasion of Nazi Germany's planned seizure and absorption of Austria by overwhelming force secretly prepared under camouflage of the German Leviathan's pledges to protect Austria's independence, our realistic Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, referred to "the problem of how to maintain the rule of law in international affairs"—a phraseology which, however imperfect, at least recognizes a paramount difficulty. The Leader of the Labour Opposition, Mr. Attlee, however, clearly thinks that the full and kindly shelter of the rule of law exists at this very moment, and awaits anyone who cares to step in out of the rain of anarchy's bullets and bombs. Overlooking that we have been there all along, Mr. Attlee informed the House of Commons on the same occasion that we were slipping back into world anarchy. Demanding yet another consultation of the Powers "to remove war by removing the causes of war," he overlooked that the chief of those causes is human nature and also that, while one nation can make war, it takes two to carry on a conversation, no consultation, for instance, between Germany and Russia being possible at that moment.

Now Mr. Attlee's view, which is shared by many, is that such changes in the political organization of Europe as may from time to time be necessary, must not be allowed to be brought about "by the *brute force* of one Power acting on its own." But to allege brute force is not to diagnose the

disease. What is brute force and what is power? As we have seen, economic power is not less but more formidable than brute force and may even be irresistible by brute force. The economic offensive is less easily held up, it is confronted by no dividing No Man's Land, nor is its front affected by the weather. The brute force employed in modern war, being mechanical, is far more dreadful and, indeed, inhuman, than the force of the brute beasts themselves who are usually inspired either by natural passion in sex affairs or else by hunger. The planned brutality of massed human nature so far surpasses the cruelty of the brute creation that the brutes might with reason claim their natural "brutality" compares favourably with the natural humanity of mankind. In short, if human nature cannot yet be checked unless by assembled power, how then can power be assembled without assembling human nature? That is the problem of Leviathan.

Now any world-plan for peace must plan for labour as well as for raw materials. Beneath Mr. Attlee's hand, therefore, is the lever of a very human power, industrial and economic, by moving which the right way he can help on the advance to the reign of law not only in England but in Germany, Spain and Russia as well. It is the rule of supranational law which alone can effect the desirable objective he has most in mind. By plan, and even intrigue, the workers of the democratic countries must be led to unite with their brothers in the totalitarian states, for the true interests of the German worker do not differ from those of the British worker. If, in more normal times, ten thousand British families had adopted or been adopted by ten thousand German families, then it is fair to assume that twenty thousand points of view in both countries might be nearer to the vital standpoint than they are to-day. Similarly Mr. Attlee's working-class mothers in England might pair off with German mothers and compare notes as to which government is the more bent on war. The Vocational Labour Congresses and Conventions of earlier times might meet fraternally on the Continent once more and, upon the basis of affinity of service, come to see and know one another's homes and what divides them besides Leviathan. As struggle

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and poverty make their witness, the more eloquent through silence, language need not be an insuperable barrier. Before the totalitarian dictatorships arrived, the various members of such international congresses afforded considerable mutual service, as, for instance, that of securing a proper wage level and avoiding the sweated labour of competition. For such advantages to the rank and file of humanity the compensations of the closed economy systems of the totalitarians are a poor substitute. When the reserves give out, their frontiers proving too small, the totalitarians have to expand them by force of armament. In so doing they end no rule of law but only increase the tempo of war in peace.

While Mr. Attlee is quite right in saying that there is widespread, economic evil, he is quite wrong in assuming that we shall get peace if the economic situation is "dealt with" along proposed lines of distribution of economic wealth. There is a mentality that does not desire peace, a mentality, moreover, whose régime the reign of peace would automatically end. Leviathan is not agreeable to being put out of business which is that of contending, as a matter of routine, against other Leviathans and of using power not as the basis of law within the state but as the instrument of policy to intensify and prolong anarchy beyond. In 1914 Germany was a wealthy creditor nation enjoying great economic wealth and, what economic troubles she had, were due chiefly to her ambitious programme and to her desire for mastery over other peoples. The sufferings of her humbler classes were brought about by their own German Leviathan's spirit of violence against which they eventually arose and which might have remained permanently overthrown if the British workers had united themselves with their German brothers while they were still free. If that had been done they would not have succumbed to Leviathan re-dressed up as national socialism totalitarianized. Moving more on the economic plane than ever, man, the worker, no less than man, the spirit, demands democracy for his welfare, but only a democracy which can hold out to him the prospect of ensured welfare and unhazarded spiritual

growth. To achieve this, the New Democracy, opposed alike to raciality as to nationalism, can succeed, as it can exist, only internationally.

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This truth supplies the real basis to the inference of the present Leader of the British Labour Party that an important part of the vicious world circle of war, want, greed and satiety, is economic. Indeed, once the circle is circuited, economic evil follows war as war follows economic evil. But what is overlooked by Mr. Attlee and others is that economic evil is most of all the result of economic war; and that war, as we have seen, whether it be war in war or war in peace, whether military war or economic war, whether monopolistic war, collective war, tariff war, or any other sort of war, can be ended only by the right choice of that fixed alternative—law or war. It cannot be ended by economic tribute or division of spoil, still less can it be transformed into real peace.

Now Mr. Attlee's suggestion for a world conference rests the main hope on the prospect of a single centre of economic gravity being fairly and durably ascertained by a number of Leviathans each of whom, however, is out to accumulate every means of power in order to obtain more power—a strange expectancy. Without being constrained by supreme power they, least of all creations, are hardly likely to be self-bound by such voluntary concord. On the contrary they declare, in the plainest terms, that they will not be bound. Nor, unless confronted by states so united through real fusion of interests and risks as to promise a rock-like stand in the face of the extremity of peril, are they ever likely to be restrained—and that is a fusion not yet actually visible on any horizon.

The League of Nations, strangely thought by some to have effected such union, proceeded merely to illustrate the changelessness of human nature. The German Leviathan, who lightly reduced his agreements to scraps of paper in 1914, reveals the same characteristic, but considerably developed, twenty years after his defeat. The more he is

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defeated the more Leviathan is the same thing. Leviathanism, therefore, must be not merely defeated but held.

The broad conclusion is that only the reign of law can end the economic disease, for, however correct the economic diagnosis, unless it is applied in law, there will be no *administration* of the remedy. That conclusion is not narrowed one inch by the indisputable truth that, in many instances, the economic cause of unrest may turn out to be not greed but want in its most terrible form—want remediable only by widened planning such as is possible only in a widened sphere of operating economic law. By a change in the fashion of women's clothes the margin between life and starvation may turn in favour of people in one part of the world and against those in another. It appears that, through it being found possible to turn cattle out into the fields in the mild winter of 1929, thousands of peasants in Manchuria starved because the winter demand for their soya beans fell off.¹ Again, an economic enquiry might result in the finding that the economic case for China is stronger than the economic case for Japan, but from the standpoint of New Japan this might be disputed. The need, therefore, is not only to ensure that a nation shall not judge its own case—economic or any other—or merely that a nation shall not rectify an unhealthy economic position at the expense of another nation even less able to bear it. The crux of the matter is that the axiom that the reign of law cannot co-exist with the reign of war, applies even more to the economic sphere than elsewhere. This is so because, although in the first stages of the Commonwealth of Nations in all probability the economic sphere will remain divided, nevertheless that sphere must eventually be left undivided in order to yield the best results. Through being adversely affected in its running by friction in any part, the economic world machine can be eased down. By a collision of integral parts it can even be brought to a standstill.

From whatever angle it is examined, the contention that economic war can be ended only by economic law is thus

¹ See article by C. Delisle Burns: "The Need for National and International Planning," *Problems of Peace*, Vol. IV.

no more than an aspect of the larger truth that economic evil, however much or little it appears to be the cause of hostilities open or menaced, is a symptom of the reign of war that can be ended only by the reign of law. So, again, we arrive back at the absolute alternative—law or war. Mr. Attlee's suggestion amounts, therefore, to the avoidance of that alternative, for it contemplates the removal of war not by law but by economic tribute or the division of spoil—the arbiter upon the question of amount being force. Similarly, on a little thought it becomes clearer than ever that the reign of law across the economic field can never be inaugurated permanently by the outcome of a single war. However stupendous the victory it does not convert human nature. And if the advance of law over the economic field is not consolidated and maintained, the forces of war will reassemble and throw back the law. Law and war are incompatibles, mutually antagonistic, and not complementary. They cannot reign together.

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On what fronts must the progress be held? The advance to the reign of law must be held on all fronts, the military front, the economic front, and the spiritual which is the chief front. The wrestle being not against flesh and blood alone but against principalities, to secure peace it is necessary to utilize the whole armour of God.

Now increasingly in these years it becomes evident that God is a God of law no less than a God of love or of understanding. The law of economic justice, as distinguished from economic laws in the sense of natural laws, requires, for its proper functioning, the full reign of supra-national law the arrival of which depends on the expansion to world-power of power assembled in the first instance along the front of the New Democracy—a front no less spiritual than economic.

It would appear that if power is indispensable to law, then the more power available for the law the better. This, however, is true only of power accumulated to the same end, and not of competitive power distributed among Leviathanic rival Powers—hence the need to distinguish between the

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armament race to means of violence and the race to power for law. That there is a limit to armament expense which any credit structure can stand is still true despite the fact that countries like Nazi Germany, in deplorable financial condition, have somehow managed to arm and thereafter menace their richer neighbours; for it is improbable that this would still prove feasible if all nations were poor, all were armed, all were dictatorships, and there were no rich democracies available to absorb the shock. Marauders maraud only when they stand to gain more than they stand to lose thereby. They cease to maraud when they have a good deal to lose. They incur this risk only at the instance of power. Unless deterred by power the more they have the more they seek. They want wealth to increase their power and power to increase their wealth.

Spengler's conclusion that the sword alone can overcome money must, therefore, be qualified, for both are forms of power and, in the reign of war they are inseparable allies, their names Mammon and Caesar. It is only in the reign of law that supreme power can remove Mammon, the paramount economic evil (Spengler's money), by controlling the economic order.

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That economic stability is not effected merely by a successful war or maintained by economic warfare is emphasized at the end of my book on reparations,¹ that aftermath tale of disaster and misfortune with its background of suffering which illuminated—

“A fundamental principle of construction hidden until now in the architecture of the world—the truth that tariff walls aggressively built in a vain attempt to stem the ebb and flow of industrial tides inevitable to life are a greater curse than armaments.”

Nor can economic evil be ended by economic violence in war terminating in dictated economic adjustment among nations according to proved capacity for violence, for the

¹ Edward Mousley: *A British Brief: England's Reparation Victims and War Debt* (1932), p. 201.

need to readjust once more would arise as power increased or diminished. It can be ended only by planning within the reign of law. When one is considering the form and manner in which the Commonwealth of Nations may begin to take its earliest shape, this conclusion must be remembered.

Thus while the problem of war cannot be reduced to a problem of economics, nor the problem of economic evil be ended by war, the new economic order which might end both is possible only in the reign of law—and that is approached by the advance of what I have called the New Democracy. The advance made can be held, as all law is held, only by supreme power. It is, therefore, the outstanding opportunity as it is the supreme responsibility of Christendom to aid this power which is directed towards the shielding and liberating of man's spirit and, at the same time, is directed towards his physical well-being. So far the efforts of the Church and Christian forces have been wholly inadequate to the occasion. As never before, the Church must now be alert and adroit to repulse the attack which is being organized against that liberation. The revolution, vast and sweeping, that is proceeding in the spiritual as well as in the political realm, cannot be stopped. It must be directed by democratic Christianity, failing which it will take the road of the totalitarians and accept the labelling and signposting of the dictators.

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But what, here, is meant by democratic Christianity? What sort of transformation will it effect in the life of the individual as of the nation? On this further questioning when the horizon once more breaks and we find ourselves looking out upon the boundlessness of the future, there comes opportunely the reminder that law, like the political society, indeed, like life itself, is a growth. There is and can be no finality of Christian view, no limit to Christian democracy, no fixed polarity of thought, no straight line of human advance so long as man remains a spirit. The political element, the legal element, are not in question here. The province of law, as law, is not to set Christian

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commandments or to secure the regimentation of spiritual life but to further the reign of order through the administration of justice replacing unchecked anarchy. So long as this is secured, Christian democracy aims at leaving the individual free, democratic Christianity enjoining spiritual service to that end in what begins to resemble a crusade. Not conversion but rescue back to religious liberty to accept or reject is the meaning of the call. The mind of man is lost in the massed-million mind, his spirit in the Leviathanic Spirit. Deprived of self-control he now rejects responsibility and this is the final surrender and degradation of man. Thus, submerging that supreme purpose of Christianity—the self-development of the individual human spirit—totalitarianism is seen to be hostile to Christianity, and Christian totalitarianism therefore to be a contradiction in terms. Here, too, events are moving towards contest.

This, at the moment (1938), is evident in Germany, where the phraseology of Christianity is utilized by Leviathan to camouflage a revived mythology several centuries old. To Rosenberg, the cultural propagandist of Nazidom, Christian love and compassion are well-displaced by Nazi honour, Nazi pride, Nazi strength and Nazi self-reliance. Christian love and the protection of the weak, he is said to have declared on a recent occasion,¹ are bad selective principles, his contention being that a religion of love is no basis for a state, seeing that this love for the weak soon becomes exploitation of the weak.

This view is less interesting as confirmatory of the shadier side of human nature than as revelatory of Rosenberg's distorted ideas of love and of democracy to both of which he obstinately maintains that God is opposed—God being Nazidom personified. It is clear that, to Rosenberg, Christian love means little more than sentimental regard—that may be a charge against Christendom but cannot dispose of Christianity which is not yet manifest on earth, being something that beckons man onward. If, as it should be, Christian love is understood as service, then Rosenberg's contention collapses. Similarly, he conceives democracy as

¹ Keller: *Religion and the Human Mind*, p. 100.

primarily based on and preserving the equality of all men; that is to say, for him democracy is a leveller. On the contrary its essential element, as we have found, is the safeguarding of the possibility of spiritual growth to every individual however humble. Democracy does not level but safeguard and release. It is totalitarianism which levels and, tragically enough, levels by lowering.

The Christian democracy of the future which I have called the New Democracy will neither define nor limit Christianity in principle or precept. What it will include will be these essential elements of Christianity—service and spiritual freedom—a basis so broad that men of widely divergent creeds and outlook can there find common ground. It will be a new essay in Christianity only in its more direct and active concern with the advance to the reign of law which alone can secure the growth of that for which Christianity, in its fullest implication, stands. The truth is that, in essence, Rosenberg's so-called new religion is neither religious nor spiritual but purely political. His contribution, politically directive toward political ends, is suspect in sincerity. Nevertheless, in spite of this feature and of its superficiality, it has served the good purpose of showing the perils that follow when Caesar begins to sort out the things which are God's.

Having decided upon the Method-War as an end in itself, the Nazis cast about for paraphernalia passing off Method as spiritual End. So they decided to disinter Luther—an astoundingly ignorant man on the subject of political theory, who may not have heard of jurisprudence and clearly never considered what the reign of law involves. From Luther's assertions the Nazis deduce the divine right of the dictator to rule by usurped might. Now, in contending that the rule of the sovereign by divine right and his personal responsibility to God are alike incompatible with democratic society, Luther's intention certainly was not to deprive the individual of the main hope and significance which Christianity bears for him. His plea was really that the leadership of the people should be Christian and, therefore, he emphasized the responsibility of that leadership to the God

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of the Reformation. It is far more likely that Luther would have seen little to choose between many German, so-called spiritual interpreters of to-day and the Devil at which he hurled the ink. And it is hardly in doubt that, with unblinkered eyes regarding the battle now fairly joined, Luther would prefer Pope Pius XI to Rosenberg as interpreter of man's spirituality.

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But, when this is said, all is not said. As the natural direction taken by the thought in this very enquiry indicates, the contest of man in his struggle in the world—which has become a contest against Leviathan instead of for Leviathan—is fundamentally a spiritual issue. The revolution now taking place in Europe, and most of all in Germany, is a new-born spiritual revolution of the utmost importance for the world. Upon the right steering of this revolution depends the hope of a strong spiritual revival on the flood of which the next great advance to peace may well take place. The interesting fact is not that the torrential anti-Christianity of the Rosenberg variety is in full spate, or that the Christian forces in Germany are split a hundredfold in an array of uncompromising doctrinaires, theorists, and exemplars; but that in Germany—a fact apparently passing almost unnoticed—the Christian forces stand on common ground with the anti-Christian forces in accepting, as End, that which is only Method—the Method War.

According to Bergmann, God is the force god, a natural god, that is to say, the god in nature—which is a somewhat stale idea. Hersch considers that, however supernatural God may be, when He stepped down upon the scene of natural history He thereby took a hand in human destiny, and is doing so still. The evangelical followers of Karl Barth, who uphold the traditional religion and are as much opposed to all rival Christian bodies as they are to the interference of the Nazis, take their stand as dialecticians rather than upon the essentials of Christianity assailed by the Nazis.

The most authentic and final words of Christ were always

most clear in their simplification. There is ground wide enough for all Christians, orthodox and unorthodox, to take a stand as a unified force upon Christ's final interpretation, "Thy neighbour as thyself." As Christian unification is one of the first world movements necessary before the advance to law can get under way, there is no time to be lost; for the Reformation has become the Deformation. The sequence must be spiritual revelation, then revolution in the political society directed toward that end—the reign of law supporting a new economic order.

The overthrow of nationalist, totalitarian and Mammonistic Leviathan may well involve the prior cleansing and consolidation of Christendom itself—a reorientation to true spiritual end, not a mere re-formation. Here construction in one quarter precedes demolition in another. The Christly purpose is not served by the mere downfall of others.

It is obvious that that purpose is working through all, perhaps most of all in the problem of war. Not as a rival political creed then, but as a menace to the forward, spiritual movement already under way, can Leviathan's challenge be taken up. He it is that, in Satanic blasphemy, has taken for political exploitation the words of that supreme utterance of Christ: "I have overcome the world," to be used as a Nazi ultimatum to the human spirit. Wherever found, before his onslaught succeeds, Leviathan the Anti-Christ must be destroyed.

ALTHOUGH they can be neither formulated nor framed, nevertheless some general conclusions are possible. It is clear that a mere theory cannot change human nature or influence the course of history; but equally clear that, while human nature cannot be changed, it can nevertheless be controlled. Likewise it is clear that while violence presupposes power, the power that alone subdues violence is not necessarily violent if, by violence, is meant the brutal use and not merely the unjudicial use of power. Given sufficient power it follows that violence—whatever its scale or degree—can be subjugated just as crime is pursued and rounded up in the most modern democracy. It would therefore be correct to amplify the statement that violence always wins, with the truism that there is no reason why it always should. As the juristic order continues to emerge, so it will be more accurate to say that power wins, that is to say the power of the law through the power behind the law.

What, in the light of this essential truth, well-meaning people lament as the failure of the League of Nations, is seen to be nothing else than the League's limitation. The League has no more failed than has a biped that has not been able to walk on four feet. A good deal of the difficulty in focussing the problem is due to the prevailing ignorance of the nations' leaders on the subject of jurisprudence which only recently has claimed attention—and to the fact that jurisprudence itself belongs to the future rather than to the past.

Some of the most eminent thinkers have completely missed this approach to the world-problem of war. In large, portentous phraseology, men in the most influential positions, as, for instance, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs himself (Mr. Eden), demand a return to the "rule of law." Even Dr. Inge, in rejecting the possibility of the world state, is assured that the future order will be that of absolutely "independent states." Such large and inaccurate declarations can only further mislead a befogged world, and the more particularly when the audience, being inter-

national, and including patriotic people in several countries, takes this to mean that some other notion of the rule of law is to be forced on them in preference to their own. The falsity which (however unintentionally), is being propagated is thus not single but multiplied.

It is, therefore, with relief that one finds, on turning to one of the most important surveys written in our generation, that jurisprudence, for once, has not been overlooked. It is true that, in the course of his wide and searching investigation terminating in its terrible warning, Spengler touches only on the fringe of this subject; but he does so sufficiently to indicate the importance of the unexplored path. That he did not proceed farther is itself evidence that the trail has not been blazed for the general traveller; and the path-finding specialist finds nothing but the path. To catch up to exploratory thought along this jurisprudential approach to the ultimate problem is the most urgent task for constructive thinkers at this moment, and, as Spengler himself hints, in the immediate future. As he maintains, in order to be most valuable the needed contribution must be something more than mere speculation. In regarding the world of actual affairs, the discoloration of the creative thought required is likely to be far less if the thinker has had the good fortune to add to his thought experience an experience in practical affairs—whether the latter directly relates to the former or not. What is required is not only a balanced and symmetrical argument but elimination and adjustment with a view to practical application; and this proceeds only from an eye seeing at a glance what is practical in the contents of the reasoned thought. Jurisprudence, the science of law which regulates human conduct, provides the test.

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The distance between points where great minds finally arrive on the heights before which stretches the outlook for humanity, seems as nothing if compared with the width of the gulf between the thought of any one man and its possible application in action. It is not difficult to pass, by thought, into the undefiled air of Plato's idealism or into the timeless

eternity where Goethe's faith wanders—or impossible even to sense that spell-like oblivion to the surrounding scene of evil that is mysteriously shed by those words of life breathed after death—"I have overcome the world." What world is that? Is it the world which God so loved that He gave His Only Begotten Son?

If the chasm dividing the outer world of Action from the inner world of Thought is to be left unbridged even in the mind, then we can never cross at all, and thought itself offers no escape. In that case, for flesh-clinging humanity, there is hope only in death—the philosophy of frustration, not of liberation.

That this chasm constantly yawned before Spengler and influenced his thought—more, perhaps, than that of any other great thinker of modern times—is evidenced in the zeal and direction of his research. He finds time to point out, *en passant*, that, as few could afford to be Stoics in ancient days, some people were perforce, and by such a materialistic factor, turned towards Christianity.

Now it is because this chasm seems most unbridgeable in moments of swift crisis that humanity precipitately and erratically divides—a division that is tragical because the decision is crucial. On the one side they head for the fool's paradise of a fancied Utopia in which they only pretend to believe, and on the other side they not only accept the war of anarchy with all speed and whatever its price, but embrace it.

If not without some conceit, still as an intellectual of honesty and fearlessness to whom no Utopia beckoned, Spengler finally took the alternative road. But he did so when on the verge of an important twofold discovery which he only just failed to make—the discovery, firstly, that only power within the law can vanquish violence beyond the law, known as war; and, secondly, that such power alone can support a world-order in which it becomes possible for human life to assume its desired form—whether the units of that world-order be large or small, whether its criteria be standardized *for* many or particularized *by* each few.

Spengler found truly that power can be overcome only

by power and not by a theory minus power—nor did he exclude spiritual power. He found, too, that only the sword can end the dictatorship of money—which, however, is true only if money is not converted into organized power as the fall of the Jews bears witness. His final word is that just as the—

“Hague Conference of 1907 was the prelude to the World War, the Washington Conference of 1921 will have been that of other wars. The history of these times is no longer an intellectual march of wits in elegant forms for pluses and minuses, from which either side can withdraw when it pleases. The alternatives now are to stand fast or to go under—there is no middle course. The only moral that the logic of things permits to us now is that of the climber on the face of the crag—a moment’s weakness and all is over . . . To-day all ‘philosophy’ is nothing but an inward abdication and resignation or a craven hope of escaping realities by means of mysticism. It was just the same in Roman times. Tacitus tells us how the famous Musonius Rufus tried, by exhortations on the blessings of peace and the evils of war, to influence the legions that in 70 stood before the gates of Rome, and barely escaped alive from their blows. The military commander Avidius Cassius called the Emperor Marcus Aurelius ‘a philosophical old woman.’ ”¹

This is but the over-statement of truth. And then Spengler draws the conclusion:

“It falls to us to live in the most trying times known to the history of a great culture. The last race to keep its form, the last living tradition, the last leaders who have both at their back, will pass through and onward, victors.”

Those words, although recent, have already proved prophetic. Unwelcomed by the Nazis although the clairvoyant of a new Caesarism, Spengler did not live to see the Nazi technique proven in the overthrow of Austria, but it would not have surprised him in the least. So he leaves suspended before us, like the sword of Damocles, the question, Victors for what? Whether, as Spengler says, under democracy money has won, there is little doubt that, as he says too, money is the hall-mark of present democracy, or, at

¹ Spengler: *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 430.

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least, the hall-mark in that democracy. That is why, as I have said, there is call for the New Democracy, one that will supply the end that beings like Spengler desire but which, nevertheless, his philosophy does not indicate will ever be reached, for there, too, the End would be lost in the Method—War. Further, in order to “keep its form,” unless precautions are taken, mankind will degenerate into the very machine Spengler so much hated and feared, and the only survivors of an ordeal of ruthlessness will, in the process, have become de-created to something lower than the animals—and in lot far less enviable—because even then man will have been left self-conscious still.

This view is by no means far-fetched. Indeed, I am convinced that there is a limit in the mental struggle and nervous strain of prolonged war beyond which the reason of man, his very sanity, cannot remain enthroned. Thus “those that pass through and onward” may be “victors” surviving the shambles but, all the same, possibly only gibbering sub-men, their survival value proved by proficiency in ruthlessness and by death of imagination that could not stand it. Into their keeping alone human destiny henceforth would pass, and, except possibly in some far cycle, ice-age distant and ice-age long, humanity would cease to count. Man, heading back for the dark cave, might even be passed on the way by the next oncoming *homo sapiens*.

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The suggestion that the door leading away from that dark prospect to a new world order can be opened only by the key of jurisprudence would be fantastic indeed. It cannot, however, be denied that the possibility of the same awful prospect remains if the present array of national independent states be regarded as everlasting, for that would perpetuate a world order which would stabilize the war of the Leviathans as an institution terminating only with the metamorphosis of human nature on earth. Spengler, it is true, any more than others, did not recognize, let alone break through, the traditionally narrow and false conceptions of sovereignty or of statehood. Nevertheless, his

salutary warning is a serviceable counter-blast to those hollow slogans and parrot phrases—"collective security," "the existing rule of law," "the fully independent state," "illimitable sovereignty" and so forth. The work of this great mind prepares humanity for what it has to meet and, much as he might have been startled to hear it, prepares mankind for the earning of liberation through man accepting his destiny as transfixed by the Cross of Christ; for it is only at the very intersection of the Cross that the outer temporal life, which is sometimes called reality, touches, and is resolved into, the life of the spirit. It is here at the Cross where the two planes meet that sacrifice is enjoined—the sacrifice of the things of this world for the new world order.

To Spengler, as to a good many of us, God is largely unrevealed and is likely to remain so. For some unknown Divine purpose the momentum of spiritual progress seems increasingly to become the affair of man himself. In order to effect its transformation of the present scene, it may be that the New Democracy could, with advantage, rescue from Spengler's final rhapsody and gloom something of his new Caesarism which, after all, means little else than the spiritual directing of necessary revolution. The usual drawback of revolutions being that they are allowed to take their own course—which is only the haphazard course of violence—it follows that the reasoned revolution of the New Democracy must be planned. It can be planned so as to preserve the human legacy handed on from century to century of faltering progress and of which, in a lament not altogether unlike Mr. Forster's, only far nobler and braver, Spengler takes farewell—nobler because not a sentimental hankering after the past, braver because it faces an ominous future.

Now the point of Spengler's arrival will be altogether missed unless the confronting final paradox is seen as a warning and taken, therefore, as a point of new departure:

"World-history is the world court, and it has ever decided in favour of the stronger, fuller, and more self-assured life decreed to it, namely, the right to exist, regardless of whether its right would hold before a tribunal of waking consciousness. Always it has sacrificed truth and justice to might and

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race, and passed doom of death upon men and peoples in whom truth was more than deeds and justice than power."

But, as we have seen, justice does not necessarily compete with power and is, indeed, conditioned by power. It will bear repeating that violence is power unregulated, uncontrolled, and wholly undirected to any supreme end. The pacifist preaches "the power of non-violence"¹ while Spengler in despair reads history as violence itself. What both overlook is *the non-violence of power*. Adequate power, whether regarded as the basis of law or as its forerunner, is superior to violence outside the law that opposes law.

In his heart Spengler felt the truth which he could not see. Even when, his vision ending, he prepares blindly to follow Caesar, his ear interprets "the Caesarism that is to succeed," as approaching "with quiet, firm step. . . ."²

Quiet, firm step! That is hardly Hitlerism of which the corresponding paraphrase would be rather the flutter and screech of Harpy—the rapacious and noisy bird-woman, the very plunderer-will that Spengler spurned, and which he looked to law to control:

"Law needs, in order to resist this onslaught, a high tradition and ambition of strong families, that find satisfaction not in the heaping up of riches but in the tasks of true rulership above and beyond all money-advantage."

Only as the crudest forerunner of the New Caesarism by which it would be quickly effaced, is Hitlerism likely to prove creative in history. As such it may after all be turned to account ultimately for the New Democracy which, in some features, Spengler's new Caesarism obviously resembles. It would have to be a democracy that looked like one day giving back to man at least his integrity as a complete unit of consciousness, instead of leaving him a being divided by the discord between his spiritual values which decree the sacrifices for law and earthly values by which men and nations cling to vital interests that perpetuate war.

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¹ See Gregg: *The Power of Non-Violence*.

² Spengler: *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 507.

In the meantime, while the dialecticians dispute whether Heaven may ever be on earth or must remain beyond, the dictators have been the first to sense the determination of man that, in any event, there shall not be Hell on earth, or, at any rate, not the old unchanged Hell—and the success of the dictators has largely lain in their exploitation of this determination along the very lines which Mr. Christopher Dawson describes and which, indeed, both he and Mr. Lionel Curtis equally deprecate.

The question is not one of intellectual or spiritual poise but rather how far the spiritual forces available can be united to reinforce power on the side of law in the contest for the spirit of man which has already begun. No doubt, as Mr. Christopher Dawson says, social idealism tends to confuse religious and political categories to the danger of the former, and there is the risk that the stimulus to Christianity of social betterment might destroy the transcendental element which is the essence of the spiritual order. Well, if the powers of Christianity are not sufficiently robust to face that risk, they are hardly worth assembling. The contrary is the case.

It is true that Mr. Dawson equally holds that religion ought not to be segregated from practical life and that self-interest ought not to be given free-play. But he also says in another place that political religion is an offence alike to religion and to politics, and that the only real politics are the politics of the world to come. Unfortunately no one knows what are the politics of the world to come, nor does Mr. Dawson enlighten us, nor can the Pope. Before we can legislate rightly we must know what the right is. It is because no two people would agree what is right in all circumstances that there has arisen the science of jurisprudence for the regulation of human affairs so that man can follow the right so far as it is expected of him and in so far as he can. And if Mr. Dawson means that politics cannot properly be so called until we reach the next world, then we must find another name for them here.

Now however distinct for the individual the two circles of religion and politics may seem to remain prior to the

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last phase of war's violence, it is at the moment of the tragic witness of the holocaust itself that their two rims inevitably meet, for beyond that point man can no longer preserve his duality. Then at least is he—unconsciously or consciously, according as he is personally involved or a spectator—re-unified and become single-minded in the most fearful, the most private struggle of human consciousness. He emerges in no doubt whatever that, although we may not know what are the politics of the World to Come, we can be pretty certain that they neither cater for nor tolerate war.

The Christly injunction is for service, which, it will be remembered, is the interpretation at which we finally arrived of love for one's neighbour. And our neighbour is whomsoever we can help. Those who accept this can offer a basis for Christian democracy throughout the world.

Now Mr. Christopher Dawson, like others, does not see democracy in this way but as an absolute equality of identical units. Few will disagree with him that any such equality is a fiction, and that democracy in that sense might offer little more than a free arena for individuals to wrestle for money—money, that very factor which Spengler went so far as to maintain that only the sword can destroy.

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Mr. Dawson has rightly emphasized the importance of the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pius XI in opposing the totalitarian invasion of the spiritual realm. The prospect that offers, however, is no less than the conversion of Nazidom itself to Christianity. While the Nazis are concentrating on exploiting isolated Nazi minorities in other lands, there is a great spiritual majority in Germany itself which is being oppressed and victimized. To release them is the duty of Christendom. To this end it is of no disadvantage that Catholicism, in the words of Mr. Dawson, "is by no means hostile to the authoritarian idea of the state," for this means that the Catholic-Nazi issue is single and plain. But further, as we have seen, the increasing tendency everywhere must be for larger state-control by state-planning and eventually world-control by world-planning. The important consideration is on what lines shall that control be applied;

and, in so far as control can mean leadership, then on what lines can spiritual control be included.

We must, however, reject the extreme position advanced by this writer whose further doctrine is that the ruler is not merely representative of a people but has an authority independent of them and is directly responsible only to God. This would inevitably result in Leviathan everywhere asserting not merely "direct responsibility to God" but absolute authority from God. From that claim to the appropriation of the Godhead would be only a matter of time and opportunity as Hitler has already begun to prove.

Mr. Dawson then proceeds to affirm that the ruler's "primary duty is not to fulfil the wishes of a people but to govern justly and well . . ." an interpretation of the doctrine which discloses its peril for mankind, but also usefully reveals that, at the outset, the task confronting civilization is primarily one of jurisprudence, as the question of the direction of government is dependent on the problem of war the solution of which lies in the reign of law. Now it is germane to my thesis that the reign of law will be most feasibly approached by some form of New Christian Democracy. While avoiding making God into a politician, Mr. Dawson's doctrine might well result in turning the politician into God who alone, presumably, can dispense justice without a court. To decide the welfare of a people without considering their approval and, also, obtaining it—possibly only after their enlightenment—robs man of that spiritual prerogative, his right of self-liberation, and lets the ruler off his supreme, democratic duty to educate those whom he rules. Leadership, instead of dictation, is the hallmark of Christian democracy.

On the other hand, in his *Civitas Dei*,¹ Mr. Lionel Curtis informs us that he wrote the book as the result of coming across these lines of Francis Thompson :

"Not where the wheeling systems darken
And our benumbed conceiving soars!—
The drift of pinions, would we hearken,
Beats at our own clay-shuttered doors!"

¹ Lionel Curtis: *Civitas Dei*, Vol. III, p. 127.

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We are left free to infer that he draws therefrom the moral that man is centred here and presumably escapes from here only in his intellectual flights but not to anywhere in particular, least of all to the somewhere of Mr. Christopher Dawson. Life here is, or can be made, all spirit-sufficing and apparently without revolutionary change—in *Civitas Dei* the problem of war is hardly mentioned. Authoritarian appeal to poetic lines is, of course, an unrestricted business however venturesome, but any plea that present life here is good and can be recommended so long as it is regarded with the eyes of the spirit, will certainly be rejected by the average man as a trap.

Now, as it happens, some years before Mr. Curtis wrote his book, these identical lines appeared prefatory to my novel, *Mr. Salt Finds Happiness*, which illuminated a significance almost opposite—the fact that, while life held out two contradictory and incomplete states of being, the better one always seemed to recede before the humble, earnest, yet unimpeded individual who so greatly desired to approach it. In the end, however, after dissatisfaction mounting up to open rebellion had culminated in deliberate effort, there took place a shift of his centre of spiritual gravity to the very core of his being which brought the City of God no nearer but which made vital adjustment through indispensable sacrifice much easier. It brought Mr. Salt at last face to face with the final transmutation—"Where your heart is, there will your treasure be also"—not merely a transposition of view-point or even of values but a transmutation which, so far from being all-sufficing because of sacrifice virtuous in itself, is meaningless and empty of any change of importance apart from the self; meaningful and significant only to the degree of the self-liberation *from* life here, and not in its acceptance. The Heavenly City still beckoned at the end.

What separates Mr. Salt from Mr. Curtis is the distance spanned by necessary revolution, but never by resignation. Such revolution, it may here be interpolated, is not necessarily less spiritual than temporal because it happens to start off with new planning in the economic field.

It is true that before the revolution finds port and the

conflict is resolved, the spirit of Mr. Salt travels a considerable way. At the end his widened outlook may be said to represent in a small degree those stupendous enlargements of life's perspective encompassed through the spirit's foreshortening of the temporal scene that minds like Spengler's envisage in spite of their doubts and even in spite of their rebellion.

"The sword," declares Spengler, "is victorious over the money, the master-will subdues again the plunderer-will. If we call these money powers Capitalism then we may designate as Socialism the will to call into life a mighty politico-economic order that transcends all class interests, a system of lofty thoughtfulness and duty-sense that keeps the whole in fine condition for the decisive battle of its history, and this battle is also the battle of money and law."¹

Here, where his reading of history confronts him with civilization's last conflict as that between "money and blood," Spengler takes his final plunge. In so doing he falls just short of the discovery that, in the battle between "money and law," the decisive factor, being power, will itself form the basis of a new law; and that, in the end, the power of law always triumphs over the violence of war. He sees clearly that jurisprudence "has not yet even recognized its coming task but this century is going to set it."

"Here, then," he declares, "is the task that German thought of the future has to perform. From the practical life of the present it has to develop the deepest principles of that life and elevate them into basic law-ideas. If our great arts lie behind us, our great jurisprudence is yet to come."²

Intuitively, if not inspiredly, Spengler, the solitary, here indicates at least one bearing for the direction of the advance away from war to ultimate peace. His words concern only Germany more than they do England. And for these two peoples they may yet prove Spengler's most important prophecy.

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In the light of the discovery that justice, democracy,

¹ Spengler: *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 506.

² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

statehood, even Christianity, are terms relating to forms of growth which no present definition can include, it follows that existing notions and many former difficulties, if re-examined, change considerably just as the meaning of such terms, when examined in their international currency, dissolve. That this is truth is confirmed by another impression revealed in any study of international affairs—that all things are in a stream of constant flowing. We must beware, therefore, not only of catchwords and slogans but of overlooking that nations, like individuals, alter from day to day as circumstances change; and their interests with them. If, over all, there appears the imperfectibility of man, through all there stands out clearly his indomitability and perseverance in the face of failure. The persisting and earnest disposition on his part to prescribe for the benefit of his fellows is, on the whole, very much more in evidence than is his desire to subjugate his fellows for his own benefit. Man becomes more than ever a gregarious being. His fighting instinct is less regularly requisitioned even in war at the present moment than is his organizing and communal instinct to conform and co-operate in order to succeed.

On the other hand it is far from true that the dreamers are content only to dream, and Plato, who was heard with respect but whose life was imperilled when he proposed to translate his opinions into action, has not proved the exception. The danger of dreamers lies in man's limitations revealed in his susceptibility to the influence of immediate environment and in his thirst for immediate experience. This limitation precludes any alliance or union of democracy and dictatorship, for it is not yet possible to insure mankind against the caprices of a personal dictatorship.

Dreamers matter less in a democracy where their dreams are perforated and made to point the necessity of educating not only the electorate but the elected. To Plato the death of his great master Socrates, who alone to him seemed capable of saving the world, is always present. Yet Plato, it may be supposed, knew little of the hordes of his fellow-beings in other lands—in darkest Africa, in China, in India, or in the undreamed of New World with its unfilled spaces.

that might have been peopled with the model of Plato's own planned Republic but which, by accidental movements of humanity, became the drab spectacle of 1938 democracy, with gangsters, sky-scrapers, millionairesses, pump-priming and thirteen millions unemployed.

The picture insinuating itself on Hobbes' mind was of an English personal sovereign struck down by the popular voice of rebels clamorous in Parliament. John Locke, more corrective than creative in his thought, was no less influenced by current events to take the opposite view and to justify our English revolution leading to the Declaration of Rights as a salutary reminder that Leviathan, after all, was really a means to the end, justice. If Hobbes insisted that supreme power was the means of law and that Leviathan was above the law, it took Locke to show that a limitation was set to the means, that the means was kept subordinate to the end, and that, to this extent, it was necessary to put back Leviathan within the law.

Even to eminent minds this, for long, remained more or less the high water-mark of jurisprudence. So late as 1881 Thomas Huxley accepted, in its entirety, that particular view of Hobbes which sanctifies the sovereign power, although, as might be expected, Huxley's earnest, reforming mind seemed chiefly aware of the considerable possibilities for good in such a power and less aware of the evil and danger underlying. He saw nothing absurd, he declared, in the state attempting to promote friendship and sympathy between man and man indirectly—as, for example, through an Established Church which could be a blessing to the community:

"A church," explained Thomas Huxley, "in which week by week, services should be devoted, not to the iteration of abstract propositions in theology but to the setting before men's minds of an ideal of true, just, and pure living; a place in which those who are weary of the burden of daily cares, should find a moment's rest in the contemplation of the higher life which is possible for all, though attained by so few; a place in which the man of strife and of business should have time to think how small, after all, are the rewards he covets compared with peace and charity. Depend

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upon it, if such a Church existed no one would seek to disestablish it.”¹

One might go further and suggest that, when a totalitarian dictator requires everyone to listen-in regularly to political propaganda, a spiritual democracy might well set aside a practical portion of each day for spiritual reflection, which habit would tend to become the rule rather than the exception. Through its periodical call to prayer the Mahommedan religion has performed the feat of habituating millions of human beings, whether in city or on the desert, to recognition of the fact that man is a spirit. That is a very considerable feat indeed.

Thomas Huxley then proceeds to illustrate how even well-informed and powerful minds like his loiter beneath the universal fog obscuring the fact that national sovereignty is limited but that statehood is an unlimited hierarchy.

“If any number of states,” declares Thomas Huxley, “agree to observe a common set of international laws they have in fact set up a sovereign authority or supra-national government, the end of which, like that of all governments, is the good of mankind; and the possession of as much freedom by each state as is consistent with the attainment of that end. But there is this difference: that the government thus set up over nations is ideal and has no concrete representative of the sovereign power; whence the only way of settling any disputes finally is to fight it out. Thus supra-national society is continually in danger of returning to the state of nature in which contracts are void; and the possibility of this continuing justifies a government in restricting the liberty of its subjects in many ways that would otherwise be unjustifiable.”²

It will be recognized that here Thomas Huxley does not contemplate any possibility of a supra-national society existing for the administration of justice and possessing the full qualifications of a state, yet this, as we have seen, is the natural development; and it is, likewise, the only alternative to endless war. Huxley obviously contemplated, as did Spengler, and as Dr. Inge does still, the continued existence *ad infinitum* of national, independent states acknow-

¹ Thomas Huxley: *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 284.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

ledging no superior. That view, whether extended across Spengler's darkening future of ceaseless war or Dr. Inge's hopeful prospect of final concord, takes insufficient account of hard facts formative of the destiny of men and of nations at this very hour. The mass mind, the mass spirit, the mass heart, each is infinitely lower than is man the individual, lower, indeed, than the animal just as the machine is lower. In cruelty, nature has nothing to show comparable with the mass human will—all-coercing, all-contriving, stooping to aim even at the very dethroning of the reason itself, and leaving man not only out of control but decontrolled. It is the supreme danger of dictatorship that man's union with man for purposes of law has, by the treachery of Leviathan, become transformed into man's union with man for war leaving him worse off in the end than he was at the beginning. Better if he had remained in the twilight than that, *homo sapiens* moving on from dawn to dawn to find the fountain of light, he should end in such midnight of widened but awful consciousness.

It is, of course, possible that the career of man on earth will not reach its zenith and then abruptly end, but that, in a cyclic order, devolution will follow evolution, and that, having reached the zenith of his time, he will turn back to the primeval darkness of cave and forest. It may be that devolution has already set in, that the transit of man has already achieved the heights and that his declension is even now proceeding apace; that the highest point, after all, occurred at the time of Greek thought which never crystallized at all in the outer world. The picture could be stretched infinitely far. The last man facing backwards at the end of the road taken after the turning-point in history, the last act of human extinction completed when, in a moment of fatal fascination by a vision of the past illuminated in a final flicker of the mind, strange, dark, encircling forms of unknown intent, origin or destiny, were, for once, allowed to draw too near. Any such picture, however, no Futurian will accept; nor is there the slightest need why the totalitarians should have it all their own way and be permitted to lead the de-creation of man. They rank among the weakest,

the poorest, the most short-lived forms of up-thrusting human growth.

To oppose their progress and take the lead, only power is necessary but it must be a power based on a faith that is of action and not on a mere theory of faith. Thus equipped it will be able to overwhelm anything the dictatorships can bring against it. The acceptance of that faith by those who unite with us must be a great deal more than a mere *terminable acceptance* of a political programme. The fusion of interests must eventually be absolute and irrevocable so as to form a new union of power within what, to all intents and purposes, would be a consolidated larger statehood, for, as we have seen, statehood is a term of ascending hierarchy reaching its highest consummation in the world-state.

That time is not yet. When at last that stage is reached, whether—in the language of philosophers or of theologians—it is called the City of God or merely the City of Spiritual Man, it will at least be a city of which the Creator will have less need to be ashamed. And if man is not a spiritual being no argument matters.

Only faith can decide that man belongs to the future instead of to the past. This is not necessarily the faith of the average intelligence, however assertive, even in a democracy, but the faith of the leaders. And leadership must look forward, not back—must look out, not in. It must be a leadership not merely away from what we are, but to what we may become.

IT follows from the above conclusions that a permanent solution is not to be had straight away—which is what the League of Nations attempted but did not succeed in doing. Nor could the League have succeeded even if its membership had been universal and remained so. Membership is not enough. The underlying difficulties are not removed but only concealed by a large membership of Powers who are content to ignore disagreements until they become important and vital interests. Here universality of membership, instead of amounting to universal concord or even universal submission to any machinery of justice, meant only universal watchfulness of self-interest.

The League has, however, at least shown more clearly than ever that, unless restrained by power, human nature will not be deterred by any phraseology of law except to exploit it. At the same time it would be the greatest mistake to suppose that the revolution proceeding throughout the world, and active even in the spiritual sphere, is not itself evidence that the underlying social order is wrong. Law being a growth, the nature of the expansion of the reign of law must be by way of instituting a new order, that is the directing of the revolution.

In saying that the New Democracy must include consideration for the spiritual aspect of human life, the social interpretation of Christianity need not be particularized beyond the provision for man's freedom and his minimum physical well-being without which the exercise of that freedom will hardly be possible. Like statehood or sovereignty the more the terms socialism, communism, collectivism, or capitalism—whether state or otherwise—are considered, the more any special meaning usually given seems likewise to dissolve. Nor can the steered course be straight, for, beside winds and tides, there are unexpected storms, and often, as now, only a swinging compass.

It is here that the German desire for world mastery is to be regarded with so much misgiving—it is not merely

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that it is incalculable but that what is calculable about it is so forbidding. The rigidity of their totalitarian discipline is equalled only by the inelasticity of the system of social order that the Nazis insist on applying without adjustment to all who come under their sway. It is unfortunate that the German people, whom experience and disillusionment alike await, can achieve maturity of vision only at the cost of suffering by those who must furnish the opportunity for that experience. That, in short, is what the Nazis demand without discussion.

How the world will look when the necessary experience has been gained—if free leave for the full experiment of totalitarianism should ever be given or permitted to be seized—we need not here enquire. It is at least plain that there would have to be a long return march from the farthest point where the education of the dictatorship began. The policy, therefore, which should receive the most earnest consideration of statesmen is whether, in order to bring nearer the ultimate outcome, it would not be better to ignore the German dictator's demand until, after the reaction has set in, a leading partner, worthy, serviceable and welcomed, will be supplied to the British Commonwealth of Nations by the great German people ready to uphold and work for the New Democracy across a world-front. Such service ability would have to include *co-operative* ability for the partners needed will be more than one.

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Nor is it only Germany that must gain experience before the supreme factor for progress—Anglo-German co-operation—can be formed. It is probable that one day England will be considered never to have been so fortunate as when she survived the extreme perils of misguidance by certain so-called democrats of this age. But, should she survive these perils, England will be in a stronger position than ever for the added experience.

The peril proceeds from the urge to gather experience by *expedient* when it is recognized that large experiment might possibly risk all. It must be obvious to any thoughtful

mind that, in a world of continuing, and therefore of increasing anarchy, any such loosely associated and widely scattered political society as the British Empire cannot, without change and consolidation, long endure.

England's sole chance is to inaugurate a strong and irresistible march towards the reign of law. Even then it is by no means certain that, when the desired prospect at last is in sight, the Empire will bear any recognizable resemblance to what it is to-day. It may serve as a comfort to formalistic minds that, in view of the demolition of old conceptions of sovereignty and statehood, this need not necessarily amount to much. Nor would it, provided that there remained those things for which England in her greatest moments has always stood and always must stand. Of these freedom comes first because it includes the prospect of adding yet more important things to come.

It may be that, in order to pursue this end, England will have to behold the gradual transformation of her Empire overseas into other forms of statehood. Already Canada swings in the American orbit. The evolution of Africa is still almost wholly hidden in the future. The self-liberation of the Chinese may yet make Asia the leading continent in a world of power. India, clamouring to exercise the right of self-government simultaneously with that of gathering experience in self-control, may take centuries to reach the very issues that confront us to-day.

And what of Europe? It may be that, faced with some new political African factor, or Asiatic factor, or even American factor, human forces at present antagonistic and divergent one from another in Europe will see fit to combine; and that a new leadership will yet redeem, if not salvage, what before the Great War was so glibly called civilization. It may be that England's new function will be to turn to account in the revolving European problem the experience she has gained in a world-wide sphere of trust exercised not without many mistakes, but, on the whole, a trust the faithful discharge of which has to a degree been reflected in the fact that all those for whom she held the trust have been given their freedom so soon as they have grown to stature.

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In any event it is clear that her trust is not yet fully performed and that, if she is not to abandon that trust and betray it, England must now take her stand and begin the march to the reign of law, in the vanguard her own British Commonwealth of Nations from which the World Commonwealth must straightway begin to expand. True, the British Empire is not England's to give. She holds it in trust for posterity where, just conceivably, even that loved name, England, may one day hardly find a place.

Two movements must set in, the first the expanding of the solid structure of a political society—a national state, already existing. This, the principal movement, will proceed by means of the expansion of an ever-widening state and the augmentation of supreme power within it, and which ultimately will enclose the World Commonwealth. The second movement is upon the international plane, where, infiltrating through the human intelligence of individuals, education and truth will build up a like-mindedness among mankind detached from Leviathan. This movement will recognize the first movement as complementary, welcome it, and reach towards it.

In the British Commonwealth of Nations an embryonic international political society already exists. If major expansion is to be from the British Commonwealth, then certain features of the World Commonwealth of nations can already be foreseen as almost inevitable. In the first place it can be only what it declares itself to be, a *commonwealth*. That implies no formalized collectivism but wealth, in its several forms, made available upon the basis of a commonwealth plan for all members of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth must preserve a basis of spiritual freedom, and for that, too, it must be planned. Above all, in order for these things to be possible, it must maintain power and control that power.

In the Commonwealth the fiendish cruelty of the Lenin Method—"Who-Whom"—will no longer be feasible let alone necessary, whether interpreted as who shall kill whom, who shall rob whom, or who shall support whom. Instead of darkening declension the prospect ahead of England

becomes finely ennobled as never before; also richer than ever from that very moment when the British Empire is thus re-envisaged as the cradle of the World Commonwealth and the future hope of mankind. Once that prospect is accepted a number of problems *ipso facto* cease to count, countless precautions and suspicions cease to possess importance, while other factors assume increased value.

Consider, for instance, in that light the German peremptory demand for colonies made at the point of the sword in order, no doubt shrewdly enough, to keep the sword in use. Or the Nazis' alteration of that claim from one of justice, however grotesque, to that of the prerogative of armed violence to manœuvre by plain daylight into strategic positions from which to make Nazidom world-wide, or at least, world-masterful. Hitlerism *uber alles*! Such demands must be explained to humanity, against the background of the future, as a challenge to all for which the New Democracy stands. And humanity will withstand the challenge according as it comes to be recognized that the New Democracy belongs to humanity and that the ordering of humanity belongs to it and not to Leviathan.

Now nations outside the New Democracy will hardly concede at once that relationships between it and them had better proceed upon the Christian basis of reasoned consideration and persuasion instead of upon that of power-politics. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the New Democracy prepares at once to make its stand for as, in time, this stand is seen to be spiritual, so its ranks will be augmented by many new recruits on discovering that the stand they had taken in the rival, masked, unspiritual movement that had enlisted them, was, after all, meant by them to be spiritual also. That is a discovery awaiting those who turn away aghast from the spectacle of the present spreading world-revolution, and also awaiting many who are already involved therein.

Stalin's quiet farewell to Mr. Lansbury, "Go and convert the Christians," by no means demolishes the truth that even the Russian upheaval itself is really a spiritual earthquake, however fearful and inhuman the manner of the

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uprooting and derooting has been! The new root has yet time to strike.

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The leadership of the British Commonwealth of Nations as the nucleus of the future World Commonwealth, is therefore spiritually bound to assemble and conserve all the power and the resources available now or hereafter for the New Democracy which, formed of the peoples aligned in common front against that supreme menace to civilization and to man—Leviathan's reign of war—will be able from the outset to apply over a considerable sector of human affairs that first principle of the reign of justice—equality before the law and which rests on the Christian principle "Thy neighbour as thyself."

Whether labelled as Christian Democracy, as collective security, as the rule of morality, or by any other phrase, that is the cardinal principle which, most of all, the present totalitarian dictatorships have violated. Thus the desired expansion of Italy has been required to proceed in utter disregard of the welfare of the Abyssinian people. The desired further increase of the teeming millions of Japan has been set higher than the holocaust of even more millions of Chinese by means of which that increase is to be rendered possible, the proportion of ten Chinamen sacrificed for each extra Japanese born being said to represent the difference in efficiency of killing power possessed by those two peoples respectively. Not only the rights of ideological mastery claimed by the Austrian Hitler for Nazi Germany at the cost of the spiritual surrender of surrounding nations, but also Nazidom itself would collapse if the Nazis acknowledged, let alone observed, the Christian principle of treating others as they would wish to be treated. The large assertion of the fear-instilling dictators that, if they are to be engaged in a doctrinal war, they will march to the end, is no doubt well explained by the presentiment in their own hearts that the end would not be very far off. But the assertion means, nevertheless, that secretly they recognize that it is precisely this cardinal doctrine of Christ—justified likewise on ethical

grounds—which they must dispute or die. This is but logic, for the commandment spells the death of the system directly erected upon its denial.

Now in order to give effect to this supreme injunction of Christ, individual resolution, however pious, is insufficient. The sacrifice and the service must be planned by the human society in order to be possible at all. It must, moreover, be faced that the new planning will not only have to be far-reaching but involve radical change however gradually it may be brought about. The very political growth of the British Commonwealth would have to be reconsidered in a new light and actively influenced towards the proposed end. Undirected by the human spirit the natural growth of the human political society leaves human nature in the ascendant, for direction governed by circumstances is unprincipled while direction by Leviathan follows the principle of exploiting human nature. Instead of dealing with events only when they arrived, the planners would anticipate the events and consider what steps were demanded. It is, of course, reasonable to suppose that those who come after us will have their own ideas, nevertheless—unless the totalitarians succeed in wiping out all free spirits from the earth—we may safely assume that the free growth of the human spirit will always be prized. It follows, therefore, that any continuing sacrifices found by us to be necessary in order to ensure man's physical well-being—without which that growth would be frustrated—will be accepted by them also.

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In setting the first horizons of the Peace Plan at two hundred years, this is taken not merely as the minimum range of the planners' vision but as the necessary span for the emerging and the evolution of certain salient features requiring embodiment in the New Democracy. There can, obviously, be no finality to any plan. But on any shorter view, such features, no less essential to the reign of law, would appear to "realists" to be too remote.

Long after Europe has been brought to compose her provincial inter-state rivalries by the last hour recognition

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of other, far greater dangers already on the horizon—whether peril from races now backward or from surprises of nature—urgent and tremendous problems possibly exceeding in difficulty and dwarfing in consequence any problems familiar to us now, will one day certainly tax civilization to the utmost. Then all such episodes as Nazidom might shrink in their proportions to mere incidents in the prelude, their total span a brief moment of fitful malady when a whole people allowed themselves to be dallied with by a dictator who, in normal times, faced with any task of lasting importance, as likely as not would prove a dolt.

Nor could that view be final. No plan of two hundred years or even of two thousand years could stand the slightest chance of arranging the order of the pieces so that, on their being fitted together, a fine picture would come up at the end. What the Plan can do is to concentrate on the consideration of long-range factors and to relate all methods and means to the supreme end—the reign of law. The methods may change so long as that end remains. Outside the reign of law, as within it, considerable spiritual progress is necessary. The reign of law is itself a spiritual end.

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At this moment an available aircraft quota of even one hundred thousand aeroplane strength with supporting supply—if properly manned, efficiently directed, and rightly deducing what its duty involved from what it was required to defend—with escorted bombers overwhelmingly in the ascendant—would suffice to safeguard and develop the democracies. But as supreme power must not only advance towards the reign of law but continue to hold the advance and even maintain the reign of law when it does arrive, so must the form of this power be expected to change as the nature of decisive power changes from time to time.

It is conceivable that the race that “holds its form” last may be the one that controls the world’s petrol supply longest; that some new beam may be invented which could paralyse the engine of any aircraft; that some new nerve-ray or even the death-ray itself may be found, able to strike

at the heart of man and still it too; that warfare may become more and more a deluge of propaganda or, through a drugged psychology, a mere matter of auction bidding, among the nations, of enticements to accept a short life although a very merry one, all guarantees being given that, as the end approaches, no regrets will appear. It is far more likely, however, that the initiative will be taken by the machine itself and that, behind mountains of embattled machinery, the last Leviathan, in the form of a degenerate, diminutive cretin—a misfit of humanity afraid of his own shadow, or even a mad, gibbering sadist—will hurl forth in a last concentrated bombardment upon humanity situated hundreds of miles away, clouds of unmanned projectiles and torpedoes releasing vast quantities of flame, gas and electricity to-day inconceivable. In that case the conjectural anti-climax of humanity as sketched in a preceding chapter would have to undergo some variation, as the declension of civilization might proceed somewhat more speedily through the wholesale electrocution of whole populations or ideologies amounting to many millions, even possibly of all aliens contiguous to the frontiers of a blood-proud race electrically wired in. Or it might be a more subtle and less spectacular contest taking the form of a competitive spread of disease.

Against the background of such horrors the economic war that means partial starvation for the poor and only ample nutrition for the rich would seem comparatively mild and, if this is the worst of the possible sacrifices that, in any event, would be entailed by membership of the New Democracy on an international front which alone held any prospect of saving mankind from the more terrible fate, then, even to shrewd, calculating minds, the sacrifice might appear a sound bargain.

The axiom stands out clearly. If forewarned is to be forearmed, then to be superiorly armed is to avoid the necessity for any exchange of violence in order to prove which of two evenly balanced powers is the stronger. Now the reason that any such overwhelming force is sometimes decried by popular democratic opinion is less often that, to

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prove its superiority would entail the actual employment of that power, than that such power would cost a great deal of money which can far better be spent in "social betterment." What is often implied by that phrase is man's more thorough-going self-fortification against boredom and spiritual dejection, a temporary bracing effected by what are called the amenities of civilization and ranging from central heating and frigidaire to mechanical pianos and seaside whirligigs, over all of which—to any seeing eye—there falls the sinister shadow, now lengthening, now shortening, of the Spectre War.

Again, nothing less than a long-range plan of the minimum of two hundred years could envisage anything approaching the large-scale undertaking of certain tasks that can proceed only a limited distance in a single life-time, but which require the co-operation of many nations—tasks that are also problems which, if left permanently unsolved, would inevitably undermine the World Commonwealth itself.

To this category belong projects for the elimination of inferior humanity, a problem already almost terrifying in the difficulties and the responsibilities it involves, yet which will be infinitely greater after totalitarian exploitation. The standardization at birth of the war-product of the Nazis in order to conform to totalitarian requirements and by which, even before they are born, babies are enlisted in the service of Leviathan, must be answered with the safeguarding of the spirit-product by the New Democracy which must seek to implant the joy of fulfilment of life's supreme purpose in each individual and to displace discord by some sort of harmonization of the spiritual with the temporal life.

Until recently the German birth-rate was falling, the British still is. If from generation to generation the New Democracy is to reflect the free choice of its members as it must, then its leadership must see that there are enough free spirits born to carry forward the right to that choice. For, if the freedom of the human spirit and its proper direction through the exercise of that freedom is not to be a

factor decisive permanently as well as decisive now, then we might almost become totalitaria at once.

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In the light of these reflections such pretty puzzles as whether, when England is "at war," any particular Dominion technically is "at war," cease to count. According to the angle of constitutional theory innumerable other similar cracks and crevices appear not only throughout the British Commonwealth but wherever democracy is to be found, all of which crevices, however, can be filled in by variations of the theory if the pastime serves.

"Is the sovereign of England," asks Mr. G. D. H. Cole, "the king who is called the sovereign? Or is it the Parliament?" It is possible to answer by replying that these are but the organs of sovereignty, but more profitable to show that all such questions are pointless beside the plain truth of the incontestable fact that in the state there is a supreme will, and behind the will a supreme or sovereign power to enforce that will—a power not the less supreme for its not being identifiable readily or completely or at all. Even a falling star has its centre of specific gravity.

Now Hobbes, accurate in his contention that law rests on power, is wrong in that part of his political theory which contemplates a contract between the people and an absolute sovereign who thereby becomes Leviathan and thenceforth is above the law and apparently free to repudiate the contract. Until the reign of law exists no legal contact is possible for, apart from moral principles, there would be no principles whatever by which the contract could be interpreted. And without provision for their impartial administration moral principles would similarly be no guide. Chiefly all this is false to the fact that law, like the human political society, is a growth. The fault of Hobbes' theory as of Rousseau's likewise is that neither took stock of the fact that, whereas they envisaged a single state, no such state exists or ever has existed in the world, each state actually co-existing with many others, no two bearing

any close resemblance, and some states actually including others.

The state of Adolf Hitler is said to be "no longer a contract between the people and its rulers as Rousseau understood it, nor an abstract effigy as in the philosophy of Hegel. It is the whole nation itself and the totalitarian expression of all its functions."¹

From the standpoint of jurisprudence this amounts to an assertion that there is no supreme power in the German state but rather that the German state is all power and nothing but power, which power is personified in the person of Hitler, the Complete Leviathan, who applies that power against all within the state and all without—so far as he can. The German people are therefore cyphers and their state cypherian and not totalitarian. Also it means that Germany claims to be the World-Leviathan. Here, as elsewhere, it is the fact that counts. It is true to the facts to say that the political society rests not on the idea of a contract but rather on the notion of a trust authorized on undefined terms, which authority will be upheld or overthrown according as its interpretation and application by the government are, in the long run, liked or disliked by the people.

Moreover, to say that the political society is a growth is not to deny the importance of remedying inefficiency or of shoring up structures which, owing to their unserviceability, prevent greater efficiency. Elsewhere I have indicated the astonishing confusion and conflict surrounding the political interpretations by statesmen of some, if not all, of the British Dominions on their first assuming the larger status known as Dominion—an ignorance which stood in the way of important reforms the urgency of which appears as each crisis comes and fades as it is surmounted.

The fact that an elastic Empire liaison plan—approved, as to its general objective, by Arthur Balfour just after the Washington Conference and, as to its means, by the majority of Dominion Prime Ministers and the most senior permanent officials at the time in England—was allowed to be killed finally by fortuitous circumstances such as that a meeting

¹ Keller: *Religion and the European Mind*, p. 101.

at the Carlton Club synchronized with the change in direction of a few farmers' votes on farming matters in New Zealand, of a few labour votes in Australia and, similarly, of a few other votes elsewhere, will perhaps still serve to illustrate that growth, whether legal or political, need be neither rank nor neglected.

It is, however, not with such difficulties that the World Peace Plan is primarily concerned. Although they offer more risk than hindrance, they will, it is often stated, under the pressure of gathering crisis be remedied over-night. That, of course, depends on the speed of the crisis which in the future may unroll with the rapidity of a film.

War being what we have now found it to be, the question is no longer whether New Zealand is at war because England is at war or whether Australia is at war because New Zealand is at war, but whether, as war in peace intensifies into war in war, the ruling of any part of the Empire or of the Empire itself upon the point will be of the slightest use in the face of a different interpretation by the enemy. That interpretation will be made by power, not by law. Similarly the American Cash and Carry Neutrality Plan sheds any importance it ever had when its interpretation rests with the attacking Leviathan.

It is hardly necessary to observe that now the Dominions have passed through the post-war stages from decentralization to disintegration on their way to independent sovereignty or full Dominion sovereignty as the new status alleged to have been won in the War was variously described by Dominion statesmen in post-war years, the reverse movement of consolidation—whether by federation or fusion—could proceed with advantage to all concerned. In any case factors now inconspicuous but decisive in the long run will effect this in the end, and the question how much the several Dominions ought to contribute to Imperial Defence will, in the not distant future, give place to the major question how long can any of them continue to exist unchanged, even if they all unite.

This consideration brings us to the Two Hundred Years' Plan itself, for the British Commonwealth can unite and can

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make its stand successfully only upon a long-range plan not determining the constitutional aspect of the rights of any one part of the British Empire as, for instance, that of seceding or of standing aside, but a plan influencing, if not directing, the course of the world-revolution already commenced.

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The stand must be that of the reign of law, the front in the first instance economic and as wide as possible, the basis that of the New Democracy.

Here it is convenient to observe that although the full reign of law does not exist until it extends over the whole world, that full reign will be reached only by the process of extending the boundaries of the state with consequent increase in the supreme power upholding that widened state and for which there is no substitute.

As the political society which, when widened, will be the world-state, the international front of peoples united to form the New Democracy can be said to represent the preliminary reign or rule of law—a reign that from the outset overreaches and shelters all within that front. Later on, when the New Democracy accepts and overcomes the inevitable challenge of opposing states, it will be accurate to say of it that it furnishes and represents the supreme-power of a world-order; and accurate to say of the subjugated residue that it represents only a minority within that world-order. So that, when it at last arrives, the World-State providing the full reign of law will be found to conform in the main political structure to national statehood, to reflect the same political principle of sovereignty, and to follow the same political objective by the same proved means—the administration of justice enforced by means of the supreme power. It makes no difference that the minority may be smaller political units or even discredited and disbanded ex-Leviathans. No more in the World-State than elsewhere will there be perfect concord flowing from universality of lip-service to any Covenant or to any creed, but only that relative harmony of the reign of law secured by, because

enforced by, the supreme power which man and political unit alike must obey.

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The long-range plan must be economic because firstly, the armament race being an economic race, the democracies are in a position at once to take the strategic lead and keep it; secondly, the economic front not only lends itself to the enveloping and undermining of Leviathan but, by its superior inducements, can secure the dispersion of his followers seeing that hunger is a grim reality no propaganda about ultimate victory can dispel.

The economic plan of the New Democracy must be of long range to permit of the possibility being turned into strong probability—and eventually into certainty—that individual welfare can be secured for all. The plan must cover not only materials but labour as well and must therefore be not merely materialistic but spiritual also. The resources of the democracies can be made available only for comprehensive planning which illustrates not merely this political theory or that school of economic thought, but applies the twin principles of Christianity—firstly, “Thy neighbour as thyself” and, secondly, service. And that will take time for it will involve education.

On a close-up view of the present world scene the task confronting the planner seems disconcerting enough, yet if man is not to perish a beginning must be made. The end, however, is a most noble one and the problem inspiring from its very immensity. Nor can it be denied that, despite the difficulties and the divergence in view between rival schools of economists, there is sufficient ground on which all can unite.

It is not merely the difficulties and obscurities inherent in the science of economics that have prevented the democracies of the world from pooling their resources and uniting, but the marginal calculations of human nature and general failure to recognize the peril. It may be that acquisitive humanity will prefer to disgorge before the catastrophe and thus escape it, instead of risking being left in any event

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with nothing to disgorge afterwards—particularly now that the menace has been revealed as totalitarian Leviathan, anti-Christ, red-handed and bent on more blood and spoil.

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Upon the stage of human progress there is about to proceed a dramatic conflict between the human nature and the spiritual nature in man; and, inevitably, therefore, between man and Leviathan. In this contest either man or Leviathan must go under, and no God except the God in man will take part. To play the right part the individual must know what the right part is. In order that there may be some singleness of resolution proceeding from singleness of faith the span of two centuries is needed for the main movement of world education to get under way. While he remains uneducated, man is unsafe for the old democracy and the old democracy is unsafe for man.

From now on his education begins with the understanding of what is meant and what is entailed by democracy. It progresses with the further recognition that the realm of the true democracy, expanding with the growth of man's spirit which its chief purpose is to safeguard, cannot be thrown wholly open to man uneducated, uncontrolled and at the beck and call of human nature.

"The only part of the conduct of anyone," wrote John Stuart Mill, a little speciously, "for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."¹

Here, even Mill himself clearly is sovereign neither over his own mind nor over his own words. Sovereignty can never be conceded to ignorance and who of us is wholly unignorant? And where does the individual begin and where the mind? It is not for the uneducated individual to govern the mind but rather for the educated mind to govern the individual.

Nor, unqualified, can the statement that follows be

¹ J. S. Mill. *Essay on Liberty*.

passed. Man is amenable to society not only for conduct "calculated to produce evil to someone else," but also for his co-operative contribution of service, such co-operation becoming rapidly indispensable to the existence of the society and even to the existence of the individual. The alternative to this larger responsibility for service to democratic society, which may involve the surrender of a further degree of independence but in return for the corresponding service of manifold others, is the advance and final hegemony of totalitarianism where the dictator will be sovereign over the "body and mind" of the individual.

The truth is that the position Mill takes up on the question of liberty is untenable, but no digression is necessary to overthrow it—and it is important that it be overthrown—for it lies across the highway of our advance. The passage in which Mill enunciates his general principle is quoted in full by Mr. Harold Macmillan in his recent book on planning¹ as one "with which most people in this country will agree." If so they must be taught to disagree and, by education, to look deeper still. The question is one of importance firstly because, as Mr. Macmillan rightly states, it deals with "the correct relationship of the individual to society and of society to the individual"; secondly because the very planning Mr. Macmillan rightly has so much at heart becomes feasible only on the finer and truer conception of liberty based on common service instead of on mere self-protection—finer because more spiritual, truer because closer to the facts of democracy.

"That principle," declares Mill, "is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant."

The point Mill missed is that the good of the individual not only cannot be separated off from the general good of

¹ Harold Macmillan: *The Middle Way*, p. 25.

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his fellows, but the good of any individual ceases to be possible without the co-operation of the rest.

The flaw in Mill's enunciation of the correct relationship of the individual to society, proceeds from the prevailing misconception of statehood and sovereignty. The reign of law not only deters the individual from certain acts but encourages and, indeed, often enables him to proceed. By legal process he can be deterred from trespass but, in like manner, he can also obtain a declaratory judgment indicating his true legal position. He can be punished for wrongly making away with property but, on the other hand, has no excuse for he can be granted a vesting-deed if he can show a good title.

That the general good of the political society is a sufficient warrant for requiring service from the individual, must be conceived to apply even more to the New Democracy than to the old, for the reason that, in the New Democracy as never before, man, the individual, will be better off in a happier scene of circumstances largely controlled because policy has been previously planned. In order to plan ahead for the community, the planner must be able to rely on the members of the community.

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Shall the individual be allowed to withhold all service in a democracy that gives back to him so much when, in the totalitarian state which is the competitor and indeed antagonist of democracy, he gives all and receives so little back? Any such claim must be rejected on every ground—political, military, economic but, most of all, spiritual. Even in his tribal days, while union undoubtedly afforded him protection against marauding human nature, something else was required of him as otherwise men would have died of hunger while, watchful but unproductive, confronting one another in a stalemate.

If, as Mr. Harold Macmillan well says, the fate of democracy is linked up with the problem of economic progress, then it is linked up with sacrifice by some and with service by all. But if "it is in greater danger from internal decay than

from external attack," nothing is more certain than that its material prosperity sooner or later will attract the envy and invite the planned onslaught of poverty-stricken Leviathan. Hardly less certain is it that, when Leviathan plans only for war against democracy that plans for law but which, at the same time, has the power of law available equally for defence, Leviathan must succumb. And, if Leviathan succeeds, then democracy will have failed and have deserved to fail because its "internal decay" arose from sacrifice and service withheld—the denial of the twin principles of Christianity which emphasizes not self-protection but self-liberation.

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The important concern is less to attach the spiritual label to any approved economic plan than to recognize that nowadays the more feasible the plan the more it seems to reflect Christian principles. But as, more and more, the only pieces that fit the pattern of life are seen to conform to the spiritual end, it would appear wisdom for the planner to recognize that he might as well take a spiritual stand at the outset.

It is not without interest that the emphasis which Mr. Macmillan gives to outstanding features of his plan is, to a degree, really a Christian emphasis although his pages contain no such word. But what is far more interesting in the light of our enquiry is that the most commendable features in his plan could hardly succeed in any self-sufficing system of a single country but might get a foothold on a small international and economic front such as might be assembled first spiritually but which, if assembled unspiritually, would soon prove not to have been assembled at all.

Now any plan like this, necessarily revolutionary to a degree with its greater central control of wealth, production, and efficiency for the diminution of want and the increase of economic security for the individual, is just what is wanted to give the whole community a stake in their own enrichment, just as the totalitarian war-planning in an otherwise

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unplanned world gives the individual a stake in the riches of others. But a plan *for* peace and *against* war requires the shelter of the reign of law and only so far as that is possible can any such plan proceed at all. Once the plan is fairly launched the hostages thereby given to fortune are far too important to permit of any risk that the plan might suddenly be scrapped. It may be that even the electoral system will have to be amended if, to retain it as at present, is to risk a reversal of the plan at each election until education has done its work.

Internationally the task of education, spiritual and otherwise, is far greater. To convince the multitude is no less difficult than to convince the dictators. Moreover, before any plan could be launched on the widest international front, the international multitude would have to be enlightened and probably systems reflecting in some measure the New Democracy first installed. There the Churches would have to prepare the way.

This is why it is important that the spiritual aspect of the New Democracy should be recognized. "Democracy," declares Mr. Macmillan, "is a way of life." But this already is the accepted definition of religion—and the question is, which way of life? Christian democracy is a promising way of life, promising, among other things, law instead of war, just as totalitarianism, its alternative, is the promising way of death. Only if the plan maintains its spiritual orientation will it survive the future strain of the control tightened at the centre without which adequate and durable planning cannot become an actuality.

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In the process of union for the purposes of co-operation for law and against war, the democracies can combine on the economic front only upon fundamental principles of common faith. They must therefore first of all apply the supreme tests of spirituality to themselves. Whatever may be the particular variety of their doctrine the Christian Churches are now required, by the cardinal Christian principle, to combine upon that very principle—and to lead

the advance. In the alternative they will be more and more discredited and, it may be, eventually overthrown. It looks as though the advance towards peace can proceed on the temporal plane only after it has obtained momentum on the spiritual plane, and, if so, a co-ordination of Christian activity throughout all Christendom, either through the Churches or without them, is a fore-ordained condition of the advance. They can unite without unification. They cannot unite without a great effort, but, if Christendom cannot unite, how can the rest of creation?

It is true that the spiritual forces, already divergent and competitive one against another rather than competitive for converts, have been further divided by the tactics of Leviathan deliberately calculated to encourage rivalry among those forces and to confuse the spiritual message. The war of words proceeds not only in the international ether but in Christendom and, not least, on the subject of war. If Christendom does not now seek to unite, at least it will perforce in the near future, and less hopefully, when driven back to its last stronghold. If the Christian Churches persist in remaining separated from the love of God by the width of their variations in the interpretation of the symbols and metaphors of Christ's teaching—as of the object of his suffering—perhaps they can contrive sufficient combination to forestall mankind's Gethsemane. Failure to make the attempt determined cannot be excused in the British Empire where freedom and democracy are said to be already installed.

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Actually at the present moment there is witnessed the disposition for drawing together, one to another, of several Churches, and of all towards Rome; likewise a movement of Rome towards the rest of Christendom. These tendencies, hardly yet marked movements, nevertheless can be brought to move harmoniously toward the common ground for resisting the totalitarian advance. The outlook for union has rarely been better. Assured further progress in the near future, a great spiritual movement attaining for the first time

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even world dimensions, might reach full momentum during the next half century—precious years that perhaps will prove the most auspicious for Christianity since the days of St. Augustine. In any event the religious revival, inevitable of some kind and following the present relapse towards the barbaric and pagan cults, will certainly be great.

That will be the time when, in a world comparatively tranquil, the permanent inauguration of international democratic journalism of a new order might well eventuate. Insulated from pressure and corruption, uninfluenced by political parties or vested interests, an international journal founded along the present free and independent yet spiritually safe-guarded lines of *The Times* and pursuing the high tradition for sweep and range of that fine news-and-views-paper, might do for the new international democracy what it and other great English journals have already done chiefly for the British people.

But to eventuate fully then, a beginning should be made now or so soon as the present spate of hate has gone by. With an International Weekly Edition, for a beginning in three or four languages and edited upon broad and simple lines from the standpoint of the New Democracy, *The Times* might well launch the venture at the first favourable moment. Even if, for a start, its circulation reached no farther than the thoughtful men of other nations who, even at this moment, do not dismiss their wonder about what is passing through the minds of individuals in adjacent countries, this would be much, for their numbers have grown as the chaos of revolution has increased. Accustomed in this way to hear a communal voice they would, even as the degree of tension increased and knowing that that voice was free, desire still to hear it, particularly if their subscriptions had had to be paid a year in advance.

To reclaim from the realm of war more territory for law is a task so important that no difficulty, however lengthy its solution, can be allowed permanently to obstruct. To the extent that the advance is held up by the barriers of language these must be circumvented. It may be required of the leaders to master sufficient new languages for their

leadership to count. Along the international front of the New Democracy this difficulty would appear at its minimum, yet here, even more than elsewhere, no single voice seems articulate against the babble. Here where democracy falters, the totalitarian forges ahead. This must be remedied. If the Nazi totalitaria are compelled to hug *Mein Kampf* from their cradles to their coffins, the followers of the New Democracy must submit to the leadership that might require them, for instance, to read "The International Times," because it articulated and interpreted their faith and also because its words had gone through the minds of fellow-men in other lands. And, in the very knowledge of that fact, man, whatever his nationality, would attain some communion with humanity.

Experience will tell. When the present cycle of confusion ends and the sorting-out time reveals to the distracted survivors the difference between history and propaganda, then, handed on, this experience itself will strengthen the reserve of man's judgment against the day when once more Leviathan prepares to usurp and lie.

Experience also can foretell intuitively and premonitorily. Its present forewarning is that the widening shambles of discoloured and deshaped humanity mawed by Leviathan is a picture that cannot be much further heightened except in humanity's death. The measure of what is at stake prescribes the effort. The front formed to take a stand for law against the invasion of war must be prepared for an effort to which no definite limit can yet be set. It may even be that ultimate peace will come only with the extension of man's consciousness by a perception so widened, so intense, or so enriched with a "future sense," as to defeat the totalitarian method completely, for, instead of the blind, massed mind of individual minds in sum, the universal consciousness would have learned to conform in forward vision which Leviathan forbids. Even then, as now, the issue will remain that of law or war.

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First of all, in assembling its armament including economic

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power, the New Democratic front would have to show an enterprise only less than that of the dictators who, by internal monetary manipulation and notwithstanding their poverty, have managed to amass sufficient armed power to overawe all less armed nations. The democracies must be enlightened to see that they have to provide a predominant margin of power to form a canopy of law above themselves; and that there is no alternative.

In regard to the conservation of power—apart from the question of financial, material, and labour resources—there is the question of service. In the New Democracy, all embracing of creeds political and otherwise as it is, there can nevertheless be no place for the anarchist who, while demanding full personal liberty regardless of the liberty of others, withdraws himself from the union by which it becomes possible for the reign of law to replace the reign of anarchy. As a national policy, pacifism, therefore, may be tolerated by a democracy as part of any democratic programme, although if the policy is applied it can hardly fail to result in catastrophe overtaking that democracy. But the individual pacifist who, by refusing personally to co-operate in the mission of the New Democracy, obstructs its advance, must be treated with patience and shown to be an anarchist; and, if he persists, he must forfeit his nationality and be sent to the Leviathans who preside over that anarchy he prefers. He must choose between the reign of law and the reign of war.

It is not as a pacifist that he would be thus ejected but as an anarchist indistinguishable from any rabid Sudeten Austrian Czecho-Slovakian German who, forming an outpost of Nazi Leviathan, agitates obediently to start off the anarchic machine. Some degree of compatibility is implied in nationality. Nor, in an international order, essentially Leviathanic, is any state to be blamed for a conception of statehood which recognizes that geographical features, reinforcing its defence against marauding Leviathans from without, can only help to preserve the reign of law within.

Thus the Nazi solution of the Sudeten German problem by appropriating the strategic parts of Czecho-Slovakia is,

of course, only one, although the Nazi Leviathans, will, if permitted, doubtless arrange through violence that it is *the* only one.¹ Another solution would be for the Czecho-Slovak Government to deprive the Sudeten Germans of Czecho-Slovakian nationality and eject them wholesale as incompatibles even as the Nazis eject those Jews whom they have not slaughtered and none of whom defaulted in their allegiance as have the Sudeten anarchists. Backed by power, the latter solution of expulsion, if visited on German settlements sent after the War to plant rebellion in Poland, alone could counter Leviathan's tactics of war in peace—the "peaceful" penetration of national frontiers whether by the propagandized plebiscite, or by the threat of what Hitler calls the German chorus of golden-voiced hyenas—descending bombs. The plebiscite of the unenlightened is far less important and, indeed, far less illuminating than the enlightenment of the plebs.

"I want to know," asks the Dean of St. Paul's,² "on what moral grounds could we base a refusal to support a plebiscite to determine the future of these people?" (the Sudeten Germans). One very good reason is that if it is right for them to be able to vote their way into the German state, it would be equally right for those in Germany that so wished to be able to vote their way out, which certainly would not be permitted. It is not very certain in Germany how the plebiscite "God or Hitler?" would be permitted to go, or whether God would get one vote. That man, while uneducated, is unsafe for democracy, is proved by the exploitation of the plebiscite for this frequently yields no more than a photograph of the mass-mind as easily inflamed by the "sonorous commonplace" which Mr. Lloyd George so rightly contemns as by the irresponsible uncommonplace of which he himself sometimes gives a display.

¹ This passage is doubly illustrative now that, for all Nazi intents and purposes, Czecho-Slovakia has fallen. Once an imperfect but vital democracy with an effective economy within national frontiers that served as outposts of a widening reign of law, Czecho-Slovakia is now but an outpost of war from which, over vast new highways, Leviathan already prepares his next sortie.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

² The Rev. W. R. Matthews: *The Times*, June 2, 1938.

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The urgency of man's need for education, then, which reflects his duty to democracy to understand the issue, precedes the urgency of his exercising a vote to decide the issue before he understands it. No man has a right to a free vote for anarchy within a democracy. He can elect to go to it. This is a matter of choice.

* * * *

The further education of the people can commence nowhere better than on this subject of pacifism and nohow better than by beginning with the recognition that the pacifist cannot have it both ways. Even in England there are those who, demanding freedom for the human spirit, yet, not knowing whence freedom comes, withhold its price.

Thus, for instance, Mr. E. M. Forster declares that Fascism leads only :

“Into the blackness that it has chosen as its symbol, into smartness and yapping out of orders and self-righteous brutality, into social as well as into international war . . . our immediate duty is to stop it.”

As, fortunately, there is only enough of it in England to do more good—by calling up an overwhelming reaction—than it does harm, Mr. Forster by “stop it” presumably means put a stop to it. If he means our immediate duty is to put a stop to it abroad, then, objecting to rearmament as he does no less than to Fascism, it is not clear how we are to perform this duty except by writing. In that case he must think harder and longer if he is to prove a useful recruit, and not indulge in ink warfare from behind the shelter of a democracy frontier he is not ready to defend when the ink bombardment turns into a gas deluge. On a recent, large placard of *The Spectator*, the full type announcement was “A New Problem of the Mediterranean” (E. M. Forster). How many people bought a copy in expectation of receiving different, if not higher value, is not known, but the problem of the Mediterranean at the moment was neither focussed nor diminished by this writer calling D’Annunzio a cad without argument, show of evidence or suggestion of proof.

If he were to visit Italy in certain circumstances it is conceivable that Mr. Forster might hear orders no more welcome for not being "yapped out" by authority holding that to libel the dead is punishable. The point, however, is not whether, according to E. M. Forster's outlook, D'Annunzio ought to be called a cad but that, if it is the prerogative of a member of a free democracy to announce that such is his conviction and chance the consequences, he should be prepared to pay for that prerogative by co-operating to defend it.

To assist in putting a stop to Fascism, whether by diverting or transforming it, Mr. Forster elsewhere considers the alternative to Fascism. One is parliament and democracy by which he means our Parliament at Westminster and our democracy in England.

"I should like," he explains, "England and Europe to muddle on as they are without the international explosion that would end them. In the second place there is Communism, an alternative which will destroy all I care for and could only be reached through violence, yet it might mean a new order where younger people could be happy and the head and the heart have a chance to grow. There, and on no other horizon, the boys and girls might return to the cliff and dance."¹

Now democracy has no more arrived than has Christianity; and to look only back and "muddle on" is not to care for democracy at all. The dancing of boys and girls, even on a Communistic horizon, is certainly a more pleasant picture than that of the dance of death in the trenches, past or future. But this dancing, now become jazz, does not go on for ever. The aesthetic interest in the dance itself is succeeded by the absorbing problem of birth-control and of the need for directing humanity, if not by those compulsory methods of selective breeding looming ahead in Nazidom, then through an appeal by the persuasive powers of intellectuals and of others.

Rearmament Mr. Forster condemns as "it can do nothing but burn and destroy many more foreigners than we can

¹ Rose Macaulay: *The Writings of E. M. Forster*, p. 286.

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at present, and destroy foreign towns and works of art more promptly and thoroughly."

Here Mr. Forster reveals himself as an unintentional international anarchist. He proceeds:

"Our freedom to-day has more to fear from enlightened authoritarians like Lord Hailsham or Lord Lloyd or Lord Trenchard than from Sir Oswald Mosley or Sir Stafford Cripps"

It is clearly not the enlightenment of authoritarianism which he fears, but authority itself. And in wanting freedom without authority he opposes the reign of law.

"What can one do," he asks, quotes Miss Rose Macaulay, "beyond not investing money in manufactures that may be used in armaments, and protesting against that annual imbecility the Aldershot Tattoo and the Olympia Tournament? I can say nothing new against war and I can do scarcely anything to prevent it. . . ."¹

Well, for a start, Mr. Forster can correct his erroneous views, implicit here, of armament, of investment, of manufacture and even of money.

"Social injustice and poverty can be cured, the evils in personal life can be righted by death. But for war under modern conditions there seems no death."

If Mr. Forster can show the world how to cure social injustice and poverty within the reign of anarchy (which is no easy problem even in the reign of law) he will, in effect, be founding a new science. His task would require a world-plan and his plan a world where justice existed without being administered.

"And yet," he continues, "I am asked to buy tickets for an entertainment where some athletes in fancy dress will play games with that curious survival the horse, and so work me up into a state of mind which bears no relation to the fact. . . . Any government that really worked for peace would have forbidden all tournaments and tattoos. The psychological effect on simple people is appalling. . . . Let them show the effect of vesicant dew on a girls' school, upon two girls' schools, our own and the enemy's. The fathers and mothers in the audience might begin to understand at last."

¹ *The Writings of E. M. Forster*, p. 291.

Not necessarily. That would depend on how "simple" the fathers and mothers were. Except the simpletons or obstinately ignorant, the rest would surely come to see, after a little private thought, that such spectacles of horror—whether of a girls' school, of a University college of "young-mannish" lady undergraduates still in the Fascist phase, or even of dons no longer young but nevertheless the objects of considerable affection and often quite serviceable—can be prevented only by superior power which must be disciplined and controlled; and, to that end, therefore, the illustration at the Royal Military Tournament and the Aldershot Tattoo of the high standard set for discipline and control, is directly purposeful.

"Gone," he exclaims, "are the German intellectual giants fast disappearing, to whom Europe has listened for two hundred years, gone with the little courts that nurtured them, gone with Estherhaz and Weimar."

True, they have gone right enough, and through the triumph of violence and ignorance. And if we make the same mistake ours will be gone too. The falling cadences of Mr. Forster's repetitives would therefore be more usefully employed in the opposite direction, in short, in a lament for England's shrunken power which we must help to restore—the power that conditions the revival of law. Leviathan will prove too gigantic for the intellectuals if their intellectuality is reflected only in their differences and not in their agreement as well—if it is exercised only to condemn and not also to construct. Weimar, the Republic, failed because, as has been remarked, there were no true republicans. And democracy similarly will fail if there are not enough true democrats.

The first step of the way to safeguard against such disasters is by political and spiritual education. There lie democracy's supreme task and opportunity—so far neglected. Profiting by that mistake the totalitarians have been quick to pass off as education their own intensive system which is merely inculcation. Instead of leading out from the individual's doubt and wonder to knowledge and truth, the totalitarians

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seize the individual, stamp upon him and into him lies without foundation, conclusions without reason, and Methods without End—for war, we recall, is method, not end, but endless. This inculcation, propagandized by the totalitarian Nazis as education, is thus spirit-crushing and soul-destroying materialism, whereas democratic education is essentially spiritual, its aim being an unfolding and expansion of the individual that leads through self-reliance and understanding to the ultimate prospect of self-liberation—the supreme end of human life on earth.

There must be shattered forever the illusion that a true democracy anywhere exists. Only the dictatorship has arrived. Now up to the present there have been many who have professed and called themselves democrats but without thought, taking their cue from the newspapers—the commonplace misleading the commonplace. In order, however, to avail against Leviathan, with his drilled, mechanized and mesmerized totalitaria, the New Democracy must produce the clear leadership of human beings resolute because they understand.

It is obvious that the education of the electorate must be preceded by the education of the elect. The delay endangering the consolidation of democracy comes from the weak and uncertain leadership of the little thoughtless men—the self-important busybodies—rather than from the big scheming business men whose trade compels them to take stock of facts. The idealist, unless a fanatic placed in authority and exploited by others, is usually a blessing because idealisms seldom arrive singly and, to some degree, usefully discount one another. The safeguarding of the New Democracy against intellectual dictation lies in the further mutual education of the intellectuals themselves.

Conditions of mind such as that of Senator Borah whose disastrous contribution over a period of years to the present world situation can be exceeded by that of few Americans, must be corrected by educative influence if the democratic advance is not to be attacked in the rear by those who care little what is the direction of the lead so long as the lead is theirs; who, by reason of their intellectual constitution,

are only camp followers. The self-appointed apostle of "isolation," Senator Borah, ever since the Great War, has persistently preached nationalism, even more confusedly, more confusingly and, possibly, no less disastrously than has Hitler—yet without Hitler's excuse. Now throwing his publicity value once more into the wrong scale he condemns the decision of England and of other European Powers to recognize the *de facto* nature of Italian rule in Abyssinia, seeing that, by every method short of war, the same Powers had objected to Fascist Italy's premeditated overthrow of the Abyssinian people and the seizure of that country by planned violence. What is the difference, demands the indignant Senator, between conquest and the recognition of conquest?

It escapes the Senator that, so long as the untamed international wild lasts, there is in that region no law but only fact, and that there recognition accordingly confers no legality. Moreover, in this connection, to recognize the fact means no more than not to ignore the fact. Whether a fact is to be ignored or not may often depend less on the beholder than on the fact itself. An air raid on New York that filled her street canyons with her sky-scrapers would be a fact that could not possibly be ignored either by motorist or pedestrian. Senator Borah himself is a fact, if less deplorable, still, by no means universally approved, yet most certainly not to be ignored. Likewise, to recognize the fact of Germany's forcible seizure of Austria is to recognize not only the truth of international fact but the fact of international war and anarchy.

To short-sighted but high-gearred patriots like Senator Borah, however well-meaning, there must not be left the leadership of democracy. Nor can the New Democratic order afford to shelter unrealism any more than can dictatorship. To carp about free democracy or the rule of law, or Christianity and civilization, as though these were orders already existing and threatened, may become, out of the mouth of leaders, a disservice to humanity.

The New Democracy cannot be launched like a ship nor can it ever be the constructed embodiment of a blueprint plan. It can only grow. The more the nature and the

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significance of human progress are considered, the more it will be found that it is growth in spiritual stature which is chiefly needed. The American aloofness from world entanglement was a decision of Mammonistic shrewdness and not a resolution made in the interests of morality or yet of democracy. Similarly the American Cash and Carry plan of neutrality is a contrivance to do business as usual in a mad and degenerate world whose madness and degeneracy America shares, for, hating the war-in-war habits of other great Powers she, in wealth greatest Power of all, has since the Armistice led the economic war-in-peace. For her, too, the testing time draws near. The advance of the New Democracy must be held up until America takes her place among the leaders. When spirituality requires co-operation, then isolation must be recognized as materialism.

France, daughter of the old democracy and mother of the old diplomacy, while spiritually farther from the New Democracy than is America, intellectually is still farther ahead. It may be her destiny to lead back international converts to the young World Commonwealth when it has finally started, and to connect these two movements to which I will now again refer.

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As the reign of law is thus based on power, it results that the First Movement towards that reign of law—the formation and consolidation of a democratic front—is more urgent, more important than the Second Movement which serves to harmonize, educate and convert the nations—the task of the future League. By the First Movement the pass can be held while there proceeds the Second Movement which, without the pass being held, cannot proceed at all for the totalitarian Leviathans will swamp the earth and there will be no minorities, no education and no conversions. We will therefore first consider the First Movement—who could form the new front, what power it can conserve, what it may be called upon to face, and its chances of success.

The beginnings of the New Democratic front are clearly seen, on critical occasions, to be already loosely assembled

in the British Commonwealth; and can be foreseen in the future no less clearly to include the United States when crisis—deepened, it may be, to the issue of life or death—surrounds her too. Every part of the democratic front is precious to the rest. As blood is thicker than water, so, when the fateful stand comes to be taken, will man's spirituality, all undefined, prove more real and important than the Statute of Westminster or the American Constitution. With all dissolved back into elemental war, it is the spirit that will decide—that is the spirit of the leaders, for leaderless the people cannot hope to stand against Leviathan, the arch-disposer of destinies.

That only aircraft, the new and stupendous peace-in-war weapon, can supply the requisite amount of crisis to America, and that an effective New Democratic front therefore must wait until the increased range of aircraft spans the great western democracy also, is surely an unnecessarily gloomy outlook, when American statesmen recognize that, faced with stark ruin through the world not being able to receive any of her exports, the United States would have to fight for her lost markets. Seeing that, to fight without sufficient power, is, as we have seen, to have to fight more ruthlessly and even then risk defeat and tenfold disaster, the New Democracy waits for no more than America's recognition that it would be far wiser for her to join that front and prepare now, especially as, to begin with, the first fusion will be that of interests and safeguards in an economic plan.¹

Instead of waiting, then, until the air-arm overshadows her, the people of the United States should be led to see not only that they are faced with a choice between freedom secured through the union of democracy now and totalitarian dictatorship sooner or later, but that their choice is one between the risk of solitary exposure to war on the one hand and sanctuary on the other. Indeed, as the New Democratic front strengthens and gains recruits, it will come

¹ It is to the honour of the United States and the credit of the Roosevelt Administration that, in the Anglo-American Trade Agreement (1938), the first steps have now been taken.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

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to represent sanctuary as nothing else ever has, and real sanctuary is something that has been overlooked both by the Covenant of the League of Nations and by the League itself.

No alliance can ever offer sanctuary, and still less can a society based on the universal membership of Leviathans, the unruly of whom it is proposed to check by the rest applying sanctional measures such as the unruly may be pleased to sanction. Sanctuary belongs to the reign of law and involves fusion because only fusion can supply power adequate to the needs of the law affording shelter to means of sanctuary.

Seeing that alone the United States can neither fight the world, even economically, nor yet plan economically without others when increasingly only the international plan matters, she is in fact at this moment not isolated at all and might be well-advised to regularize her connection. No answer, therefore, appears yet to the question what is to become of her when the outside world can no longer accept her exports. Moreover, it cannot escape her clearest-eyed reformers that it will hardly serve for President Roosevelt to stop at the national campaign against economic evil which he has waged so manfully, if thereby the evil is to be magnified internationally. Unplanned and therefore unsupervised by law, internationalism may be far worse than nationalism as representing not only wider evil but evil projected to a zone of human activity where no writs of justice have yet begun to run. For instance, the great combines and monopolistic trusts reach fullest, Mammonistic stature only in the international sphere. It is there where monopoly attains to its fullest meaning and, oddly enough, serves the Leviathans in turn.

It must not be overlooked that while Leviathan needs a plurality of Leviathans against whom to contend—and he must contend if he is not to go out of business—at the present juncture, when the democracies are inclined to unite, Leviathan is not above a Leviathanic alliance himself. This is what is threatened and against which the democracies must unite without delay.

At the moment the clash of democracy with totalitarianism may appear to some to raise no issue deeper than the preference for a varied form of government, but, as we have seen, deeper and more tremendous issues lie beneath it. The most tremendous of these which, in the future, can be expected to take other forms, is the permanent and unchanging issue between Man and Leviathan: *Who is to be master and who to go under?*

The United States then, must turn in her tracks sooner or later, and, in a second Declaration of Independence more consummatory than the first because this time it is less the fair liberty than the life of the human spirit itself that is at stake, she must decide between God and Mammon. By taking her place in the New Democratic front without any constitution to begin with other than an international alignment upon existing facts of hostages already given to fortune, the United States will be securing as never before those identical things for which the *Mayflower* sailed away and which Mr. Neville Chamberlain now clearly proclaims England's unalterable determination to defend. It will be the task of leadership in America to quicken the imagination of her people so that they can recognize, without waiting for its abrupt intrusion, the fact that America's insulation has already ended for ever.

The education of which the British Commonwealth stands in need is likewise required by the American Democracy. For that purpose the body of intellectual leadership that is required would have to include the best vision that America could give, so that, through the mutual enlightenment of leaders, there would follow a cancelling out of doubts and contradictions among them that at least would not leave the voice of politico-spiritual leadership so inarticulate and contradictory as it is to-day. Co-operation to that end might have been far-reaching. For instance, the final cast of Spengler's thought might have been improved with important results in Germany at this moment if he had had more than a superficial knowledge of the English tradition of jurisprudence. Before the prospect of the Nazi onslaught on spiritual freedom, the outposts of which are held chiefly

by England and America, the need of a unification of leadership becomes imperative. Resistance must be prepared and pointed. Thus the Bertrand Russells, the Aldous Huxleys, the E. M. Forsters, the Joads, all rejectors of Christianity, but also all haters of war, might, for instance, after a period of intellectual collaboration, recognize common ground upon which the work for the spiritual object they all desire could best proceed. Nor would it be surprising if the outcome resulted in nothing more than some such amendment of formula as that from Christian democracy to Jesusian democracy.

BESIDES its organization of the New Democratic front including the British Commonwealth and the other great democracies, the Two Hundred Years Plan would consider how to assist the Second Movement—the international movement which more and more would reach out towards the first. Thus, while the future world commonwealth would have its beginning in a democratic enclosure, recruits would be won from and contact established with the outside nations. This would take the place of the present ambitious programme of League of Nations. To this we will return at the end of the survey.

To assist both movements the paramount requirement is an organization for intellectual leadership the qualifications for which would not be slight; indeed the manner of selecting the right persons would exercise the best judgment of democracy. Mere academic or professional ability without actual experience would not be enough, nor are men wanted whose experience has reduced them to mere machines, and who are, in short, a mere part of all that they have met. To expect man to discount his own blind fidelity to the recognized course of personal experience may be asking much. It would, however, be hardly more difficult than for him to divest himself of his vested interests such as invisible wealth and intangible power either of which may make him unconsciously partisan. Even before the age of a new economic order arrives, it should be possible for certain, matured individuals, in a quiet world of comparatively closed economy so far as they personally are concerned, to work at the Plan which, the first of its kind, might be considered the new guard of civilization.

The World Commonwealth Plan requires a commonwealth leadership proceeding in unbroken continuity; that is, not a hard and fast plan but careful and sustained planning.

Already there exists an institute of Intellectual Co-operation housed in Paris and Geneva, but this, set up under the League Council, is far from what is wanted. While no

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doubt useful in some degree, the functions it performs are not purposeful to the main design, and, with intellectuals, the problem of the international advance towards peace must come first. The contribution of this particular body to the solution of that problem does not appear to have gone much farther than, for instance, the consideration of how to save works of art from destruction in war. This selected salvation the intellectuals are attempting to effect by beseeching the nations not to commit that sin. While the results of the labours of any such body should be welcomed in the clearing-house of the League of Nations, especially the League of the future, the existing institute might have made more headway if its foundation had not been under the aegis of the League.

The co-operation of intellectuals must proceed with a view to action such as would be considered practicable by any democratic statesman. It is, therefore, as I have said, an institute of Intellectual Leadership that is required, and not merely an institute bent on ascertaining the centre of intellectual gravity on which a particular problem could, according to some theory, be said fairly to rest. Thus, what Mussolini would call unrealism—and the Mussolinis cannot be ignored by the statesmen—is included in an address given by that sincere worker for peace, Dr. Gilbert Murray, in his quality as President of the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation above referred to, and on the subject of collective security. In pleasant phraseology, pointed by scholarly reference, Dr. Gilbert Murray touches on philosophy, history, sanctions, neutrality and even peaceful change. Admitting, for instance, that the neutrality question was going to prove difficult, he confesses:

“I had always imagined in my innocence that the Covenant of the League had abolished neutrality altogether. I see that I have now to say that it has either abolished or transformed it, which is not quite so clear.”¹

The obscurity must have been increased rather than lifted by the address from which it must appear to any mind

¹ League of Nations: “Institute of Intellectual Co-operation,” Address, June 1935.

alert to the real issue that Dr. Gilbert Murray, seeing even less daylight upon the subject of collective security than on that of neutrality, variously refers to it as a present problem, as a great question still in the future, and then as an interest of civilization already existing and arrived. He informs us that it is the system of collective security as it now exists that is faulty.

The truth escaping Dr. Gilbert Murray on this occasion is that, though they may not admit it, what the nations have desired and what they have been endeavouring to secure is *individual* security including the security of their "vital interests" by means of *collective action*; and also the further truth that whether the contemplated security in fact is to be obtained or not must depend on how that *collective action* is conducted and on its result.

The Institute of Intellectual Co-operation has left collective security a mere phrase by confusing the method of obtaining the result with the result itself. It is not the security that has, in the first place, to be collected, but the concord which alone makes possible the fusion of power adequate to support a wider reign of law in which, *and in which alone*, security can be won and kept.

Moreover—and the Intellectuals appear to have missed this too—only then could law be administered not only *by* the group of nations comprised within the system of so-called collective security, in administration to the group, but *to each individual member* of the system apart from the rest. On the other hand, united security resulting from fused sovereignty and widened statehood is obviously feasible. That is a fact which intellectuals can discover by co-operating not only among themselves but with those engaged in the actual task of government.

Only unplanned leadership could miss seeing that "collective security" is farcical and has collected nothing, certainly not the adhesion of the Powers. Likewise that the prayerful wail for universality in the League goes no deeper than membership by subscription and touches neither concord nor yet sacrifice. Beginning with their resources and ending with their interests, it is the fusion

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of the great democracies that is so urgent for it is their disunion on which the totalitarians chiefly count for success.

In the First Movement—the expansion of statehood movement—where democratic governments are concerned and where the publicity of spiritual truth has to-day every scope, it is the leaders on whom all depends and the responsibility is therefore theirs. While, in a democracy, the concurrence of its members is important, their understanding can be expected only with their education; and, for that, world events proceeding and impending, cannot wait. Moreover, the education of peoples of wide range of intelligence, and, no less, of ignorance as of information, must largely take the form not of priming in theory but of the promulgation of matters of fact and plain principles the application of which can only be entrusted to organized government. One part of the educative process includes the proof that the programme is being carried out.

Thus leadership in the New Democracy, only less than in the dictatorship, must act ahead of the people who, nevertheless, can ratify their trust at the next election. It should be possible on certain conditions for the United States, France and the British Commonwealth straightway to form an industrial, democratic, economic front co-operating with other democratic states economically as far as possible. While this would not, in any way, aim at precluding or restricting trade with any other country, even totalitarian, the fact remains that, while the reign of war continues at the instance of Leviathans, it is impossible to overthrow or even to repulse the Leviathanic advance by the doctrines of free trade which, in such circumstances, could mean only unplanned trade. There can be no real free trade in an anarchic system but only under the reign of law where the free trade plan can be made and maintained. That is to say, administrated liberation of trade is conditioned by extension of the reign of law.

The New Democratic front would, therefore, operate economically and its power be available to enforce its economic law along that front and to throw back in war any Leviathanic offensive against that front. That would

involve, sooner or later, a pooling of economic resources and reserves along that front. For instance, it would mean a complete overhaul of the neutrality principles operative in any attacks on the democratic front as well as a review of arrangements like that of Ottawa and even of policies like the Monroe Doctrine. Pending fusion, the co-existence of like-minded sections of that front is obviously to the common advantage of all the democracies as of democracy itself. To take a further instance, the problem of England's shrunk foreign investments has recently been further imperilled by Mexico confiscating British oil interests. The Monroe Doctrine would therefore be re-applied by the United States to secure redress for the sister democracy, England, rather than be left in a form exploitable by the Mexican Government against that democracy.

Again, while the capital system lasts it would have to be fairly used by the democracies. If she cannot lend abroad, then England, as a bulwark guarding democracy, will be weakened, for her population must then either decline or starve. England's problem at the end is therefore America's problem so they must economically combine. Any protest from the dictators that the economic front of the democracies has commenced a doctrinal war can be ignored. Leviathan's plan, veering between anarchy and barter, is confronted by a plan of the New Democracy; and here, too, power will decide. As the economic arrangements between these two great democracies pass from co-operation, past collaboration, to combination, so that power will increase. As it increases so the reign of law, at first on economic matters, will expand. With that widened sovereignty in the economic sphere, the subordinate national sovereignties can keep step. But even economically increased power from union must come first because it is on power that law stands.

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The task of leadership would be simplified by the First Movement concerning itself primarily with the stable democracies where like-mindedness has been sharpened by recent events. It is obvious that the theory that mere uni-

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versality of state membership of any league or front could ever further peace must henceforth be abandoned. Concord on such fundamental matters must be established among the leaders before they can presume to lead, and the more so if, as is contemplated here, that leadership were recommendatory and consultative.

Membership of the intellectual leadership should neither confer any title nor lead to any title. The rare distinction of being connected with the work involved should be sufficient to rid the most intellectual of either superiority or inferiority complex accumulated possibly through years of unrecompensed toil, the sustaining thought being that, for the future, the solitary effort would be rounded off by communal effort of other minds. There should be certain privileges, opportunities for travel and research, a modest allowance for expenses, a sanctuary in case of illness, but little more.

It is remarkable, considering the frequency of the danger signals that civilization itself now faces extreme peril and possibly extinction, that there is no provision for continuity of the leadership of its vanguard beyond the accidental contributions of mass-mind manipulators, of moneyed up-thrusting politicians, increasingly professional, and quite often political careerists whose pick and choice of points and programmes are governed by party legacies or the push administered by the circumstances of the moment. The need is for the co-ordination of minds no less than for expert intelligence. The direction and strength of a world intellectual advance cannot be maintained if so much is left to depend on the political contrivances of the party machine. An intellectual advance is an advance in understanding. For it neither the thrust of theory nor the advancement of naked experience can ever be a substitute.

It may perhaps be contended that any such intellectual contribution to the evolution of a plan must be very limited seeing that the politician's task is rarely if ever concerned with long-range planning at all, as even the legislative measures that come before him often represent a policy already working in full momentum and which itself was only

accidentally launched and therefore not a plan at all. This but confirms that to be adequate the plan must be of sufficient range and that not an inconsiderable part of the Two Hundred Years Peace Plan would be concerned with the planning of the intellectual leadership itself.

It is obvious that any contribution by intellectual co-operation confined to the academic sphere would not provide for the requirements of the New Democracy. There would have to be included minds chosen throughout the British Commonwealth, from the United States and elsewhere. The play of light from a number of such independently reared minds could not fail to illuminate any problem. An immediate problem in Australia, for instance, that of balancing imports by exports, is seen more there than in England against the background of hard facts such as that Japan, an important customer, is at loggerheads with British policy which, somewhat uncertain in late years, might quite probably change again with the result that that custom, if lost now, would then be irrecoverable. On a still longer view, however, the position to be faced is how far custom could be allowed to be the deciding factor—whether Australia is prepared to sacrifice those things she prizes greatly or whether, if it comes to the point, Australians are prepared to die in order that they should still endure.

A rare phenomenon is Gandhi who is endeavouring to strike a political direction only after considering the spiritual situation to which he thinks it might lead. Rather than have his three hundred million villagers transformed into human ants upon the treadmill of Mammon urged on by the whips of Caesar, he prefers that they should remain backward with their spinning-wheels—a forlorn hope, it is true, that has not, as it stands, the slightest chance of ultimate success. Nor could any ideals even approaching that ever become projects unless included in some such plan.

The British Commonwealth is richer in her available intellectual resources now than ever before. There have been rare opportunities for observation in the momentous decades just passed. There has been, and is, no provision for recording the voice of intellect in communion whatever the

theme. The nearest we have got is perhaps the rushed output of some royal commission, or celebrities in arranged debate. Nor are the intellectuals the *intelligentzia*.

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In the course of my travels round the Empire, from time to time, my conviction has strengthened that no Commonwealth of Nations' plan can ever be evolved, let alone pursued, without far closer liaison between British Empire minds than exists to-day. The problem here is not that of erecting a cast-iron structure supporting arrangements for securing information such as previously was forthcoming through the continuity of the Permanent Under-secretaryships of State for Foreign Affairs in London, nor yet of setting up ambassadorial machinery whatever the merits or demerits of any such projects.¹

What is required is intellectual guidance—available for any part of the Empire—by minds in touch with affairs, viewing them against long vistas of the Plan, and withal supreme in the detachment of their reasoning.

"The momentous task of founding the first international commonwealth must," thinks Mr. Lionel Curtis, "be achieved by peoples who have really known how it feels to depend on their own resources. The Dominions south of the line can, if they will, experience that feeling, and the task of initiating the first international commonwealth will, I believe, rest with them."²

It may be so. Experience over a good many years, however, passed in the world not only of thought but also of action, including some acquaintance with political affairs, both international and Imperial, both public and private, tells me that it is far more likely that the real innovation will be one that is crept into almost without the fact being noticed; and that, evolution here being a growth, it will be neither spectacular, portentous nor abrupt.

Not long after the War and encouraged by Lord Milner

¹ See article "The Cabinet Secretariat and Empire Government," Edward Mousley, *Fortnightly Review*, March 1923.

² Lionel Curtis: *Civitas Dei*, Vol. III, p. 118.

I wrote a little book dealing with the problem of maintaining the unity of the Empire¹ and which received wide circulation throughout the British Dominions and elsewhere as the question was receiving considerable attention at that time. The innumerable views expressed by Dominion statesmen and others and by the Empire Press revealed the most astonishing divergency and conflict conceivable. Unanimity was clear in only one regard—an objection to anything that looked like “constitution-mongering.” And, what was still more interesting, they all declared themselves ready to run the risk of delaying reforms until compelled to do so by the next war which, at that time, was considered to be immeasurably remote.

Although the outlook has changed, the time-lag in Dominion understanding is still chiefly on those political issues of the long view which, although supreme, rarely find room for emphasis in political despatches or communications passing from day to day over the distances of Empire. The need for the New Democratic front and the conditions of its advance would have to be set out clearly and carefully before Dominion minds. Once they realized what is at stake and were set thinking upon the Two Hundred Years Plan, contemporary thought overseas would make a vital contribution. Aware, far more than are those who live in Europe, of the Gulf Streams that circulate through the international world of ocean, and conscious of their own comparative isolation, they could, I believe, eventually be brought to prove as instrumental for co-operative union, if not quite as Mr. Curtis anticipates, and, after education, as responsive as anyone could desire.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the Plan would be concerned less with detailed steps than with direction and landmarks. It would consider detailed planning in the light of that direction for, however much points of view and planning may change, direction must be preserved. What is wanted is a steady beam of light to illuminate the span. A great deal of unproductive Dominion assertiveness in the

¹ Edward Mousley: *The Empire View of the Empire Tangle* (1921): Introduction by the Rt. Hon. W. Massey, P.C., Prime Minister of New Zealand.

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years immediately following the War could have been avoided if there had then been properly put to the Dominion peoples the view that, whatever degree of independence and freedom they claimed or possessed, there was not the slightest need why, wholly apart from that, a co-existing unity of the Empire should not be maintained—as, in the event, luck has willed.

But the present unity is not enough. What served to regulate (Empire) domestic relationships in the piping days of British industrial and imperial expansion will no longer serve to withstand the shock of the impending impact so carefully prepared by totalitarian Leviathan. The theory I have put forward regarding sovereignty and the state and which I believe provable as it reflects the actual facts of the present situation, can help forward the Commonwealth of Nations by demolishing the constitutional impedimenta that trail behind the words of politicians throughout the Empire and throughout the United States—thus opening the way for fusion. Breaking new ground as it does in the field of jurisprudence, its validity is being and will be proved by events, for jurisprudence is a science resting on the verities and which cannot be permanently distorted by the mere word whether of Nazis or of others. The widened conceptions of sovereignty as of statehood permit of the Dominions retaining their fullest stature while likewise falling into line along the new democratic front—an alignment that, by fusion, may and must crystallize into a new and widened political society. The same applies to the United States.

It is only by means of a long-range plan that Democracy can make the most of that special advantage which the dictatorships do not possess—the factor of continuity and permanence. Equipped with a plan, democracy can outlast dictatorship. It is sometimes overlooked that, while one dictatorship may succeed another, the policy of dictatorship, being largely opportunism and dependent on power, is never constant. And that while the idea of a classless society hatched by yesterday's communist dictator may give place to the idea of a Jewless Jerusalem hatched by the dictator

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of to-day, when both dictators have passed away there will probably remain only Leviathan.

Mr. Curtis suggests that the urgent need is for political thinkers "free to see, think and declare what they feel to be true without regard to the effect that what they say may have on political programmes and parties."

This suggestion calls for critical examination if, as he maintains, such men are only or chiefly to be found in the academic circles of the universities. Mr. Curtis is the reverse of reassuring when he goes on to confess that "the League of Nations was to a great extent the result of thought which came from those circles," the influence of which, as he maintains with some truth, has been used since the War to create the belief that human society can and must be stabilized on the basis of the Covenant. Until the universities have evolved some plan for extending their cloistral shelter to practical workers who have been out in the international and imperial fields, they are certainly not to be trusted with any paramount influence of leadership, let alone with its monopoly. It is beginning to be recognized that the Treaty of Peace "liquidating" the Great War might have been best, after all, if left to the soldiers to settle.

In less than two hundred years other and rival empires will undoubtedly have arisen, and it is not unlikely that they will contain consolidated and unified power gathered under strong direction if not under totalitarian dictatorship. The post-war clap-trap phraseology of our worthy Dominion politicians—"the loose silken threads that might be snapped if there was not full consultation"; "the only surviving ties not of law or of necessity but of sentiment"; the "right of any fully sovereign Dominion to make war or peace alone," as also to "proclaim its full independence before the world with no uncertain voice"—has, for the most part, sensibly been dropped. The Dominions have gathered their experience at Geneva and elsewhere in the meantime, that is why. Having made their own reconnaissance into the international world, they must now ask themselves whether the plan for the preservation of British democracy can afford to wait two hundred years or fifty years or twenty—and why it

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should not begin now. The co-operative union for peace of America with the British Commonwealth must be worked at steadily over a period which may be of many years; but at least the effort may proceed always with the assurance that sooner or later world factors, already operative, promise in the end to render that union inevitable.

For that end the educational quickening needed is spiritual, as only this can change the emphasis and give the new direction. In this light the instanced outlay of a hundred thousand aeroplanes needed for the New Democratic front is relatively small and, by any measurement, compared with the amount of what is at stake, almost negligible. Nevertheless, except after a spiritual assessment of objectives and advantages, there is little likelihood that the American democracy or the French or any other, will co-operate with us to make up even that quota of material sacrifice forthwith. Seeing that these three democracies are as wealthy as the totalitarian states are poor, will cavilling about the cost to each respectively be allowed to involve delay while the totalitarians proceed to win the war in peace? The more it is examined the more the advance to the reign of law is seen to be primarily a spiritual advance; and if that advance is being forced upon man only by his great need, then the reason that war persists at last begins to appear.

As it is on the facts that the spiritual factor will play, the facts must be *seen* out, not merely *let* out. However unwelcome authoritarianism may be in matters of faith and religion, it is undeniable that in matters of fact it is increasingly indispensable. Facts and factual utterances must be hall-marked wherever possible. That safe refuge for sweeping statement—the well-phrased generalization—can work mischief if accepted as the conclusion of a research that has not in fact taken place at all.

For instance, on a recent occasion Mr. Aldous Huxley attacked the British Government for:

“having chosen the moment when it no longer possesses command of the seas to reverse the free trade policy by means of which its predecessors thought fit to placate the envy of the Powers. It has closed the doors of its Colonies

to other nations, thus possibly reminding them of their own poverty and giving them new grievances against the British Empire."

As Sir George Schuster showed to those who happen to take *The Times*¹ this criticism is wholly unsupported by the facts. Free trade does not follow the gun nor even serve it by placating totalitarian Leviathan who remains unsatiated by free trade and dissatisfied with anything short of the human spirit. The material facts, clearly reflected over vital periods by the trade figures Sir George Schuster fully quoted under desirable heads, amply justify his deductions that the Imperial field over which the British Government could utilize its position as an Imperial Power is extremely limited owing to the principle of self-determination—or determination according to local interest—being operative throughout most of the Empire.

Sir George Schuster's conclusion, however, that our vital need

"is to prevent the Empire countries falling under the domination of other Powers whose policy would possibly restrict the 'natural economic inducements to trade,'"

enunciates only the half-truth, but is accurate in direction. The whole truth is that the British Commonwealth must plan more wholeheartedly than ever, not for itself, but for the new Commonwealth of Nations, the beginning of which would be enclosed by the New Democratic front and expand with it.

Now the fact that Mr. Aldous Huxley, who so clearly desires to help the lead towards peace, misleads as he does here, demonstrates once more that for efficient leadership the intellectuals must co-operate between themselves and with others. As elsewhere, cancelling out must precede co-ordination. Mr. Aldous Huxley's own precept that a bad means cannot result in a good end would seem to require the careful testing of conclusions in the light of facts. Supplied, we will assume by a colleague in this instance, with accurate accounts and facts, he would have found

¹ Articles in *The Times*, June 4 and 8, 1938.

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that they pointed no less eloquently to the true objective he desires to urge. Facts must prove, on investigation, to form the foundation of any structure intended to be built by many hands. If those are subverted or overlooked no lasting structure can rise at all.

Few have insisted on this condition of service more than that great English spirit, scientific-minded Thomas Huxley, and it may safely be supposed that it is one of the first things he would look for in the work of that gifted stylist, the somewhat more artificially experienced yet equally honest Huxley with us to-day. Style alone, however unsparing the effort, is not enough, any more than is an encyclopaedia of facts.

What is wanted is the crystallized thought that will bear investigation right down to the supporting facts.

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The body of intellectual leadership would be the forward mind of the New Democratic front looking out upon the changing scene from the unchanging standpoint of the essential earth process of the widening reign of law. That would be a mind observing, enquiring, examining, foreshadowing, suggesting, anticipating, conceiving, recording, correcting—and, as such, increasingly influencing the evolution of man and some day possibly even directing it. In the strange possibility that man happens to be the highest form of life in the universe—which is just conceivable—then, excepting God, the intellectual leadership we are considering would be the supreme controlling intelligence in space and time—a stupendous and splendid responsibility by no means frightening to man the Spirit so long as his compass-bearing is spiritual.

If, on the other hand, that far conjecture of man's seniority should now, by any chance, be actual fact, then, at this moment, the evolution of life's consciousness, still less of its spiritual awareness, is not yet far advanced, for life at its highest in the universe is but a haphazard affair. Even in its crowning edifice of British democracy the only control proceeds from politicians, some of them bored careerists

who can provide several hundred pounds a year to lubricate the party machine in their constituencies; some of them, on the most favourable view, only intermittent interveners; all, however, throwing their odds and ends of chance experience into a political crucible which is more fitted to facilitate expedient than to design a world-plan for human life and to apply it. And if that duty to humanity sounds over-stated for anything that could reasonably be expected of British democracy, then on whom shall the duty fall? One thing is clear—the task of a world plan for human life is no longer a dream but the demand of man's spirit and the command of God.

Furnished with the cardinal points of principle from the planning by the intellectual leadership—which would be consultative and not at all executive—the labours of parliament might achieve a new value altogether. On earth, where there is no vision, the people perish; and the vision is that of the leaders. If Anglo-Saxon democracy is to lead—or democracy is not to be left leaderless—this applies most to ourselves. To lead is not to dictate but to educate. As I have said, to be satisfactory the lead cannot take the form of a number of independent, intellectual leads by individual intellectuals, but must be the single leadership of a communal, intellectual mind operating in continuity. Above all, the leadership must conform in direction to one spiritual end—the self-liberation and growth of man, the spirit; that is, the objective of democracy.

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Now the Christian Church has recently been accused here in England of failing to articulate its own message and of giving the politicians *carte blanche*. It is obvious that the Church, as such, and unaided, is not competent to pronounce, for instance, upon the gold standard, the minimum wages and hours legislation now under consideration in Washington, or even on the jurisprudential aspect of the question of pacifism. Indeed, whenever the clergy do permit themselves to pronounce on such problems the result is usually disconcerting because here the exhibition of technical ignorance

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is from a quarter that is expected to provide spiritual revelation. But the reluctance of the Church to clarify its spiritual guidance by the steady illumination of the supreme spiritual end and to agree on a policy of education in collaboration with the rest of the intellectual leadership as a whole, would no longer be excusable on this ground. Some such collaboration might eventually result in a spiritual system that would be more than an article of faith.

It is because only a religion revitalized to the length of welcomed action and happy service can hope to off-set the totalitarian politico-religions of the dictators that one or two somewhat gloomy if not forbidding aspects of religion come down from the past might be given less prominence. Such a programme would stand as good a chance as anything of educating the rank and file of the American people on the advisability of preferring controlled evolution to uncontrolled revolution—for that is what, otherwise, is ahead of the United States.

Right education stimulating the growth of the individual spirit will not be accomplished by capitalizing slick confession, disinterring the past self to unearth ancient sin, disintegrating the present self by delegating in all directions the spirit's prerogative of self-liberation, or even by sustained prayer for blind guidance. The purpose of God, mysterious as the Divine plan behind the universe is hidden, at least clearly requires the individual to earn his guidance by seeking and self-effort. It is only some political system like the New Democracy that can give him the adequate chance.

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What form the adjustments in the existing political machinery of legislation the intellectual leadership would advise is not to be anticipated, but, the direction determined, it is safe to say certain results would inevitably follow. In so far as the lead of the new democracy rests with the British Commonwealth, the responsibility for that lead at the moment lies chiefly on the shoulders of the British Cabinet. What, then, is the British Cabinet, how did it arise, and whither is it going?

The British Cabinet to-day is little more than an assembly of the heads of certain great departments of state grown up, or rather come down, from the distant past, the efforts and policies of which the Prime Minister is supposed to co-ordinate from moment to moment. That would be a super-human task beyond the reach of any single brain, and one which, in any case, could only give indifferent results.

Now co-ordination, however intense, from moment to moment, without arrangement for continuity of co-ordination, is, at the best, only the intermittent attempt of successive Prime Ministers to harmonize unplanned efforts by unplanned co-ordination. It is commonly supposed that the work of the departments proceeds along lines of policy which converge and so require little harmonizing. But in an unplanned order that means only the conservation of planlessness. And in practice the deflecting influence of any policy (except that introducing abrupt change) on the course of departmental labours is negligible compared with the forward momentum of the departmental programme already proceeding. It is in the light of this fact that innovations like the setting up of a Ministry of Supply should be critically re-examined. Is the innovation to be deferred until the war in peace at some point of imperceptible change becomes war in war?

In short, no co-ordination of diverging, unplanned efforts could ever reduce them to plan even if a plan existed which is not the case in the democracies. What actually happens is that the Prime Minister does less co-ordinating than directive over-ruling. That is, he resolves departmental differences so far as he can and, on occasion, even has to determine their spheres where the departments overlap.

The resulting picture is that of the leadership of the present planless democracy. In the totalitarian states, on the other hand, the degree of necessary co-ordinating is infinitely less, as all efforts converge in accordance with a plan, albeit Leviathanic, dictated from the outset. Conspicuous in the totalitarian dictatorship and conspicuously absent in the democracy, planning may be a decisive factor in the contest of man with Leviathan.

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The plan of the New Democracy must be to surpass and eclipse that of the totalitarians, for while the latter is a destructive plan for war the former must be a constructive plan for ultimate peace—its preliminary span at least two hundred years.

How, it may be asked, can democracy, new or old, plan at the same time *for* the reign of peace for themselves and *against* the reign of war of Leviathan? The answer is that power available and effective for law in the one case can, on one condition, be made available and effective to overthrow Leviathan in the other. The condition is that voluntary union of the new democratic front for law must *proceed faster than Leviathanic violent expansion of the reign of war*.

How would the democratic front shape in a contest, mediate or immediate? As time passes and armament changes, so the adversary is likely to change in formation and in design, although whatever that re-formation, Leviathan can be expected to remain, concealed or unconcealed, unto the end. It is equally safe to assume that, however the totalitarian aspect of the enemy may fade, true democracy, standing for the reign of law guarding spiritual liberty, will remain a permanent issue because permanently opposed by Leviathan—the spirit of war. The issue will continue to be spiritual. As the victory, therefore, must be a spiritual victory, so a defeat would be that of the human spirit.

THE contest between man and Leviathan, upon the alternative of law or war, thus falls to be fought out between the New Democratic front and the anti-democratic front. It follows that victory for man cannot be reached at once but only in the eventual outcome of the contest—the expansion of the Commonwealth of Nations into the World Commonwealth. Nothing short of that will give victory complete and final, for only then will Leviathan be driven from his last stronghold and subjugated. The plan of the New Democracy, therefore, must be for *ultimate* victory but, in the meantime, to *hold the advance*. It is because only democracy can plan for far-off victory while Leviathan can plan only for immediate victory that, the decisive factor being planning, democracy can outlast and in the end, overthrow Leviathan. On the long forward view, at least, the outlook becomes for democracy the heartening one of certain victory in the end if only the requisite effort is made in time. No new note from Leviathan confounds the teaching of history that dictatorships know no continuity. It seems that, born in violence, upheld by violence, they must, perforce, take the way of violence which is of opportunism and temporary expedient.

Thus the road of violence, even of planned violence, cannot equal the reach of any long-range plan. The dictators have yet to prove that they can combine for large-scale operations involving vast *sustained* sacrifice, seeing that, except for a mere lifetime or so, they are not available to do the planning. Nor is any totalitarian dictator likely to acknowledge any rightful duty of succession to policy, even if the need of variety did not forbid. Asserted by one dictator after another, the claim to the appointment by Divine Right, for instance, would wear a little thin and, indeed, lead to complications. Moreover, unless the preceding dictator's claim were challenged, then, seeing that God must be presumed to know His own mind, the change in policy inevitable on a change of dictators would be

difficult to explain. Or, as might be expressed in terms of Mussolini's realism, once the dictator's divine right and the dictator's method are seen to boil down to bluff and bullying, the game can be kept going on only by startling expedients one of which is for him to call himself God. By using this identical expedient so early, Hitler proves himself less astute than Mussolini who is thereby obliged to remain atheist, like the Soviets, unless he is to accept the other end of the axis, Hitler, as Italy's God. The machine, Leviathan, it is true, outlives the dictator, but the Leviathanic pattern, as we have seen, is resultant and not planned, Leviathanism being the Method—War, and without End.

Democracy, therefore, can plan better, wider, longer than Leviathan, and also faster, for its resources are far greater; and its front, already wider, promises to expand as the real issue comes to be recognized. Moreover, as all desire to be on the winning side, it is the impressiveness of the Plan itself—its earnestness, its boldness, and its reach—that can materially help to ensure from the start that democracy succeeds. Much, then, depends on the Plan, the Plan depends on leadership, and, therefore, most depends on the planning of the leadership itself. What are the earliest recommendations a body of intellectual leadership, such as I have indicated, would make, it is beyond the compass of this work to foreshadow. These could only be determined as the main features of the practical planning began to loom into shape. It is obvious that at the outset, the New Democratic Front would require considerable co-ordination of its several sections.

Co-ordination must begin at home. To-day the British Commonwealth of Nations is wholly unco-ordinated whether for war in war, or war in peace. The question of reforms and innovations recognized as necessary for a long time are still put off in deference to some ancient prejudice, as, for instance, was the recent plea for a Ministry of Supply. Should the office of a deputy Prime Minister, a British Commonwealth Prime Minister, be created? It is almost inconceivable that, except on the spur of crisis, sufficient interest and determination could be generated to make this a live issue amongst us, yet who does not know that the task

of the first post in the Empire is already too arduous for one man, and that in a great upheaval it would be even worse? Now responsibility overflowing from ministerial shoulders finds a ready receptacle in what the public are sometimes led to believe are the mere figure-heads of the great administrative departments, but who, in fact, cannot help themselves on occasion from making important two-dimensional decisions—politico-bureaucratic—later to be ratified wholesale. It has long been recognized around the Empire that this applies to Imperial affairs no less than to United Kingdom affairs in so far as they are separable at all. The old jealous insistence by the Dominions on running their own affairs has had the obvious result.

On the occasion of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament it was admitted that this is almost startlingly true, not only by my colleague, the late Sir John Salmond—an outstanding authority on constitutional law and jurisprudence—but by almost all the other Dominion representatives; and, no less certainly, if a little more reluctantly, by the principal Secretary-General, Sir Maurice Hankey. It was as a feature possibly inevitable in the existing arrangements for Empire Government, but which might in sufficient stress of emergency assume alarming proportions, that Lord Balfour subsequently considered the matter with me at some length and did his best to advance suggestions for an ultimate remedy, as, indeed, so far as he properly could, did Sir Maurice Hankey.

It was not, as afterwards came to be alleged, Dominion bone-headedness or Whitehall bone-headedness that allowed chance circumstances to demolish the whole consideration, but that that bone-headedness, differing in one part of the Empire from that in another, was constantly changing. With unnecessary apprehension in one quarter, imperfect comprehension in another, the general recognition that a reform of some sort was needed was allowed to fade out. At the present moment the question of organization indispensable to the Empire's own salvation in any large-scale international crisis is still either shelved or actually resisted by the various Dominion Governments, and often for con-

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flicting reasons. Leviathan begins to lift his head there as well. The malady of "vital interests" begins to blind the Dominions also. The anxiety of each Dominion lest its political decisions regarding its particular "vital interests" should be influenced by outside factors has meant, and, with the multiplication of those interests, must increasingly mean that the British Commonwealth is careering more haphazardly as time goes on. Further, having regard to what the world revolution only just getting under way portends, the situation in the above respects has deteriorated from what it was in 1914, just as the peril has become more grave. If no longer, in the absence of a plan, can England's civil servants or an impromptu Empire War Cabinet possibly prop up the Empire against the pressure of war, how can the Empire be led, as things are, in an advance towards law? In order to effect that, as we have discovered, the plan must not be one to check the world revolution, but one to direct it.

As *The Economist* shrewdly remarked—

"The retirement of Sir Maurice Hankey now removes the man who, through successive Governments, has been the real Minister for Co-ordination."¹

If that statement is true, then its accuracy might be rounded off with the amplification that the largest measure of co-ordination the whole Empire has ever received has been only at an occasional conference when this super-secretary and highly placed co-ordinator was Secretary-General. That a son of Empire, a South Australian by birth, an officer of Marines, should, through momentous times, rise to become, as a permanent official, "the real Minister for Co-ordination" to the British Government, and then retire with the Government gift of a directorship of the Suez Canal, invites the question what provision remains for the co-ordination of the whole advance of the British Commonwealth of Nations—and furnishes additional evidence of the urgent need for a plan, seeing that the odd coincidences of this public servant's career are hardly likely to recur.

¹ June 4, 1938, p. 525.

The testing time for the Empire, as for democracy, lies ahead, and it would seem not far ahead. Before the eyes of us who privately strive because we have not only looked at war but seen it, the stupendous and succeeding years do not remain rolled up with their events as a film rolls up, as its tale is told. For some who beheld from the distance, contemplation, retrospective and detached, may be not altogether an uncongenial pastime, particularly if they happen to have retired with well-deserved honours and ample cash resources. But for those less lucky yet driven by duty to the grim task, the pain of unrolling that film in memory can be justified only by results more illuminating than anecdotal. Mere photography of political facts, like photography in the novel or in any other art, here contributes as little as the *credo* of Lord Milner, that final fragment pathetic in its microcosmic tidiness which, when set against the background of the world laid waste as it now confronts us, is seen to have served its turn and grounded in a period closed to the British Empire for ever.

The earth's need at the moment is for men with vision who can look back but only in order to look forward. The need for the planning of what I have called the New Democratic front is tremendous and urgent. If the nucleus of the leadership contemplated does not receive physical embodiment it will be useless to blame the governments. They may supply the facilities for leadership but hardly leadership itself which remains the prerogative of free individuals and private effort despite the old problem of pounds, shillings and pence. If all else fails, however slow the process the intellectual leadership can proceed by the written word but precious years will be lost through the same want of co-ordination. Freed from office and free to suggest, serviceable contribution to the plan, possibly of great value to posterity, should be forthcoming from all great servants of the people who are not still greater self-seekers.

The need is not for theories but to assemble the front, for, given sufficient power, the advance, as we have seen, can then be less costly. In order to succeed, the democratic front will have to do more than hold off Levia-

than. It will have to be prepared to advance and keep on advancing.

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In order to facilitate union for increased power a good many ancient conventions call for review. The first requirement is for education. To subdue Leviathan it is necessary to unmask him. It is not to be forgotten that the violence by which Leviathan rises to authority and maintains it, is power magnified by totalitarian ruthlessness. The difference between power and violence—which turns on the end they are made to serve—may be also reflected in a difference in the method of their application, but on one condition. Provided there is an overwhelming margin of superior power, extreme measures will not be called for.

Now the supremacy of power turns no less on the actual instrument of power than on the executive that uses it. Here the dictatorship enjoys an advantage over democracy so great that, other things being equal, it must prove decisive. As power involves planning we may expect some necessary revolution of ideas and practices for, so far, the world has known no like plan for peace through law and power. Already, for instance, the overload of the legislature involves more and more decentralization of the task of legislation, and the task of the Government executive more and more unloading on the administrative departments. The accidental advantage of a dictatorship here is that it discounts this process of change a considerable distance ahead.

For all Lord Hewart's¹ protest against bureaucracy usurping the legislative or the judicial function, it may be said with equal truth that the judiciary no less frequently usurps the function of the legislature; and, further, that to some degree, even the public exploit and thus, in a sense, usurp the judicial functions of the judiciary itself. The judges cannot beat up all misinterpreting their decisions any more than can one judge beat up another who differently interprets the law. The legislature has the right to legislate, the judge

¹ Lord Hewart: *The New Despotism*.

the right and, indeed, duty to decide when the matter comes up for decision. That is all. It is by no means incompatible with the true meaning of democracy that an able Civil Servant of great experience should discharge *approved* duties of either function. And indirectly and generally there is such approval. As we have seen, "the bureaucracy" of the public official, Sir Maurice Hankey, considered by *The Economist* to have attained to the degree of a Ministry of Co-ordination in itself, has been of considerable service however singular and unprecedented. More and more must devolution of duties and centralization of direction be democracy's reply to the dictator's machine of government.

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Here it is not inapposite to remark that after great changes the Mother of Parliaments seems to have become stabilized as in a past century. And it is not less interesting that this condition of things seems to have become repeated in varying degrees throughout the Empire, the Lower House representing the will and emotionalism of the people, the Upper Chamber at best only suggestive but in any event hardly formative of any legislation at all. The Cabinet thus remains subservient to the will of the Lower Chamber where the free course of emotional prejudice, unchecked and unguided by the reasoned thought of any second chamber, or, still less, of the Cabinet, seems to avoid catastrophe only through some uncanny judgment of the British masses as crisis draws near. And, excepting those moments of crisis, the political course for the most part followed has been more a matter of luck than a choice of reason. In the earlier day of British Empire expansion and progress, when trade was thriving and raw materials from large sectors of the world's resources were tapped for the first time, this worked well enough. But such haphazard policy cannot continue to serve in the testing period that lies ahead.

The decisions required of democracy reach down to revolution in the forms as in the life of democracy itself.

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The suggestion recently advanced by some enterprising young members of Parliament in England that the House of Lords should be radically and immediately reformed and that there should be admitted to the future Upper Chamber suitable men from the Dominions, would have shocked Victorian ears. True, it would not fully meet the case either for the Empire that lags behind or for England who leads. But at any rate such suggestions recognize the need. If composed of men deriving from the several parts of the British Commonwealth, a council of intellectual leadership would offer the possibility of continuous guidance not only of the Empire as a Commonwealth but of the British Commonwealth as the beginning of a Commonwealth of Nations. If, above all, the first need is to educate the New Democracy to understand what is the issue, who are the parties to the issue, what is the way to victory and its price—this, for instance, might well point to the reformation of the House of Lords which that Chamber has certainly not outlived. Like a pond of goldfish in a forsaken garden it is in danger of becoming only the haunting place of wistful labour leaders who, in a fit of envy, once in a while fling in a homely herring. It would be far better to abolish it, along, in a competitive world, with the unfair play of its qualifying titles, and to replace it by a leadership of intellectuals who, if necessary, would not be above working anonymously. Far more intellectual than the Commons, the House of Lords should arrange their own revolution with a view to serving the New Democracy in the coming contest.

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Preparations for the directing of the democratic front should not be delayed seeing that, as we have found, the way lies via democracy or nowhere. At the same time it is necessary to bear in mind how often the nations reverse and exchange rôles, and how transformed the international scene may become even in two hundred years. Only a few years ago that practised observer, Dr. Gilbert Murray, not unaccustomed to travelling across the centuries and to distinguishing what fades and what endures, set down these

thoughts introductory to an optimistic little book written in the cause of peace:¹

"I count among the few pieces of good luck which the League has enjoyed that there has so far been no international force. It would have been recruited from those nations which now maintain large armies; it would have had a French Commander-in-Chief, and heaven knows what it would have been or what it would have been doing by this time. Until the League has earned public confidence by its justice it would be madness for it to try to impose its will by military force. . . . The failures of the League have been due to external causes. . . . It was meant to be universal. . . . And lastly the crushing disaster of Central Europe, the enforced disarmament of the ex-enemy nations and the willing disarmament of many others, have left France alone, bristling with arms and flushed with hard-earned triumph, able to assert her sovereign will over Europe without troubling the rest of the League for their assistance or much regarding their disapproval. Forty millions are not the equivalent of seventy millions. But the seventy are now broken and prostrate at the feet of the forty and as long as they can be kept there and their heads bludgeoned if they attempt to rise, the forty can feel serene. The only power capable of remonstrating with France is Great Britain; and Great Britain has strong reasons to make her reluctant to take up that ungrateful rôle. The result is that the League which was meant among other things to be the guarantee of France's permanent safety against German attack, has nothing to offer her half so brilliant as the rôle she now enjoys."

Come full circle since, the wheel still turns. Long thoughts about Germany and contacts with German friends over many years have led me to the conclusion that not until they have passed through the experience of suffering under an autocracy will the German people understand democracy. That experience gained, the New Democracy they would not only understand but could vitalize into a world force, if properly led. To have paved the way for the most violent reaction of a people in modern times may be the best assessment of Hitler's effort by some future historian.

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¹ F. N. Keen: *Towards International Justice*, p. 8.

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The New Democratic Front must be led to surpass the adversary in service and it is the immediate duty of the Christian Churches to indicate that Christianity requires that this service shall be not withheld, but, if necessary, enforced. The commendable up-to-date suggestions for national individual service made recently by Sir Auckland Geddes and others, have only to be set against the receding future perspective for the Plan's urgency to be proved. Thus, in order to succeed or to deserve to succeed, any programme of national service must embody an obvious principle of equity and Christianity so far ignored—the principle that in return for individual service there must be individual consideration. As communal service implies communal cover, the risk of individual disaster must be shared by the community. The dividing line illogically and unfairly drawn between soldiers and civilians can no longer be excused or tolerated as happened in the Great War when the soldier was protected and compensated but the unfortunate civilian was left without relief. If he suffered in health from the effects of war, whatever its form, whether from being bombed in his home or from being hurled into the North Sea from his fishing trawler, he was left to bear the brunt. If he were killed his widow, children and dependents were left unprovided for and many of them suffered terribly. It is true that they would have been provided for if the British Government had obtained reparations from Germany, but the money due for this purpose was appropriated for more armament by the German Leviathan. Hitler, the *soi-disant* socialist and talkative champion of humble humanity, makes no reference whatever in *Mein Kampf* to these poor, unfortunate people who had their share of the Kampf as well.

A close and wide acquaintance with the subject obtained as legal adviser on these cases that came before the Royal Commission presided over by Lord Sumner, I am of the opinion that, any difficulties of the British Government notwithstanding, the treatment of these unfortunate individuals whose sufferings are known throughout the land, was not what a great and powerful state ought to have given, and that, as Sir Thomas Inskip when in opposition

insisted, it was particularly unworthy of England. To provide for health and unemployment insurance in normal times yet to leave the individual wholly uninsured against major disaster in war, is not only unjust and unchristian, but absurd.

But, whatever excuses or explanations were available before, there can be none whatever now that the whole nation fights in a Volkskreis and will be equally under fire and possibly equally under privation. When, with more at stake and with consequences more momentous than ever before in our history, we have decided, if necessary, as a whole people to take the field for those things for which, in his responsible interpretation of British will and desire, Mr. Neville Chamberlain has announced to the world we are prepared to fight, such contemptible parsimony must no longer be permitted. It perishes at the very first Shakespearean touch of that true socialism with which an English king declares: "For he to-day that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother: be he ne'er so vile, This day shall gentle his condition."

The rich need not insure, the poor cannot. In the New Democracy all should be insured because all serve. The insurance companies once again, and naturally so, have refused to accept the illimitable risk to houses and to householders that plainly will be involved on a tremendous scale. Government action, whether by national insurance or national relief, should here anticipate Mammon.

There are certain aspects of this problem which raise important considerations that lie beyond the province of our immediate enquiry. The need for the consideration of this whole subject only illustrates the urgency of general planning for world peace through defence of law. Thus, pacifism of the unworthy sort may have to be dissolved. The thoughtless, service-withholding pacifist may, in the alternative of "serve or go unprovided for," be made to realize that democracy implies duty given as well as rights received. In assessing the chances of victory for democracy the importance of service comes second only to the importance of the plan. We must face the position that, par-

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ticularly in this regard, democracy, as at present, will not see us through. Unreformed it is little more than government by pleasant "means," whereas the New Democracy will include the end.

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The time-factor sets a limit to our respite and therefore to the remedy for delay. There should be immediate and unequivocal articulation that the true democratic faith is spiritual, and that a Christian revolution is no less needed in the democracies than in Germany. It is possible that the consolidation of the New Democratic front would influence the ideological conversion of Germany as nothing else would.

It is obvious that, once conversion in Germany sets in, it would soon reach across the main front of the adversary so that the very discipline and service now being exacted throughout Germany might well be a tremendous factor for progress toward world order. With the further turning of the wheel the golden age of German thought and feeling might return with greater splendour than ever. In that event the addition of consolidated German power to that of the New Democracy would make the main advance to peace practically irresistible. For such a mighty prospect what sacrifice of material possessions, British or other, would be too great? The tragedy of man's worst betrayal by Leviathan is ironically deepened by common knowledge in the democracies that the quickest factor in their own education has proved to be the spectacle of the German people encoiled by Leviathan who, nevertheless, can be uncoiled with the minimum suffering to them only by the German people themselves. But whoever accomplishes the task, Germany can become a partner and a leader in the World Commonwealth only after the strangle-hold of Leviathan has been shaken off.

This view must be considered in light of the fact that, unless brought down by the impetuosity of her Leviathan, sooner or later Greater Germany will divide Europe in two by reaching in a great belt of power from the Baltic to the

Mediterranean. Artificially, and on the jerry-built plane of political contrivance into which no spiritual factor can enter, it might appear that she had done so already. So far, however, the basis there is only a profit-snatching partnership without any arbitration-clause.

It is fairly obvious that the German and Italian ideologies are opportunistic, materialistic and immoral; and also each selfishly purposeful. The axis of their plan, on which all turns, is for violence to decide everything without limit of ruthlessness. The revolving ideologies are not likely to remain long distinct, and their political coalescence may be expected to occur either through the two-way percolation of adjacent waters or by the inundation of the higher level upon the lower—an inescapable dilemma for Mussolini if ideologies remain anything like what they are now. Well may he enjoin Italian lads—"spiritually mobilized with but the single hope of being called on to fight"—to live dangerously. He has surrounded them with that opportunity. The calculated policy of some such "Brenner doctrine" may well be already the official Nazi interpretation of Hitler's pontifical utterance, "that the frontier of the Alps, which nature has erected between us, shall remain unchangeable." What the same political ideology has jointed together no mere mountain can put asunder! In any event in the interpretation of his will and general testamentary disposition the oath of Leviathan can hardly be expected to count, seeing that for him the only god to swear by is expediency at the moment. Already there are signals showing that the only exclusive and abiding function of the Alps accepted, and indeed insisted on, by the Nazis will be that of keeping the influence of the Vatican "ultramontane."

All doubt that any such natural and inevitable projection of the Nazi-anti-spiritual faith as this "Brenner doctrine" would be challenged by the Rome of St. Paul and would not be encouraged even by the Rome of Mussolini, has already been answered by the courageous spiritual stand recently reasserted by the Vatican. Only on the outcome of what is not a political campaign but a spiritual crusade that may end in a spiritual victory, can the political direc-

tions of Italy and Germany conform, let alone coincide. Hitler, the genuine maniac, who could not but prove irksome to Mussolini in joint harness, will not, so Mussolini must be thinking, last for ever. In any event maniacs do not run true to type, and their behaviourism, like all else about them, is incalculable. If two Hitlers were conceivable as successive dictators, even in that event reversal rather than continuity of policy could be confidently expected. Sooner or later, here as elsewhere, the excitement, the hallucination and the violence which distinguish mania, cannot fail to come full circle with the wheel.

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So history works. That, even now, through these dark hours of their destiny, history is working for the German people, is the consoling thought of those who like and respect German individuals and, above all, desire true German greatness to come to be acknowledged through deserving to be acknowledged. That the effective plan for world peace must span at least two centuries is partly governed by the fact that that greatness apparently lies yet beyond her immediate reach. Nor can it be snatched at for it lies, alas! on the further side of wide and hard experience. Sympathetic consideration of her need for greater experience and of her right to earn experience should be readily recognized by the New Democracy but not allowed to weaken, let alone jeopardize, the New Democratic front which is the front of law held against the front of war. "The real test of the League," declares the Marquis of Lothian, "lies ahead—namely whether it could bring about those revisions by peaceful means which would give Germany the place in the world to which she is entitled and so save mankind from another war."

Germany is entitled to no place, let alone to a favoured place, in the world order, if the distinctive basis of that place is to be Leviathanic blackmail that will not hesitate to plunge the world in ruin and jettison civilization unless all she desires is granted. An occasional porter of the German brief, Lord Lothian can be its supporter only when he

has mastered this truth. The sounder brief to be taken up is for the German people no less than against the German Leviathan. To stable and feed that Leviathan or any other Leviathan does not form one of the League's functions, still less its crucial test.

Until the outlook changes, realization of the supreme hope of Anglo-German co-operation can proceed on no basis of compromise, for here principle at its highest is involved. Where the point of intersection will be no man can say but, in certain respects, the true direction of British policy is clear enough. Even now, with all its limitations, present democracy does secure some opportunities for the growth of the human spirit. Once, however, democracy is revived it will promise boundless freedom.

It would be a disservice to the supreme cause of democracy, then, for England to concentrate on the quickening of that spirit yet simultaneously to surrender any part of that freedom which alone preserves the possibility of the spirit's permanence. The New Democracy must build on the best we have and make that best available for others. We must not sell what solid basis we do possess, least of all deliver it to those who would erect upon it a spiritless system where no freedom for spiritual growth is required because no such spirituality is tolerated.

Our present duty (1938), therefore, is to stand on guard with all the available might and power of England while we have breath—the power of our finance and industry, of our raw materials, and of labour; in short, of armament, including propaganda of spiritual power through education. It is our duty to take our stand with all these for the new world-order.

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Upon such terms it falls to the British Commonwealth of Nations to serve civilization as a solidly established beginning of the future World Commonwealth, and to furnish humanity with the prospect, at the end, of universal understanding and union between all peoples. But it must take into account

the facts and not ignore events hastening to a climax. Nor can the prospect be brought one inch nearer by subsidizing Leviathan. The Promised Land opens out only as the main advance to the reign of law gets well on the way. That advance, as we have seen, begins with the advance of superior power for law augmented by the union and fusion of detachments of power located in national states.

The nearest hope of peace, albeit limited peace, thus lies in that main movement towards it which we have now examined. It remains for us to consider briefly the Second Movement, the pioneering, educative, missioning movement among individual human beings, our fellow-men, whether in the coils of totalitarian Leviathan or elsewhere.

This movement, largely one of education, must flow up and down the length and breadth of the international field of independent states with their vital interests, Leviathanic dispositions, antagonistic sovereignties and conflicting claims—and endeavour to reach the minds of the individuals so that, through the appeal in the programme of the New Democracy, their nations in turn might swing over to the democratic front for law. The movement would obviously be socially, economically and politically educative. The council of intellectual leadership guiding both movements would justify its title not least by its simplification of truth for presentation to common humanity.

It is around this Second Movement that a new League of Peoples might be encouraged to grow. As its membership would not provide for any representation of states as states but include individuals and groups, it could make no pretence of security collected through the collection of Leviathanic resources. It could not offer sanctuary under the shelter of the reign of law which would, however, be available to the states that so wished on their joining the front existing for the purpose. By the exclusion of states from membership of this Movement the alternative of law or war would be sharpened instead of being obscured as it was in the League of Nations. Better an unsheltering League where the formative influences of education can operate than a sheltering convenience, erected in the name of peace, for pseudo-

Leviathans with hearts fixed against conversion to peace because against the payment of its price.

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It is sometimes stated that all would have been well if the activities of the League had been wholly economic and not political, in which event, even admitting that no economic advance can outstrip the political, the League would have known its limitations and realized the high-water mark of its endeavours. The answer is that, except through the reign of law, no high-water mark can ever be set as high as peace. Secondly, if peace at once cannot exist across the world, it can exist internationally, as well as nationally, along the front of the New Democracy. The League, says one, is greater than the sum of its parts. Possibly. But if those parts are several Leviathans, the aggregate will be Leviathanic likewise. Out of nothing, nothing comes. If there is no true fusion of will and intention among the state members, then it is no service to the cause of peace to declare untruthfully that, notwithstanding that want, harmony can nevertheless result from the mere assembling of elements unfused and fundamentally antagonistic one to another—harmony, indeed, misrepresented as so full that a new power of unison, called Collective Security, is alleged to have been created.

Now it is true that these empty phrases, which are nearly always the false coinage accepted in diplomatic currency, rarely fall from the lips of economists whose attitude of cautious reserve favourably compares with diplomatic bluff and over-statement deliberately contrived to allow for shrinkage. The wake of politicians is far muddier than that of scientists and, if the basis of the League's endeavours had been less political, the result might have been greater and more apparent. Nevertheless, even then, the main issue would have been only pushed into the background.

True again, if it had been an economic structure, then the League would not have been launched on diplomatic waters by diplomats, its engines of diplomacy running full. It could have remained on dry land, its structure cautiously

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raised so as to give a farther view. The outlook, however, would still have been Leviathanic, across the "economic defences" of "vital interests" and, no doubt, their "economic wires" to be politically "pulled." On the other hand a great many principles of economics are at the service of all, and can be successfully denied by none; and the fact remains that internationally there is incomparably more common economic ground than political. There would have been less rhetoric and more thought, less exaggeration and more calculations; and, instead of committal, experiment. For example, instead of the astronomical reparation figures shining down upon Versailles—that dazzling firmament that rose only in the dreams of politicians and, alas! vanished entirely on their rough awakening—there would have been some compensation for our civilian war sufferers instead of none. In short, instead of the field of economics being left entirely free for the manoeuvres of Mammon and Leviathan, there would probably have resulted the beginnings of a plan.

The new League of Peoples, therefore, should concentrate on economic findings, and recommendations, on publicity of facts, on exerting "good offices" and, not least on the important truth that the spirituality of man provides, after all, the most constructive communal factor among the nations, just as human nature provides its most disintegrative factor.

In a realistic League of Peoples, inevitably politics and religion at last would meet, and there would be no Leviathans present to protest. So far from being ignored, the spiritual angle of human affairs would be conceded first importance. As no state would be bound thereby, the objections would be at a minimum. As invective would be pointless and resolutions embodying no conviction equally so, the main effort would be constructive.

The picture Señor Madariaga draws of the League as it has existed reveals only too well the human nature that fashioned it. The higher posts were allotted nationalistically and the secretariat became a mere collection of nationally-minded people—"a nationalism that spread even to the

League's Commissions whose work was warped thereby," resulting sometimes in a cacophony of nationalistic opinions.

"Experts," declares Señor Madariaga, ¹"paid by League of Nations funds and trusted to give evidence as free and good men, twist their advice to suit the policy of their own Governments. This spectacle can be witnessed in Geneva time and again. . . . Nor are the League executive organs much better . . . the Council is a meeting of national representatives whose handling of world affairs is inspired not by world but by national standards. The scramble for seats on the Council is in the main the consequence of this."

This severe criticism of the machinery of the League cannot be dismissed as unjust, and, indeed, is only illustrative of much else that might be said. It agrees with my own observations that go back to the meeting of the Third Assembly which I attended in an official capacity for a British Dominion. Much of the evil followed inevitably on the League's diplomatic send-off with a diplomatist as its first Secretary-General, its staff taking their cue diplomatically from the diplomats, the prevailing official mentality that of closed, assured minds expert in international affairs. It was a depressing but not uninteresting diversion to pass along the corridors and overhear, in wordy battle that revealed the most childish ignorance, glibly turned phrases about sovereign rights, vital interests and, most frequently of all, about collective security. Geneva became largely a parade-ground of Leviathans arrayed in the full paraphernalia of arrogant sovereignty.

Señor Madariaga also would appear to have passed along those same corridors and, perhaps, to have lingered there overlong, for he declares that "justice can be secured only by means of permanent institutions with unlimited jurisdiction over the whole community and with unrestricted jurisdiction over all the conflicts between members of the community"—a conclusion that seems to involve a world-order born fully-fledged and which ignores the fact of growth. Indeed, he proceeds to say so :

"If we do want real world peace we must create, strengthen, respect, and obey world institutions."

¹ Salvador de Madariaga: *The World's Design*.

CONCLUSIVE

Here he omits the cardinal feature. A world-institution, he should have said, equipped with the power of exacting compliance from those who obey only because they must.

The League has not completely failed, but served humanity well in lighting the way of advance. This it has done by illustrating human nature in the proceedings and by indicating the need of sorting out the Leviathans. What it illuminated less clearly and more fitfully than the strange but familiar crop of crosses on the war-field, was that solitary Cross on that distant hill. What it did not reveal at all is that that crop was sown by Leviathan.

* * * * *

Will man fail? Leviathan can be dislodged only by man's triumph, and man can triumph only if he takes control. It may be that control will have to be seized and *established* within the next two centuries if it is to be in time; and if, pressing forward, the backward races are not to find the machines ready to their hand before they have served apprenticeship. If we do not act and they should forcefully dispute the control or gain it and, continuing along the same road, should travel along it as we all have done, only faster, then the twilight that ends in vestigial memory will be reached a little earlier, but the tragedy of man will be completed by human nature all the same.

The tragedy, then, of course, would be not that his race was run and that all was finished, nor yet that man, the spirit, had sunk so low that even a glimpse of his great past then lay quite beyond the capacity of his memory. The deep tragedy would be, whether the length of the span were long or short in its reach from his origin to his end, that man could have had so much easier, happier, and more interesting a time if only he had liberated himself from war—war which was included in the scheme of life to promote the growth of man's intelligent spirit that alone could overcome it.

It is true, so incalculable is life, that the end of that span might not be the final end but that, in some far-off aeon, hope might still beckon. Somewhere between, overshadowing, when it came, almost his very interest in immortality, the

discovery, unutterably sad, would then one day await him that only after the cyclic process had been repeated many times on one star or another, had he looked ahead at the cross-roads and taken the turning that does not lead back. Is that moment now?

The answer provides man with his hardest task but also with his greatest opportunity—to wrest back the mastery from Leviathan and to place it in the midst of the widening reign of law.

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